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ABSTRACT 
 
The unique maritime geography of the Southeast Asian region presents 
distinct maritime security threats. Southeast Asia has a vast maritime area and the 
ocean plays an important role in the economy of all Southeast Asian countries. The 
flow of trade in this region is highly dependent on maritime trade and constitutes one 
of the main sources of national income. 
Analyses of the prevailing international and regional legal frameworks 
governing maritime security threats in Southeast Asia are elaborated in this thesis. 
Moreover, the thesis confines the scope of its inquiry specifically to five issues: 
piracy, maritime terrorism, people smuggling, IUU fishing, and marine pollution 
caused by offshore oil and gas activities. Furthermore, the thesis examines these 
maritime security challenges, both from an international and a regional perspective.  
This thesis analyses the components of the international and regional legal 
frameworks which govern issues of maritime security in Southeast Asia and identify 
their weaknesses. It also identifies and addresses the problems which stem from the 
inherent gaps and weaknesses in legal instruments at the international and regional 
levels, as well as the measures that are required to remedy these gaps and 
weaknesses. Furthermore, in circumstances where no binding legal framework is in 
place to regulate certain maritime security challenges, the thesis examines existing 
non-binding legal and policy frameworks which address the maritime security 
challenges. 
The thesis concludes that the current international and regional legal 
frameworks are inadequate to address the issues of piracy, maritime terrorism, people 
smuggling, IUU fishing and marine pollution caused by offshore oil and gas 
 
iv 
activities in Southeast Asia. In order to address these maritime security threats in a 
comprehensive manner, there is a need for States in the region to cooperate with one 
another to formulate (and sometimes reformulate) existing legal frameworks. 
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CHAPTER I 
1 Introduction  
 
1.1 Introduction 
The sea has made a large contribution to the world economy – one which it 
continues to make today. In 2014, seaborne trade contributed approximately 9.84 
billion tonnes of goods to the global economy, with approximately 38 per cent (3.82 
billion tonnes) coming from Asia.1 The sea has played a pivotal role in Southeast 
Asia’s economic and political development.2 However, seaborne trade also faces 
several challenges and threats. These series of challenges and threats vary according 
to time and place and constitute what has been often characterised as maritime 
security threats. 
The definition of maritime security, as well as what constitute threats to 
maritime security has been subject to much academic debate.3 However, despite the 
lack of a universally accepted definition of maritime security, governments, 
organisations, institutions and scholars have attempted to define maritime security 
and its elements. A law of the sea expert from Indonesia, Hasjim Djalal  stated that 
maritime security includes issues such as: (i) national unity; (ii) piracy and maritime 
terrorism; (iii) territorial claims; (iv) major power interests; and (v) foreign 
intelligence gathering activities in the exclusive economic zone.4 The International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) has drawn a distinction between maritime safety and 
                                                
1 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Review of Maritime Transport 
2015 (United Nations, 2015) 8. 
2 J Bradford, ‘The Growing Prospects for Maritime Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia’ (2005) 
58(3) Naval War College Review 63, 63-64. 
3 United Nations General Assembly, Oceans and the Law of the Sea: Report of the Secretary-General 
(United Nations, 2008) 15-32. 
4 H Djalal, Regional Maritime Security Threats in Southeast Asia (2012). 
 
 
2 
 
maritime security. IMO stated that ‘maritime safety refers to preventing or 
minimizing the occurrence of accidents at sea that may be caused by substandard 
ships, unqualified crew or operator error,’ whereas maritime security ‘is related to 
protection against unlawful, and deliberate, acts’5. As for maritime threats, it is 
commonly identified as activities conducted in maritime spheres including  ‘terrorist 
attacks; the movement of terrorists, as well as raising of finances for terrorist 
activities through shipping activities; the shipping of WMD and related components; 
shipping of conventional weapons; drug trafficking; people smuggling; piracy and 
armed robbery at sea’6.  
In contrast, and owing to its broad nature, the 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea7 (LOSC) does not contain any provisions which 
provides for a specific definition of maritime security. The LOSC merely identified 
some illegal activities which possess elements of maritime security, such as piracy 
and illegal fishing. However, there are other types of illegal activities which occur in 
maritime areas that are not covered in the LOSC. These illegal activities, such as 
armed robbery, usually take place in areas which are rich in natural resources or on 
routes which are commonly used for international navigation.  
This thesis will examine the challenges/threats facing Southeast Asian States 
in relation to maritime security, both from an international and a regional 
perspective. The research focuses on the main elements of maritime security in 
Southeast Asia. These include piracy, maritime terrorism, people smuggling, illegal, 
                                                
5 Natalie Klein, Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea (Oxford, 2011), 9. 
6 Ibid,10. For other views on the idea of maritime security see Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for 
the Twenty-First Century (Routledge, 3rd ed 2013) chap 12; and Chris Rahman, Concepts of Maritime 
Security: A Strategic Perspective on Alternative Visions for Good Order and Security at Sea, with 
Policy Implications for New Zealand (Victoria University of Wellington, 2009) 29-46. 
7 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 16 November 1994). Hereinafter referred to as LOSC. 
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unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing, and marine pollution caused by offshore 
oil and gas activities. These main threats to maritime security have been selected 
with deliberation based on the perception of States in the region which would be 
discussed later in this chapter. 
This thesis also highlights the legal framework - at both the international and 
regional levels - that seeks to address the five threats mentioned above. Furthermore, 
the possibility of improving the current legal framework and enhancing cooperation 
in the region in relation to maritime security will also be discussed.  
 
1.2 Southeast Asia Region 
1.2.1 Geographical Description and Profile 
Based on geographical criteria, for the purposes of this thesis Southeast Asia consists 
of eleven States, namely, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam and Timor Leste. Except for 
Timor Leste, all of these States are members of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN).8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
8 Association of Southeast Asia Nations, see http://www.asean.org/ at 10 October 2015. 
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Figure 1: Map of Southeast Asia and Major Seaborne Trade Routes9  
 
The land area of Southeast Asia is approximately the same as South Asia, 
about half the combined size of China and the US, and about 58 per cent of the size 
of Australia.10 The north-south reach of Southeast Asia covers some 39˚ of latitude, 
extending from Myanmar (roughly 28˚N) to Rote Island (about 11˚S), while the 
west-east extent of the region covers a distance of some 49˚, spreading from Arakan 
(Myanmar) to the easternmost part of Papua (Indonesia). 11 Much of Southeast Asia 
is made up of semi enclosed seas (such as South China Sea, the Gulf of Thailand, the 
Gulf of Tonkin, the Andaman Sea, and the numerous seas of the Indonesian and 
Philippine archipelagos).  
 
                                                
9 Map of Southeast Asia, see http://www.cgsgs.com/article/201401044101, at 20 November 2016. 
10 R Hill, Southeast Asia: people, land and economy (Allen & Unwin Australia, 2002),, 2. 
11 Ibid, 2. 
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Table 1: Land Area of Southeast Asian States12 
 
Various terms have been used to refer to Southeast Asia. The region has been 
known as the ‘Asia of Monsoons’, as the monsoon weather is vital for agriculture in 
all States in the region.13 The term ‘further India’ has also been used to refer to some 
parts of Southeast Asia. This is because several States in the region lie beyond the 
Bay of Bengal, such as Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia. The term Southeast Asia 
itself gained popularity during the Second World War, and was often used in a 
military context to differentiate the region from India, China and the Pacific. In the 
                                                
12 Europa World Year Book (1997). 
13 M Osborne, Southeast Asia: An Introductory History (Allen & Unwin, 11th ed, 2013) 3.  
Country Area (KM2) Proportion of region’s total (%) 
Brunei 5765 0.13 
Cambodia 181035 4.03 
Indonesia 1904443 42.37 
Laos 236800 5.27 
Malaysia 329758 7.34 
Myanmar 676552 15.06 
Philippines 300000 6.68 
Singapore 648 0.01 
Thailand 513115 11.43 
Vietnam 331114 7.37 
Timor Leste 15410 0.35 
Total 4494640 100.00 
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past, there have been debates as to which States should be included in Southeast 
Asia. For example, before the 1960s, it was questioned whether the Philippines 
should be considered to be part of Southeast Asia14. The most recent State which has 
sought to join the region (through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
regime) is Timor Leste.  
 The Second World War represented a watershed in the history of Southeast 
Asia. Many scholars, historians, anthropologists and political scientists have focused 
their research on this part of the world in relation to the war. It was believed that 
Southeast Asia was neither little India nor little China, although it has been 
recognised that China and India did influence some Southeast Asian States in the 
arts, religion and political theory. However, States like Myanmar, Cambodia, and 
Indonesia did use values which could be traced from China and India in these areas  
tailored for their own benefit and in accordance with the needs of their countries. 
Accordingly, some scholars have proposed that the contribution of China and India 
in the cultural, economic and political development of the region has been over 
emphasised.15 
Several historians, such as Chandler and Steinberg, have argued that the 
boundaries of Southeast Asia have been located at different places in the past, which 
do not correspond to where those boundaries lie at present.16 Politically, Southeast 
Asia has clear land boundaries which stretch from Myanmar to Vietnam, 
encompassing the ‘Indian Archipelago’ (now popularly recognised as Indonesia), 
                                                
14 Ibid, 3.  
15 Ibid, 3-5. 
16  Hill above n 10, 1. 
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which spreads from the westernmost island, Sumatera, to the easternmost island, 
Papua.17  
The clarity of the land boundaries between States in Southeast Asia exists due 
to uti possidetis juris, a principle of customary international law wherein successor 
States (or a newly formed State) should possess the same land territory that their 
former colonies possessed before their independence. Therefore, it is clear that States 
in Southeast Asia are assured of the ownership of their land territory. However, there 
have been disputes over islands such as Sipadan and Ligitan between Indonesia and 
Malaysia, but these disputes were settled in 2003.18 The clarity of land boundaries 
supports the notion that good fences (i.e. defined boundaries) make good neighbours. 
Today, most Southeast Asian nations enjoy robust and largely positive diplomatic 
and economic relations with one another. Indeed, the stability of undisputed 
territorial boundaries principally account for this.   
                                                
17 Ibid, 1.  
18 Case Concerning Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipidan, Indonesia v. Malaysia, 
Judgment, 17 December 2002, Reports 2002, 625.  
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No Year Parties Type of 
Delimitation/ 
Provisional 
Arrangement 
Area Signed/ Entered 
Into Force 
1. 1969 Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Continental Shelf Straits of Malacca 
West South China 
Sea East South 
China Sea 
27 Oct 1969 
7 Nov 1969 
2. 1970 Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Territorial Sea Straits of Malacca 17 March 1970 
8 Oct 1971 
3. 1971 Indonesia 
Australia 
(PNG) 
Continental Shelf New 
Guinea 
Arafura 
Sea 
18 May 1971 
8 Nov 1973 
4. 1971 Indonesia 
Thailand 
Continental Shelf Strait of 
Malacca 
Andaman Sea 
17 Dec 1971 
16 July 1973 
5. 1971 Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Thailand 
Continental Shelf Northern Part of the Strait 
of Malacca 
21 Dec 1971 
16 July 1973 
6. 1972 Indonesia 
Australia 
Continental Shelf Timor 
Sea 
Arafura 
Sea 
9 Oct 1972 
8 Nov 1973 
7. 1973 Indonesia 
Australia 
(PNG) 
Single Multi-
Purpose Territorial 
Sea, Continental 
Shelf Fishery 
Boundary 
South of New Guinea in 
the Arafura Sea 
12 Feb 1973 
26 Nov 1974 
8. 1973 Indonesia 
Singapore 
Territorial Sea Straits of Malacca 25 May 1973 
29 Aug 1974 
9. 1974 Indonesia 
India 
Continental Shelf Andaman Sea dividing the 
shelf between Nicobar Islands 
and Sumatra of Indonesia 
8 Aug 1974 
17 Dec 1974 
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10. 
1975 Indonesia 
Thailand 
Continental Shelf Andaman Sea 11 Dec 1975 
18 Feb 1978 
11. 
1977 Indonesia 
India 
Continental Shelf Andaman Sea 14 Jan 1977 
15 Aug 1977 
12. 
1978 India 
Thailand 
Continental Shelf Andaman Sea 22 June 1978 
15 Dec 1978 
13. 
1978 Australia 
Papua New 
Guinea 
Multiple 
Boundaries 
Continental Shelf 
Fisheries 
Torres Strait  Unknown 
14. 
1978 Indonesia 
India 
Thailand 
Continental Shelf Andaman Sea 22 June 1978 
2 March 1979 
15. 
1979 Malaysia 
Thailand 
Territorial Sea Straits of 
Malacca Gulf 
of Thailand 
24 Oct 1979 
15 July 1982 
16. 
1979 Malaysia 
Thailand 
Continental Shelf Gulf of Thailand 24 Oct 1979 
15 Oct 1982 
17. 
1980 Myanmar 
Thailand Single Multi-
Purpose Territorial 
Sea, Continental 
Shelf Fishery 
Boundary 
Andaman Sea 25 July 1980 
12 April 1982 
18. 
1980 Indonesia 
Papua New 
Guinea 
Single Multi-
Purpose 
Continental Shelf 
EEZ 
Pacific Ocean 13 Dec 1980 
10 July 1982 
19. 
1981 Indonesia 
Australia 
Provisional 
Fishery Line 
Timor Sea 29 Oct 1981 
1 Feb 1982 
 
20. 1986 Myanmar 
India 
Single Multi-
Purpose Territorial 
Sea, Continental 
Shelf Fishery 
Boundary 
Andaman 
Sea Coco 
Channel 
Bay of 
Bengal 
23 Dec 1986 
14 Sept 1987 
21. 1993 India 
Thailand 
Continental Shelf Andaman Sea 27 Oct 1993 
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22. 1993 India 
Myanmar 
Thailand 
Continental Shelf Andaman Sea 27 Oct 1993 
24 May 1995 
23. 1995 Malaysia 
(Johor) 
Singapore 
Territorial Waters Johor Straits 07 Aug 1995 
07 Aug 1995 
24. 1997 Australia 
Indonesia 
Multiple 
Boundaries 
Continental Shelf 
EEZ 
Timor Sea 14 Mar 1997 
Not yet in force 
25. 1997 Thailand 
Vietnam 
Single Multi-
Purpose 
Continental Shelf 
EEZ 
Gulf of Thailand 9 Aug 1997 
27 Dec 1997 
26. 2000 China 
Vietnam 
Single Multi-
Purpose Territorial 
Sea Continental 
Shelf EEZ 
Gulf of Tonkin 25 Dec 2000 
30 June 2004 
27. 2003 Indonesia 
Vietnam 
Continental Shelf South China Sea 26 June 2003 
29 May 2007 
28. 2009 Indonesia 
Singapore 
Territorial Sea Singapore Strait 
(Western) 
Unknown 
29. 2009 Brunei 
Malaysia 
Single Multi-
Purpose Territorial 
Sea Continental 
Shelf EEZ 
Off Borneo Unknown 
30 2014 Philippines 
Indonesia 
EEZ Mindanao Sea and 
Celebes Sea 
Unlknown 
 
Table 2: Maritime Boundaries Arrangement in Southeast Asia19 
 
Southeast Asia is significant because of its geography as well as the size of its 
population. Geographically, it plays an important role in the geopolitical and geo-
strategic context of the world. There are several important straits in the region which 
                                                
19 Tara Davenport, AsianSIL Working Paper 2012/ 7, Southeast Asian Approaches To Maritime 
Delimitation, Paper presented at the 3rd NUS-AsianSIL Young Scholars Workshop, NUS Law School 
23 February- 24 February 2012. 
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are used for the international navigation of goods and energy resources. These 
important straits include the Malacca, Singapore, Lombok, Sunda Straits. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Straits of Malacca and Singapore20 
 
In terms of population, Southeast Asia accounts for eight per cent of the 
world’s total population.21 Indonesia alone has approximately 250 million people, 
making it the fourth most populous nation in the world (after China, India and United 
States).22 About 91 million people live in Vietnam, which is twice the population of 
Spain and almost three times the population of Canada.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
20 Strait of Malacca and Singapore, see http://www.safety4sea.com/malaysia-ensures-smooth-
shipping-traffic-in-malacca-straits-15423. 
21 Osborne, above n 13, 1. 
22 World Population, see http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/. 
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State Population 
2014 
Population 
2015 
World Rank 
Brunei 423,205 428,539 175 
Cambodia 15,408,270 15,677,059 69 
Indonesia 252,812,245 255,708,785 4 
Laos 6,894,098 7,019,652 106 
Malaysia 30,187,896 30,651,176 43 
Myanmar 53,718,958 54,164,262 24 
Philippines 100,096,496 101,802,706 12 
Singapore 5,517,102 5,618,866 114 
Thailand 67,222,972 67,400,746 20 
Vietnam 92,547,959 93,386,630 14 
Timor Leste 1,152,439 1,172,668 157 
 
Table 3: Population of Southeast Asian States23 
 
Southeast Asia is considered an economic powerhouse and an attractive area 
for investors around the world. The growth of several cities in Southeast Asia, 
especially after the Second World War, illustrates the significant developments that 
have taken place in the region. A good example is the case of Bangkok, the capital of 
Thailand. Over a century ago, Thailand’s total population was approximately six 
million. However, in 2010, the population of Bangkok alone was 14 million. This 
                                                
23 List of Asian Countries by Population 2015, http://statisticstimes.com/population/asian-countries-
by-population.php at 19 August 2016  
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trend can also be seen in other major cities in the region, such as Jakarta, Phnom 
Penh and Ho Chi Minh City.24     
  
1.2.2 Limitation of the Region 
Southeast Asia is described as “a subregion of Asia geographically situated east of 
the Indian subcontinent, south of China and north of Australia, between the Indian 
Ocean (in west) and the Pacific Ocean (in east)”25. The scope of this research is 
limited to 11 (eleven) States in Southeast Asia,  namely, Brunei Darussalam, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, 
Vietnam and Timor Leste. Ten out of eleven States in Southeast Asia are members of 
ASEAN. 
 
1.2.3 Complexity of the Region 
Southeast Asia is predominantly maritime in character. Every country in the 
region, with the exception of Laos, has direct contact with the sea. The region has 
two of the world’s largest and most important archipelagic States, Indonesia and 
Philippines. The region is highly dependent on maritime trade which constitutes a 
primary source of national income across all States. The transport of goods, 
including raw materials and finished goods, as well energy resources such as oil, are 
transported by ships. Southeast Asian waters are major arteries of world trade, 26 with 
about one-third of world trade passing through these waters. The Malacca and 
Singapore straits are two critical sealanes in the global oil trade. Therefore, any kind 
                                                
24 Osborne, above n 13, 1. 
25 About the Southeast Asia Region,   
http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map_of_southeast_asia.htm at 19 August 2016 
26 S Huang, ‘Building Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Outsiders Not Welcome?’ (2008) 61 
Naval War College Review 87, 87.  
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of disruption to the flow of trade at sea, such as illegal activities involving ports, the 
hijacking of ships, as well as armed robberies, piracy and kidnappings, would have a 
dramatic impact on the Southeast Asian economy. Moreover, there are several 
important straits in the region that could be vulnerable to terrorist attacks, as well as 
the trafficking of drugs, weapons and people.27 This scenario illustrates the 
importance of safety at sea for States in Southeast Asia. The increase in legislative 
and enforcement coastal State jurisdiction, provided by LOSC, makes this issue 
particularly relevant. Therefore, the concept of managing maritime security threats is 
significant in the region in order to maintain State sovereignty and sovereign rights. 
Due to their importance, Southeast Asian waterways are not only a concern 
for States in the region, but also for other States that have an interest in them. 
Therefore, it is common for non-Southeast Asian States to offer schemes of 
cooperation with Southeast Asian States and regional organisations. However, such 
action is not always perceived positively by States in the region, and as a result many 
of the initiatives are not legally binding or have been rejected to some extent. It is 
important to note that the principle of non-intervention (as mandated by the ASEAN 
Charter, not as a state policy) among the Southeast Asian nations could often pose 
serious impediments to regional cooperation. This is particularly the case when 
States are dealing with sensitive issues such as maritime security, which has the 
potential to erode State sovereignty. The principle of non-intervention has been 
firmly in place since the inception of the ASEAN regime in 1967,28 and was 
favoured by all member States. The fact that all member States (with the exception of 
                                                
27 Catherine Raymond, ‘The Malacca Straits and the Threat of Maritime Terrorism’ (2005)  Power 
and Interest Report  http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/Terrorism-Asia/Raymond-Catherine-
Zara/The-Malacca-Straits-and-the-Threat-of-Maritime-Terrorism . 
28 The Founding of ASEAN, see http://www.asean.org/asean/about-asean/history. 
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Thailand) were once under colonial rule means that it is incredibly difficult for such 
States to be involved in sensitive agreements with other States, especially where 
there is a risk their State sovereignty will be compromised. As a result, some 
Southeast Asian States are reluctant or hesitate to cooperate with the outside world. 
This hesitancy is an effort to avoid other forms of colonialism. 
A good illustration of this problem is the initiative proposed by the United 
States (US) - the Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI)29. This proposal was 
not warmly received by States in the region on suspicions that it would allow the US 
to conduct anti-terror patrols in the Malacca Strait. Another initiative that did not 
receive support was the Proliferation Security Initiatives (PSI), which suffered from 
a lack of trust by Southeast Asian States.30 Interestingly, there are other States 
outside the region which do not agree with foreign involvement in Southeast Asia. 
China, for instance, rejected the proposal of the Japanese Prime Minister in 1999 to 
create a regional coast guard to combat piracy.31  
The unwillingness of some Southeast Asian States to cooperate with extra-
regional powers is unfortunate, as it means regional States are prevented from 
gaining information through information sharing, as well as the benefits of 
responsive multinational decision-making related to maritime issues. However, 
cooperation with regard to maritime security in Southeast Asia can be efficiently 
practised with the presence of a neutral, multinational framework.  
It is important to note that States in Southeast Asia tend to cooperate among 
themselves. This cooperation is articulated in the form of different arrangements and 
                                                
29 Bradford, above n 2. 75. 
30 David Rosenberg, ‘Dire straits: Competing security priorities in the South China Sea’ (2005) 13 
Japan Focus 1, 1-4.  
31 Huang, above n 26, 88.  
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agreements. Indeed, stringent action has been taken by Southeast Asian States to 
control their rights over the sea. Such action includes ratifying and implementing 
relevant international conventions, improving national legislation and law 
enforcement, complying with UN Security Council resolutions and improving 
maritime domain awareness, as well as strengthening enforcement capabilities and 
encouraging bilateral and multilateral cooperation. However, when viewed in terms 
of their effectiveness, such actions have not proved adequate. Despite these 
measures, many criminal acts are still occurring in Southeast Asian waters. For 
example, in 2003, a sea robbery was committed on a carrier called Alberto, anchored 
in Panjang, Indonesia. Robbers attempted to steal the ship’s stores and the crew’s 
valuable belongings.32 In the same year, a cargo ship, Trimaggada, was forcibly 
stopped by pirates while passing through the Strait of Malacca. The pirates 
kidnapped the master, chief officer and chief engineer of the ship. Incidents 
involving Sunrise 689 and Srikandi 515 in 2014 are examples of sea-based crimes 
perpetrated in the region.33 Further statistic regarding the acts of piracy and armed 
robbery against ships which were reported to have been allegedly committed and attempted 
in Southeast Asia period 2010-2014 are set out in Table 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
32 Dana R Dillon, ‘Maritime piracy: Defining the problem’ (2005) 25(1) SAIS Review 155, 159.  
33 ReCAAP, ‘Piracy And Armed Robbery Against Ships In Asia: Annual Report’ (ReCAAP 
Information Sharing Centre, 1st January - 31st December 2014 )62, 32-33. 
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Locations 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Indonesia 40 46 81 106 100 
Malacca Straits 2 1 2 1 1 
Malaysia 18 16 12 9 21 
Myanmar (Burma) 0 1 0 0 0 
Philippines 5 5 3 3 6 
Singapore Straits 3 11 6 9 8 
Thailand 2 0 0 0 2 
Vietnam 12 8 4 9 7 
Table 4: Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships which were reported to have 
been Allegedly Committed and Attempted in Southeast Asia34  
 
Despite measures undertaken by States with respect to maritime security, the 
nature of these arrangements has been quite general and limited in its scope and 
goals. Therefore, in the absence of legally binding tools to address maritime security 
issues, incidents such as those described above will continue to take place. Indeed, 
more persuasive talks among the States in the region are urgently needed, especially 
within the auspices of ASEAN.  
 
1.2.4 Maritime Security Threats in Southeast Asia 
The 2008 UN Secretary General’s Report on Oceans and the Law of the Sea 
noted that the definition of maritime security is yet to be agreed. However, the report 
adopted a broad perspective when dealing with maritime security threats. 
Furthermore, the UN Secretary General elaborated that “maritime security involves 
protection from direct threats to the territorial integrity of a State, such as an armed 
attack from a military vessel”. 35 The Report identified seven specific threats to 
maritime security: piracy and armed robbery against ships,36 terrorists acts involving 
                                                
34 ICC-IMB, ‘Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual report’ (International Maritime 
Bureau, 1 January - 31 December 2014) 7. 
35 Assembly, above n 3, para 39. 
36 Ibid, para 54. 
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shipping, offshore installations, and other maritime interests,37 illicit trafficking in 
arms and weapons of mass destruction,38 illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and 
psychotropic substances,39 smuggling and trafficking of persons by sea,40 illegal, 
unreported and unregulated fishing,41 and finally, intentional and unlawful damage to 
the marine environment.42 This report encompassed the apprehension of many 
related parties such as governments, the shipping industry, operators, military, 
researchers and analysts as the list covers a large scope of maritime problems.   
The Southeast Asian States which participated in the Maritime Security 
Desktop Exercise (MSDE) 2, 3 and 4 held in 2011, 2012 and 2013, respectively, 
revealed that piracy, maritime terrorism, people smuggling and IUU fishing were 
deemed to be the primary maritime security threats in Southeast Asia. 
The MSDE aims to strengthen cooperation and coordination among the 
participating countries in combating crimes at sea and dealing with other maritme 
challenges in the region. The exercise is organized by the Badan Koordinasi 
Keamanan Laut (Bakamla) Indonesia in cooperation with Australian Border Force. 
States outside the Southeast Asian region such as Australia, Sri Lanka, China, Japan, 
Maldives, Pakistan, also participate in the exercise. 
As illustrated in Table 5, almost all the States in the region had a similar 
threat perception within the three year period (2011-2013). 43 Marine pollution 
caused by offshore oil and gas activity also forms a significant challenge to maritime 
                                                
37 Ibid, para 63. 
38 Ibid, para 72. 
39 Ibid, para 82 
40 Ibid, para 89. 
41 Ibid, para 98. 
42 Ibid, para 107. 
43 The researcher attended the 3rd and 4th Maritime Security Desktop Exercise which was held in 
Jakarta (2012) and Bali (2013).  
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security in the region, as raised by Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Singapore and 
Thailand in MSDE 2013. Although marine pollution caused by offshore oil and gas 
activity may not be a primary maritime security threat, the growing significance of 
oil and gas in Southeast Asia to the world economy means that it ranks as one of the 
recognised potential maritime problems in the region.  
 
 Piracy Maritime 
Terrorism 
IUU Fishing People 
Smuggling 
Oil and Gas 
Years 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 
Brunei 
Darussalam 
- ü X - ü ü - X ü - ü ü - X ü 
Cambodia - X X - ü X - ü X - ü X - X X 
Indonesia ü X ü ü X X ü ü ü ü ü ü X X ü 
Laos - X X - X X - X X - X X - X X 
Malaysia ü ü X X X X ü ü ü ü ü ü X X X 
Myanmar - X - - ü - - X - - X - - X - 
Philippines ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü ü X X X X 
Singapore - ü ü - ü X - X X - ü X - X ü 
Thailand X ü X X ü ü X ü X ü ü ü X X ü 
Vietnam ü ü ü ü ü X ü ü X ü ü ü X X X 
Timor Leste ü X - ü X - ü ü - ü ü - X X - 
 
Legend: X = Not mentioned, ü = Mentioned, and - = did not attend the MSDE. 
 
Table 5: Maritime Security Threats in Southeast Asia 2011-201344 
 
 
 
                                                
44 Maritime Security Desktop Exercise (2011-2013) based on Country Presentations. 
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1.3 Purpose, Scope and Limitation 
This thesis provides analyses of the prevailing legal framework at both international 
and regional levels governing maritime security threats in Southeast Asia. 
Furthermore, non-binding frameworks (at regional level) are also analysed in the 
absence of legally binding frameworks for some of the maritime security threats.  
Whilst the thesis recognises that there are different types of maritime security threats 
in Southeast Asia, this thesis confines the scope of its inquiry specifically to five 
issues: piracy, maritime terrorism, people smuggling, IUU fishing, and marine 
pollution caused by offshore oil and gas activities.   
In order to achieve the purpose, this thesis will address the following: firstly, 
it will discuss different approaches to maritime security and provide an overview of 
the maritime security challenges in Southeast Asia. Secondly, the international and 
regional frameworks governing maritime security challenges in Southeast Asia will 
be canvassed. To this end, the thesis identifies and discusses those rules which exist 
at both the international and regional level to regulate the five central threats to 
maritime security in the region. Furthermore, these legal frameworks are analysed to 
ascertain their weaknesses. Finally, the possibility of improving the current legal 
framework and enhancing cooperation in the Southeast Asia region in relation to 
maritime security will also be discussed. 
The scope of ‘maritime security’ adopted by this thesis reflects the approach 
taken by the 2008 UN Secretary General’s Report on Oceans and the Law of the Sea 
noted above. Like the UN Secretary General’s Report, which elaborated numerous 
maritime security threats, this thesis adopts an approach to maritime security based 
on regional States’ maritime security threat priorities. As mentioned earlier, the 
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MSDE meetings established the maritime security threat perceptions of every 
participating State. Those list of threats are taken into account in this thesis and 
analysed separately in different chapters. 
 
1.4 Statement of the Problem 
As discussed earlier, Southeast Asia covers a huge maritime area. There are two 
archipelagic States in the region (Indonesia and Philippines) and several straits used 
for international navigation (Malacca and Singapore Straits). In the past decade, there 
have been a number of maritime security incidents in the region such as sea piracy 
against Trimaggada and incidents involving Sunrise 689. Therefore, understanding 
the different kinds of threats to maritime security in Southeast Asia and taking 
appropriate measures to combat these threats are important issues to consider. 
There are three main arguments that this research seeks to highlight: 
1. The Southeast Asia region is prone to maritime security challenges 
because of its complex maritime nature. Thus the question to be 
addressed is: in what way are maritime security challenges more 
difficult to address in Southeast Asia? 
2. Addressing the maritime security challenges require regional 
cooperation. Thus, what specific types of cooperation would be more 
appropriate, orhave better chances of success for Southeast Asia? 
3. The current legal framework is inadequate to address the maritime 
security challenges in Southeast Asia. 
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This thesis analyses the components of the international and regional legal 
frameworks which govern issues of maritime security in Southeast Asia and identify 
their weaknesses. This thesis will identify and address the problems which stem from 
the inherent gaps and weaknesses in legal instruments at the international and 
regional level, as well as the measures that are required to remedy these gaps and 
weaknesses. Furthermore, in circumstances where no binding legal framework is in 
place to regulate certain maritime security challenges, the thesis examines existing 
non-binding legal and policy frameworks which address the maritime security 
challenge. 
 
1.5 Thesis Statement  
The current international and regional legal frameworks are not adequate to address 
the issues of piracy, maritime terrorism, people smuggling, IUU fishing and marine 
pollution caused by offshore oil and gas activities in Southeast Asia. In order to 
address these maritime security threats in a comprehensive manner, there is a need 
for States in the region to cooperate with one another to formulate (and sometimes 
reformulate) existing legal frameworks. 
 
1.6 Methodology  
In analysing the international and regional legal frameworks governing maritime 
security threats in Southeast Asia, the researcher used the inductive strategy of 
writing - that is, explaining the problem from a broader or general perspective, then 
narrowing down to the main idea that the researcher would like to point out.                                      
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In order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the problem, the 
researcher also visited several relevant institutions in Southeast Asia. The relevant 
institutions include universities, government institutions, and non-governmental 
organisations. Furthermore, the researcher also participated in seminars, dialogues, 
exhibitions and consultations that proved useful in gaining additional information for 
the thesis. 
This thesis also follows a particular framework to comprehensively address 
five maritime security threats in Southeast Asia which are elaborated in Chapter 3 to 
7. First it starts with the explanation of the concept of the threat, and then it 
elaborates the nature of the problem in Southeast Asia. Next, the chapter discusses 
the overview of the international legal frameworks regulating the threat. The chapter 
then narrows down its discussion to examine the regional legal frameworks 
governing the threat in the region. Furthermore, if the international and regional legal 
frameworks are lacking or absent, the chapter also discusses other non-legally 
binding measures which addresses the problem. Before concluding the discussion, 
the chapter highlights and analysis the gaps in the international and regional 
frameworks and provides possible ways these frameworks could be improved. 
 
1.7 Significance of the Research  
This research fills a gap in the academic literature on the issue of maritime security 
in Southeast Asia. There is a clear dearth of academic studies which analyse, from a 
comprehensive and interrelated perspective, the five maritime security threats 
(piracy, maritime terrorism, people smuggling, IUU fishing and marine pollution 
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caused by offshore oil and gas activities) in Southeast Asia from international and 
regional legal perspectives.  
In addition, this thesis also discusses the possibility of improving the current 
legal framework and enhancing cooperation in the Southeast Asia region. Regional 
cooperation will be vital in implementing measures to combat maritime security 
threats.  
 
 
1.8 Thesis Structure 
This thesis consists of eight chapters. Chapter one, the Introduction, discusses 
the geographical area of Southeast Asia, the complexity of the region and the 
primary maritime security threats facing Southeast Asia.  The chapter outlines the 
purpose, scope, limitations and the central problem that the thesis seeks to 
investigate. It also provides the statement of thesis, explains the methodology and 
significance of the research, and the structure of the thesis. 
Chapter Two, Maritime Security in Southeast Asia, discusses the concept of 
security and the different approaches towards maritime security, with the main aim 
of highlighting different views on the concept of maritime security. This chapter 
discusses the regional architecture and maritime complexity in Southeast Asia. It also 
provides an overview of maritime security challenges in Southeast Asia.   
Chapter Three, Maritime Piracy on Southeast Asian Waters, discusses the 
concept of piracy and its legal history, the nature of piracy in the Southeast Asian 
region and the possible measures that could be adopted to combat piracy. The debate 
over which acts constitute piracy as opposed to armed robbery will also be discussed. 
Furthermore, this chapter highlights international as well as regional legal 
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frameworks that are designed to address this issue, as well as possible ways these 
frameworks could be improved.  
Chapter Four, Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia, discusses maritime 
terrorism as a maritime security threat. This chapter analyses the nature of maritime 
terrorism in Southeast Asia, and examines the relevant international and regional 
legal frameworks, as well as non-binding regional efforts to combat maritime 
terrorism in Southeast Asia. In addition, this chapter identifies and analyses the gaps 
in the international and regional frameworks and provides recommendations how 
these frameworks could be improved. 
Chapter Five, People Smuggling in Southeast Asia, describes the status and 
causes of people smuggling in Southeast Asia. This chapter highlights the concept 
and regional context of people smuggling in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, the 
chapter analyses both the binding international legal frameworks and non-binding 
regional framework designed to combat people smuggling in Southeast Asia along 
with suggestions to improve the current framework. 
Chapter Six, Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported Fishing in Southeast Asia, 
discusses concept and challenges in combating IUU fishing in Southeast Asia. 
Furthermore, this chapter discusses the nature of IUU fishing in the region. This 
chapter examines the legal framework at both the international and regional levels 
that address the problem of IUU fishing in the region as well as ways to further 
strengthen and improve the regime in the future.  
Chapter Seven, Marine Pollution caused by Offshore Oil and Gas Activities 
in Southeast Asia, discusses marine pollution caused by offshore oil and gas 
activities as a maritime security threat as well as the nature of the problem in 
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Southeast Asia region. This chapter analyses the international legal framework 
regulating marine pollution caused by offshore oil and gas activities. Furthermore, 
regional non-binding framework addressing the issue in region is also analysed. This 
chapter also highlights several measures that could be taken to improve the current 
framework. 
Chapter Eight, Prospects for Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: A Proposal 
for Change, summarises the five maritime security threats in Southeast Asia 
discussed in Chapters three to seven. This chapter highlights maritime security 
partnerships as a proposed solution to address maritime security threats. 
Furthermore, this chapter discusses ways in which States in the region could 
cooperate to solve maritime security issues. Finally, the chapter discusses the 
possibility of improving the prevailing framework and suggests that regional 
cooperation is the preferred solution to combat maritime security threats in Southeast 
Asian region. 
. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
2 Maritime Security in Southeast Asia  
 
2.1 Introduction  
There is no universally accepted definition of maritime security. The variance in 
definitions, approaches and perceptions of maritime security are often accounted for 
by differences in interests, political or ideological perspectives.1  Geoffrey Till 
argues that there are different definitions of maritime security due to the vast scope 
of the term.2    
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC)3 which was 
adopted and signed in 1982 and came into force in 1994 gave hope to the world that 
it could be used as a tool in resolving maritime-related problems. However, the 
LOSC has not given a clear definition of the term ‘maritime security’. It merely 
provided a broad understanding of security in general. There are several articles in 
LOSC that explain and regulate security. These provisions address wide-ranging 
issues such as threats caused by military activities (weapon exercises, use of force, 
military aircraft activities, etc.) and environmental issues and illegal fishing.4 
However, these provisions do not define maritime security nor does the Convention 
classify them strictly as maritime security threats. 
                                                
1 Chris Rahman, Concepts of Maritime Security: A Strategic Perspective on Alternative Visions for 
Good Order and Security at Sea, with Policy Implications for New Zealand (Victoria University of 
Wellington, 2009) 29. 
2 Geoffrey Till, ‘Developments in Maritime Security’ in Peter Cozens (ed), New Zealand’s Maritime 
Environment and Security, (Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand, Victoria University of 
Wellington, 1996), 5. 
3 United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 
3 (entered into force 16 November 1994). Hereinafter referred to as LOSC. 
4 Article 19, LOSC. 
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There are different approaches to maritime security. The following 
approaches will be discussed in this chapter: a. defence perspective on maritime 
security; b. maritime security threats; c. maritime safety and maritime security; d. 
non-traditional approach; and e. geographical and national interest approach. There 
are numerous scholarly research and academic publications which expound the 
varieties of approaches towards maritime security.  This chapter will highlight the 
views of some of these scholars, including Natalie Klein, Chris Rahman, Geoffrey 
Till and Sam Bateman.  
This chapter will discuss several regional organisations which play a 
significant role in addressing regional issues including maritime security. The 
chapter identifies critical factors unique to the region which illustrate the maritime 
complexity of Southeast Asia. Lastly, the chapter provides an overview of maritime 
security challenges in Southeast Asia that would be discussed in detail in the 
succeeding chapters.   
 
2.2 Concept of Security 
Maritime is derived from the Latin word “Mare” which means sea, the term is used 
in connection to activity connected with the sea, especially in relation to seafaring 
commercial or military activity. The concept of maritime security can be understood 
through its intricate association with general concepts of security, such as collective 
security.  
 The concept of collective security rejects traditional balance of power 
considerations and alliances aimed against identifiable threats; whilst acknowledging 
the role of force in world affairs. Collective security supports the existence of a 
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global body such as the UN in order to resist any aggression against the political 
status quo.5 This concept underpins the US Navy’s global maritime partnership 
initiative,6 the US national strategy for maritime security7 and also its 2007 maritime 
strategy.8 However, in reality, collective security is not truthfully implemented but 
rather utilised more as technical jargon and as a mere slogan. In line with this view, 
Gwyn Prins believes that the presence of an ‘ocean guard’ and a UN standing naval 
force would be measures to implement the real concept of collective security at sea.9 
The ocean guard would operate under the control of an international recognised 
agency and attempts to resolve maritime issues related to its task.10 
While there are different security concepts, the unique nature of maritime 
security implies that not every security concept will be suitable or could be easily 
implemented alongside maritime security. Another security concept that is applied in 
the maritime realm is comprehensive security. The concept of comprehensive 
security is premised on inclusivity and not the application of security in strict sense. 
Whilst one might think that this concept might work in Southeast Asia because of the 
enclosed and semi-enclosed nature of the seas in the region; however, the imaginary 
lines that separate a nation’s jurisdiction render it difficult for States to surrender 
their maritime jurisdiction. Nor is it possible to ask fish and other marine resources to 
                                                
5 Inis L Claude, Swords into plowshares: the problems and progress of international organization 
(University of London Press, 1965), 234-238.  
6 Admiral Mike Mullen, USN, remarks delivered to the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, Pearl 
Harbor, HI, 31 October 2006, 3. 
7 White House, ‘The national strategy for maritime security’, September 2005.  2. 
8 US Navy, US Marine Corps and US Coast Guard, ‘A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 
Seapower’ (2007) 3 Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 5. Also read the latest version in 
US Navy, US Marine Corps and US Coast Guard, ‘A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 
Seapower’ (2015). 
9 Gwyn Prins, ‘Maritime Security and Common Security’ in Andrew Mack (ed), A Peaceful Ocean? 
Maritime Security in the Pacific in the Post-Cold War Era (Allen & Unwin, 1993), 38-39. 
10 Rahman, above n 1, 42. 
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remain within a particular territory or to limit terrorist and other criminal actors to 
conduct their actions in one particular place.11 
The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region (CSCAP)12 
Memorandum (Guidelines for Regional Maritime Cooperation)13 clearly states that in 
the Asia Pacific region, the concept of comprehensive security is adopted. It covers 
the ‘maritime confidence and security building and preventive diplomacy measures 
identified by the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and reflect the strong support in the 
region for UNCLOS’14.  Also, ‘the Guidelines are consistent with UNCLOS and have 
been influenced by State practice with regard to developments in oceans 
management and international law since UNCLOS was opened for signature’15. The 
series of maritime issues including ocean management are interrelated, and therefore 
should be considered as one package. In order to have a comprehensive outcome, 
there should be a multidisciplinary approach which would involve the cooperation 
and coordination of every related body involving measures such as “accession to and 
cooperation under LOSC, conflict prevention at sea, protection and maintenance of 
sea lines of communication (SLOC), the sharing of maritime surveillance 
information, naval cooperation, search and rescue, maritime safety, management of 
natural marine disasters (including humanitarian assistance), law and order at sea, 
protection and preservation of the marine environment, marine resources, marine 
                                                
11 Martin Murphy, ‘Piracy and UNCLOS: Does international law help regional states combat piracy?’ 
in Peter Lehr (ed), Violence at sea (2007), 155-182; and Martin N Murphy, ‘The blue, green, and 
brown: Insurgency and counter-insurgency on the water’ (2007) 28(1) Contemporary Security Policy, 
73-74. 
12 The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region, see http://www.cscap.org/. 
CSCAP is a forum for dialogue on security matters in the Asia Pacific. It is a second track or non-
governmental process that discusses issues related to political and security challenges in the region. 
13 CSCAP, Memorandum 4, Guidelines for Regional Maritime Cooperation, December 1997. 
14 Ibid 
15 Ibid 
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scientific research, technical cooperation and capacity building and training 
education.”16 
There are different opinions on the feasibility of the CSCAP Memorandum as 
it is very broad in nature and assumed to include all interested bodies in activities. 
Jim Rolfe raised a critique that the Memorandum is not quite convincing when it 
comes to the argument of linking all the above factors.17 It is true that the seas are 
connected to one another and transnational in nature, but, it is somehow impossible 
to link all aspects of maritime security to different regions, for example treatment in 
Bay of Bengal would be different to that of West Java. 
 If it is not possible to apply at a regional level, is it possible for the concept to 
be implemented at national the level? The answer to this question is different 
depending on the unique maritime security concerns of every State. In the case of 
Australia, which adopted a comprehensive Oceans Policy which also addresses 
maritime security issues, because the lead agency was the Department of 
Environment, most of its contents were environmental in nature and merely cursorily 
addressing maritime security 18. The case of New Zealand exhibits the same concern. 
New Zealand has an oceans governance approach, but similar to Australia, placing 
an enormous emphasis on marine environmental management and not on security 
issues. Moreover, a report produced by a ministerial group composed of six ad hoc 
members did not represent the whole nation’s efforts in improving maritime 
                                                
16 Rahman, above n 1, 43. 
17 Jim Rolfe, ‘Regional Comprehensive Security: Some Problems of Definition and Application’ in 
Rolfe (ed), Unresolved Futures: Comprehensive Security in the Asia-Pacific (Centre for Strategic 
Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, 1995), 94. 
18 Environment Australia, ‘Australia’s Ocean Policy - Specific Sectoral Measures’ (1998), 37-42. 
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security.19 ‘New Zealanders recognize the sea as a global entity, and want their 
Oceans Policy to lead the world’.20 Furthermore they demanded ‘better integration of 
the range of activities and processes currently associated with managing their 
involvement with the marine environment’21. Thus compliance and enforcement are 
regarded as important issues that need to be realised.  
The other security approach towards maritime security is cooperative 
maritime security, which proposes to replace existing regional security structures 
with new multilateral ones. This approach requires like-minded states to converge on 
collective need to assure access to the maritime commons and adopts a collaborative 
approach to preserve safety and security.  
This raises a question of the imperative for inclusive cooperation that 
involves many States in addressing the issue of maritime security. In ASEAN, for 
instance, where non-intervention is a cornerstone principle and sensitivity on issues 
concerning sovereignty are still held sacrosanct, countries like Indonesia and 
Malaysia tend to avoid multilateral arrangements and are still more comfortable 
addressing the issue domestically.22  Southeast Asia, a region with large maritime 
areas, is one of those regions that does not prefer to have multilateral arrangements to 
address law of the sea issues.23 The case of the Strait of Malacca illustrates this view, 
where Indonesia and Malaysia show more inclination to solve their own problems 
and avoid foreign involvement in the region. Thus, given the prevailing cultural 
                                                
19 Ministerial Advisory Committee on Ocean Policy, ‘Healthy Sea: Healthy Society. Towards an 
Ocean Policy for New Zealand’ (30 September 2001). 
20 ibid 
21 ibid 
22 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, see http://www.asean.org/ at 4 May 2015. 
23 Rahman, above n 1, 45. 
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mind-set of the States comprising Southeast Asia, the chance of inclusive 
cooperation between States in this area is relatively small. 
In contrast, in the South Pacific there are better prospects for cooperative 
maritime security. The enforcement of the Niue Treaty24 has become the basis of 
maritime security cooperation. Australian-donated Pacific patrol boats can also lead  
cooperation amongst Southwest Pacific countries which is also in line with Gwyn 
Prins’ proposal on ocean guards.25 However, in the Asia-Pacific region, cooperative 
maritime security would be harder to see realised as States have different maritime 
interests which would deter this idea. 
The United States has tried to apply this approach by pursuing a maritime 
strategy called A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower in which one of its 
main goals was to improve maritime security cooperation.26 However, this effort is 
principally to safeguard their position economically and maritime superiority 
globally rather than their intention to apply the concept of cooperative maritime 
security itself 27.  
The ASEAN-United States relationship has expanded dramatically since 
formal relations began in 1977. The United States acceded to the Treaty of Amity 
and Cooperation in Southeast Asia in 2009. There are numerous commonalities of 
interest. Both are combating terrorism and have taken initiatives to strengthen 
cooperative anti-terrorism measures, including intelligence sharing, joint surveillance 
and police training. The ASEAN-U.S. strategic partnership plays a vital role in 
                                                
24 Niue Treaty on Cooperation in Fisheries Surveillance and Law Enforcement in South Pacific 
Region, opened for signature 9 July 1992, (entered into force 20 May 1993). Hereinafter referred to as 
Niue Treaty. 
25 Gwyn Prins and Robbie Stamp, Top guns and toxic whales: the environment and global security 
(Earthscan Publications, 1991), 144-149.  
26 Navy, Corps and Guard, above n 8, 2. 
27 Rahman, above n 1, 46. 
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tackling transnational challenges. ASEAN and the United States work together to 
address challenging global issues with maritime elements, such as terrorism and 
violent extremism, trafficking in persons, and IUU fishing.28  
 
2.3 Approaches towards Maritime Security 
2.3.1 Defining the Term 
The first approach is adopted by US Naval Operation Concept which looks at 
maritime security from a defence perspective, which guarantees navigational 
freedom and stability in the flow of commerce, in addition to the protection of ocean 
resources.29  Furthermore, the concept also covers issues such as securing “the 
maritime domain from nation-state threats, terrorism, drugs trafficking and other 
forms of transnational crime, piracy, environmental destruction and illegal seaborne 
immigration”. 30  
In the US, the term maritime security operation is popular in describing 
maritime enforcement operations particularly in connection with their efforts in 
combating terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.31 In line 
with this notion and the focus on counter-terrorism recognized in the US National 
Strategy for Maritime Security, US maritime strategy recognises the importance of 
maritime security: 
The creation and maintenance of security at sea is essential to mitigating 
threats short of war, including piracy, terrorism, weapons proliferation, drug 
trafficking, and other illicit activities. Countering these irregular and 
                                                
1 28 Joint Statement on the ASEAN-U.S. Strategic Partnership, see https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2015/11/21/joint-statement-asean-us-strategic-partnership, at 20 November 2016. 
29 Chief of Naval Operation-Commandant of the Marine Corps, ‘Naval Operations Concept 2006’   
<http//www.quantico.usmc.mil/seabasing/docs/Naval_Operations_Concept_2006.pdf>.  
30 Ibid. 
31 US Navy and US  Marine Corps, ‘Naval Operations Concept 2006’ (2006) , 14; and The U.S. Coast 
Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship, 19 January 2007, 11-12. 
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transnational threats protects our homeland, enhances global stability, and 
secures freedom of navigation for the benefit of all nations.32 
 
Maritime security is also defined by the Royal Navy as ‘actions performed by 
military units in partnership with other government departments, agencies and 
international partners in the maritime environment to counter illegal activity and 
support freedom of the seas, in order to protect national and international interests’. 33 
The private sector such as operators in the shipping industry also tried to 
define maritime security as issues related to the marine transport system which 
includes the assurance that shipping of cargo is free from criminal activity. 34 
Likewise, shipping industries do not differentiate the kinds of criminal activities such 
as piracy, armed robbery and terrorism but regards that maritime security includes 
the avoidance of maritime violence in general.35 In line with this approach, Hawkes 
explained that maritime security aims to protect against seizure, sabotage, piracy, 
pilferage, annoyance or surprise. Owners, operators and administrators of vessels, 
port facilities, offshore installations, and other marine organisations take steps in 
order to assure themselves that they are safe from these problems.36  
2.3.2 Threats of Maritime Security 
This approach focuses on the discussion of the different threats to maritime security 
and avoids defining the term as well as discussing the concept of maritime security. 
This approach posits that by exposing what constitutes maritime security threats is 
                                                
32Navy, Corps and Guard, above n 8, 8.  
33 Simon Mitchell, ‘Maritime Counter Terrorism’  (2008) Royal Navy: A Global Force, 71.  
34 Catherine Zara Raymond and Arthur Morriën, ‘Security in the Maritime Domain and Its Evolution 
Since 9/11’ in Sam Bateman Rupert Herbert-Burns, and Peter Lehr (ed), Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of 
Maritime Security (CRC Press, 2008) 3,  4. 
35 Maximo Q. Meija Jr, ‘Maritime Gerrymandering: Dilemmas in Defining Piracy, Terrorism and 
other Acts of Maritime Violence’ (2003) 2(2) Journal of International Commercial Law 153-157. 
36 Ibid, 156. 
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the best way of understanding maritime security. According to Sadurska, a threat is 
“an act that is designed to create a psychological condition in the target of 
apprehension, anxiety and eventually fear, which will erode the target’s resistance to 
change or will pressure it towards preserving the status quo.” 37  
The 2008 Report on Oceans and the Law of the Sea by the UN Secretary 
General recognises terrorist movement, terrorist attacks using ships as well as piracy, 
arms robbery, trafficking narcotics and drugs, illegal fishing and environmental 
issues as threats to maritime security. As noted in Chapter 1, the UN Secretary 
General in the Report acknowledged that there is no agreed definition explaining 
maritime security that can be accepted universally. Furthermore, the report also 
elaborated different threats to maritime security. All of these threats affect States 
directly or indirectly. Some threats also affect private victims, including commercial 
entities. This Report reflected the apprehension of many related parties such as 
government, shipping industry, operators, military, researchers and analysts as it 
covers a large scope of maritime problems.  In line with this approach, Klein 
suggested that understanding the ‘commonly perceived’ threats of maritime security, 
in addition to knowing the measures that have been or should be done to address 
these threats is the ideal way to recognise maritime security. With this regard, Klein 
defined maritime security as “the protection of a state’s land and maritime territory, 
infrastructure, economy, environment and society from certain harmful acts 
occurring at sea.” 38 Harmful acts here refer to the specific threat to maritime security 
mentioned in the UNGA Report 2008. Similar to this definition, a Dalhousie 
                                                
37 Romana Sadurska, ‘Threats of Force’ (1988) 82 American Journal of International Law 239. 
38 Natalie Klein, Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea (Oxford, 2011), 11.  
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University study defined maritime security as a process of maintaining stability in 
the international system on, over, under and from the sea.39 
2.3.3 Maritime Safety and Maritime Security 
There are also other organisations that do not follow the two abovementioned 
approaches. For instance, the International Maritime Organization (IMO)40 since 
1980, understands maritime security from the perspective of its Maritime Safety 
Committee which explains and elaborates the concept.41 The Committee 
differentiates between maritime safety and maritime security. Maritime safety refers 
to the act of preventing accidents which normally occur due to substandard ships, 
unqualified crew or operator errors.42 In contrast, maritime security is an action of 
protection against unlawful acts. 43  Despite differentiating the two terms, the IMO 
only has differentiated expressions for ‘security’ and ‘safety’ in other international 
languages such as French (proteccion maritime) and Spanish (surete maritime) since 
the amendment of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS 
Convention)44 Chapter XI.45          
2.3.4 Non-traditional Approach 
There are alternative approaches in looking at the issue of maritime security from a 
non-traditional perspective. The traditional approach to maritime security is statist in 
orientation and as such mainly involves States as the main actors and units of 
analysis. On the other hand, the non-traditional approach views maritime security in 
                                                
39 Rahman, above n 1, 29. 
40 International Maritime Organization, see http://www.imo.org/en/Pages/Default.aspx at 4 May 2015 
41 Q. Meija Jr, above n 35, 153-155. 
42 Mukherjee and Maximo Q. Mejia Jr Proshanto K, ‘The ISPS Code: Legal and Ergonomic 
Considerations’ in Maximo Q. Meija Jr (ed), Contemporary Issues in Maritime Security (World 
Maritime University, 2004) , 33.  
43 Ibid, 33. 
44 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, opened for signature 1 November 1974, 
(entered into force 25 May 1985). Hereinafter referred to as SOLAS Convention. 
45 Chapter XI, SOLAS Convention. 
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a non-strategic way, which is arbitrary and non-exclusive.46 The explanations are 
sometimes interrelated, overlap and at certain times explains the same problem but 
exploring it from a different viewpoint. Those alternative perspectives which were 
highlighted by Rahman are: security of the sea itself, ocean governance, maritime 
order protection, military activities at sea, and security regulation of the maritime 
transportation system 47. 
The first approach, that is the security of the sea itself, believes that the 
objective of maritime politics should be the ‘ocean’, which needs to be secured not 
because it impacts on human existence or development or security, but for its own 
sake.48 The main idea of this approach is to protect marine resources (living and non-
living) and also the marine environment. The centre of attention here is the ocean 
itself and not the implication of marine environmental security towards people and 
their political relationships. 
Another alternative approach to maritime security is the ocean governance 
approach which posits  that the international political and legal framework play a big 
role in managing the ocean.49 Furthermore, LOSC becomes the core idea in this 
approach which should be upheld and implemented in order to form a stable 
maritime regime.50 This approach also stresses that governments should create the 
rules and regulations to govern the ocean and also implement them. The rules and 
regulations would act as the solution to conflicts and problems occurring at sea and 
                                                
46 Rahman, above n 1, 31. 
47 Ibid, 31-42. 
48 Cath Wallace, ‘The Security of the Marine Environment’ (New Zealand’s Maritime Environment 
and Security) in Peter Cozens (ed), New Zealand’s Maritime Environment and Security (Centre for 
Strategic Studies: New Zealand, Victoria University of Wellington, 1996) , 117-144.  
49 Daniel Moran, ‘The Maritime Governance System’ in Andrew T.H. Tan (ed), The Politics of 
Maritime Power: A Survey (Routledge, 2007), 115. 
50 Michael Leifer, ‘The maritime regime and regional security in East Asia’ (1991) 4(2) The Pacific 
Review, 126-136. 
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thus become a tool to govern the ocean. As there is no government which can lead 
the whole world, it is upon the States to decide and negotiate on the set of rules that 
can enhance trust and stability in a particular area, in this case, the ocean. However, 
although the LOSC acts as the central solution in this approach it does not mean that 
it will be applicable at all times.  
The regulations in the LOSC which carried a huge impact on coastal State 
jurisdiction may affect their relationship with other States in maritime areas rich in 
natural resources in the exclusive economic zone, deep sea bed and also the high 
seas. Furthermore, the growing trend of illegal activities that occur in several regions 
of the world such as the Gulf of Aden, the Gulf of Guinea, the Caribbean, Indian 
Ocean and Southeast Asia might draw the attention and consideration of States in 
those regions. Therefore, there is a need for tighter regulations both in addressing this 
issue at the national and international levels. 
The third alternative approach is maritime border protection. This approach 
argues that in order to have effective ocean governance, efforts taken should not be 
limited to multilateral frameworks (regional and international levels) but should also 
include the role of coastal States in maintaining their maritime jurisdiction.51 As the 
LOSC has thickened the jurisdiction of coastal States, especially those related to the 
exploration and exploitation of the EEZ, coastal States have to be aware of their 
sovereignty and their sovereign rights at sea.  Furthermore, the concept of 
archipelagic States, which is relevant to countries such as Indonesia and the 
Philippines, will also have impact on their security as they need to exercise control 
over ships passing through their archipelagic waters. This approach is simple and 
                                                
51 Rahman, above n 1, 34. 
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uncontroversial as it includes the measures of States in upholding their sovereignty, 
assurance of their sovereign rights at sea, as well as implementation of their interests 
in their maritime zones. However, solving a maritime problem is not an easy task for 
a State to resolve. Cooperation with other countries through bilateral, regional and 
multilateral negotiations is still needed in order to effectively protect their 
sovereignty and application of sovereign rights at sea.      
The next alternative approach explained by Rahman is military activities at 
sea. This approach explains maritime security in relation to common security which 
highlights the concept of arms control. Up until now discussions regarding the 
limitation of arms are still taking place, and yet there is not an agreed policy on 
restriction of arms of a State. The Independent World Commission on the Ocean 
tried to promote reduction of arms, demilitarisation, and elimination of sea-based 
nuclear weapons;52 however, this effort is not in line with several navies which still 
do not have restrictions to arms, particularly the leading naval powers.   
Due to the difficulties associated with structural arms control, there has been 
a change in focus. Naval/maritime confidence building measures CBMs) instead 
became the solution, which focus on three categories: declaratory (statement of intent 
or general principles), transparency (communication, notification and 
observation/inspection measures) and constraint (risk reduction and 
exclusive/separation measures, and constraints on personal, equipment and 
activities). 53  
                                                
52 Mario Soares, The Ocean: Our Future (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 11.  
53 M Susan Pederson and Stanley Weeks, ‘A Survey of Confidence and Security Building Measures’ 
(1995) 17(3) Asia Pacific Confidence and Security Building Measures; Charles A Meconis and 
Stanley B Weeks, ‘Cooperative Maritime Security in the Asia-Pacific Region: A Strategic and Arms 
Control Assessment’ (1995)  Institute for Global Security Studies, Seattle, 66-91; and SB Weeks, 
‘Incidents at Sea Agreement and Maritime Confidence-Building Measures’ (1996) 118 , 83-93.  
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The last non-traditional approach towards maritime security is the security 
regulation of the maritime transportation system. 9/11 changed the approach towards 
maritime security. The international maritime system before 9/11 hardly attracted 
serious security concerns with only a few regulations produced prior to 9/11, which 
included the 1988 Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation (SUA Convention)54 and its Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf.55 The 
IMO, which plays a big role in maintaining and governing shipping and maritime 
safety of the member States surprisingly, had no particular desk to deal with security 
issues. In fact, the Maritime Safety Committee within IMO plays an important role in 
dealing with navigational safety and also in the making of numerous regulations for 
safety at sea.56 One of its products was the SOLAS Convention of 1974.  
9/11 marked a global turning point in perception towards security. There was 
widespread concern that all forms of transportation could be targeted or utilised to 
launch a terrorist attack. This scenario was most worrisome in the maritime 
transportation context which did not have any comprehensive regulation.57 The 
United States, which was the main victim of 9/11, tried to bring the issue of terrorism 
to the attention of the IMO in order to initiate a binding regulation that could prevent 
terrorist attacks at sea. Since then, the IMO has produced several regulations as 
measures to combat maritime terrorism and other maritime crimes. Those regulations 
                                                
54 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Safety of Maritime Navigation, opened for 
signature 10 March 1988,  27 ILM 668 (1988); 1678 UNTS 221 (entered into force 1 March 1992). 
Hereinafter referred to as SUA Convention. 
55 Protocol for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of fixed platforms located on the 
continental shelf, see http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/docs/conventions/Conv9.pdf at 4 May 2015 
56 Rahman, above n 1, 40. 
57 The 9/11 Commission Report, Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon 
the United States, 391. 
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include the  International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code)58 which 
came into force in 2004, provision for satellite-based Long Range Identification and 
Tracking (LRIT) of SOLAS-regulated ships and the establishment of new protocols 
to the SUA Convention.  
Because of its nature, the IMO would continue to be the hub that could 
connect many nations in order to deal and tackle with maritime security issues. The 
IMO is seen as an organisation whose regulations will be accepted by major 
countries and has a bigger bargaining power especially for those nations who are not 
allies of the United States. Furthermore, the IMO is the largest regulatory body that 
is in charge of governing regulations over maritime issues. However, the IMO as an 
organisation has limited authority, States still need to take the lead in resolving their 
own issues including issues in respect of the maritime transportation system.  With 
regard to this approach, 9/11 has played a vital role in changing the world 
perspective towards security regulations, especially for shipping, ports, offshore 
installations and also the existing international system for seaborne trade and 
somehow altered the new security regime.59  
2.3.5 Geographical and National Interest Approach 
The national interests and geography of States may also impact the definition of 
maritime security. It is not easy to get an acceptable definition of maritime security 
in a particular region as States often do not share a common view of what constitutes 
maritime security. Some States considers traditional threats to maritime security in 
                                                
58 International Ship and Port Facility Security Code, adopted on 12 December 2002, Hereinafter 
referred to as ISPS Code.  
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the definition while others would prefer not to classify them as such.60 
Environmental issues and illegal fishing are non-traditional threats to maritime 
security; whereas military threats, protection of national interests and sovereignty at 
sea constitute traditional threats. Traditional threats are classified exclusively as 
national matters.61 
Another illustration of this approach is looking at the reaction and framework 
of States with large maritime areas. Indonesia and the Philippines for instance, as 
archipelagic States that have large jurisdiction over maritime areas would likely 
support the broader definition of maritime security. These States would consider the 
inclusion of issues such as environmental protection and illegal fishing. A country 
like China might also support this approach as it is in line with their maritime 
concept of a ‘harmonious ocean’.62 This concept boosts their maritime security in 
terms of naval strength and security responses that include non-traditional threats 
such as environmental protection and disaster relief.63   In contrast, States that do not 
have control over vast maritime areas and have limited access to the sea would 
possibly agree with the notion of exclusion of non-traditional threats in the definition 
of maritime security.64 , Small countries such as Singapore, which exercises 
jurisdiction over a very limited maritime area, would most likely share the same 
position. The inclusion of non-traditional threats in the definition would compel them 
to enact additional maritime security regulations, which might not be in their national 
interest priorities. 
                                                
60 Sam Bateman, ‘Solving the “Wicked Problems” of Maritime Security: Are Regional Forums up to 
the Task?’ (2011) 33 Contemporary Southeast Asia 3.  
61 Ibid, 3. 
62 Yang Mingjie, ‘Sailing on a Harmonious Sea: A Chinese Perspective’ (2010) 5(4) Global Asia, 22-
25. 
63 Ibid, 22. 
64 Bateman, above n 63, 3. 
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However, there is a common concern among the States in the region that 
maritime security includes issues of security and safety of shipping and seaborne 
trade. In addition, countering piracy and maritime terrorism, search and rescue 
(SAR) as well as other marine safety services are also common issues of concern 
across States. Despite these commonality of concerns, there is still much hesitation 
among regional States to include security concerns in regional agreements, for 
example in the Cooperative Mechanism for Safety and Environmental Protection in 
the Malacca and Singapore Straits.65 The hesitation in this case was due to the 
sovereignty concerns of Indonesia and Malaysia. 
 
For the purpose of this thesis, maritime security is defined as the combination 
of preventive and responsive measures to protect the maritime domain against threats 
and intentional unlawful acts.  
As mentioned in the previous Chapter, this thesis adopts the approach of 
maritime security based on the perception of threats of the Southeast Asian States 
towards maritime security. The list of threats set out by the Southeast Asian States in 
the MSDE becomes the main discussion of the substantive Chapters of the thesis. 
The list of international and regional frameworks, both binding and non-binding, 
which are used to prevent or resolve the prevailing threats are analysed.  
In addressing the identified maritime security threats, governments make 
decisions and policies, and participate in legal mechanisms, and collaborate with 
other States in the region. This thesis sets out frameworks at both international and 
                                                
65 Robert Beckman, ‘Maritime Security and Cooperation Mechanism for the Straits of Malacca and 
Singapore’ in Sam Bateman and Joshua Ho (ed), Southeast Asia and the Rise of Chinese and Indian 
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regional level as a form of commitment of the States to resolve the problem. The 
thesis also offers an alternative way of collaboration in situations where international 
and regional frameworks are absent or in circumstances where frameworks are 
poorly endorsed.   
There are different forms of maritime cooperation that are to be found among 
States in Southeast Asia: 
a. Cooperative Anti-piracy and Maritime Border Patrols  
Several cooperative maritime border patrols are tasked with combating 
piracy/sea robbery and other unlawful activities at sea66. A good example for 
this cooperation is the Indonesia-Singapore Coordinated Patrols (ISCP), 
which was formed in July 1992 aimed to combat sea robberies in the 
Singapore Straits, expanded into the MALSINDO Malacca Straits Patrols in 
2004.. 
b. Maritime Information Exchange 
Regional cooperation is enhanced by the creation of maritime information 
databases and data exchange mechanisms. Examples of information that can 
be made available in a database include piracy and other illegal activities at 
sea that may pose threats to commercial traffic, information on ports, 
shipping, and oceanographic data67. Prominent examples of maritime 
information sharing in the region include the the international Piracy 
Reporting Centre of the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) of the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and  and ReCAAP. 
                                                
66 Chris Rahman, Working Paper No.7: Naval Cooperation And Coalition Building In Southeast Asia 
And The Southwest Pacific: Status And Prospects, Royal Australian Navy,  Sea Power Centre and 
Centre for Maritime Policy, 2001, 37 
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c. ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and other Track I Meetings. 
The ARF provides a platform for the exchange of views and ideas among 
maritime-related agencies, including navies68. Other forums that deal with 
maritime security issues include the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meetings 
(ADMM) and ADMM-Plus, APEC, The ASEAN Maritime Forum and 
Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum, and the East Asia Summit. 
 
2.4 Regional Architecture  
There are no shortage of regional multilateral organisations in Southeast Asia. The 
most prominent and most recognised one is ASEAN. However, there are other 
institutions such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)69 forum and 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which have Southeast Asian States as core 
members. 
Since its inception, ASEAN has become a platform where its members could 
communicate and discuss issues that are of common concern. In order to make it a 
rule-based organisation, ASEAN adopted a constitution called the ASEAN Charter. 
The legal platform was designed to facilitate a more efficient process in settling 
disputes among the member States and acts as a foundation to create a more 
integrated ASEAN.70 
In 2015, the ASEAN Community consists of three main pillars, Economic, 
Socio-Cultural and Security Communities, was formed. The third pillar is of 
particular importance to the security development of the region and creates hope in 
                                                
68 Ibid, 40 
69 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, see http://www.apec.org/ at 16 October 2015. 
70 Teo Chee Hean, ‘ASEAN and Asia’s Regional Security Architecture’ (2008)  Hampton Roads 
International Security Quarterly, 48-52. 
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addressing the maritime security challenges in Southeast Asia. The ASEAN 
Political-Security Community ‘subscribes to a comprehensive approach to security, 
which acknowledges the interwoven relationships of political, economic, social-
cultural and environmental dimensions of development’71. Furthermore, ‘it promotes 
renunciation of aggression and of the threat or use of force or other actions in any 
manner inconsistent with international law and reliance of peaceful settlements of 
dispute’72. It also supports relevant ASEAN instruments that play an important role 
in confidence building measures and preventive diplomacy. Those instruments 
include the Declaration on Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), the 
Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in South East Asia (TAC) and the Treaty on the 
Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ). 
To date, ASEAN is considered an important organisation in terms of setting 
up dialogues on numerous maritime issues; however, a legally binding framework 
necessary to eradicate the problems is yet to be adopted.73      
ASEAN also plays a role in the regional security architecture especially in 
Asia. ASEAN created a forum called the ASEAN Regional Forum which consists of 
ASEAN States as well as neighbouring States such as India and Pakistan and also 
extra regional powers such as the US and Russia. This Forum aims to enhance 
security dialogues among the member States and promote cooperation. The ARF has 
focused on issues such as non-proliferation, terrorism and maritime security.  
Furthermore, ASEAN countries also play pivotal role in the East Asia Summit, 
which involves States from Northeast Asia, Australasia, ASEAN and South Asia. 
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This forum also discusses issues related to security.74 Another forum which was 
created by ASEAN was the ASEAN Maritime Forum. In this forum, member states 
discuss numerous maritime security and safety issues including freedom and safety 
of navigation, marine environment protection and piracy.75  
APEC is a regional forum for economic cooperation which consists mainly of 
states from the Asia-Pacific region. This regional institution established in 1989 was 
formed in order to enhance sustainable economic growth among its members. APEC 
countries account for around 50 per cent of international trade and 60 per cent of 
global gross domestic product (GDP). Its rapid development plays a big role in 
regional confidence building measure processes as well as institutional capacity 
building.76  
However, the involvement of a large number of States in a regional institution 
creates a host of challenges. The inherent diversity of member States in terms of 
population, economy, political systems and income level, poses a challenge in 
creating a mutually acceptable agreement to all members. Therefore, APEC needs to 
be flexible in nature and resilient to accommodate diversities and divergences in 
interests to ensure common economic and trade goals are achieved by the member 
States.77 
 
                                                
74 Ibid, 48. 
75 Chairman’s Statement, 3rd ASEAN Maritime Forum, see http://www.asean.org/news/asean-
statement-communiques/item/chairman-s-statement-3rd-asean-maritime-forum at 16 December 2015. 
76 Richard W. X. Hu, ‘American Foreign Policy Interests: APEC and Future Asia-Pacific Regional 
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2.5 Maritime Complexity in Southeast Asia  
The maritime complexity of Southeast Asia could be attributed to several 
factors unique to the region. The region is home to several international shipping 
lanes that straddle the territorial waters of numerous States. The Strait of Malacca, 
for example, passes through the territorial seas of Malaysia and Indonesia. There are 
several maritime areas shared by more than two States. The tri-border area between 
Indonesia, Philippines and Malaysia, for instance, affects the tightening of each of 
the respective national security measures for all three countries.78 
The unavailability of a common, unified regional language is another reason 
which makes this region complex. States in the region have their own recognised 
national language and therefore communication between States are conducted in a 
second language such as English. Nonetheless, there are States which have 
similarities in language such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei. 
There are numerous political structures in the region. Some countries are 
democratic but Thailand still adopts the monarchy system where the king still has a 
role in deciding the State’s priorities. Furthermore, there are two communist States in 
Southeast Asia, namely Vietnam and Laos. The differences in political structures 
also potentially pose challenges which affect the bilateral and multilateral relations 
amongst States 
Another complexity of the region is the presence of disputed, contested and 
un-delimited territorial and maritime boundaries which are often the source of 
intermittent friction and occasional armed violence between claimant States. The 
absence of well-defined boundaries and the close proximity of States to one another, 
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which means there are no high seas present in the water areas of the Southeast Asian 
States, render the situation volatile at times. The South China Sea, for instance, is 
particularly contentious being subject to competing claims between several Southeast 
Asian states and China. Furthermore, other than the South China Sea issue, there are 
still other un-delimited maritime boundaries between neighbouring States. Of course, 
many States in the region have made some progress in delimiting overlapping 
maritime zones over the years.   
There are several important SLOCs in Southeast Asia. The Straits of Malacca 
and Singapore connect the Indian and the Pacific Oceans, and the Indian Ocean with 
the South China Sea. Around one-third of global trade is carried through this strait. 
Annually, approximately 50,000 vessels pass through the Strait of Malacca. Other 
transit lanes which are also important are the Lombok, Sunda, Makassar and 
Mindoro Straits. For those heavy tanks which are not able to pass through the 
draught-limited Malacca Strait, it is necessary to transit other deeper straits such as 
the Lombok or Sunda Strait.79 These straits are important to world trade. Around 
85% of Chinese oil imports and approximately 80% of the total import of Japanese 
petroleum are carried through the Malacca Strait.80 Other States such as Taiwan and 
Korea are also dependant to the sealanes in Southeast Asia for raw materials carried 
from Africa and Australia through the Southeast Asian waterways to the industries 
present in East Asia. Furthermore, the straits in Southeast Asia are considered 
economic chokepoints to the world economy. It would create a global problem if the 
                                                
79 John Bradford, ‘U.S. Strategic Interests and Cooperative Activities in Maritime Southeast Asia’ 
(2010) 24 NBR Special Report, 20. 
80 Ibid, 20. 
 
 
51 
 
straits are closed for some reason and vessels are not allowed to pass through them. 
Therefore the straits have strategic importance worldwide.81  
Southeast Asia is also significant because of its ports. Several ports located in 
this region are considered among the busiest in the world. A prime example is 
Singapore, where many vessels passing through the region visit and conduct 
activities such as refuelling and offloading.82 Heavy traffic in the area is also due to 
the presence of hub ports around the region in places such as Japan, Hong Kong, 
Taiwan and South Korea. Southeast Asia’s maritime complexity thus can be thought 
to be  not only ‘internally generated’ but also ‘externally generated’.83 
Finally, another significant factor that could be pointed out in the region is 
the presence of numerous offshore installations that extract oil, gas and other mineral 
resources. Several of these platforms, however, are located in underdeveloped areas. 
Therefore security arrangements are important in order to maximise the utilisation of 
these platforms.84  
 
2.6 Overview of Maritime Security Challenges in Southeast Asia 
As mentioned earlier in the Chapter 1, there are five maritime security challenges in 
Southeast Asia which will be discussed in this thesis. Those are: piracy, maritime 
terrorism, people smuggling, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, and marine 
pollution caused by offshore oil and gas activities. These challenges will be 
elaborated briefly in this section. 
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Piracy and armed robbery at seaare leading maritime security threats present 
in Southeast Asia. Indeed, in the past few years, this threat has gained the attention of 
both the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and the International Maritime 
Bureau (IMB) – with both organisations highlighting piracy in Southeast Asia in 
their published reports. Indeed, the ReCAAP organization was established to 
improve cooperation to deal with the threat.Issues regarding piracy in Southeast Asia 
will be further discussed in Chapter 3.    
Another threat to maritime security in Southeast Asia is maritime terrorism. 
In order to fulfil their political ambitions, offenders conduct criminal activities in 
groups which are affiliated with a particular terrorist organisation.85 Terrorist 
activities intentionally intimidate civilians to create fear and sometimes conduct 
violence.  Terrorists also seek to create enduring damage through their actions. This 
damage can be psychological, by cultivating an atmosphere of fear and panic, or it 
may take the form of physical acts causing damage or destruction, the intention being 
that the relevant authorities may concede (or partially concede) to the terrorists’ 
demands.86 Furthermore, terrorists aim to achieve maximum publicity in their 
attacks, because the more people that recognise their attacks, the more political 
pressure they can create. In order to combat maritime terrorism, States have taken 
measures both at the international and regional levels. Issues regarding maritime 
terrorism in Southeast Asia will be further discussed in Chapter 4. 
People smuggling constitutes another threat to maritime security in Southeast 
Asia. Indeed, this issue has become one of the main concerns of the international 
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community, as people smuggling not only affects countries of origin and destination, 
but also transit States.87 There are several causes of people smuggling, although 
poverty is a main reason people decide to ‘migrate’ to another country. Their 
intention is to make a better life for themselves by seeking employment opportunities 
in their destination country.88 Another factor that causes many people to migrate is 
discrimination..89 Humanitarian crises in places such as the Middle East, Afghanistan 
and Sri Lanka have also played a significant role in the rise of people smuggling. 
Further discussions on people smuggling in Southeast Asia will be elaborated in 
Chapter 5. 
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IUU fishing) is one of the major 
maritime concerns in the world today. IUU fishing commonly occurs in the EEZ, 
with irresponsible or criminal fishermen harvesting protected fish species or large 
quantities of fish which are subsequently not reported. Fish is a primary food source 
of protein for many developing States, and therefore its continued availability is 
critical. Despite this fact, larger and larger quantities of fish are captured every day in 
order to meet an ever-growing demand. Moreover, the advent of modern technology 
has made the process of harvesting fish even easier. The US Commission on Ocean 
Policy has estimated that only three out of every ten fish stocks around the world are 
being fished at a sustainable level, and hence it is not surprising to see States rally 
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together in opposing illegal fishing practices.90  Issues regarding IUU fishing in 
Southeast Asia will be further discussed in Chapter 6. 
 The last issue that will be discussed is Marine Pollution Caused by Offshore 
Oil and Gas Activities. An increase in demand for energy has caused greater pressure 
to explore and exploit offshore oil and natural gas resources, particularly in Asia. It is 
anticipated that the economies of China and India will grow by more than five per 
cent per annum until 2035.91 Indeed, these countries, and other non-OECD countries 
in the Asia Pacific region (excluding Japan and Republic of Korea) are predicted to 
consume more natural gas in the future. In 2008, their world natural gas consumption 
was ten per cent, and is expected to reach 19 per cent by 2035.92 The number of 
projects currently operating in South Asia, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia and 
Australia is quite significant in comparison to other parts of the world. Combined, 
these regions have 441 projected shallow (less than 300 metres) and deep water 
(greater than 300 metres) offshore oil and gas fields.93 This industry, however, poses 
considerable environmental risks to the marine environment. Further discussions on 
marine pollution caused by offshore oil and gas activities in Southeast Asia will be 
elaborated in Chapter 7. 
 
                                                
90 U.S. Commisssion on Ocean Policy, ‘An Ocean Blue Print for the 21st Century’ (2004) 40. 
91U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Outlook 2011 (IEO2011), 
viewed 9 August 2012, 19.  
92Ibid, 48-49. 
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2.7 Conclusion 
In conclusion, maritime security can be understood by examining the concept from 
different approaches, as the discussion above illustrated. The differences in people’s 
backgrounds, interests and concerns ultimately influence how maritime security is 
perceived and addressed. Defence officials, operators, shipping industries, 
researchers or analysts, policy makers, other members of the private sector and 
government officials would understand the issue differently based on their interests 
and fields. Klein explained that maritime security is often described in a context-
specific meaning and infrequently in a categorical way.94 Thus, there are no universal 
agreed elements that constitute maritime security. 
 It is clear that there are numerous regional organisations which are 
particularly concerned about maritime security issues prevailing in the region. 
However, the complexities of the region as well as the inadequacy of these regional 
organisations to address the problem are the reasons why several maritime threats 
persist. This chapter thus highlighted five maritime security threats in Southeast Asia 
which are the focus of discussion in the succeeding chapters. 
. 
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CHAPTER III 
3 Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asian Waters 
 
3.1 Introduction  
One of the main threats to maritime security in Southeast Asia is piracy. In the past 
few years, this threat has gained the attention of both the International Maritime 
Organisation (IMO) and the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) – with both 
organisations referring to piracy in Southeast Asia in their published reports. 
Furthermore, reports on piracy are also produced by the Regional Cooperation 
Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia 
(ReCAAP). These reports show that there is a significant number of piratical 
incidents taking place in the maritime area of Southeast Asia.1  
The term piracy originates from the Greek word ‘peirates’, and was used to 
refer to people who attacked ships.2 According to Vagg, an English criminologist, 
acts of piracy are similar to acts of banditry,3 the only difference being that piracy 
occurs on water. Piracy is an unlawful act at sea which may involve violence and 
robbery.4  Other scholars have proposed that piracy more closely resembles armed 
                                                
*Parts of this chapter were published in the following publications: (i) Ahmad Almaududy Amri, 
‘Piracy in Southeast Asia: An Overview of International and Regional Efforts,’ (2013) 1 Cornell 
International Law Journal Online 128; (ii) Ahmad Almaududy Amri, ‘Combating Maritime Piracy in 
Southeast Asia from International and Regional Legal Perspectives: Challenges and Prospects,’ in 5th 
International Conference on Southeast Asia: Conference Proceedings, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 12 
December 2013, 442; (iii) Ahmad Almaududy Amri, ‘Southeast Asia’s Maritime Piracy: Challenges, 
Legal Instruments and A Way Forward,’ (2014) 6 Australian Journal of Maritime & Ocean Affairs 
154; and (iv) Ahmad Almaududy Amri, ‘The International Legal Definition of Piracy and Its 
Motives,’ (2014) 19 Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 25. 
1 ReCAAP, ‘Piracy And Armed Robbery Against Ships In Asia: Annual Report’ (ReCAAP 
Information Sharing Centre, 1st January - 31st December 2014 ), 6. 
2 B. Innes, The Book of Pirates: Bucaneers, Corsairs, Privateers, Freebooters, & All Sea Rovers 
(Bancroft, 1966), 1-96.  
3 J. Vagg, ‘Rough Seas? Contemporary Piracy in South East Asia’ (1995) 35 British Journal of 
Criminology, 65. 
4 N Murphy Martin, Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money: Piracy and Maritime Terrorism in the 
Modern World (Hurst & Company, 2010), 7. 
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robbery - with both offences involving violence or criminal acts which occur in areas 
lacking in government control.5  
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the international and regional legal 
frameworks governing piracy. The chapter also examines the concept of piracy from 
different perspectives. Furthermore, it analyses the prevailing gaps at both 
international and regional levels.  
In order to get a comprehensive picture of the problem, this chapter will discuss 
several issues related to piracy such as the concept of piracy and its legal history, the 
nature of piracy in Southeast Asia, and the international and regional legal 
frameworks for combating piracy The chapter concludes that the existing legal 
frameworks both at the international and regional levels are inadequate to address the 
problem. Piracy is transnational in nature and thus multinational cooperation is 
needed to overcome the problem.6 Furthermore, cooperation at the regional level is 
required in order to eliminate maritime piracy in Southeast Asia.    
3.2 Concept of Piracy and its Legal History 
This section will analyse the concept of piracy by discussing the different definitions 
of piracy, elaborate the hostis humani generis (the enemies of all mankind) nature of 
piracy, and provide a brief historical overview of the initial development of the legal 
framework in addressing piracy. 
                                                
5Derek  Johnson, Erika  Pladdet and Mark Valencia, ‘Introduction: Research on Southeast Asian 
Piracy’ in D. Pladder Johnson, E. Valencia, M, J. (ed), Piracy in Southeast Asia: Status, Issues, and 
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6 Chris Rahman, ‘The international politics of combating piracy in Southeast Asia’ in Peter Lehr (ed), 
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3.2.1 Defining Piracy 
In the past, the main goal of piracy was to steal riches, booty and slaves. However, 
with developments in the political, economic and military affairs of States, these 
types of raids decreased in frequency. The current aim of piracy is varied in nature, 
but extends to receiving ransom from governments and ship companies.  
The IMO and IMB are the two main organisations which are concerned with 
the issue of piracy globally. Both organisations have defined piracy in different 
ways. The IMO, as a body under the United Nations (UN), adopts the definition of 
piracy from the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC).7  The 
definition itself is quite narrow and defines some illegal activities at sea to be piracy. 
Compared to the IMO, the IMB’s definition is broader and covers almost all attacks 
against ships in all maritime jurisdictions of a State. 
The offence of piracy, as defined in Article 101 of the LOSC, consists of five 
elements.8 In order for an act to be categorised as piracy, it must satisfy the following 
conditions: Firstly, there must be violence, detention or depredation.9 Secondly, such 
action must be conducted on the high seas.10 Thirdly, there must be two ships 
involved in the action.11 Therefore, the pirates must use another ship in order to 
attack the targeted ship. Illegal acts such as mutiny and privateering are not 
categorised as piracy. Fourthly, the spoils of piracy must be enjoyed for private (as 
opposed to political) ends.12 Finally, the vessels used to carry out the piratical attack 
                                                
7 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 16 November 1994). Hereinafter referred to as LOSC. 
8 Article 101, LOSC. 
9 Article 101 (a), LOSC. 
10 Article 101 (a)(i), LOSC.  
11 Article 101 (a)(ii), LOSC. 
12 Article 101 (a), LOSC. 
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must be private vessels.13 Hence, attacks by government owned ships, such as naval 
vessels, are not considered acts of piracy subject to several exceptions as stipulated 
in LOSC.14 
In light of the above requirements, many illegal acts committed at sea fall 
outside the definition of piracy. Criminal acts conducted in territorial seas where 
States enjoy both sovereignty and jurisdiction are not categorised as piracy. Indeed, 
such acts are considered by IMO to be armed robbery at sea. However, this 
distinction between ‘piracy’ and ‘armed robbery’ has led to other complications. As 
not every State has domestic legislation dealing with armed robbery, it is often 
difficult for governments to prosecute offenders who have engaged in such activities. 
Only those acts which are committed on the high seas (including the EEZ) where 
States enjoy freedom of navigation or ‘mare liberum’ are considered piracy. The 
IMO defines armed robbery in resolution A.1025 (26) Code of Practice for the 
Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships as:  
(i) any illegal act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, 
other than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and directed against a ship or 
against persons or property on board such a ship, within a State’s internal waters, 
archipelagic waters and territorial sea; and (ii) any act of inciting or of intentionally 
facilitating an act described above.15 
 
On the other hand, the IMB definition of piracy is different than that of the 
LOSC. The IMB definition consists of three different elements. Firstly, the crew or 
passengers of the ship must board or attempt to board another ship. Secondly, the 
                                                
13 Article 101 (a), LOSC. 
14 Johnson, Pladdet and Valencia, above n 5, xi. 
15 Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships. 
Adopted on 2 December 2009. Resolution A.1025 (26). See 
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/PiracyArmedRobbery/Guidance/Documents/A.1025.pdf at 
14th October 2015. 
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motive of this act must be to commit theft or another crime. Finally, there must be 
“an attempt or capability to use force in furtherance of that act.”16 
It is clear that the IMB definition of piracy is broader than that of existing 
international law. The LOSC requirement that the act must be committed on the high 
seas in order to be categorised as piracy has not been adopted by the IMB. 
Furthermore, the LOSC requirement that two ships must be involved in the attack 
also has not been adopted by the IMB, thus allowing an attack from a raft or quay to 
be considered piracy. In addition, there is no limitation that the act be committed for 
private ends. Hence, if the motive of the criminal act is regarded as political or 
environmental, the act may nonetheless be categorised as piracy according to the 
IMB.17 Therefore, the attack against the Achille Lauro falls within the IMB definition 
of piracy.18 Interestingly, acts committed by naval ships, which are generally under 
the control of the State, can also be categorised as piracy under the IMB definition, 
provided it can be shown the naval ship committed a criminal act. 
From the above discussions, the LOSC definition of piracy is different to the 
IMB. The latter, however has no legal standing. Thus, for the purpose of this thesis, 
the definition of piracy which is adopted is the one defined by the LOSC. The 
definition is widely accepted as it is a part of LOSC which has been ratified by most 
States in the world. The existence of several definitions of piracy created confusion 
for some States; for those States which are affected by a high number of armed 
robberies at sea conducted in territorial waters would not want these offences also 
categorised as piracy.  
                                                
16 ICC-IMB, ‘Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report’ (International Maritime 
Bureau, 1 January - 31 December 2003), 3. 
17 Johnson, Pladdet and Valencia, above n 5, xii. 
18 Ibid, xii. 
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3.2.2 Pirates as hostis humani generis  
The act of piracy is a violation of international law and considered as a sui generis 
universal crime.19  The universal crime nature of piracy gives the right to every State 
to seize the pirate ship, arrest the pirates,20 and punish the perpetrators. An act is 
categorised as piracy if it is committed on the high seas, an area where all States 
enjoy several rights, including the freedom of navigation. Indeed, it would be almost 
impossible to eradicate piracy and apprehend its perpetrators if the act was restricted 
to a narrow jurisdiction. For this reason, every State is allowed to seize pirate ships21.  
Likewise, in Europe, the act of piracy is considered hostis humani generis or 
‘enemy of all mankind.’22 Indeed, piracy has historically been regarded as a threat to 
many people around the world, especially those from a western culture. In 1820, the 
US Supreme Court accepted the concept of hostis humani generis, thereby granting 
any State the right to prosecute piratical acts.23 As a result, pirates are subject to 
universal jurisdiction, which means that every State has the right to take appropriate 
action,24 even though the act may not have been committed within the state’s 
jurisdiction.  
Universal jurisdiction is a unique concept of international law, allowing 
States to exercise jurisdiction over an accused person regardless of where the offence 
                                                
19 James Kraska and Raul Pedrozo, International maritime security law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2013), 697. 
20 Robert C Beckman, ‘12 The 1988 SUA Convention and 2005 SUA Protocol: Tools to Combat 
Piracy, Armed Robbery, and Maritime Terrorism’ in Rupert Herbert-Burns, Sam Bateman and Peter 
Lehr (eds), Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of Maritime Security (Auerbach Publications, 2008) 188. 
21 Article 105, LOSC. 
22 J. Harrelson, ‘Blackbeard meets blackwater: An analysis of international conventions that address 
piracy and the use of private security companies to protect the shipping industry’ (2010) 25 American 
University International Law Review 291. 
23 Ibid, 291. 
24 Article 105, LOSC. 
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took place.25 In most cases, international law only allows States to enforce their 
jurisdiction over crimes that take place in their territory, or over accused citizens who 
are their nationals. Furthermore, the right of a State to assume jurisdiction over 
another State’s territory is strictly limited. Interestingly, this provision of 
international law does not apply to piracy. In contrast, States are allowed to exercise 
their jurisdiction on the high seas and over any national, as piracy is considered 
hostis humani generis.26 Hence, it is legitimate under international law for States to 
implement measures to prosecute perpetrators of piracy. Flag state jurisdiction on the 
other hand gives the right to a state to prosecute a crime (exercising enforcement 
jurisdiction) if it has recognised grounds to claim jurisdiction over the event in 
international law, and its domestic law expressly asserts that jurisdiction.  
3.2.3 Privateering versus Piracy 
Historically, privateering was considered a legal act, as the attack was committed 
with the authority of the government. Privateering was practiced by private 
companies during times of war, with privateers being asked to attack and capture 
enemy ships with the consent of the ruling party. Such action was considered 
legitimate, as the government provided letters of marque to authorise the seizure.27 
During those times, privateers were not considered pirates and therefore privateering 
was legal, whereas piracy remained illegal. However, with the issuance of the Paris 
Declaration Respecting Maritime Law in 1856, privateering was abolished. The 
reason behind the abolition was the inappropriate use of government authorisations 
                                                
25 P. Campbell, ‘A Modern History of the International Legal Definition of Piracy’ in B Elleman, A., 
A. Forbes and D. Rosenberg (eds), Piracy and Maritime Crime (Naval War College Press, 2010) , 20,. 
26 Ibid, 21. 
27 Geneva-Academy, ‘Academy Briefing No1: Counterpiracy under International Law’ (Geneva 
Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights 
August 2012), 11. 
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by the privateers. The privateers were known to be motivated by their own self-
interest, using their powers for personal enrichment. 
3.2.4 Harvard Draft 
The legal formulation of ‘piracy’ started in the 1930s, with the Harvard Research 
Group attempting to define the term.28 An important aspect of the group’s work was 
to create a ‘special jurisdiction’ which could be used to prosecute acts of piracy. This 
group was led by American scholar Professor Joseph Bingham from Stanford 
University.29 Their work resulted in a 1932 paper which was known as the ‘Harvard 
Draft’. This draft contained nineteen articles and associated commentary on piracy. 
The group’s definition of piracy, which formed a vital part of the draft, was the initial 
source for today’s modern definition of piracy.30 There are two significant aspects of 
the Harvard Draft. Firstly, the Draft had undergone an extensive consultation 
process, with the Harvard Research Group canvassing the views of several national 
courts and competent jurists.31 Secondly, the Harvard Draft formed the foundation of 
the modern concept of piracy, as found in the Geneva Convention on the High Seas, 
as well as LOSC.32    
3.2.5 High Seas Convention 
A further development in piracy law took place when the General Assembly of the 
United Nations requested the International Law Commission to review and draft 
conventions relating to the law of the sea, based on the prevailing rules of 
                                                
28 Ibid, 11. 
29 Campbell, above n 25, 23. 
30 Geneva-Academy, above n 27, 11. 
31 Campbell, above n 25, 23. 
32 Ibid, 23. 
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international customary law.33 This process was held in 1950 – a time when the 
International Law Commission was heavily influenced by the Harvard Draft, 
especially in relation to drafting laws related to piracy. As a result, the commission 
was able to prepare four draft conventions on the law of the sea. The definition of 
piracy was also included in these conventions and was embedded in the 1958 
Convention on High Seas.  
LOSC restates verbatim the definition of piracy drafted by the International 
Law Commission in articles 14-20 of the High Seas Convention. As most UN 
member States are either a party to LOSC or the High Seas Convention, the legal 
definition of piracy is today uniform across most States.34  
3.3 Nature of Piracy in Southeast Asia 
Many researchers categorise maritime piracy as a non-traditional threat which means 
that the perpetrators are non-State actors. Meanwhile, non-traditional security theory 
treats it as ‘human security.’35 Especially in the post-cold war era, piracy has been 
regarded as one of the non-traditional treats which “arise from factors or actors 
which are sub-state or trans-state in character, are diffuse, are multi-dimensional and 
multi-directional, cannot necessarily be managed by traditional military means, and 
often threatening to something beside the state”.36  In contrast, maritime piracy has 
traditionally been perceived as a threat that mainly affects the security of the State 
itself.  
                                                
33 Ibid, 25. 
34 Geneva-Academy, above n 27, 11. 
35 AJ Young, ‘Roots of Contemporary Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia’ in D.  Johnson and M. 
Valencia (eds), Piracy in Southeast Asia: Status, Issues, and Responses (ISEAS Publications, 2005) 
33, 1. 
36 Terry Terriff et al, Security Studies Today (Polity Press Cambridge, 1999), 135. 
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The transnational nature of piracy and the sea means that States must 
cooperate with one another in order to combat it. Unilateral action on the part of a 
State, and even bilateral ties between States, are often considered inadequate to 
resolve the issue.37 As piratical acts are complex in nature, it is necessary for States 
to cooperate on a multilateral level, and in a consistent and comprehensive manner.   
It is difficult to define piracy as the term has been used to refer to enemy 
combatants as well as common criminals.38 However, there are several ways to 
understand the concept. Distinguishing piracy from other illegal acts, and 
ascertaining the motive behind piratical acts in terms of time and place, are some of 
the measures that have been used. Southeast Asian States might have their own 
definition of piracy in their domestic law: the Philippines for example has a 
legislative definition backed up by jurisprudence that has broader applicability than 
UNCLOS. 
As Young has proposed, piracy should not be treated as something which is 
static in moral judgement.39 Rather, it should be viewed as a concept that is subject to 
change over time, or as Campo has described: “a concept in development”.40 
According to Hugo Grotius, piracy should be regarded as any illegal act against 
“lawful commerce and [a] state’s sovereignty”. 41 Grotius was previously engaged by 
the Dutch government to protect the commercial interests of the government.  
                                                
37 T. Shie, ‘Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia: The Evolution and Progress of Intra-ASEAN 
Cooperation’ in G. Gerard and O.  Webb (eds), Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Malacca 
Straits (ISEAS Publishing) 22, 164. 
38 Young, above n 35, 3. 
39 Ibid, 3. 
40 Joseph N.F.M. a Campo, ‘Discourse without discussion: Representations of piracy in colonial 
Indonesia 1816-25’ (2003) 34(2) Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 2. 
41 Young, above n 38, 4. 
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Southeast Asia is an important area in terms of piratical studies. There are 
several reasons for this. Firstly, the region experienced the second highest rate of 
piratical attacks in the world over the period of five years (2010-2014). Only Africa 
exceeds the number of ‘attacks’ that were committed in Southeast Asia in the same 
period. The prevalence of piratical attacks in Africa is due to the high number of 
cases that occurred in Somali waters. However, in 2013 and 2014 the rate of piracy 
and armed robbery incident in Southeast Asia is the highest in the world with 128,42 
and 141,43 respectively. According to data from the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre 
(which takes into account both ‘actual’ and ‘attempted’ piratical attacks), Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Singapore were highly affected by piracy in the period between 2010 
and 2014.    
 
Locations 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Indonesia 40 46 81 106 100 
Malacca Straits 2 1 2 1 1 
Malaysia 18 16 12 9 21 
Myanmar (Burma) 0 1 0 0 0 
Philippines 5 5 3 3 6 
Singapore Straits 3 11 6 9 8 
Thailand 2 0 0 0 2 
Vietnam 12 8 4 9 7 
Table 6: Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships which were reported to have 
been Allegedly Committed and Attempted in Southeast Asia44  
 
Secondly, the geographical location of the region is very important to world 
trade. There are several sea lanes and straits which are commonly used for 
international navigation, mainly for trade purposes. In fact, six of the 25 busiest ports 
                                                
42 ICC-IMB, ‘Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual report’ (International Maritime 
Bureau, 1 January - 31 December 2013) 7. 
43 ICC-IMB, ‘Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual report’ (International Maritime 
Bureau, 1 January - 31 December 2014) 7. 
44 Ibid, 5.  
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in the world are located in Southeast Asia. They include Singapore, Port Klang 
(Malaysia), Tanjung Pelepas (Malaysia) and Tanjung Priok (Indonesia), Laem 
Chabang (Thailand), and Ho Chi Minh (Vietnam).45 Furthermore, Singapore is the 
second largest container port in the world after Shanghai (China).46 Furthermore, 
Singapore boasts the third largest oil refinery industry in the world, as well as being 
the third largest port in terms of percentage of global cargo.  
Thirdly, the need to eradicate piracy has been an issue for individual States in 
the region, as well as groups of States.47 Their failure to address the issue has 
compelled the international community to cooperate in suppressing piracy in 
Southeast Asian waters.    
Piracy and armed robbery against ships in the region is influenced by 
numerous factors including economic, political and social forces. These factors, 
along with the increased availability and dissemination of information in today’s 
globalised world, also play a role in the prevalence of piratical attacks.48   
Piracy in Southeast Asia is difficult to define as it differs from piracy in other 
parts of the world. As Young has described, piracy in the region has its own 
religious, economic and political agenda.49 However, this understanding changed 
after the European involvement in the region in the 16th century. The local concept of 
piracy was eroded and replaced by the European concept. By the nineteenth century, 
European concepts were officially entrenched in most countries in Southeast Asia. It 
is for this reason that the European concept of piracy today represents the established 
                                                
45 Top 50 World Container Ports, see http://www.worldshipping.org/about-the-industry/global-
trade/top-50-world-container-ports at 14th October 2015.  
46 Ibid. 
47 Shie, above n 37, 164. 
48 Young, above n 35, 7. 
49 Ibid, 7. 
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(international) view. Piracy and armed robbery in Asia is different from Somalia-
based piracy. In Somalia, ‘pirates generally attacked ships in order to hijack them 
and then hold the crew for ransom’, whereas in Asia, the criminal activities generally 
‘revolves around theft of personal property and hijacking of ships for the purpose of 
cargo theft’50. Furthermore, in the context of Southeast Asia, attacks on ships often 
occur within territorial waters instead of the high seas, which does not strictly fall 
under the definition of piracy under the LOSC. Contemporary forms of piracy and 
piratical operations in Southeast Asia are more in the nature of opportunistic crimes 
rather than large-scale, organised operations conducted by petty criminals, relatively 
random in nature and disorganised.51 They usually occur in congested harbours or 
whilst the ships are at anchor.52 
In the past, many of the anti-piracy measures identified by researchers, and 
later implemented in Southeast Asia, were carried out by actors or States outside the 
region. Indeed, Japan and the United States, as well as other shipping nations, have 
shown concern over the situation in the region, and have thus offered their assistance 
in the form of anti-piracy measures.53 Little action has been taken by States in 
Southeast Asia itself, and thus not surprisingly, many of the indigenous approaches 
to combating piracy in the region have proved either inadequate or ineffective. 
3.3.1 Motives of Piracy 
In recent times, pirates have become more sophisticated in their activities. Broadly 
speaking, these activities can be classified as either theft or hijacking. In regard to 
                                                
50 Regional Guide to Counter Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia, ReCAAP ISC, 1. 
51 Derek Johnson and Mark J. Valencia (eds), Piracy in Southeast Asia: Status, Issues, and Responses 
(Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005) xiv – xv. 
52 Ibid., xv. 
53 Shie, above n 37, 164. 
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theft, several decades ago pirates commonly stole items that were not of high value54 
- such as the personal belongings of captains and other crew members. It was also 
common for pirates to seize ship equipment and other goods belonging to the ship 
that could easily be transported. Today, pirates are more calculated in their actions 
and are commonly equipped with weapons. They also execute their activities with 
high level planning, often having selected their targets ahead of time.  
Hijacking represents another form of piracy. Pirates seek to attack a vessel 
and transfer its cargo to another ship. As the movement of the ship is carefully 
monitored by the pirates, they can usually seek out their target with a high degree of 
precision. This kind of hijacking occurs in circumstances where the value of both the 
ship and its cargo are high. Pirates are not only equipped with guns, but also other 
weapons such as knives. They also have the skills to navigate their ship without the 
presence of experienced crew members. Pirates often provide fake ship papers, cargo 
papers and even passports in order to carry out their plans. Unfortunately, there is no 
guarantee as to the treatment of crew members captured by pirates. Some crew 
members are intimidated and tortured, while others are killed. A sombre illustration 
of this can be seen in the attacks carried out on the Cheongson and the Tenyu. The 
1998 IMB Annual Piracy Report stated that all crew members on board these vessels 
were killed during the attacks.55 
 
 
 
                                                
54 P. Mukundan, ‘The Scourage of Piracy in Southeast asia: Can Any Improvements be Expected in 
the Near Future?’ in D. Pladder Johnson, E. Valencia, M, J. (ed), Piracy in Southeast Asia: Status, 
Issues, and Responses (ISEAS, 2005) 35. 
55 Ibid, 35 
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Types of Arms 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Guns  243 245 113 71 62 
Knives 88 69 73 81 83 
Not Stated 108 117 104 109 93 
Other Weapons 6 8 7 3 7 
Total 445 439 297 264 245 
Table 7: Types of Arms used during Attacks, January-December 2010-201456 
 
 
Before 2001, merchant ships were the main targets of piratical attacks, as 
they provided an opportunity for pirates to steal both the crew’s valuable belongings 
as well as the ship’s cargo. However, after 2001, there were several cases where 
pirates were apprehended, convicted and sentenced for their attacks, especially in 
India and China. Following these convictions, groups of pirates began looking for 
easier targets such as tugs and barges. According to Mukundan, barges in Southeast 
Asia usually carry palm oil and timber products, both of which are highly valued and 
thus extremely attractive to pirates.57  
Collecting ransom from authorities is another motive for piratical attacks. 
Indeed, there are several cases where a ransom has been used by pirates as a 
bargaining tool - for instance, by militia groups in the southern part of the 
Philippines. Here, the pirates captured several crew members and demanded a 
ransom in exchange for their release. A similar incident took place in Malaysia in 
August 2003, when the Malaysian tanker Penrider was hijacked by a group of 
pirates.58 The pirates abducted the crew members pending the payment of their 
ransom. 
                                                
56 ICC-IMB, above n 43, 10. 
57 Mukundan, above n 54, 36 
58 Ibid, 38. 
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3.3.2 Incidents of piracy and armed robbery in Southeast Asia  
Reports on piracy and armed robbery incidents are produced by numerous 
institutions. In this section, piracy incidents which are reported by the prominent 
institutions which are widely known and recognised are elaborated upon.  The 
institutions referred are the IMO and IMB and the ReCAAP Information Sharing 
Centre (ISC) in Singapore.   
3.3.2.1 IMO Reports 
According to the IMO annual report, there were 291 piracy and armed robbery 
against ships incidents in 2014. This number only decreased by seven incidents 
compared to the previous year where 298 incidents occurred in 2013. The report also 
accumulated the total piracy and armed robbery against ships incidents since 1984.59 
There were 7,043 incidents which occurred globally from 1984-2014. 
 
Figure 3: Yearly Statistic of Piracy and Armed Robber 1984-201460 
 
                                                
59 IMO, ‘Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery aginst Ships: Annual Report 2014’ 
(International Maritime Organization, 28 April 2015) 17. 
60 Ibid, 17. 
 
 
72 
 
The 2014 IMO report also pointed out that there was an increase in piracy 
and armed robbery incidents in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore from 2011 to 
2014. Except for 2013 where the number of incident decreased, piracy and armed 
robbery continued to increase every year peaking in 2014 with 77 (committed) and 
four (attempted incidents). The Straits of Malacca and Singapore (81 incidents in 
total) are the second most affected area by acts and attempted acts of piracy and 
armed robbery against ships in 2014 after the South China Sea (93 incidents in 
total).61 
 In terms of the location of these illegal activities, the figures vary to some 
degree. In 2011, 2012 and 2014, the number of illegal acts (armed robberies) 
occurring in the territorial sea was higher than in international waters, whereas in 
2013, the number of illegal acts (piracy) occurring in international waters was higher 
than in the territorial sea. The IMO has also reported that there were several attacks 
in ports that occurred in the Strait of Malacca and Singapore 2011-2014.62 
 
  2011 2012 2013 2014 
 
In International 
Waters 
0 0 0 1 
In Territorial Waters 1 2 0 2 
In Port Area 0 0 1 1 
 1 2 1 4 
Status of Ship when  
Attacked 
Steaming 1 1 0 3 
At anchor 0 1 1 1 
Not Stated 0 0 0 0 
Table 8: Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships which were reported to have 
been Allegedly Attempted in the Malacca and Singapore Straits 2011-201463 
 
                                                
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
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 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Location of Incident 
In Territorial Waters 5 2 6 16 
In International 
Waters 
14 7 4 43 
In Port Area 2 13 6 18 
 21 22 16 77 
Status of Ship when  
Attacked 
Steaming 9 5 6 45 
At anchor 8 16 4 29 
Not Stated 4 1 6 2 
Table 9: Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships which were reported to have 
been Allegedly Committed in the Malacca and Singapore Straits 2011-201464 
 
3.3.2.2 IMB Reports 
An examination of IMB statistics reveals that globally the number of piracy and 
armed robbery has decreased from 2010 to 2014. Within the five-year period (2010-
2014) it peaked in 2010 with 445 incidents and gradually decreased every year 439, 
297, 264 and 245 respectively.65  These attacks varied in nature, which includes 
attacks in ports, the theft of ship equipment and crew’s valuable belongings, as well 
as the hijacking of ships. The IMB’s PRC also reported that in 2013 there were 202 
ships boarded, 12 ships hijacked, 304 crews taken hostage, one crew member killed, 
21 crew members injured and nine crew members kidnapped. However, these figures 
decreased slightly in 2014, where there were a total of 245 piracy and armed robbery 
incidents, with 183 ships boarded, 21 ships hijacked, 442 crews taken hostage, four 
people killed, 13 people injured and nine people kidnapped.66 Even though the 
number of incidents decreased in 2014 compared to the previous years, 245 incidents 
is still a huge number and thus should be appropriately addressed.  
 
                                                
64 Ibid. 
65 ICC-IMB, above n 43,10. 
66 Ibid, 10. 
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Category 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Attempted 89 105 67 28 28 
Boarded 196 176 174 202 183 
Fired Upon 107 113 28 22 13 
Hijack 53 45 28 12 21 
Total 445 439 297 264 245 
Table 10: Comparison of the Type of Attacks, January–December 2009-201267 
 
 
Types of Violence 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Assaulted 6 6 4 0 1 
Hostage 1174 802 585 304 442 
Injured  37 42 28 21 13 
Kidnaped/Ransom 27 10 26 36 9 
Killed 8 8 6 1 4 
Missing 0 0 0 1 1 
Threatened 18 27 13 10 9 
Total 1270 895 662 373 479 
Table 11: Types of Violence to Crew, January–September 2009-201468 
 
 
It is important to note that the decrease in the total number of incidents in 
2014 does not affect the total percentage of piracy and armed robbery incidents 
committed in Southeast Asian waters. Indeed, in 2014, Southeast Asia was the most 
piracy and armed robbery affected region in the world. Of a total of 245 attacks, 141 
were committed in Southeast Asia. On a regional basis, Africa is the second highest 
with 55 incidents in 2014. In Southeast Asia, there was significant increase in piracy 
and armed robbery incidents (committed and attempted) from 15 incidents in 2013 to 
81 incidents in 2014.69 
 
 
 
                                                
67 Ibid, 10.  
68 Ibid, 10. 
69 Ibid, 10. 
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Table 12: Total Incidents per Region, January-December 201470 
 
 
3.3.2.3 ReCAAP Reports 
The ReCAAP annual report showed a significant number of piracy and armed 
robbery acts committed in Southeast Asian waters in 2014. Out of 183 (actual and 
attempted) incidents in Asia in 2014, 153 incidents occurred in Southeast Asia. The 
report also divided the incidents into several categories such as very significant, 
moderately significant, less significant and minimum significant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Number of Incidents Occurred in Asia (actual and attempted) 2010-201471 
 
                                                
70 Ibid, 7. 
71 ReCAAP, above n 1, 6. 
Region Number of Attack 
Far East 8 
America 5 
Indian Sub-Continent 34 
Africa  55 
Southeast Asia 141 
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Figure 5: Significance level of Incidents (2010-20104)72 
 
The number of piracy incidents in 2014 which occurred in Southeast Asia is 
the highest in the five-year period from 2010 to 2014. Except in 2012, piracy and 
armed robbery incidents have been increasing since 2010. The number of incidents 
reported in 2010 were 99 (actual) and 21 (attempted) whereas in 2014 there were 140 
(actual) and 13 (attempted) incidents. In 2014, incidents which occurred in the Straits 
of Malacca and Singapore increased more than three times higher compared to 2013. 
Nonetheless there is a significant decrease in Indonesian waters from 83 incidents in 
2013 to 41 incidents in 2014. The improvement occurred in several Indonesian ports 
including Dumai, Belawan, Samarinda and Pulau Nipa.73  
Despite the decrease in piratical incidents, the ReCAAP annual report 
highlighted that compared to other areas in the region within the five-year period 
(2010-2014) Indonesia still has the highest number of incidents at its ports and 
anchorages. During such incidents in 2014, the report pointed out that the offenders 
                                                
72 Ibid, 6. 
73 Ibid, 12. 
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were armed with guns and knives (three incidents) and several crew members were 
held hostage (five incidents).74  
 
 
Table 13: Incidents occurred Southeast Asia from 2010-201475  
 
The IMO, IMB and ReCAAP reports suggest that Southeast Asia is still 
regarded as a region prone to piracy and armed robbery. The reports also revealed 
that in several incidents the perpetrators were armed with weapons.  
3.4 Overview of the International Legal Frameworks on Piracy 
This section will analyse the different international legal frameworks that govern 
piracy. The two international frameworks which are highlighted are the LOSC and 
the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Safety of Maritime 
Navigation (SUA Convention).76 Before going into the discussion of the legal 
frameworks, this section elaborates several definitions of piracy which are widely 
acknowledged by States.  
                                                
74 Ibid, 12. 
75 Ibid, 12. 
76 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Safety of Maritime Navigation, opened 
for signature 10 March 1988, (entered into force1 March 1992). Hereinafter referred to as SUA 
Convention. 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
 Actual Attempted Actual Attempted Actual Attempted Actual Attempted Actual Attempted 
Gulf of 
Thailand 
1          
Indian Ocean          1 
Indonesia 37 10 47 2 66 6 83 7 41 5 
Malaysia 18  14 3 11  6  4 1 
Myanmar   1        
Philippines 5  4 2 3  5  5  
Singapore 2  3  2      
South China 
Sea 
17 8 12 6 7  10 1 40 2 
Straits of 
Malacca and 
Singapore 
5 3 24 2 12 1 12  44 4 
Thailand 1          
Vietnam 13  8  3 1 8 1 6  
Sub-Total 99 21 113 15 104 8 124 9 140 13 
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3.4.2 Law of the Sea Convention 
The Security Council has repeatedly affirmed that international law, as reflected in 
LOSC, regulates the legal framework applicable to combating piracy and armed 
robbery at sea, as well as other ocean activities. In particular, the United Nations has 
regulated the problem of piracy in Articles 100 to 107 of the LOSC.77 Article 100 of 
the LOSC obliges all States to cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the 
repression of piracy.78   
 
State Signature 
dd/mm/yy 
Ratification/accession; 
dd/mm/yy 
Brunei Darussalam 05/12/84 05/11/96 
Cambodia 01/07/83  
Indonesia 10/12/82 03/02/86 
Lao PDR 10/12/82 02/05/86 
Malaysia 10/12/82 14/10/96 
Myanmar 10/12/82 21/05/96 
Philippines 10/12/82 08/05/84 
Singapore 10/12/82 17/11/94 
Thailand 10/12/82 15/05/11 
Timor-Leste  08/10/13(accession) 
Viet Nam 10/12/82 25/07/94 
 
Table 14: Ratification of the UNCLOS by Southeast Asian States 
 
                                                
77 Articles 101-107, LOSC. 
78 Article 101, LOSC. 
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Article 103 of LOSC defines a pirate ship or aircraft.79 According to this 
provision, where a ship or aircraft is under the dominant control of a person who 
intends to commit one of the acts stipulated in Article 101, then it is deemed to be a 
pirate ship or aircraft. Furthermore, the same provision applies to those ships and 
aircrafts which have been used to commit piracy and which are still under the control 
of the pirate who committed the act.    
Where a mutiny takes place on board a warship, government ship or 
government aircraft, then the vessel or aircraft will be treated as though it is a private 
ship, provided it commits one of the acts mentioned in Article 101.80 This provision 
is stipulated in Article 102 of LOSC. In any event, if the crew of a warship, 
government ship or aircraft rebels and takes over the ship or aircraft, and proceeds to 
commit an act of piracy, this activity is considered illegal and will constitute piracy.81     
Under Article 104 of LOSC, a flag State may retain or lose the ownership of a 
ship or aircraft which has become a pirate ship in accordance with the domestic law 
of the flag State.82 Therefore, if a State has, under its national law, determined that a 
pirate ship shall retain the ownership of the flag State, then according to Article 104 
of the LOSC, the State has the right to own the pirate ship.83   
The right of a State to seize a pirate ship or aircraft is permissible under 
Article 105 of LOSC in certain circumstances.84 Importantly, the seizure must take 
place on the high seas or in another place outside the jurisdiction of any State. 
Moreover, the State conducting the seizure is entitled to arrest the pirates and seize 
                                                
79 Article 103, LOSC. 
80 S. Kaye, ‘The International Legal Framework for Piracy’ in A. Forbes (ed), Australia’s Response to 
Piracy: A Legal Perspective (2011) 31, 38. 
81 Article 102, LOSC. 
82 Article 104, LOSC. 
83 Kaye, above n 69, 38. 
84 Article 105, LOSC. 
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the property on the ship or aircraft. The State conducting the seizure has, through its 
courts, the right to impose sanctions on the pirates, as well as determine what action 
to take in respect of the property on board the ship or aircraft.    
Article 107 of the LOSC specifies those ships or aircraft which have the 
authority to conduct a seizure on account of piracy. These include warships, military 
aircraft, as well as any other ship or aircraft which is authorised by the government 
and has a sign or mark which is clearly identifiable as a government service ship or 
aircraft.  
There have been debates as to whether a State’s EEZ qualifies as part of the 
‘high seas’ when dealing with piracy. Interestingly, LOSC has defined ‘high seas’ in 
two different ways. Some parts of LOSC refer to the area outside the territorial sea as 
the high seas. This includes the contiguous zone as well as the EEZ. In contrast, 
Article 86 of LOSC states that the high seas include all parts of the sea except the 
EEZ, territorial sea, internal waters and archipelagic waters.85 This debate arises due 
to the existence of some rights which could be enjoyed not only on the high seas, but 
also in the EEZ. According to Article 58(1) of LOSC, every State, whether it is 
landlocked or coastal, enjoys freedom of navigation and overflight, as well as the 
laying of submarine cables and “other internationally lawful uses of the sea” in the 
EEZ.86  
The LOSC in Article 58(2), explicitly states that the high seas provisions of 
the convention, including the rules on piracy, apply to the exclusive economic zone. 
The Article states that the contents of Articles 88 to 115 (which include piracy and 
                                                
85 Article 86, LOSC. Also see, for a discussion of LOSC-related archipelagic issues in the case of the 
Philippines, Jay Batongbacal, ‘A Philippine Perspective on Archipelagic State Issues,’ (2002) 122 
Maritime Studies 18. 
86 Article 58 (1), LOSC. 
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other international maritime law provisions), apply to the EEZ, so long as they are 
not incompatible with the provisions of Part V.87 In other words, if one of the illegal 
acts stipulated in Article 101 is conducted beyond the outer extent of the territorial 
sea - that is, the contiguous zone or the EEZ, then such an act is considered piracy. 
The seizure of pirated ships is not always lawful. Under Article 106 of LOSC, 
where the seizure is carried out by a State without adequate grounds, the State 
conducting the seizure will be liable for any loss or damage to the State of nationality 
of the seized ship or aircraft.88  
The next issue for consideration is whether the articles in the LOSC that seek 
to regulate piracy are effective. From the outset, it is important to note that piracy 
continues to take place, and more importantly, that LOSC does not cover the whole 
issue of piracy. Indeed, a large number of piratical incidents are committed at sea 
each year,89 especially in the Southeast Asia region. IMB reported that in 2014 there 
were 245 incidents which occurred globally. Out of 245 incidents, 57.55 per cent or 
141 incidents occurred in Southeast Asia.90 Cases such as the piracy committed on 
board the Trimaggada in 2003, the sea robbery in Panjang in 2003,91 incidents 
involving Sunrise 689 and Srikandi 515 in 2014, are examples of sea-based crimes 
perpetrated in the Southeast Asia region.92 These cases occurred despite the 
widespread ratification of LOSC in the region, so it could be argued that the 
regulations governing piracy in LOSC are not sufficient to eradicate the problem.   
                                                
87 Article 58 (2), LOSC. 
88 Article 106, LOSC. 
89 Rommel C Banlaoi, ‘Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia’ (2005) 58(4) Naval War College 
Review , 63. 
90 ICC-IMB, above n 43, 5. 
91 Dana R Dillon, ‘Maritime piracy: Defining the problem’ (2005) 25(1) SAIS Review 155, 159.   
92 ReCAAP, above n 1, 32-33. 
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In light of the above difficulties, it is proposed that States in Southeast Asia 
(and particularly those with large maritime areas) try to find a more effective 
solution. One step that could be taken is the creation of new regional legal 
instruments that seek to penalise perpetrators of piracy. However, before considering 
such a solution, States should clearly define the elements of the offence of piracy 
itself. 
3.4.3 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Safety of Maritime 
Navigation 
The SUA Convention is a legal instrument addressing illegal acts conducted at sea, 
including piracy. Although this convention does not specifically address piracy, 
piratical acts are subject to it. The SUA Convention was initiated after the hijacking 
of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro in 1988 – an act which was allegedly 
motivated by political ends.93 Unfortunately, the perpetrators of this hijacking were 
not able to be apprehended pursuant to Article 101 of LOSC,94 as the act did not meet 
the requirement of having been “committed for private ends.” Therefore, it was 
incumbent upon States to create a legally binding instrument which could be used to 
arrest perpetrators of criminal acts conducted at sea in circumstances where such acts 
had been committed for political and other ends. 
 The SUA Convention fills the gap left by LOSC – namely, that piratical acts 
must involve two or more ships on the high seas or another area beyond the national 
jurisdiction of States.95 The SUA Convention96 in Article 3 provides that it is an 
offence for any person to unlawfully and intentionally: (i) seize or exercise control 
                                                
93 Harrelson, above n 22, 293. 
94 Article 101, LOSC. 
95 Harrelson, above n 22, 293. 
96 Article 3, SUA Convention. 
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over a ship by force, threat, or intimidation97; (ii) perform an act of violence against a 
person on board a ship if that act is likely to endanger the safe navigation of the 
ship98; (iii) destroy or cause damage to a ship or its cargo which is likely to endanger 
the safe navigation of the ship99; (iv) place or cause to be placed on a ship a device 
which causes damage to the ship or its cargo100; (v) destroy maritime navigational 
facilities101; (vi) communicate false information102; and (vii) injure or kill any person 
in connection with the commission of an offence set out in the convention.103                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 As mentioned above, piratical acts under the SUA Convention do not require 
the involvement of two ships on the high seas. Indeed, the mere act of taking control 
of a ship with the use of force or intimidation qualifies as an offence under the 
Convention, even if the perpetrator is from the same ship. Furthermore, to bring 
proceedings against an offender, the SUA Convention does not require the act to have 
been committed on the high seas. Rather, Article 4 explains that the Convention will 
apply “if the ship is navigating or is scheduled to navigate into, through or from 
waters beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea”.104  
The SUA Convention also aims to punish perpetrators of sea based crimes. 
Article 10(1) expounds that a State has the responsibility to prosecute or extradite 
offenders committing one or more of the crimes stated in Article 3 of the 
Convention.105 Article 11(1) elaborates that offences in Article 3 are extraditable 
                                                
97 Article 3 (i), SUA Convention. 
98 Article 3 (ii), SUA Convention. 
99 Article 3 (iii), SUA Convention. 
100 Article 3 (iv), SUA Convention. 
101 Article 3 (v), SUA Convention. 
102 Article 3 (vi), SUA Convention. 
103 Article 3 (vii), SUA Convention. 
104 Article 4, SUA Convention. 
105 Article 10 (1), SUA Convention. 
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based on the existence of any extradition treaty between States.106 Where States do 
not have an extradition treaty, the Convention allows states, through Article 11(2), to 
use the SUA Convention as the legal basis for extradition.107 In terms of prosecution, 
the Convention clearly states in Article 6(1) that each State party has the right to 
establish jurisdiction if the offence meets one of the following requirements: (i) the 
offence is against or on board a ship flying the flag of a State;108 (ii) the attack is 
committed in the territory of the State, including its territorial sea;109 or (iii) the 
perpetrator is a citizen of the State.110  
 
 SUA Convention 
1988 
Brunei Darussalam ü 
Cambodia ü 
Indonesia x 
Laos ü 
Malaysia x 
Myanmar ü 
Philippines ü 
Singapore ü 
Thailand  x 
Vietnam ü 
Timor Leste x 
 
Legend: ü = acceded, x = has not acceded 
Table 15: Accession Status of SUA Convention in Southeast Asia111 
 
                                                
106 Article 11 (1), SUA Convention. 
107 Article 11 (2), SUA Convention. 
108 Article 6 (1)(i), SUA Convention. 
109 Article 6 (1)(ii), SUA Convention. 
110 Article 6 (1)(iii), SUA Convention. 
111 Accession Status of SUA Convention in Southeast Asia, see  
 http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx, at 4th May 2015. 
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3.5 Overview of the Regional Legal Frameworks on Piracy 
This section explains the measures taken by States at the regional level in order to 
address the problem of piracy. This section will discuss various regional efforts such 
as the Regional Cooperation Agreement against Piracy and Armed Robbery against 
Ships in Asia (ReCAAP); Malacca Strait Patrol; and measures within the Association 
of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) framework. 
3.5.1 Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery 
against Ships in Asia  
Cooperation is a key element in preventing, deterring, as well as suppressing acts of 
piracy and armed robbery. This cooperation could be enhanced at the multilateral, 
regional as well as bilateral level. In Resolution 63/111, the United Nation General 
Assembly (UNGA) stated that international, regional, sub-regional and bilateral 
cooperation plays a significant role in combating piracy, armed robbery and other 
threats to maritime security.112 This Resolution, which was passed on 12 February 
2009, also demonstrated the concern of the international community over the 
escalation of piratical acts around the world.113 Furthermore, the IMO Code of 
Practice for Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships 
echoed this concern, urging States to adopt and implement agreements as a 
cooperation tool, as well as to combat piracy and armed robbery against ships.114 
In accordance with the above concerns, Asian states, especially those in 
Southeast Asia, have adopted the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating 
                                                
112 United Nation General Assembly Resolution on Oceans and the law of the sea, Sixty-third session, 
Agenda item 70 (a), Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 5 December 2008. See  
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/63/111 at 14th October 2015. 
113 Robin Geiss and Anna Petrig, Piracy and armed robbery at sea: the legal framework for counter-
piracy operations in Somalia and the Gulf of Aden (Oxford University Press, 2011), 44. 
114 Ibid, 44. 
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Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia.115 The Japanese initiative was 
positively received by the international community. In March 2006, the UNGA 
passed Resolution 60/30, which in principle welcomed ReCAAP and urged States to 
conclude, adopt and implement regional agreements in high risk areas.116 ReCAAP 
also served as a guide for the adoption of similar regional measures in the Western 
Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden. 
ReCAAP went through a protracted negotiation process and was the result of 
a multilateral legal framework in which States in the region sought a tool to prevent 
and suppress piracy and armed robbery. The drafting of ReCAAP involved ten 
members of the ASEAN, as well as another six countries from South and Northeast 
Asia. In accordance with Article 18(5), ReCAAP is open to any State interested in 
joining.117 However, before 4 September 2006, it was only intended that regional 
States could accede to the agreement.118 Currently, ReCAAP consists of 20 parties, 
but the two main players in the region – namely, Indonesia and Malaysia, are not 
members. This poses a challenge to the successful implementation of the lofty goals 
of ReCAAP.119 
                                                
115 Regional Cooperation Agreement against Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia, 
adopted 11th November 2004, (entered into force 4 September 2006). Hereinafter referred to as 
ReCAAP. See 
http://www.recaap.org/Portals/0/docs/About%20ReCAAP%20ISC/ReCAAP%20Agreement.pdf 
browsed 4th May 2015. 
116 United Nation General Assembly Resolution on Oceans and the law of the sea, Sixty-third session, 
Agenda item 75 (a), Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 29 November 2005. See 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/489/34/PDF/N0548934.pdf?OpenElement  at 
14th October 2015. 
117 Article 18 (5), ReCAAP. 
118 Geiss and Petrig, above n 113, 45. 
119 About ReCAAP, see http://www.recaap.org/AboutReCAAPISC.aspx at 14th October 2015 
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 Malaysia and Indonesia have different reasons why they remained outside the 
ReCAAP arrangement.120 Malaysia did not agree that the ReCAAP ISC should be 
located in Singapore. Malaysia argued that since the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre is 
located in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, to have another reporting centre is close 
proximity is unnecessary.121 Furthermore, Indonesia has concerns regarding the 
presence of ReCAAP, arguing that it would undermine its sovereignty.122 The 
sensitivity of Indonesia over its sovereignty in the Malacca Straits, as well as its 
preference of conducting security cooperation within a bilateral framework with its 
neighbours, instead of a multilateral one, account for its reservations toward 
ReCAAP.123 It was also concerned that the ISC may publish reports which are unfair 
to littoral States.124 
Thus, both Indonesia and Malaysia do not share their information openly with 
ReCAAP compared to other Southeast Asian countries which are signatories to the 
arrangement. Neither State has joined ReCAAP, possibly because they fear of 
exposing blind spots in their intelligence-gathering. Indonesia, according to 
numerous reports125, are prone to maritime attacks and its patrol boats are old and 
costly to run. But both States have stated that they would cooperate with ReCAAP126. 
In case of a body aimed at information sharing (ReCAAP), this is a major issue.  
                                                
120 Miha Hribernik, ‘Countering Maritime Piracy and Robbery in Southeast Asia’ (2013) 13(2) 
Briefing Paper , 8. 
121 Sam Bateman, ‘Piracy and armed robbery against ships in Indonesian waters’ (2009) 119. 
122 John F Bradford, ‘Shifting the tides against piracy in Southeast Asian waters’ (2008) 489. 
123 Alfred Daniel Matthews, Indonesian maritime security cooperation in the Malacca Straits (Masters 
Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California, 2015) 51. 
124 Ibid., 62.  
125 ICC International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, Report for the 
Period 1 January – 31 December 2015, (ICC International Maritime Bureau , January 2016) 18, 22, 
28-29. 
126 John Stevenson and Garett Tippin, “The Audacity of Hype: Why International Cooperation will 
easily defeat Piracy in Southeast Asia”, 29 July 2015, Online: 
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3.5.1.1 Content of ReCAAP 
The constitutive text of ReCAAP defines ‘piracy’ and ‘armed robbery’. Indeed, these 
definitions are not new to member States, as the agreement adopts the definition of 
piracy from Article 101 of LOSC127, and the definition of armed robbery from the 
IMO Code of Practice for the Investigation of Armed Robbery against Ships128. The 
agreement also explains, in Article 3(1), that States must take necessary steps in 
accordance with national and international law to: (i) prevent and suppress piracy 
and armed robbery;129 (ii) arrest pirates or persons committing armed robbery;130 (iii) 
seize ships or aircrafts committing piracy or armed robbery;131 and (iv) rescue victim 
ships as well as victims of piracy and armed robbery.132 
ReCAAP acts as a hub for information sharing, cooperation, as well as 
capacity-building for member States. Through its Information Sharing Centre (ISC), 
created pursuant to Article 4 of the agreement, ReCAAP operates as an information 
body which shares collected information with member States.133 The ISC acts as an 
international organisation which operates under the guidance of a Governing 
Council. The ISC consists of representatives from each contracting party and also has 
a Secretariat in Singapore, which operated for the first time on 29 November 2006. 
In addition, Article 7 elaborates that the ISC serves as an information exchange 
centre, as well as an organisation which analyses various reports prepared by 
                                                                                                                                     
http://www.start.umd.edu/news/audacity-hype-why-international-cooperation-will-easily-defeat-
piracy-southeast-asia. 
127 Article 101, LOSC. 
128 Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships. 
Adopted on 2 December 2009. Resolution A.1025 (26). See 
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/PiracyArmedRobbery/Guidance/Documents/A.1025.pdf at 
14th October 2015. 
129 Article 3(1)(i), ReCAAP. 
130 Article 3(1)(ii), ReCAAP. 
131 Article 3(1)(iii), ReCAAP. 
132 Article 3(1)(iv), ReCAAP. 
133 Article 4, ReCAAP. 
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member States.134 In order to fulfil its function, the ISC requires focal points from 
each State in order to ease the communication between itself and contracting 
parties.135 Hence, Article 9 requires every State to submit their focal points that will 
act on behalf of the State to inform and receive information regarding ReCAAP.136 
Through the ISC, States are also able to request other States to cooperate in 
identifying perpetrators of piracy or armed robbery, as mandated in Article 10.137  
ReCAAP provides extradition measures. According to Article 12, member 
States, in accordance with their respective national laws, must cooperate to extradite 
persons who have committed piracy or armed robbery.138 If the perpetrators are 
present in the territory of a member State, then upon request by the other contracting 
States, the State is urged to cooperate and extradite the perpetrators to the State that 
has jurisdiction over them. Furthermore, ReCAAP enables member States to seek 
mutual legal assistance and share evidence in accordance with Article 13.139 In this 
context, however, ReCAAP recognises the supremacy of a State’s national laws, and 
therefore any prosecution, extradition or mutual legal assistance measures must be in 
conformity with the prevailing national laws of the States concerned.  
As a regional measure, ReCAAP does not supersede the enforcement 
measures of LOSC. In line with this view, the agreement does not facilitate member 
States to seize pirate ships in other States’ territorial waters. Although piracy is 
subject to universal jurisdiction, ReCAAP respects the sovereignty of other States 
and does not interfere in the national jurisdiction of a State. This assessment is 
                                                
134 Article 7, ReCAAP. 
135 Geiss and Petrig, above n 113, 46. 
136 Article 9, ReCAAP. 
137 Article 10, ReCAAP. 
138 Article 12, ReCAAP. 
139 Article 13, ReCAAP. 
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embedded in Article 2(5) of the general provisions, which in principle explains that 
no State is entitled to exercise jurisdiction over another State’s territorial sea.140 
Although ReCAAP is unlikely to make a great impact in terms of joint 
maritime enforcement operations (but does provide for operational cooperation), it is 
believed that the agreement is promising and will lead the way in eradicating piracy 
and armed robbery against ships.141 As stated in Article 7(9), the ISC is also entitled 
to perform other functions which are considered necessary upon the consent of the 
Governing Council.142 Such consent requires the Governing Council to reach a 
consensus as mandated by Article 4(6)143, with a view to preventing, suppressing and 
deterring piracy and armed robbery. Although this measure might seem promising, 
the limited enforcement measures provided in Article 2(5) forms a barrier to the 
agreement breaking through the loopholes of the high seas requirement in LOSC.144 
Nonetheless, ReCAAP is a valuable tool for fostering cooperation and coordination 
between States in combating piracy and armed robbery in Asia, and particularly in 
Southeast Asia. Therefore, although ReCAAP lacks robust enforcement measures, its 
ability to enhance mutual trust and confidence building between States may pave the 
way for stronger cooperation in the future. Indeed, it is possible that ReCAAP may 
lead to joint or coordinated patrolling between States over Southeast Asian waters, as 
well as even more significant enforcement measures in other State’s territorial 
waters. 
 
 
                                                
140 Article 2(5), ReCAAP. 
141 Geiss and Petrig, above n 113, 47. 
142 Article 7(9), ReCAAP. 
143 Article 4(6), ReCAAP. 
144 Article 2(5), ReCAAP. 
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Southeast Asian States ReCAPP 
Brunei Darussalam ü 
Cambodia ü 
Indonesia x 
Laos ü 
Malaysia x 
Myanmar ü 
Philippines ü 
Singapore ü 
Thailand  ü 
Vietnam ü 
Timor Leste x 
 
Legend: ü = acceded, x = has not acceded 
Table 16: Accession Status of ReCAAP in Southeast Asia145 
 
3.5.2 Malacca Strait Patrol 
Another regional effort to suppress piracy, especially in the Malacca Straits, 
is the MALSINDO (Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia) operation, which was 
introduced in July 2004. MALSINDO is composed of navies from three littoral 
States in the Malacca and Singapore Straits – namely, Malaysia, Singapore and 
Indonesia.146 Its task is to conduct coordinated patrols within their respective 
territorial seas in the Strait of Malacca. One of the weaknesses of this patrol is that it 
does not allow cross border pursuit into other States’ territorial seas, as this is viewed 
as an interference with State sovereignty. Indeed, even in hot pursuit, the contracting 
States are not allowed to enter the territorial waters of other States.147 Thus, it is not 
surprising that even after the introduction of this measure, there was no significant 
reduction in piratical attacks in the Strait of Malacca since its inception until late 
                                                
145 About ReCAAP, see http://www.recaap.org/AboutReCAAPISC.aspx at 14th October 2015. 
146 Z Raymond, R., ‘Piracy and Armed Robbery in the Malacca Strait: A Problem Solved?’ in Bruce A 
Elleman, Andrew Forbes and David Rosenberg (eds), Piracy and maritime crime: Historical and 
modern case studies (Naval War College Press, 2010) , 114. 
147 Article 111, LOSC. 
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2004. Nonetheless, this is understandable as MALSINDO was only able to function 
for several months before the tsunami occurred in December 2004.   
A significant reduction in piratical attacks around the Malacca Strait was 
reported in 2005. One of the main reasons for this was the Asian tsunami, which 
affected the northern part of Indonesia, Aceh and surrounding coastlines. The 
tsunami resulted in the death of a vast number of people living in the northern part of 
Indonesia, in Aceh, which was considered a haven for pirates. As a result, the IMB 
reported that there was a 60 per cent reduction in piracy and armed robbery attacks in 
2005 compared to the previous year. Furthermore, even after the recovery of the 
region in the wake of the disaster, and the concomitant increase in the number of 
people living in Aceh, the number of piracy cases has not been as high as in 2004.  
Another reason that could account for the drop in piratical attacks in the 
region is the political situation in Aceh. This province was once heavily occupied by 
the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), particularly before the 2004 tsunami. Indeed, 
GAM had been in conflict with the Indonesian government for more than 20 years. 
However, after the tsunami, both GAM and the Indonesian Government participated 
in negotiations and decided to bring an end to the conflict. GAM agreed to surrender 
their weapons, and the Indonesian Government agreed to withdraw thousands of 
troops from the province. 
The reduction in the number of piratical attacks was also influenced by the 
launching of an aerial patrol over the Malacca Straits, known as the “Eyes in the 
Sky” (EiS) Plan.148 This plan which is an adjunct to MALSINDO, allows patrolling 
aircraft to fly over the territorial sea (up to three nautical miles) of other States. This 
                                                
148 Raymond, above n 147, 115. 
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measure was introduced to strengthen water patrols, which are limited to the 
territorial sea of the respective States.  
In 2006, the Malacca Straits Patrols (MSP) was formed, consisting of both 
MALSINDO and EiS. The Malacca Straits Patrols Information System (MSP-IS), 
which used to operate separately, later joined MSP and was re-named the 
Intelligence Exchange Group (IEG). This group plays an important role in the 
exchange of data among member States. In 2008 and 2009, Thailand joined 
MALSINDO and EiS respectively.149     
3.5.3 ASEAN Measures 
Piracy has also been a lingering concern for the ASEAN regime. Indeed, over 
the years, various measures to combat piratical attacks have been initiated by several 
ASEAN members. However, maritime security issues including piracy do not affect 
all members of the organisation.150 Therefore, to date, no anti-piracy measures have 
been adopted which involve all members of ASEAN. 
Nonetheless, ASEAN has been committed to discussing issues related to 
maritime security in their meetings. As a result, there have been three prominent 
forums to address maritime security - namely, the ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF), 
the ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional Meeting (ARF-ISM) on Maritime 
Security, and the Maritime Security Expert Working Group (MSEWG)151.   
                                                
149 H. Lowen and A. Boedenmuller, ‘Straits of Malacca’ in Stefan Mair (ed), Piracy and Maritime 
Security: Regional Characteristics and political, military, legal and economic implications (Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, 2011) vol 2, 46. 
150 Ibid, 46. 
151 S. Bateman, ‘Solving the "Wicked Problems" of Maritime Security: Are Regional Forums up to the 
Task?’ (2011) 33(1) Contemporary Southeast Asia 1, 18. 
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The AMF was established in July 2010 to address not only maritime security 
issues such as piracy, but also other issues including the protection of the marine 
environment, illegal fishing, maritime transportation as well as people smuggling.152 
Moreover, it was agreed that the AMF would facilitate ASEAN connectivity through 
the establishment of maritime linkages.153 
The ARF-ISM, which was established in July 2008 (at the 15th meeting of the 
ARF) aims to facilitate clear dialogue concerning maritime security. This dialogue 
includes, but is not limited to, piracy and armed robbery, the smuggling of goods and 
people, as well as capacity building and cooperation.154 The first ARF-ISM meeting 
took place in Indonesia in 2009 and has since been held annually. On the third 
meeting, which was held in Tokyo, the Work Plan for the group was devised. It 
identified three main objectives: (i) information/intelligence exchange and sharing of 
best practices, including transparency around naval capacity building operations; (ii) 
confidence building measures based on international and legal frameworks, 
arrangements and cooperation; and (iii) capacity building of maritime law 
enforcement agencies in the region.155 
The MSEWG was initiated by the ASEAN Defence Minister Meeting Plus 
(ADMM Plus) during its inaugural session in October 2010. The ADMM Plus agreed 
to oversee regional security issues including maritime security. The objective of the 
                                                
152 Ibid, 18. 
153 Termsak Chalermpalanupap, “ASEAN and Maritime Security: An Update”, paper presented at 
Centre for International Law Workshop, “International Maritime Crimes: Legal Issues and Prospects 
for cooperation in ASEAN”, Singapore 17-18 January 2011. 
154 Bateman, above n 152, 18.  
155 Termsak Chalermpalanupap, “ASEAN and Maritime Security: An Update”, paper presented at 
Centre for International Law Workshop, “International Maritime Crimes: Legal Issues and Prospects 
for cooperation in ASEAN”, Singapore 17-18 January 2011. 
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MSEWG is to discuss issues including, but not limited to, piracy, search and rescue 
operations and illegal trafficking.156 
In addition to the three forums mentioned above, ASEAN has also devised 
initiatives to address maritime security threats including piracy. These initiatives 
include the ASEAN Declaration on the Prevention and Control of Transnational 
Crime157, the Hanoi Declaration of 1998158, the Bali Concord II 2003159, the ASEAN 
Security Community Plan of Action and Vientiane Action Programme 2004–2010160, 
as well as the ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint.161 In addition, in 
2003, the ARF produced the ARF Statement on Cooperation against Piracy and 
Other Threats to Security.162 This statement was issued during the tenth ARF 
meeting in Cambodia. The statements generally urged to promote regional 
cooperation to maintain peace and stability, build upon existing modes of pacific 
settlement of disputes and consider strengthening them with additional mechanisms 
as needed. It also explained that maritime security is an indispensable and 
fundamental condition for the welfare and economic security of the region.  
Furthermore, the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters is another 
instrument that could be used to enhance the investigation, prevention and 
                                                
156 Bateman, above n 152, 19. 
157 ASEAN Declaration on the Prevention and Control of Transnational Crime, see 
http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-political-security-community/item/manila-declaration-on-
the-prevention-and-control-of-transnational-crime-1998-introduction, at 12th October 2015. 
158 The Hanoi Declaration of 1998, see http://www.asean.org/news/item/ha-noi-declaration-of-1998-
16-december-1998, at 12th October 2015.  
159 the Bali Concord II 2003, see http://www.mfa.go.th/asean/contents/files/other-20130527-164513-
046340.pdf, at 12th October 2015. 
160 The ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action and Vientiane Action Programme 2004–2010 
https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/documents/ASEAN-041129-VientianeActionProgramme.pdf, at 
12th October 2015. 
161 The ASEAN Political-Security Community Blueprint, see http://www.asean.org/archive/5187-
18.pdf, at 12th October 2015. 
162 Asean Regional Forum Statement on Cooperation Against Piracy And other Threats to Maritime 
Security. Adopted at 17 June 2003, in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. See 
http://www.aseansec.org/14837.htm, at 4 May 2015.  
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prosecution of criminal activities by law enforcement authorities. The treaty enables 
member states render to one another the widest possible measure of mutual legal 
assistance in criminal matters, namely investigations, prosecutions and resulting 
proceedings.163 Another political document that addresses maritime security is the 
EAS Statement on Enhancing Regional Maritime Security Cooperation, which, in 
principle, highlights the importance of enhancing regional cooperation in promoting 
maritime safety and security. It also tasked member States’ respective officials to 
explore the possibility of including maritime cooperation as a priority area of EAS 
cooperation. 164 
3.6 Analysis of the Prevailing International and Regional Legal Framework 
Piracy still poses a serious threat to the region, affecting both international commerce 
and human safety. The international legal frameworks governing piracy, as embodied 
in the LOSC and the SUA Convention, do not appear to be adequate to resolve the 
problem.165 Indeed, the definition of piracy contained in LOSC is too narrow to 
encompass most of the piratical acts that occur in the Southeast Asia region. In 
particular, a significant proportion of piratical attacks occur in territorial waters, but 
LOSC only covers acts committed in waters beyond the territorial sea.166 Moreover, 
the SUA Convention, which was intended to fill the gap left by LOSC, has failed to 
gain popularity in the region. In fact, two important littoral States in the region, 
Indonesia and Malaysia, are not party to the SUA Convention 1988 or its Protocol. 
                                                
163 Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters 
http://agreement.asean.org/media/download/20160901074559.pdf, at 20 November 2016  
164 EAS Statement on Enhancing Regional Maritime Security Cooperation, Kuala Lumpur, 22 
November 2015, http://www.asean.org/storage/images/2015/November/10th-EAS-
Outcome/EAS%20Statement%20on%20Enhancing%20Regional%20Maritime%20Cooperation%20-
%20FINAL%2022%20November%202015.pdf at 17 November 2016. 
165 Erik Barrios, ‘Casting a wider net: addressing the maritime piracy problem in Southeast Asia’ 
(2005) 28 BC Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 149, 163. 
166 Ibid, 163. 
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Therefore, at present, the SUA Convention is essentially inapplicable in the region’s 
most piracy/armed robbery afflicted waters.  
Regional forums have also been used to address the issue of maritime 
security, with a particular emphasis on the eradication of piracy. Forums such as the 
AMF, the ARF-ISM and the MSEWG could be used as a tool to foster understanding 
between States on anti-piracy measures, and to discuss the issue in an open and 
transparent manner. Political instruments that were produced by some of these 
forums are as follows: ASEAN Regional Forum Ministerial Statement on Enhancing 
Cooperation among Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies issued by AMF, which, in 
principle, encourages members States to promote concrete and practical cooperation 
between respective Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies, and ASEAN Regional 
Forum Work Plan for Maritime Security 2015-2017 issued by the ARF, which 
creates a practical, long-term, coordinated and comprehensive plan that creates a 
compilation of shared experiences and lessons learned between member States. It 
should be noted, however, that many of these forums, including those mentioned 
above, are often regarded as ‘talk shops’, and hence a more technical approach to 
involving a majority of Southeast Asian states is needed.167 In light of the Malacca 
Strait Patrol playing a significant role in suppressing piracy in the Strait of Malacca, 
similar efforts involving a larger number of countries in the region could be part of 
the solution. Furthermore, the doctrine of territorial sovereignty, which has as one of 
its chief tenets the principle of non-intervention, still plays a pivotal role in the 
foreign policy of regional States. The application of this approach should be 
reconsidered, as it forms one of the barriers to multilateral cooperation. Indeed, it is 
                                                
167 Bateman, above n 152, 21. 
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proposed that a cooperative mind-set should be developed and promoted among 
Southeast Asian States, along with an understanding that regional cooperation does 
not preclude respect for a State’s territorial sovereignty.     
Extra-regional actors could also play a role in enhancing maritime security in 
the region. Their understanding of maritime security issues (including piracy), could 
help in the capacity building of people and communities in Southeast Asia.168 
Moreover, extra-regional actors could be involved in enhancing interregional 
initiatives such as ReCAAP. Indeed, they could join ReCAAP and promulgate 
initiatives to eradicate piracy. The involvement of Thailand in the Malacca Strait 
Patrols, as well as the growing number of States joining ReCAAP, demonstrates the 
possibility of expanding regional cooperation.169 Furthermore, ReCAAP’s growing 
membership can be seen as an indication that States in the region are becoming 
increasingly aware of the importance of cooperation to combat maritime security 
challenges. ReCAAP was proposed by Japan, ‘which emphasized sharing 
information about ships victimized by and suspected of committing piracy and armed 
robbery’170. Its inception has changed Japan’s aid distribution pattern. Japan 
channelled  aid for maritime security capacity building through the multilateral 
ReCAAP.171 Most of the Southeast Asian States perceived this Japanese initiative as 
a positive measure to address maritime security in the region. Japan’s contribution, 
                                                
168 S Huang, ‘Building Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Outsiders Not Welcome?’ (2008) 61 
Naval War College Review 87, 19. 
169 Lowen and Boedenmuller, above n 150, 48. 
170 Yoichiro Sato, Southeast Asian Receptiveness To Japanese Maritime Security Cooperation, Asia-
Pacific Center For Security Studies September 2007, 3. 
171 The Seventh Governing Council Meeting of the ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC), Press 
Release, 7 March 2013, 4; Scott Cheney-Peters, “US, Japan to Boost ASEAN Maritime Security”, The 
Diplomat, 30 April 2014. 
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particularly funding of ReCAAP, was also welcomed by most Southeast Asian 
States.  
Building trust and confidence among Southeast Asian States could also play a 
pivotal role in solving maritime issues such as piracy. Trust and confidence-building 
measures, such as information sharing would diffuse tension and uncertainly between 
States, resulting in better relations. The ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre, which 
is based in Singapore, collects, analyses and disseminates information regarding 
piratical attacks and threats in the region. Another information sharing framework is 
the Information Fusion Centre (IFC), which is hosted by the Republic of Singapore 
Navy’s Changi Command and Control Centre (C2C). The IFC communicates with 
relevant agencies in order to share maritime security-related information. 
Furthermore, the ADMM-Plus Maritime Security Community Information Sharing 
Portal (AMSCIP), which was established by the ADMM-Plus EWG on Maritime 
Security, facilitates information sharing between the member States172. Nonetheless, 
despite of the presence of numerous information sharing arrangements, the current 
situation is far from perfect and there are definitely gaps since there is no single 
institutional measure that sufficiently covers all information sharing across all States 
in the region. However, this can only be achieved if the political environment in the 
region is supportive.173 Therefore, issues surrounding security and arms race 
escalation would need to be set aside. Moreover, the expansion of military forces 
should not occur because of an arms race, or security dilemma, but more to facilitate 
the need of cooperation.  
                                                
172 Discussion Paper, East Asia Summit Seminar on Maritime Security and Cooperation, Sydney, 22-
25 November 2016. 
173 Bateman, above n 152, 22. 
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Despite the sharp decline in the number of piracy cases in the Malacca Straits 
since 2004, piratical attacks continue to occur.174 Indeed, the current situation could 
be improved if Indonesia and Malaysia (as coastal States) would enhance the 
economic condition of their citizens, reduce poverty and unemployment. In addition, 
measures such as the MSP continue to play an important role and should therefore be 
continued.  Whilst it is imprudent to suggest that the MSP directly caused the dip in 
reported cases of piracy since 2004, it can be securely asserted that regional 
cooperation and coordination in anti-piracy operations among littoral States 
contributed to this decline.175 
It is evident that the current maritime security focus in the Strait of Malacca 
must be extended to other parts of the region. The significant decline in piracy cases 
post-2004 is not only due to the Asian tsunami, but a variety of measures taken by 
littoral States. It is proposed that these same measures be adapted and applied in 
other piracy prone areas in the region such as the Sulu and Celebes seas.176   
3.7 Conclusion 
Piracy still constitutes a serious threat to maritime security in Southeast Asia. 
Numerous piratical attacks, which have been reported by the IMO, IMB and 
ReCAAP, show that the problem is still prevalent. Although piracy attacks continue 
to occur, States are taking actions at both the international and regional levels. At the 
international level, anti-piracy measures have been addressed by international 
conventions such as LOSC and SUA Convention. At the regional level, measures 
have also been taken through ReCAAP, the Malacca Strait Patrol and ASEAN. 
                                                
174 Raymond, above n 147, 118. 
175 Thomas Fieldhouse, “Piracy’s Decline in the Strait Of Malacca”, Foreign Affairs Review, 7 
February 2013. 
176 Ibid, 118. 
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However, from the discussions of this chapter, it could be concluded that the current 
international and regional frameworks are inadequate in addressing the problem. 
Piracy/armed robbery against ships are transnational crimes which cannot be solved 
nationally and therefore cooperation among the regional States is needed. 
Furthermore, enhancing cooperation with extra regional players is also another 
option that could be taken by regional States in combating the problem.   
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CHAPTER IV 
4 Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia  
 
4.1 Introduction 
Maritime terrorism is considered a critical maritime security threat in Southeast Asia. 
As mentioned in the 2001 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter 
Terrorism: the ‘ASEAN heads of states view acts of terrorism in all its forms and 
manifestations, committed wherever, whenever and by whomsoever, as a profound 
threat to international peace and security which require concerted action to protect 
and defend all peoples and the peace and security of the world’1. In order to address 
this, the ARF member States committed to continue existing activities, including 
joint coordinated patrols, intelligence and information exchange, and exercises to 
combat piracy, armed robbery against ships at sea and other transnational crimes 
(including terrorism).2 Terrorism involves a group of people who are associated with 
a particular organisation conducting criminal activities to fulfil their political 
ambitions.3 It involves violence (or the threat of violence) being intentionally 
directed against civilians to create an atmosphere of fear and intimidation.   
In order to exert political pressure, terrorists often target their attacks to 
achieve maximum publicity, usually claiming credit for what they have done. 
Furthermore, terrorists seek to create enduring damage through their actions. This 
                                                
1 2001 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, http://asean.org/?static_post=2001-
asean-declaration-on-joint-action-to-counter-terrorism at 19 August 2016. 
2 ASEAN Regional Forum Ministerial Statement on Enhancing Cooperation among Maritime Law 
Enforcement Agencies,  
https://www.asean2016.gov.la/kcfinder/upload/files/ARF%20Statement%20on%20Enhancing%20Co
operation%20among%20MLEA%20Final.pdf, at 20 November 2016.  
3 Hans Tino Hansen, ‘Distinctions in the Finer Shades of Gray: The “Four Circles Model” for 
Maritime Security Threat Assessment’ in Rupert Herbert-Burns, Sam Bateman and Peter Lehr (eds), 
Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of Maritime Security (CRC Press, 2008)73, 76. 
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damage can be psychological, in the sense of cultivating an atmosphere of fear and 
panic, or it may take the form of physical acts causing damage or destruction, the 
intention being that the relevant authorities may concede (or partially concede) to the 
terrorists’ demands.4 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the international and regional 
frameworks governing maritime terrorism. In order to understand the extent of the 
problem in Southeast Asia, as well as the counter-terrorism measures that have been 
implemented, this chapter will explore: (i) maritime terrorism as a security threat; (ii) 
the type of maritime terrorism threats in Southeast Asia; (iii) the international legal 
framework governing maritime terrorism; (iv) the regional legal framework which 
seeks to address maritime terrorism; and (v) the prevailing gaps that exist in both the 
international and regional frameworks. 
This chapter concludes that the existing frameworks at both international and 
regional levels are inadequate to address maritime terrorism in Southeast Asia. 
Furthermore, because of its transnational nature, maritime terrorism cannot be 
addressed through unilateral State action. Indeed, regional cooperation involving all 
States in Southeast Asia is required in order to eradicate maritime terrorism in the 
region.    
 
4.2 Maritime Terrorism as a Maritime Security Threat 
Maritime terrorism is widely recognised as a maritime security threat. Terrorists 
operate in maritime areas and target naval and civilian vessels.5 A definition of 
                                                
4 Ibid, 76. 
5 Nong Hong and Adolf KY Ng, ‘The international legal instruments in addressing piracy and 
maritime terrorism: A critical review’ (2010) 27(1) Research in Transportation Economics 51, 52. 
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maritime terrorism was introduced by a Working Group of the Council for Security 
Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP)6 in 2009. It defined maritime terrorism as: 
the undertaking of terrorist acts and activities within the maritime environment, 
using or against vessels or fixed platforms at sea or in port, or against any one of 
their passengers or personnel, against coastal facilities or settlements, including 
tourist resorts, port areas and port towns or cities.7  
 
Although the definition formulated by the CSCAP Working Group sheds 
some light on the issue, the definition lacks detail about terrorism itself, and leaves 
unanswered the question of whether attacks against military vessels or merchant 
ships would fall within the ambit of maritime terrorism. In the past, domestic courts 
have treated terrorist attacks against ships as acts of piracy under their respective 
national legislation. Indeed, this has occurred even though the acts in question were 
not committed for private ends and only involved one ship. The reason for this was 
that, at the time, there was no international regulation punishing terrorists, and so in 
order to bring the perpetrators to justice, domestic courts treated terrorist attacks as 
forms of piracy.8  
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea9 (LOSC) has defined 
piracy in Article 101, as discussed in Chapter 3 of this thesis.10 Although the 
definitions of piracy and maritime terrorism are quite similar, there are several 
factors that differentiate the two illegal acts. The first concerns the aim or motivation 
of the attacks. Piracy is associated with acts which are perpetrated for private ends 
                                                
6 Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, see http://www.cscap.org/ at 22 October 2015. 
7 This definition is used by the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Working Group 
on Maritime Terrorism. See Peter Chalk, The maritime dimension of international security: terrorism, 
piracy, and challenges for the United States (Rand Corporation, 2008), 3.  
8 HE Joséluis Jesus, ‘Protection of foreign ships against piracy and terrorism at sea: legal aspects’ 
(2003) 18(3) The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 363, 387.  
9 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 16 November 1994). Hereinafter referred to as LOSC. 
10 Article 101, LOSC. Please refer to Chapter 3.2.1 above.  
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(such as financial rewards), whereas maritime terrorism seeks to fulfil political 
motivations. The second factor relates to the means by which the illegal acts are 
conducted. Piratical attacks usually involve basic tactics such as boarding vessels and 
stealing valuables, as well as the use or threatened use of force or violence. On the 
other hand, while maritime terrorism may involve the basic tactics of piracy, the 
ultimate objective of terrorist acts is obtain strategic political benefits. Even though 
these factors distinguish the two acts, the possibility exists for offenders to carry out 
piratical attacks in order to finance maritime or other terrorism.11  
Speculation has arisen of a link between piracy and maritime terrorism with 
regard to numerous maritime attacks in Southeast Asia. Although the modus 
operandi of the two acts is quite similar, the distinction lies in the motive behind the 
particular attack. As stated earlier, maritime terrorism has political motives, whereas 
piracy is conducted chiefly for private ends. In conducting their attacks, maritime 
terrorists require specialised knowledge and skills that pirates tend to possess. 
However, such skills may not be sufficient where the intention is to stage a major 
terrorist attack, and therefore terrorists are also suspected of having links with former 
naval personnel and commercial seafarers in Southeast Asia.12 Furthermore, it is 
believed that pirates in the region have been receiving assistance from other actors 
when hijacking marine assets (including any cargo) and then on-selling it to other 
                                                
11 Hong and Ng, above n 6, 52. 
12 Sam Bateman, ‘Confronting Maritime Crime in Southeast Asian Waters: Re-examining Piracy in 
the Twentyfirst Century’ in Bruce A. Elleman, Andrew Forbes and David Rosenberg (eds), Piracy 
and Maritime Crime: Historical and Modern Case Studies (Naval War College Press, 2010) 137, 145.  
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parties.13 Indeed, it would be almost impossible for pirates to on-sell hijacked assets 
without comprehensive planning and connections to other criminal syndicates.14   
It is important to note the different motives of piracy. One of the motives of 
piracy is to obtain a financial benefit. Indeed, this view was emphasised at the 2004 
Maritime Security in the Asia Pacific (MSAP) Conference, which identified that the 
most pressing issue in the region was the need to fight pirates, not terrorists.15 This is 
because pirates are now fully trained and are most often armed with grenades, 
automatic weapons, as well as anti-tank missiles. Furthermore, they tend to be 
equipped with global positioning and satellite system phones.16 As major sources of 
funding for terrorist groups are increasingly being frozen by the international 
community, terrorists may turn to piracy to support their activities. Moreover, as both 
terrorists and pirates have operated in the same areas for extended periods of time, 
such as in the Sulu Sea and the Arabian Sea, it is not difficult for them to work 
together and mutually support each other’s activities.  
During the 1990s, terrorism was not considered a major international 
maritime security threat. Therefore, unlike other maritime security threats, such as 
piracy and armed robbery at sea, maritime terrorism was not regulated by a specific 
international instrument.17 The international community only developed a formal 
response to maritime terrorism after the Achille Lauro incident which occurred in 
1985. During this incident four armed terrorists hijacked the Achille Lauro in the 
                                                
13 K Zou, ‘Crackdown on piracy in Southeast Asian Seas: need a more effective legal regime’ (Paper 
presented at the Conference on Maritime Security in the South China Sea, Haikou, China, 2005).  
14 Hong and Ng, above n 6, 53. 
15 Koi Yu Adolf Ng and Girish C Gujar, ‘Port security in Asia’ (2008)  Maritime safety, security and 
piracy 257, 257-278.  
16 Hong and Ng, above n 6, 53 
17 Natalino Ronzitti, Maritime terrorism and international law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1990) , 
1-14. 
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Mediterranean Sea off the coast of Alexandria, Egypt. Approximately 320 
crewmembers and 80 passengers were taken hostage.18 The terrorists identified 
themselves as members of the Palestine Liberation Front and demanded the release 
of 50 Palestinian militants imprisoned in Israel. The first international legal 
framework which was adopted to suppress the act of maritime terrorism was the 
1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Safety of Maritime 
Navigation19 (SUA Convention). 
There have been several other instances of maritime terrorism that have 
occurred since then. For instance, on 4 May 1991, a maritime terrorism incident 
occurred against Abheeta, a Sri Lankan naval ship.20 The Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE) claimed responsibility for the attack, which took place on the north 
Sri Lankan harbour at Kankesanthurai. A similar terrorist attack occurred in October 
2000 against the USS Cole, this time off the coast of Yemen. During this incident 
United States Navy guided-missile destroyer USS Cole (DDG-67) was attacked by 
Al-Qaeda while it was being refuelled in the port of Aden. It was reported that 39 
sailors were injured and 17 were killed.21  Despite these attacks, history has shown 
that maritime terrorism is not a common form of terrorism.22 Indeed, terrorists are 
more likely to target domains which allow for easy planning and will result in a 
greater number of casualties. These include the aviation sector and land-based 
targets. Furthermore, to conduct maritime terrorism, terrorists require certain 
                                                
18 Achille Lauro hijacking ends, see  http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/achille-lauro-
hijacking-ends at 21 October 2015 
19 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Safety of Maritime Navigation, opened 
for signature 10 March 1988, (entered into force1 March 1992). Hereinafter referred to as SUA 
Convention. 
20 Arabinda Acharya, Whither Southeast Asia Terrorism? (Imperial College Press, 2015), 115. 
21 Attack on the USS Cole, see http://www.al-bab.com/yemen/cole1.htm at 21 October 2015. 
22 Peter Chalk, ‘Threats to the Maritime Environment: Piracy and Terrorism’ (2002)  RAND 
Stakeholder Consultation, held in Ispra, Italy on October 28, 9. 
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equipment, such as ships and weapons, as well as particular skills, such as boarding 
techniques and knowledge of ship operations. Therefore, terrorists who choose to 
commit illegal activities in the maritime domain most often have naval skills and 
usually originate from coastal States.23      
Nonetheless, after the 9/11 attacks, terrorist groups widened their attention 
from the aviation sector and land-based targets to include the maritime domain, 
targeting container traffic, port infrastructure and the shipping industry. This shift is 
due to the fact that international community has gone to great lengths to stem the tide 
of terrorist attacks in the sky and on land, whereas the maritime sector had been left 
largely unprotected and is thus vulnerable to attack.24 This shift towards maritime 
targets has been identified by terrorists themselves. Following their apprehension in 
2001, members of the militant group Jemaah Islamiah stated that they intended to 
attack naval ships and facilities which belonged to the US. In early 2002, terrorists 
planned to attack a US warship in the Indian Ocean by hijacking a civilian aircraft 
and then crashing it into the warship. Although Moroccan authorities foiled a 
terrorist plot to attack merchant ships in Strait of Gibraltar in mid-200225, a ferry, the 
Super Ferry 14, was bombed by terrorists in Manila Bay in the Philippines in 
February 2004.26        
 
                                                
23 Brian Michael Jenkins et al, A chronology of terrorist attacks and other criminal actions against 
maritime targets (1983) 4. 
24 Chalk, above n 23, 22. 
25 Tanner Campbell and Rohan Gunaratna, Maritime terrorism, piracy and crime (Singapore, Eastern 
Universities Press, 2003), 77-80. 
26 Acharya, above n 21, 116. 
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Figure 6: Global Terrorism Index 2002-201127 
 
Terrorists are able to use sophisticated tactics when conducting their 
activities. Indeed, the 9/11 attacks represent the most prominent example of the high 
level tactics that can be used in the commission of terrorist activities. Unfortunately, 
terrorist groups are able to imitate these types of attacks in the maritime domain.28 
On 23 October 2000, LTTE suicide boats breached the heavily guarded port of 
Trincomalee in Sri Lanka, destroying a fast personnel carrier in what was similar to 
                                                
27 Fear and loathing, The Economist 
 http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2012/12/daily-chart-0 at 19 August 2016 
28 Tamara Renee Shie, ‘Ports in a storm? The nexus between counterterrorism, counterproliferation, 
and maritime security in Southeast Asia’ (Paper presented at the Pacific Forum CSIS Issues & 
Insights, 2004), 2-33.  
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the attack on the USS Cole on 12 October 2000. An Israeli naval craft was also 
attacked one month later by a Hamas suicide boat, although the attack was not 
entirely successful, with the boat exploding prematurely and causing only minimal 
damage to its intended target. In addition to the suicide attacks described above, the 
maritime domain could provide an opportunity for terrorists to explore new methods 
of attack. Indeed, the impact of such attacks to maritime assets would undoubtedly 
command the attention of both government officials and the general public.29 The 
Global Terrorism Index figure above shows those States that were victims of terrorist 
attacks in the period 2002-2011. Even though terrorist attacks are distributed widely 
around the world, the majority are concentrated in just a handful of countries such as 
Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan, but with numerous attacks in maritime Southeast 
Asia. 
Another explanation for the shift towards maritime terrorism is the link 
between terrorism and other forms of organised crime, such as piracy. Terrorists and 
other criminal actors stand to mutually benefit by working with one another.30 In 
order to sustain and support their activities, terrorists require sources of funding. By 
working with other criminals, such as pirates, terrorists are able to gain access to the 
proceeds of crime and thus finance their activities. The final reason for the shift of 
terrorism into the maritime domain is that terrorists have become increasingly aware 
of the importance of the sea to global trade. Approximately 90 per cent of the 
world’s cargo is transported by sea, and therefore any interruption to maritime assets, 
such as shipping lanes or port infrastructure, would affect world trade. This situation 
                                                
29 Acharya, above n 21, 118. 
30 Frank Cilluffo, “Testimony before the U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary’s Subcommittee on 
Crime about the Threat Posed from the Convergence of Organized Crime, Drug Trafficking, and 
Terrorism,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (13 December 2000), 
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/congress/ts001213cilluffo.pdf at 22 October 2015.  
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fits the ultimate objective of terrorist groups – that is, to gain the attention of major 
stakeholders (including governments) through their attacks, and then force the 
relevant parties to fulfil their demands. This type of attack would produce the 
maximum impact for the minimum cost.31 
In the same way that the US World Trade Centre functioned as a hub of 
international trade, major sea lanes, such as the Strait of Malacca, serve as strategic 
routes for global trade and commerce.32 The supply chains of goods, which are based 
on real-time accuracy, are connected to one another and interdependent. Therefore, 
any disruption to major sea lanes would seriously impact the world economy. One of 
the strategists of the global jihadist movement, Abu Musab al-Suri, has 
acknowledged the importance of the maritime domain, stating that global trade could 
be brought to a halt by closing down the sea passages through which the world’s oil 
supply is transported. This could be achieved by attacking or sinking US ships or 
those of its allies.33 Jihad Press, which is linked to al-Qaeda, posted an article in 2008 
which stated the necessity of waging battle in the maritime domain.34 Jihadist forums 
conducted in late 2009 also planned to launch a campaign which would specifically 
deal with targets in the maritime domain. This campaign was popularly known as the 
‘Battle of the Masts Media Invasion’. Its aim was to attack strategic American 
military assets at sea, specifically submarines, vessels and ships.35  
 
                                                
31 Ayman Al Zawahiri, Knights under the Prophet’s Banner (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 2001) translated by 
Laura Mansfield, His Own Words, Translation and Analysis of the Writings of Dr. Ayman Al 
Zawahiri (New Jersey, TLG Publications, 2006).  
32 Acharya, above n 21, 118. 
33Mustafa Al-Suri, The Call for a Global Islamic Resistance (2005) 1384. 
34 ‘Maritime Terrorism - A Strategic Necessity’ (9 May 2008), translated at ICPVTR, Singapore (May 
2008).  
35 Acharya, above n 21, 120. 
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4.3 Types of Threats of Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia  
Terrorist attacks in the maritime domain are of great concern due to their potential 
flow on effects on trade and commerce.36 Indeed, the maritime sector is vulnerable to 
terrorist attacks, as the international community has largely concentrated on 
developing sets of measures that guard against land-based terrorism. Maritime 
terrorism can be seen in recent attacks directed at assets in the maritime space. 
Arguably, terrorists have been able to deal with the operational constraints of the 
maritime sector by working with other criminal syndicates which are experienced in 
sea-based crimes.37  Nonetheless maritime terrorism is different from other sea-based 
crime. Terrorists are motivated by their political objectives and not for financial gain. 
The objective of maritime terrorism is for immediate or strategic political goals.  
Terrorists are willing to learn from previous mission failures and can have the 
patience to wait until they have expanded their capabilities to ensure a higher 
probability of mission success. Other sea-based crime such as piracy, for example, is 
committed for financial gain. Pirates are looking for the greatest return on their 
investment, and are willing to redirect their efforts on targets of opportunity that 
offer the highest probability of success.  
Southeast Asia is well known for its waterways, which are highly significant 
for global trade and commerce.38 Straits such as the Malacca Strait, the Singapore 
Strait, the Sunda Strait and the Lombok Strait are among those important straits 
which are located in Southeast Asia. Thus, from a geographical perspective, any 
disruption to these waterways would have serious consequences for relevant 
                                                
36 Bateman, above n 13, 144. 
37 Bjørn Møller, Piracy, maritime terrorism and naval strategy (DIIS Reports/Danish Institute for 
International Studies, 2009), 5-30.  
38 Acharya, above n 21, 121.  
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stakeholders, including government and industry organisations. These waterways are 
positioned between islands of Southeast Asian States which are populated by people 
who do not have ideal economic, social or political conditions.39 Furthermore, the 
region is known for its shallow reefs, tiny islands and narrow channels. This 
geography creates a volatile environment which is ideal for the commission of 
maritime crimes such as piracy and terrorism.          
The chokepoints, which are located in different parts of the narrow channels, 
provide a perfect opportunity for terrorists to conduct illegal acts. The Malacca Strait 
connects the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean. This 1000-
kilometre-long strait serves as one of the busiest shipping lane in the world, with 
approximately 50 per cent of the world’s large ships traversing through it each year. 
These ships include container ships, bulk carriers, as well as oil tankers. 
Furthermore, it is through the Malacca Strait alone that approximately 50 per cent of 
Asia’s oil supply is transported.  
The Singapore Strait also has narrow points which make it ideal for 
perpetrators to conduct maritime crime. The narrowest point of the Phillips Channel 
located in the Singapore Strait is only 1.5 miles wide. A planned attack on US ships 
in this area by members of the Jemaah Islamiah was uncovered by Singaporean 
authorities with those involved being apprehended. The strategy of the terrorists was 
to bomb US ships travelling eastwards from Sembawang Wharf by means of a small 
suicide vessel. Due to the channel being very narrow, the possibility of the US ship 
escaping from the suicide vessel would have been low.40  
                                                
39 M Roy, ‘Sea lanes of communication, an Indian perspective’ in A Forbes (ed), The Strategic 
Importance of Seaborne Trade and Shipping, Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs (Commonwealth 
of Australia, 2002) 85, 88. 
40Acharya, above n 21, 121. 
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Therefore, ramming a suicide vessel into a targeted ship (in a similar style to 
the attacks on the USS Cole and the Limburg) could be a potential tactic used by 
terrorists. The incident involving Limburg occurred in October 2002 in the Gulf of 
Aden where an explosives-laden dinghy bumped into the side of the vessel, is an 
example of this mode of terrorist attack. The Limburg, which was carrying more than 
390,000 barrels of crude oil caught fire and around 90,000 barrels of oil leaked into 
the ocean and caused pollution to the marine environment. It was reported that one 
crew member was killed and 12 others were injured.41  Another tactic which 
terrorists could use to disrupt the flow of world trade would be to place huge ships at 
chokepoints, thus causing container and other ships to find alternative routes and 
undoubtedly increasing transport costs for industry.42   
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 
2003 produced a report which  discussed the risks posed by terrorist organisations to 
the international merchant maritime transport system.43 The report elaborated the 
economic impact of terrorist attacks against maritime transport assets. Some of the 
risk factors identified by the OECD which are relevant in Southeast Asia include risk 
to vessels, financing and logistics support, and risks to people.  
The motivations of terrorists to attack vessels include holding the crew 
hostage for ransom, to hijack its cargo or sink the vessel.44 In order to support 
terrorist activities of their linked groups, major terrorist groups are able to provide 
                                                
41 The nature and trends of global maritime security, see 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20081120170436/http:/royalnavy.mod.uk/upload/pdf/The_
nature_and_trends_of_global_maritime_security.pdf at 22 October 2015. 
42 Richard Halloran, ‘What if Asia’s Pirates and Terrorists Joined Hands?’ (2003) 17 South China 
Morning Post 70, 70. 
43 Maritime Transport Committee, ‘Security In Martime Transport: Risk Factors and Economic 
Impact’ (OECD, July 2003), 7. 
44 Ibid, 13. 
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financial as well as logistics support using maritime transportation. Furthermore, the 
involvement of a large number of seafarers in international trade on commercial 
vessels makes them vulnerable as victims of terrorist attacks directed against 
vessels.45 
Maritime terrorism poses a threat to trade and commerce in Southeast Asia. 
Ports serve as hubs for the transport of logistics from one region to another46. These 
logistics are usually stored in containers and transported to destined ports. 
Containerisation has changed the delivery of logistics from the traditional port to port 
method to a modern door to door delivery service. Therefore, goods are able to reach 
their final destination without ever being opened during the shipping process.      
Although every port has a certain level of capability, the most heavily 
frequented ports are those which can provide complete logistic networks and 
accommodate large container ships.  Indeed, there are only several ports which are 
large enough to handle the high volume of containers required for global seaborne 
trade and commerce. Apart from their capability, these mega ports must be located in 
areas or along the sea lanes through which a high density of ships traverse. To 
illustrate the importance of ports to sea trade, one estimate has been made that if the 
Port of Singapore were to close, the toll to the global economy would exceed $200 
billion per year.47 Another prominent example is the 2002 shutdown of ports on the 
west coast of the US. This closure caused losses of approximately a billion dollars 
each day.48  
                                                
45 Ibid, 15. 
46 Joshua H Ho, The Security of Sea Lanes in Southeast Asia (University of California Press, 2006) 
563.  
47 Daniel Y Coulter, ‘Globalization of maritime commerce: The rise of hub ports’ in J. Sam Tangredi 
(ed), Globalization and Maritime Power (National Defense University Press , 2002) 133, 135-138. 
48 Ho, above n 47, 563. 
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Given the importance of ports (and especially mega ports) to the world’s 
economy, it is easy to see why terrorists would choose to target them. Terrorists are 
able to create bombs from liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), first by hijacking LPG 
carriers and then exploding them in order to disrupt port activities.49 Through this 
kind of attack, not only would port facilities be damaged or destroyed, but the real 
potential exists for the loss of human life.50 A fireball 1,200 meters wide could well 
be generated by the explosion of a ship tanker carrying 600 tonnes of LPG.51 
The planting of bombs in ports could also be achieved by smuggling them in 
containers carrying logistics. Maritime terrorists not only target ports, but also carry 
out attacks on ships.52 In order to reduce the risk of being attacked, ship owners or 
captains could choose alternative routes which are less likely to be targeted by 
terrorists. However, this is likely to increase transportation costs for business – costs 
which would then have to be passed on to consumers.  
Terrorist organisations in Southeast Asia have significant maritime 
capabilities. Organisations such as the Abu Sayyaf Group, Laskar Jihad, Jemaah 
Islamiyah, the Kumpulan Militan Malaysia, Al-Qaeda and the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front have all allegedly committed maritime attacks since 2000. Marine 
areas are also being used by terrorists to ship weapons from one place to another.53          
                                                
49 Michael Richardson, ‘A time bomb for global trade: maritime-related terrorism in an age of 
weapons of mass destruction’ (2004) (134) Maritime Studies 1, 112-114. 
50 Ben Sheppard, ‘Maritime security measures’ (2003) 15(3) Jane’s Intelligence Review 55, 55.  
51 Ibid, 55. 
52 Ho, above n 47, 564. 
53 John F Bradford, ‘The growing prospects for maritime security cooperation in Southeast Asia’ 
(2005) 58(3) Naval War College Review 63, 63-64.  
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4.3.1 Terrorist Groups in Southeast Asia  
There are several terrorist groups in the region which have maritime capabilities, and 
are thus well placed to carry out terrorist attacks against maritime targets. They 
include the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in 
the Philippines, Jemaah Islamiah and Al-Qaeda.54 One of the pioneers of maritime 
terrorism in Asia was the LTTE. This militant group had approximately 3000 
personnel and equipped with more than one hundred surface and underwater 
vehicles. Furthermore, LTTE had a dedicated maritime division for developing 
marine engineering and boat-building capabilities, as well as underwater demolition 
teams. The LTTE only operated in Sri Lanka, but was known to share information 
regarding maritime techniques and tactics with other terrorist groups, such as MILF 
and ASG.55  
Although not every terrorist group in Southeast Asia is able to conduct 
maritime terrorism, each group does have its own agenda and individual capability to 
commit maritime crime. Some of the groups which are well placed to carry out 
maritime terrorist attacks include ASG, MILF, GAM, JI and Al-Qaeda.56  
4.3.1.1 Abu Sayyaf Group 
The coastal area of the southern Philippines is favourable for terrorists to conduct 
their activities. This area is composed of islets, reefs, thick jungles and rocky-
mountains, creating an ideal environment for illegal maritime activities.  Most of the 
people living in the area belong to the ‘Bajau’ or ‘Sea Gypsy’ tribe – a group that 
                                                
54 Acharya, above n 21, 122. 
55 Barry Desker and Kumar Ramakrishna, ‘Forging an indirect strategy in Southeast Asia’ (2002) 
25(2) Washington Quarterly 161, 165. 
56 Acharya, above n 21, 123. 
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relies on fishing (particularly in the Sulu Sea) for their livelihood.57 The Muslim 
‘Moros’, one of the local clans in the southern Philippines, maintain their maritime-
based sultanates because Spanish colonialists were not able to integrate them into the 
local population. They also rejected the transfer of sovereignty of the Philippines to 
the US. Even after the US granted the Philippines independence in 1946, the Moros, 
whose territories were also previously subject to US rule, demanded freedom.58  
Most ASG members are based in the island of Basilan in the Sulu 
archipelago, in the southern Philippines.59 They are known to have maritime 
capabilities and have engaged in banditry and piracy in the region. ASG is divided 
into different factions, each being led by veterans of the Afghan Jihadi. They have 
previously attacked numerous targets in their operational areas including in and 
around the Sulu and Celebes Seas in the southern Philippines, Kalimantan in 
Indonesia and east Malaysia.60 
The group is also known to smuggle weapons to different regions within 
Southeast Asia. Indeed, ASG has smuggled weapons as far as Indonesia’s Maluku 
and Sulawesi Islands. The Joint Petroleum Development Area (JPDA) in the East 
Timor Sea considers ASG a threat to their operations.61  
The Abu Sayyaf Group is known to have committed a series of attacks, 
particularly in Manila, the eastern part of Malaysia, as well as in the southern part of 
the Philippines.62 Their first attack occurred on the 11 August 1991 against MV 
                                                
57 Clifford Sather, The Bajau Laut: Adaptation, history, and fate in a maritime fishing society of 
South-eastern Sabah (Oxford University Press, USA, 1997), 1-400.   
58 Andrew Tian Huat Tan, Armed rebellion in the ASEAN states: persistence and implications 
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Doulos which was stopping in the southern Philippine port of Zamboanga City. A 
member of the Abu Sayyaf group threw a grenade on the vessel and killed more than 
five people and 32 people were injured.  Another major attack occurred in April 1995 
in the Philippines, when terrorists landed by boat in the town of Ipil and killed more 
than fifty people. During the same attack, they were able to rob no less than five 
banks. The terrorist group gained increasing notoriety after they were successful in 
kidnapping people in and around the Sulu and Celebes Seas. Between 2000 and 
2001, Abu Sayyaf was successful in abducting people from the Philippines, 
Malaysia, America, Europe and China. According to Philippine authorities, the 
bombing and sinking of the SuperFerry 14 in early 2004 was carried out by Abu 
Sayyaf. This attack, which occurred near Manila, killed more than one hundred 
people. Furthermore, a 2005 bomb attack against the ferry Dona Ramona was 
allegedly attributed to the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). A bomb which was hidden in a 
trash can exploded on Dona Ramona which was docked at the wharf at Lamitan, on 
the island of Basilan. The incident killed two people and caused injury to more than 
20 other.63 In order to address this issue, authorities are now required to take 
necessary measures to ensure the safety of people on passenger ships, such as 
tightening security and screening luggage and passengers boarding the ship. 
The kidnapping raids on Sipadan in 2000 and Palawan in 2001 were among 
Abu Sayyaf’s criminal maritime operations. The group also claimed responsibility 
for the bombing of Davao City port in 2003, which caused the death of 16 people and 
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injured more than 50.64 Even though their blue (high seas) water capability is 
inadequate, they are certainly capable of executing brown (riverine) and green 
(coastal and archipelagic) water operations.  
During their operations, ASG members use boats which are equipped with 
machine guns. These boats, which are usually made out of wood, can travel at fast 
speeds, sometimes outrunning naval vessels.65 ASG members are able to navigate 
these boats in areas where reefs and swamps predominate. In addition to small boats 
which allow for maximum speed across shorter distances, the group owns larger 
ships which are able to travel on longer journeys.66 In terms of weaponry, ASG units 
are armed with hand guns, rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), grenade launchers and 
assault rifles. Their strategy is to hit and run; therefore, after mounting an attack, 
ASG members tend to run into reefs and swamps to avoid being apprehended by 
authorities. Most ASG attacks involve kidnapping (the attack on Superferry 14 is an 
exception in this regard), in order to extract ransoms from victims’ families, 
companies and/or the relevant authorities. For these types of operations, ASG prefers 
small craft to bigger boats, as they are able to travel at faster speeds and stop quickly 
at any point.67     
4.3.1.2 Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
Although the Moros are located in the southern Philippines, many of them still refuse 
to regard themselves as Filipinos and are motivated to create their own Muslim state. 
The MILF’s maritime domain operations are supported by their land-based 
                                                
64 ‘Abu Sayyaf Owns Davao Airport Blast’, 6 March 2003, 
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capabilities.68 The group is known to possess and effectively operate numerous types 
of weapons including improvised explosive devices (IEDs), which are equipped with 
electronic detonators. Apart from using IEDs on their targets, which include ferries 
and ports, MILF are able to conduct green water and brown water operations. They 
carry weapons from one place to another and engage in people smuggling activities. 
Even though the MILF are able to navigate the Philippine/Indonesian archipelago, 
they are not able to conduct extended operations due to a shortage of logistical 
capability.69 Therefore, their blue water capability is not as strong as their brown and 
green water operations.  
Some of the operations undertaken by MILF include attacks against seaports 
and ferries using IEDs, smuggling, as well as minor clashes with government forces. 
Their intention is to destroy critical infrastructure and create civilian casualties. In 
order to avoid apprehension by government forces, the Moros are unlikely to engage 
in untoward behaviour in the presence of authorities; but when their liberty is 
threatened, they will try to escape into reefs and swamps using speedboats. It is 
important to note, however, that the operations conducted by MILF – such as 
kidnapping for ransom, sabotage, assassination and piracy, have been in steady 
decline. This is because the group has been engaged in peaceful negotiations with the 
Philippine government in an effort to find the best resolution for both parties. So as 
to not jeopardise these talks, and to demonstrate their commitment to a peaceful 
settlement, the Moros have scaled back their maritime operations.70  
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4.3.1.3 Gerakan Aceh Merdeka  
Located in Aceh province of Indonesia, Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) or the Free 
Aceh Movement is well known for having conducted maritime operations. 
Nonetheless, the group signed a peace agreement with the Indonesian government in 
2005 and participated in the local elections. The 2004 tsunami and the constant 
operation of the Indonesian military were among the reasons GAM decided to 
reconcile with Indonesia.  
Aceh, which is located in the northernmost part of the Sumatera Island, has a 
number of small islands on its western coast.  The area is favourable for maritime 
operations as it has an abundance of reefs, islets, small coves and mangrove swamps. 
The province also serves as the gateway to the Malacca Strait, as it is located on the 
northern tip of the strait.71 Numerous people living near the coast of Aceh province 
rely on smuggling and other maritime crimes as a source of income. Attacks against 
merchant ships were carried out by the people of Aceh since the 19th century.72 In an 
effort to stem the tide of these attacks, more control started to be exerted by 
Indonesian, Dutch and Japanese forces during those times.73   
In terms of natural resources, Aceh is known to have abundant natural gas 
fields.74 Indeed, GAM perceived Aceh to be favourable not only in terms of the 
marine environment, but also as an area rich in natural gas. This was one of the 
reasons that spurred GAM to pressure the Indonesian government for its own state.  
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GAM operated in several areas, including the Strait of Malacca, the 
Singapore Strait, southern Thailand and Myanmar and west Malaysia.75 Although 
GAM was not capable of blue water operations, their crafts are able to navigate into 
high seas areas. Despite this lack of capacity in blue water operations, GAM was 
capable of conducting brown and green water operations. During their operations, 
GAM usually used speed boats, fishing boats and tug boats to smuggle both people 
and weapons. GAM was also known to target facilities and personnel of the 
International Petroleum Company, as well as Indonesian forces working in Aceh. In 
order to gain financial benefits, GAM was accused of committing maritime crimes 
such as kidnapping and piracy. With two or three boats operating together, GAM 
usually intercepted passing ships and demanded that valuables be handed over. In 
order to coerce crews to surrender, GAM members resort to firing shots against the 
pilothouse of ships.    
GAM was linked to piracy rings operating in the Malacca Strait, as well as to 
criminal syndicates which smuggle arms, narcotics and petroleum.76 They also 
received support from ethnic Acehnese in Penang, Malaysia, and Islamic mariners in 
southern Thailand.77  
In addition to targeting the international shipping sector in the Strait of 
Malacca, GAM committed attacks against ships which provide offshore oil facilities 
with services and logistics. However, a drastic reduction in piratical attacks 
(especially in Indonesia’s maritime area), was seen after the tsunami that occurred in 
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2004.78 Indeed, many coastal fishing villages in Aceh – the point of origin for many 
Southeast Asian maritime attacks - were damaged or totally destroyed in the disaster. 
Significant numbers of GAM personnel, many of whom were suspected of having 
been engaged in piracy, also died in the tsunami.79  
4.3.1.4 Jemaah Islamiah 
Unlike other terrorist groups, Jemaah Islamiah (JI) does not possess intensive 
maritime capabilities. However, they have used Southeast Asian waterways to 
transfer recruits, especially from Indonesia to the Philippines where their training 
camps are conducted. The group has also undertaken surveillance operations of oil 
refinery facilities on Jurong Island located in Southwest of Singapore and closely 
observed a US vessel at the Changi naval base.80 Despite their limited maritime 
capabilities, JI have established communication networks with other, well-equipped 
terrorists groups in the region, including ASG and MILF. In this regard, it is 
important to note that the attack against Superferry 14 is suspected of having been 
committed by several terrorist groups, among them ASG, JI and Raja Suleiman 
Islamic Movement.81    
Jemaah Islamiah is one terrorist group that poses a severe threat to the Strait 
of Malacca. Not only has the group attempted to attack ships passing through the 
Strait, but it has also targeted US vessels headed for Singapore.82 In 2003, 
Singapore’s then-Deputy Prime Minister, Tony Tan, speaking at the Shangri-La 
Dialogue, asserted that terrorists would start focusing their efforts in the maritime 
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domain. The Deputy Prime Minister also noted that that the shift towards terrorists 
targeting assets in the maritime domain (and especially those in the commercial 
shipping sector), was due to difficulties they had encountered when targeting land 
and aviation targets.83 
4.3.1.5 Al-Qaeda 
Al-Qaeda is another terrorist group that is present in the region. Its willingness to 
attack maritime assets is well documented, especially in a file called ‘targets of 
opportunity’. The file was discovered following the apprehension of Abdulrahim 
Mohammed Abda al-Nashiri, chief of Al-Qaeda’s naval operations. This file lists the 
terrorist group’s maritime targets, which include large cruise liners and naval vessels. 
Another Al-Qaeda member, Tawfiq bin Attash, popularly known as Khallad, was the 
master planner of the attack on the USS Cole. Khallad was also present at an Al-
Qaeda meeting in 2000, during which the 9/11 attacks and other operations 
(including those committed in Southeast Asia), were discussed.84   
Documents that provide diving instructions, as well information on the use of 
equipment for military operations, have been found in the house of the Al-Qaeda’s 
commander of military operations, Mohammad Atef. The capability of Al-Qaeda to 
create a naval fleet that could carry cargoes of lethal chemicals and nuclear weapons 
was revealed in a report published in September 2003.85 Furthermore in 2005 it was 
reported that Al-Qaeda was working together with their linked groups to “train 
militants in scuba diving for seaborne terror attacks.” 86 
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Al-Qaeda has links to other extremist organisations such as ASG and Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI), with the three organisations conducting joint training camps in the 
southern Philippines. They use ferries and speedboats to move from one camp to 
another, usually between Sabah and Borneo.87 Furthermore, Al-Qaeda, in concert 
with Jemaah Islamiyah and the Kumpulan Militan Malaysia, has planned to disrupt 
global trade and attack US naval forces in Southeast Asia. However, such attacks 
have been disrupted on numerous occasions due to the intervention of regional 
security forces.   
Terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda concealed and transferred their assets to 
Southeast Asia as result of the crackdown on Middle Eastern funding mechanisms.88 
Even though concerns have been raised over terrorist activities in Southeast Asia, 
particularly after the 9/11 attacks, effective measures are still lacking to combat 
maritime terrorism in the region. Several reasons have been proposed for this deficit 
of action, including the poor enforcement capacity of States, a general lack of 
political will, as well as the unavailability or weakness of States’ domestic legislation 
governing terrorism.89 Due to these shortcomings, terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda 
are still able to use Southeast Asia as their financial hub, and therefore States in the 
region must pay more attention to the issue and implement concrete measures to 
disrupt terrorist activities.90 
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Terrorist Group Attack Year  Maritime 
Attack 
Abu Sayyaf Attack against MV Doulos. This 
incident killed more than five people 
and 32 people were injured. 
August 1991 Yes 
Abu Sayyaf  Raided the mostly Christian town of 
Ipil in the southern Philippines, 
killing more than 50 people after 
robbing banks and stores and burning 
the town center 
April 1995 No 
Abu Sayyaf Gunmen seized 21 people, including 
Western tourists, from a Malaysian 
resort and took them to their 
Philippine stronghold in Jolo Island; 
most are released in exchange for 
millions of dollars in ransom 
reportedly paid by Libya. 
April 2000 No 
 Americans and other tourists are 
snatched from the Dos Palmas resort 
in the southwestern Philippine 
province of Palawan, starting a year 
long kidnapping saga that left several 
hostages dead, including Americans 
Guillermo Sobero and Martin 
Burnham. 
May 2001 No 
 33 Christian residents of Balobo 
village on southern Philippine 
Basilan Island are taken hostage and 
10 are beheaded. 
August 2001 No 
Al-Qaida helped 
fund the attacks 
Triple bombings on Bali, Indonesia, 
kill 202, mostly foreign tourists, 
including 88 Australians.  
October 2002 No 
Abu Sayyaf A nail-laden bomb detonates in 
Zamboanga city in southern 
Philippines, killing four, including an 
American Green Beret. Four more 
bomb attacks during the month, 
killing 16.  
October 2002 No 
 A suicide bomber attacks the J.W. 
Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, killing 11. 
August 2003 No 
Abu Sayyaf A bomb on a passenger Superferry 
14 in Manila Bay kills 116 in the 
Philippines’ worst terrorist strike. 
February 2004 Yes 
 Three crewmen of a Malaysian 
tugboat are abducted off Malaysia’s 
Sabah state; they are believed to have 
either died of illness or killed by their 
captors. 
April 2004 Yes 
 A suicide bomber detonates a ton of 
explosives packed into a delivery van 
outside the Australian Embassy in 
Jakarta, killing 11 and wounding 
200. 
September 2004 No 
 Almost simultaneous bombings in February 2005 No 
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Manila and two southern cities kill 
eight and wound more than 100. 
 Triple suicide bombers kill 20 in 
attacks on restaurants in Bali. 
October 2005 No 
Abu Sayyaf Attack against a ferry Dona Ramona. 
The incident killed two people and 
caused injury to more than 20 others 
August 2005 Yes 
 Gunmen on Jolo kidnap three aid 
workers of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross from 
Switzerland, Italy and the 
Philippines. They are freed 
separately, reportedly after ransom is 
paid. 
January 2009 No 
 Filipino militants kidnap an 
American, her teenage son and 
Filipino cousin. She is freed two 
months later and the boy escapes in 
December. 
July 2011 No 
 Gunmen seize two tourists, one 
Dutch and one Swiss, in Tawi-Tawi 
province in southern Philippines. 
February 2012 No 
 
Table 17: Major terror attacks in Southeast Asia91 
 
 
4.4 International Framework on Maritime Terrorism 
This section discusses the international framework to combat maritime terrorism, 
including the SUA Convention and its Protocol and the International Ship and Port 
Facility Security Code. 
4.4.1 The SUA Convention and Protocol  
Maritime terrorism was not a significant issue when the LOSC was signed in 1982, 
and therefore provisions on terrorism were excluded from the agreement. Even 
though, to some extent, there are similarities between piracy and maritime terrorism, 
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there is a unique feature that differentiates the two crimes. Indeed, whereas maritime 
terrorism is conducted to achieve political ends, the main motivation of piracy is to 
obtain financial gain for private ends. Some maritime crimes have been included in 
LOSC, such as illicit traffic in narcotic drugs, illegal dumping, piracy as well as the 
discharge of pollutants. However, after the LOSC was adopted, other maritime 
crimes came to the fore which needed to be addressed at the international level. 
Maritime terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are 
among those crimes which have created concern amongst the international 
community, particularly after the 9/11 attacks.92 
The SUA Convention was the first international legal instrument which 
addressed the issue of maritime terrorism. Even though the convention does not 
specifically use the term ‘maritime terrorism’, an offence is committed under Article 
3 when any person unlawfully or intentionally:  
seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any other form of 
intimidation; or performs an act of violence against a person on board a ship if that act is 
likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or destroys a ship or causes damage to a 
ship or to its cargo which is likely to endanger the safe navigation of that ship; or places or 
causes to be placed on a ship, by any means whatsoever, a device or substance which is likely 
to destroy that ship, or cause damage to that ship or its cargo which endangers or is likely to 
endanger the safe navigation of that ship…93  
 
Unlike the provision of piracy found in LOSC, the SUA Convention does not 
specifically mention that the act needs to be conducted for private ends. Therefore, 
any act of piracy, even where it is conducted for a political end, is punishable by this 
convention. Furthermore, the instrument echoes the ‘extradite or prosecute’ 
provisions of anti-terrorist conventions. The SUA Convention imposes an obligation 
on State parties to prosecute offenders which are present in their territory in 
                                                
92Hong and Ng, above n 6, 56. 
93 Article 3, SUA Convention. 
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accordance with their domestic legislation.94 This rule applies regardless of whether 
the illegal act was committed within or outside the territory of the particular State. If 
a State party does not wish to prosecute, then the convention requires the State to 
extradite the perpetrator(s)95 to another State that is party to the convention.96      
Furthermore, in order to make sure that the perpetrators are punished, the 
SUA Convention urges State parties to extradite the perpetrators present in their 
territory. In case the State party is not able to extradite then they are liable to 
prosecute the offenders in accordance with their domestic law. Likewise, provisions 
that are found in the 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the 
Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf are in line with the SUA 
Convention. Unlike LOSC where the provisions on piracy only apply in the EEZ and 
on the high seas, the offences created by the SUA Convention apply both on the high 
seas and in the EEZ and also waters within national jurisdiction. Therefore, whether 
an attack is committed in a State’s national jurisdiction, such as in a port or territorial 
sea, or outside the nation’s jurisdiction, as in the case of a hijacked ship on the high 
seas, the offenders will be subject to prosecution under the SUA Convention.97    
In relation to Southeast Asia, if the SUA Convention were to be accepted and 
ratified by all States in the region, then any person conducting maritime terrorism in 
the region would become an international criminal, and would thus be liable for 
prosecution or extradition. Indeed, even if offenders were able to flee from one State 
to another, any Southeast Asian State would be able to prosecute them in accordance 
                                                
94 Article 10 (1), SUA Convention. 
95 Article 11 (1), SUA Convention. 
96 Ted L McDorman, ‘‘Maritime Terrorism and the International Law of Boarding of Vessels at Sea: 
Assessing the New Developments’ (Paper presented at the paper submitted to the Conference on 
Maritime Security in the South China Sea, 2005), 237-264. 
97 Robert C Beckman, ‘Combatting piracy and armed robbery against ships in Southeast Asia: the way 
forward’ (2002) 33(3-4) Ocean Development & International Law 317, 317-341. 
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with their domestic laws. If this was the prevailing situation, it would be extremely 
difficult for any terrorist to run away or hide in any Southeast Asian State. However, 
despite widespread concern amongst the international community over terrorism, and 
mounting pressure by maritime powers for other States to ratify the convention, there 
are 166 States which are party to the SUA Convention.98 Furthermore, Indonesia and 
Malaysia - two maritime powers in Southeast Asia – are yet to ratify the 
convention.99  
The reason for non-ratification by some countries in the region stems from 
their apprehension that ratification of the convention would derogate their 
sovereignty as a State. For other countries, there was a fear that the convention 
would allow foreign navies and vessels to enter maritime areas that are within their 
national jurisdiction. There was also a perception that the convention favoured States 
which did not have maritime delimitation disputes. Southeast Asia is certainly a 
region where maritime boundaries are not completely delimited, particularly in the 
South China Sea.100  The concern of some States was that, rather than making 
                                                
98 Contracting States to SUA Convention, see https://imo.amsa.gov.au/public/parties/sua88.html at 21 
October 2015.  
99 Hong and Ng, above n 6, 56. 
100 Ibid, 56. The academic literature on the South China Sea disputes is particularly vast. Please see the 
following works for an excellent discussion of issues related to maritime boundary delimitation issues 
in the South China Sea: Song, Yann-Huei and Tonnesson, Stein, ‘Impact of the Law of the Sea 
Convention on Conflict and Conflict Management in the South China Sea’ (2013) 44 Ocean 
Development and International Law 235; Song, Yann-huei, and Zou, Keyuan (eds) Major law and 
policy issues in the South China Sea : European and American perspectives (Ashgate, 2014) 
Song, Yann-huei, ‘Survey of Declarations or Statements Made by the Parties to the Law of the Sea 
Convention: 30 Years after Adoption’ (2013) 28 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 5; 
Song, Yann-huei, ‘Sovereignty and Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea: Potential Conflicts 
between China and the United States’ (2012) 16 China Oceans Law Review 112; Batongbacal, Jay L., 
‘Extended Continental Shelf Claims in the South China Sea: Implications for Future Maritime 
Boundary Delimitations,’ (2015) 29 Ocean Yearbook 21; Bautista, Lowell, ‘Dispute settlement in the 
Law of the Sea Convention and territorial and maritime disputes in Southeast Asia: issues, 
opportunities and challenges,’ in Guifang Xue and Ashley White (Eds.), 30 Years of UNCLOS (1982-
2012): Progress and Prospects (China: Shanghai Jai Tong University, 2013) 289; Bautista, Lowell, 
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progress in the fight against maritime terrorism, the regime created by the SUA 
Convention would lead to greater friction between States.  The reason why Indonesia 
is hesitant ratify the 1988 SUA Convention is because it is perceived as not consistent 
with general international law and UNCLOS101. Also, it is perceived to potentially 
infringe Indonesian sovereignty, particularly the provision of article 4, which states 
that the ‘Convention applies if the ship is navigating of is scheduled to navigate into, 
through or from waters beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea of a single State, 
or the lateral limits of its territorial sea with adjacent States’102. Furthermore, 
Indonesia is also concerned on the extradition provision contained in Article 11 of 
the Convention, that those States that do not have mutual extradition treaties, could 
directly use the SUA Convention as the legal basis for extradition in respect to the 
offences stated in Article 3 of the Convention.103  
The lack of a preventive approach is another weakness and limitation of the 
SUA Convention. While it is true that the convention provides jurisdiction for 
member States to extradite or prosecute offenders, it does not contain a preventive 
measure that deters perpetrators from committing maritime crimes in the first place – 
crimes that could include attacks on ships, pipeline facilities, ports, as well as 
platform structures. Nor does the convention allow marine police to immediately 
                                                                                                                                     
‘Thinking Outside the Box: The South China Sea Issue and the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (Options, Limitations and Prospects)’ (2007) 81 (4) Philippine Law Journal 699 
101 Karsten von Hoesslin, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the ASEAN Region: Incidents 
and Trends, Piracy and International Maritime Crimes in ASEAN: Prospects for Cooperation, edited 
by Robert C. Beckman, J. Ashley Roach, NUS Centre for International Law, Edward Elgar Publishing 
Limited, 136. 
102 Article 4, SUA Convention. 
103 Article 11 and 3, SUA Convention. 
 
 
133 
 
intercept terrorists once they receive credible information regarding the planning of a 
terrorist attack.104    
In order to address some of the above concerns, and to expand the scope of 
the convention, in 2005, the international community adopted the Amendments to the 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation 1988 (SUA Protocol 2005).105 One of the highlights of the SUA Protocol 
2005 is the preventive measure allowing authorities of one State party to board a 
vessel of another State party on the high seas, once authority has been granted by the 
ship’s flag state. This system is regulated in Article 8bis of the SUA Protocol 
2005.106 
Other significant offences not regulated by the SUA Convention but 
addressed in the SUA Protocol 2005 include: 
(i) the use of vessels as instruments of or platforms for terrorist activities; (ii) the 
transportation of suspected materials, biological, chemical or nuclear weapons; and 
(iii) the transportation of people who have committed acts that are offences under 
any of nine terrorist conventions.107 
 
While the broadening of offences in the SUA Protocol 2005 may reduce the 
incidence of terrorist attacks, it also has the potential to instil apprehension amongst 
States, particularly in relation to provisions that grant boarding access to vessels.108 
Thus, it not surprising that no State in Southeast Asia is party to the SUA Protocol 
2005.109    
                                                
104 Jesus, above n 9, 363-400.  
105 2005 Protocol to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation. Adopted in London, United Kingdom on 14 October 2005. Hereinafter referred 
to as SUA Protocol 2005. See 
https://www.unodc.org/tldb/pdf/Protocol_2005_Convention_Maritime_navigation.pdf at 22 October 
2015. 
106 Article 8bis, SUA Protocol 2005. 
107 SUA Protocol 2005. 
108 McDorman, above n 97, 237-264. 
109 Status of Conventions, see 
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Another concern associated with the Protocol is that it regulates logistics in a 
very general way. Indeed, the reference to ‘any equipment, materials or software or 
related technology that significantly contributes to the design, manufacturing or 
delivery of a biological, chemical or nuclear weapon’ is quite a broad description, 
such that almost any logistics carried by merchant vessels would fall foul of the 
regulation. Therefore, States are reluctant to allow other contracting States to 
investigate their commercial vessels.  Furthermore, knowing the above provisions are 
in place, States which are actively engaged in weapons proliferation are unlikely to 
become parties to the SUA Protocol 2005.110  
 
 SUA 
Convention 
1988 
SUA Protocol 
1988 
SUA Convention 
2005 
SUA Protocol 
2005 
Brunei 
Darussalam 
ü ü x x 
Cambodia ü ü x x 
Indonesia x x x x 
Laos ü ü x x 
Malaysia   x x x x 
Myanmar ü ü x x 
Philippines ü ü x x 
Singapore ü x x x 
Thailand  x x x x 
Vietnam ü ü x x 
Timor Leste x x x x 
 
Legend:  ü = Contracting States, x = Non- Contracting States. 
 
Table 18: Status of SUA Conventions and Protocols in Southeast Asia111 
 
                                                                                                                                     
  http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx at 22 October 
2015. 
110 Hong and Ng, above n 6, 57. 
111 Status of Conventions, see 
  http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx at 22 October 
2015. 
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4.4.2 The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code 
Southeast Asia is home to many ports, with many being significant for world trade 
and commerce. More than 135 international ports can be found in Indonesia alone, 
while the Philippines and Malaysia have in excess of 55 and 20 international ports 
respectively.112 International provisions on port security are produced by the IMO. 
This organisation also produced the International Ship and Port Facility Security113 
(ISPS) Code, which was introduced in 2002. The International Convention for the 
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS Convention)114, which provides minimum safety 
arrangements for ships, ports and government agencies, was amended by the ISPS 
Code to include new security provisions.115 
Since the 9/11 attacks and Limburg incident, developments in the 
international legal framework have been rapid. The ISPS Code, which was 
effectively implemented in mid-2004, was agreed to by more than 100 contracting 
parties to the SOLAS Convention, which was adopted in late 2002.116 The Code also 
regulates maritime security on ships and in ports.117 Vulnerability assessments and 
security plans are required for ships over 500 gross tonnage, as well as for critical 
facilities within ports. These security plans describe the measures to be undertaken in 
order to avoid or minimise the effects of terrorist attacks. Such action may include 
                                                
112 World port source website, http://www.worldportsource.com/ports/KHM.php, at 14 September 
2015.  
113 International Ship and Port Facility Security Code, adopted on 12 December 2002, Hereinafter 
referred to as ISPS Code. see  
http://www.ubak.gov.tr/BLSM_WIYS/DISGM/tr/HTML/20130304_142647_66968_1_67502.pdf at 
16 October 2015. 
114 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, opened for signature 1 November 1974, 
(entered into force 25 May 1985). Hereinafter referred to as SOLAS Convention. 
115 Hong and Ng, above n 6, 58. 
116 Contracting States to SOLAS Convention 1974, see at 22 October 
2015.https://imo.amsa.gov.au/public/parties/solas74.html  
117 Thomas A Mensah, ‘The place of the ISPS Code in the legal international regime’ (2004) 3(1) 
WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs 17, 17-30. 
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security patrols, screening passengers and baggage, the installation of surveillance 
equipment, as well as the implementation of access control systems.118 
As stated in Annex1, Part A of the Mandatory Requirements Regarding the 
Provisions of Chapter XI-2 of the SOLAS Convention, the objectives of the ISPS 
Code are as follows:  
1. to establish an international framework involving co-operation between 
Contracting Governments, Government agencies, local administrations and 
the shipping and port industries to detect security threats and take preventive 
measures against security incidents affecting ships or port facilities used in 
international trade; 2. to establish the respective roles and responsibilities of 
the Contracting Governments, Government agencies, local administrations 
and the shipping and port industries, at the national and international level for 
ensuring maritime security; 3. to ensure the early and efficient collection and 
exchange of security-related information; 4. to provide a methodology for 
security assessments so as to have in place plans and procedures to react to 
changing security levels; and 5. to ensure confidence that adequate and 
proportionate maritime security measures are in place.119   
 
The Code is a two-part document, with Part A addressing obligatory 
requirements for ships and ports, and Part B120 providing security assessments and 
plans in the form of guidelines. Therefore, in principle, Part A of the Code is 
mandatory (and thus maritime stakeholders must meet the minimum requirements), 
whereas Part B is recommendatory, with suggestions and guidelines for states to 
consider implementing.121 In light of the detailed provisions of the ISPS Code, the 
incidence of maritime terrorism could well be reduced, and the security of port 
facilities strengthened, provided States are willing to accept and implement the Code. 
Indeed, the IMO has explained that the Code aims to enhance the security of ships 
                                                
118 Hong and Ng, above n 6, 58 
119 Annex1, Part A of the Mandatory Requirements Regarding the Provisions of Chapter XI-2, SOLAS 
Convention. 
120 Part B of the Mandatory Requirements Regarding the Provisions of Chapter XI-2, SOLAS 
Convention. 
121 Hong and Ng, above n 6, 58.  
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and port facilities. 122  In addition, it provides alternative guidelines for responding to 
threats against ships and port facilities. 
Even so, there are several shortcomings associated with the implementation 
of the ISPS Code, particularly with regard to ports. Governments are responsible for 
maintaining port security, and it is important for maritime security in general, and the 
supply chain in particular, that port security is in place.123 However, the control of 
the public sector in this regard has the capacity to overshadow the contribution that 
non-governmental stakeholders (such as terminal operators), stand to make in 
safeguarding ports. The risk is that other stakeholders will simply have to follow the 
instructions given by government, effectively hampering their ability to contribute to 
port security development.  
In order to address this shortcoming, some countries have established port 
security committees or working groups which bring together all relevant stakeholders 
to discuss port security issues. In the US for instance, all ports have been tasked to 
establish an Area Maritime Security Committee (AMSC). The AMSC will bring 
together all government and non-government stakeholders to discuss port security 
plans.124 Furthermore, the US Coast Guard also produced an international port 
security program. This program aims to reduce risk to US maritime interests 
including US ports and ships, and secure global maritime trade by cooperating with 
                                                
122 International Maritime Organization, see http://www.imo.org/en/Pages/Default.aspx at 22 October 
2015. 
123 MR Brooks and R Pelot, ‘Port security: a risk based perspective’ in Wayne K Talley (ed), Maritime 
Safety, Security and Piracy. (Informa, 2008) 195, 195-216. 
124 Hong and Ng, above n 6, 58. 
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their maritime trading partners to assess foreign ports’ compliance with the code 
under their international port security program.125   
From a broader perspective, in order for States to effectively implement the 
Code, they must first be willing to ratify the instrument and enact the relevant 
domestic legislation to give it effect. Furthermore, States need to have sufficient 
manpower and facilities to implement the provisions of the ISPS Code. In this regard, 
it is important to note that the IMO does not have the authority to enforce the 
instrument.126 Furthermore, few States had sufficient capabilities and expertise to 
implement the Code. Thus, the instrument was only likely to benefit those States 
which were able to satisfy all requirements of the Code.127  
It must also be borne in mind that ship owners incur increased costs from the 
implementation of the ISPS Code. These costs stem from two main sources. Firstly, 
in several circumstances, ship owners may be required to add more crew to their 
team, increasing wage costs. Secondly, ship owners will most likely be charged 
greater port fees and charges to offset the cost of any new security measures being 
undertaken in the port and ship security measures.  
As an archipelagic state, Indonesia relies on shipping for its international and 
domestic trade. At present, ports services are being managed by a state-owned 
enterprise – Pelabuhan Indonesia (PELINDO). The authorities engaged by PELNDO 
to provide port security include the Sea Police, the Directorate General for Sea 
Communications, as well as customs officials. A plethora of domestic legislation is 
                                                
125 International Port Security Program, see http://www.uscg.mil/d14/feact/Maritime_Security.asp at 4 
November 2015. 
126 Catherine Zara Raymond, ‘The Challenge of Improving Maritime Security An assessment of the 
implementation of the ISPS Code and initial responses as to its effectiveness’ (2004)  IDSS 
Commentaries (62/2004) 1-4. 
127 Expressed in Hong and Ng, above n 6, 59.  
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also being enacted, such as Regulation No.33/2003, which seeks to enhance 
cooperation between agencies. This regulation appoints the Directorate General for 
Sea Communications to oversee the implementation of the ISPS Code.128 
However, despite the passage of the regulation above, some ports in 
Southeast Asia have yet to comply with the requirements of the ISPS Code. This 
situation exists in Cambodia and Timor Leste.129 The problems faced by these States 
include deficiencies in information sharing, capacity building, as well as training.  
 
 
 SOLAS Convention 
1974 
Brunei 
Darussalam 
ü 
Cambodia ü 
Indonesia ü 
Laos x 
Malaysia ü 
Myanmar ü 
Philippines ü 
Singapore ü 
Thailand  ü 
Vietnam ü 
Timor Leste x 
 
Legend: ü = Contracting States and x = Non- Contracting States. 
 
Table 19: Status of SOLAS Conventions 1974 in Southeast Asia130 
 
                                                
128 Ibid, 59. 
129 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, United States Coast Guard, Port Security Advisory (3-15), 
International Port Security Program, 22 June 2015, 1-4. 
130 States who are contracting government to SOLAS have a legal obligation to comply with the 
requirements of the ISPS Code. Status of Conventions, see 
http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx at 21 October 2015. 
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4.5 Regional Framework on Maritime Terrorism 
Since State authorities may have more knowledge and experience about local 
terrorist cells, it is possible that domestic measures may be suited to combating 
maritime terrorism. This argument is made doubly forceful if one considers that, in 
committing terrorist attacks, offenders will be breaching numerous State laws, and 
could thus be prosecuted in accordance with a State’s domestic legal framework. 
Furthermore, the non-interference principle, which is highly respected in Southeast 
Asia, means that States are unlikely to readily accept the involvement of other States 
in national matters. Therefore, regional efforts which have been implemented in 
Southeast Asia (and which remain in place today), aim to supplement and support the 
national legislation of States.131 Article 1 (1) of the ASEAN Comprehensive Plan of 
Action on Counter Terrorism states tha ASEAN States shall: 
Enhance cooperation among the law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and 
other relevant authorities of ASEAN Member States to counter, prevent and suppress 
terrorism, terrorist organisations and their associations, to disrupt their support 
networks and impede their plan of terror acts, and to bring them to justice.132 
 
Furthermore, considering the nature of modern maritime terrorism, it is 
almost impossible to combat it through unilateral State action.133 Indeed, the 
transnational nature of the crime makes it difficult for countries to prosecute 
offenders, particularly with terrorists conducting their activities (including their 
training camps) across numerous locations throughout Southeast Asia. The planned 
terrorist attack on Singapore, which was successfully disrupted by authorities, 
                                                
131 ‘ASEAN Comprehensive Plan of Action on Counter Terrorism’, 30 June 2009 in 
The ASEAN Secretariat, A Compilation of ASEAN Declarations, Joint Declarations and Statements 
on Combating Transnational Crime and Terrorism (Jakarta: Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
2012), 69,  
http://www.asean.org/resources/archives?task=callelement&format=raw%20&item_id=5415&elemen
t=a0c6d315-bb76-42c6-9ecf-c287d406937b%20&method=download at 21 October 2015. 
132 Article 1 (1) ASEAN Comprehensive Plan of Action on Counter Terrorism. 
133 Acharya, above n 21, 217. 
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involved offenders from different countries, each with their own logistical 
strengths.134 In this case, officials were able to intercept the explosive device in the 
neighbouring country, Malaysia. Another example is the 2002 Bali Bombings.135 
Although this attack was planned in Thailand, the terrorists received money from 
their counterparts in Pakistan, which was funnelled to them through Malaysia.136       
The close networks established by terrorists can also be seen in the Abubakar 
training complex in Mindanao. Although the sprawling complex belonged to MILF, 
it was also used by JI to train its militant squad.137 Following the demolition of the 
complex by the Philippine military, JI, which has members from numerous States in 
Southeast Asia, began conducting training camps in several isolated locations in the 
Philippines.138 Dulmatin and Omar Patek, two JI activists from Indonesia, were 
known to have close ties with ASG.139 In order to avoid the apprehension by State 
authorities, many JI members have claimed refugee status in the southern 
Philippines. By this action, not only have they been able to escape arrest, they have 
established contacts and shared their expertise with other militants in the area, such 
as ASG and MILF. Indeed, due to the favourable geographic and archipelagic nature 
of the region, terrorists are able to move from one State to another with little 
difficulty. Furthermore, poor border management in several Southeast Asian States 
enables terrorist to embark on the journey without fear of apprehension by 
authorities. Therefore, counter-terrorism measures are interdependent, and in order to 
                                                
134 Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs, above n 81, 1-24.  
135 Simon  Elegant, ‘Untangling the Web’, Time 28 January 2002 
<http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,197713,00.html>, at 22 October 2015.  
136 ‘Terrorist Hambali Tells All’, The Sunday Times 12 October 2003 < 
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address the matter comprehensively, cooperation between States is essential. For 
instance, it would be almost impossible for Indonesian authorities alone to combat JI, 
as many members of the group reside in the Philippines for the duration of their 
training. Therefore, it is important that Philippine authorities work together with the 
Indonesian government to take concrete measures to disrupt terrorist cells. A similar 
situation exists with extremist groups in Thailand. In order to avoid Thai authorities, 
militants in southern Thailand cross the borders to hide in the northern area of 
Malaysia.140           
Even though States in the region are willing to address maritime terrorism, 
the networking capabilities of terrorist groups have proved to be a significant 
barrier.141 It is clear that the domestic measures taken by States have not been 
effective, particularly with regard to combating country-based terrorism. Fortunately, 
Southeast Asian States have been eager to address this issue, not only through the 
passage of domestic legislation, but also by working closely with other States in the 
region. Indeed, cooperative arrangements have been forged at the bilateral, sub-
regional and multilateral level. Furthermore, numerous declarations have been made 
by governments in the region to demonstrate both the political will and serious intent 
of States to combat terrorism. The outcome of these declarations has been effective 
law enforcement and mutual legal cooperation, as well as confidence-building, 
information sharing and capacity-building measures. For instance, at the 7th 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit in Brunei, which was 
held in late 2001, ASEAN States acknowledged the importance of cooperation in 
combating terrorism, signing the ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter 
                                                
140 Acharya, above n 21, 219. 
141 Todd Sandler and Walter Enders, ‘An economic perspective on transnational terrorism’ (2004) 
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Terrorism.142 This declaration stated that cooperation at different levels is required in 
order to comprehensively address terrorism, which poses a threat to international 
peace and security. Furthermore, in order to address the issue comprehensively, the 
declaration stated that ratification of international anti-terrorist conventions is 
required by member States.143 In 2002, the declaration was supplemented by the 
adoption of the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime.144    
The Plan of Action aims to enhance cooperation between States in the 
region.145 It urges States to ratify relevant international anti-terrorism conventions 
and develop regional capacity-building programs, thereby strengthening the national 
legislation of States and cross-border counter-terrorism mechanisms.146 To enhance 
capacity-building measures in the region, the Southeast Asia Regional Center for 
Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT), located in Kuala Lumpur, was established. 
Furthermore, existing centres and training facilities which are present in Southeast 
Asia are being utilised, such as the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) 
located in Bangkok, as well as the Jakarta Center for Law Enforcement Cooperation 
(JCLEC), located in Semarang. Information sharing among States is being conducted 
through the Association of Southeast Asian National Police (ASEANAPOL). 
Another objective of ASEANAPOL is to enhance joint operations on terrorism and 
other criminal investigations, as well as facilitate cross-border cooperation on 
                                                
142 ‘“ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism’, 5 November 2001 
<http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-political-security-community/item/2001-seandeclaration-
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143 Ibid 
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intelligence.147 These measures are also being addressed at the annual ASEAN 
Chiefs of Police conference. 
In order to enhance the investigation, prevention and prosecution of criminal 
activities by law enforcement authorities, ASEAN member States produced the 
Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters in 2005.148  
The Parties shall, in accordance with this Treaty and subject to their respective 
domestic laws, render to one another the widest possible measure of mutual legal 
assistance in criminal matters, namely investigations, prosecutions and resulting 
proceedings.149 
 
Furthermore, to counter, prevent and suppress terrorism in particular, 
ASEAN member States adopted the ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism in 
2007.150 This convention is unique in that it provides common procedures for 
prosecuting offenders, such as the use of video conferencing facilities in court 
proceedings. Furthermore, the convention regulates the extradition of perpetrators, 
establishes a common database for disseminating information between member 
states, enhances cooperation between agencies (particularly law enforcement 
agencies), and provides the basis for information sharing among ASEAN member 
States. In mid-2009, ASEAN adopted a Plan of Action which aimed to boost 
cooperation between law enforcement agencies and between intelligence agencies. 
The Plan of Action is called the ASEAN Comprehensive Plan of Action on Counter-
                                                
147 ‘Objectives and Functions ‘, ASEANAPOL  <http://www.aseanapol.org/aboutaseanapol/objectives-
and-functions> at 22 October 2015. 
148 ‘Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters’, 29 November 2004 
<http://cil.nus.edu.sg/rp/pdf/2004%20Treaty%20on%20Mutual%20Legal%20Assistance%20in%20Cr
iminal%20Matters-pdf.pdf> at 22 October 2015. 
149 Article 1, Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters. 
150 Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ‘ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism ‘, 13 January 
2007 <http://www.asean.org/news/item/asean-convention-on-counter-terrorism> at 22 October 2015. 
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Terrorism,151 and clearly notes that member States are committed to preventing and 
suppressing terrorism. It also aims to prosecute offenders and foil potential terrorist 
attacks.152 
In addition, the Plan of Action provides States with detailed measures to 
address terrorism by equipping them with information on the political, social, 
economic and cultural conditions that lead to terrorism. The protection of people and 
infrastructure is also addressed by the Plan of Action. Furthermore, it urges States to 
implement regional legal frameworks, establish mechanisms for information 
exchange, enhance border control and immigration management, as well as comply 
with the UN Security Council Resolutions and international conventions and 
protocols on terrorism.153       
ASEAN has also made declarations to address terrorism with extra-regional 
actors including India, Australia, the Russian Federation, Japan and the Republic of 
Korea. These declarations include the 2002 ASEAN-US Joint Declaration for 
Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism and the 2003 Joint Declaration on 
Cooperation to Combat Terrorism.  
Another ASEAN forum which focuses on combating terrorism is the ASEAN 
Plus Three framework. In January 2004, the First ASEAN Plus Three Ministerial 
Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC3) was held to discuss issues related to 
transnational crime in Southeast Asia, including terrorism, piracy, people smuggling, 
as well as money laundering. The meeting also highlighted the importance of 
                                                
151 The ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Comprehensive Plan of Action on Counter Terrorism Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations 
<http://www.asean.org/resources/archives?task=callelement&format=raw%20&item_id=5415&eleme
nt=a0c6d315-bb76-42c6-9ecf-c287d406937b%20&method=download> at 4 November 2015. 
152 Ibid. 
153 Ibid.  
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addressing terrorism, with participants expressing their commitment to conduct 
intelligence sharing and enhancing communication between contracting States.154 
The attendees also acknowledged that development gaps and poverty are some of the 
root causes of transnational crime, including terrorism.155   
Measures to combat terrorism are also being conducted through bilateral and 
trilateral arrangements. For instance, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines have 
adopted the 2002 Agreement on Exchange and Establishment of Communication 
Procedures.156 The agreement, which has also been adopted by Thailand and 
Cambodia, provides the legal basis for members to set up hotlines, participate in joint 
operations to hunt suspected terrorists, as well as conduct anti-terrorism exercises. 
Counter piracy/armed robbery at sea initiatives are also relevant to combat terrorist 
activities, including the Malacca Straits Coordinated Patrol and the ‘Eyes in the Sky’ 
program discussed in the previous chapter.  
Several terrorist leaders have been apprehended as a result of intelligence 
sharing between ASEAN States. Moreover, these partnerships have extended beyond 
ASEAN member States, with counter-terrorism efforts being raised at other regional 
forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)157 and the Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum.158 In June 2003, at the 10th ARF Post-
Ministerial Conference, ARF member States agreed on a Statement on Cooperation 
against Piracy and Other Threats to Maritime Security (such as terrorism). The States 
                                                
154 Nancy-Amelia Collins, ‘War on Terrorism ‘ASEAN Plus 3’ Pledges to Combat Transnational 
Terror’, Clarinews 10 January 2005 <http://quickstart.clari.net./voa/art/ek/C5EC3E5DB39E-4FB1-
872CCDFD76D82D7C.html> at 22 October 2015. 
155 Ho, above n 47, 570. 
156 Agreement on Information Exchange and Establishment of Communication Procedures, see 
http://www.asean.org/archive/17346.pdf at 22 October 2015. 
157 ASEAN Regional Forum , see http://aseanregionalforum.asean.org/ at 22 October 2015. 
158 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, see http://www.apec.org/ at 22 October 2015.  
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participating in the conference, which was held in Cambodia, also considered 
ratifying the SUA Convention and Protocol. APEC explicitly addresses the matter 
through several initiatives, including the Counter-Terrorism Task Force (CTTF), the 
Workshop on Countering the Financing of Terrorism, the APEC Cybersecurity 
Strategy and several Counter-Terrorism Action Plans.159  
 
 APEC's Counter 
Terrorism Action Plans 
Brunei 
Darussalam 
ü 
Cambodia x 
Indonesia ü 
Laos x 
Malaysia ü 
Myanmar x 
Philippines ü 
Singapore ü 
Thailand  ü 
Vietnam ü 
East Timor x 
 
Legend: ü = Contracting States and x = Non-Contracting States 
 
Table 20: Status of APEC Counter Terrorism Action Plans in Southeast Asia160 
 
Most States in Southeast Asia prefer to devote their counter-terrorism 
cooperation efforts at the ASEAN level rather than the multilateral level. However, 
the mistrust that exists even among ASEAN States makes it difficult for States to 
engage in a greater level of cooperation.161 Even so, in order to maintain domestic 
                                                
159 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, ‘Counter-Terrorism’,  <http://www.apec.org/Groups/SOM-
Steering-Committee-on-Economic-and-Technical-Cooperation/Working-Groups/Counter-
Terrorism.aspx> at 22 October 2015. 
160 Status of APEC Counter Terrorism Action Plans in Southeast Asia, see 
http://www.apec.org/Groups/SOM-Steering-Committee-on-Economic-and-Technical-
Cooperation/Working-Groups/Counter-Terrorism/Counter-Terrorism-Action-Plans.aspx 22 October 
2015. 
161 Renato Cruz De Castro, ‘Twenty-First Century Philippine–American Security Relations: Managing 
an Alliance in the War of the Third Kind’ (2006) 2(2) Asian Security 102, 106. 
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and regional stability, according to Acharya States in the region still prefer to work 
together to conduct security coordination as opposed to having third parties from 
outside the region intervening.162  
4.6 Gaps in the International and Regional Framework 
The international community has accepted terrorism as a maritime security threat, 
and thus the development and adoption of numerous legal frameworks regulating 
transnational organised crime (such as terrorism) has taken place. International 
frameworks such as the SUA Convention and its 2005 Protocol, the ISPS Code form 
the main legal bases for combating maritime terrorism. However, these frameworks 
still have their limitations and shortcomings, and therefore the further development 
of these frameworks is required.   
The inability of the LOSC to address issues related to maritime terrorism led 
to the development of the SUA Convention. However, even though the convention 
attempts to address maritime terrorism from a broad perspective, not all aspects of 
the crime are sufficiently covered by the SUA Convention. One of the limitations of 
the convention is the need for States to obtain the express consent of the flag State 
before boarding and inspecting a suspect foreign-flagged vessel. Indeed, this is a 
barrier faced not only by the SUA Convention but also by the PSI Interdiction 
Principles. The traditional method of requesting flag State consent before taking 
further action with regard to a vessel on the high seas (such as boarding the vessel), 
prevents the pursuing State from taking immediate action where required. Therefore, 
amendments to the legal frameworks mentioned above are needed in order to 
accommodate developments in transnational crime.  
                                                
162 Acharya, above n 21, 226. 
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With the ISPS Code there is still a wide disparity in the standard of ports 
around the world. In order to create a uniform standard, relevant agencies need to 
work together to assist those ports which are unable to meet the ISPS Code 
requirements and non-compliant ports create risk into the system.163  
Despite the limitations of the current international framework, the possibility 
exists to move forward and effect meaningful change. Firstly, international 
regulations which only pertain to maritime crimes committed on the high seas and in 
the EEZ need to be re-examined and revised, if necessary. International law should 
be able to include within its ambit specific crimes (such as terrorism) committed in 
other maritime zones such as the territorial sea. Even so, such measures need to be 
discussed and agreed upon by States to ensure the measures do not encroach upon 
State sovereignty and in order to avoid interference with domestic legal jurisdiction. 
Secondly, practical and meaningful cooperative mechanisms need to be developed to 
ensure that prevailing international instruments are adopted and effectively enforced. 
These mechanisms will hopefully strengthen the capacity of States in greatest need 
of assistance. Lastly, the international community must take further steps to persuade 
States which are not party to the SUA Convention and its 2005 Protocol to adopt and 
ratify them. Indeed, in order to have uniform legal enforcement mechanisms, States 
need to implement the provisions of the convention into their respective domestic 
legal framework. If the legal environment could be set up in this way, then 
authorities would be better placed to enforce prevailing international law, as every 
                                                
163 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, United States Coast Guard, Port Security Advisory (3-15), 
International Port Security Program, 22 June 2015, 1-4. Ports in Cambodia and Timor Leste have not 
fulfilled the requirement International Port Security Program.  
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State would have similar procedures to investigate maritime crimes and prosecute 
offenders.164  
In relation to ASEAN counter-terrorism efforts, although the regional 
organisation has numerous initiatives in place, ASEAN States seem to be proceeding 
very cautiously in developing their response.165 As a result of this tentative approach, 
operational measures to combat terrorism are lacking in the ASEAN framework. 
Indeed, ASEAN initiatives are more geared towards the declaration of principles 
than adopting practical measures to fight the problem of terrorism.166 Moreover, as 
ASEAN still abides by the non-intervention principle, there is widespread belief 
among member States that the involvement of third parties outside of the region 
compromises their sovereignty. This complex situation affects the implementation of 
regional treaties. For instance, the ASEAN Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in 
Criminal Matters, which was adopted in 2005, facilitates the domestic 
implementation of international criminal instruments by member States. However, 
the treaty enables States to implement the relevant international instruments in a way 
that best accords with their national interests. As national interests differ between 
States, the implementation of the convention is unlikely to be uniform, thereby 
undermining the very purpose of the treaty – that is, to create regional cooperation 
with regard to transnational crime.       
Another example of a regional instrument lacking robust application is the 
ASEAN Convention on Counter-terrorism, which was adopted in 2007. Although this 
                                                
164 Hong and Ng, above n 6, 60. 
165 Sheldon W.  Simon, ‘U.S. Policy and Terrorism in Southeast Asia’ in Asia Program Special Report 
No. 112, Fighting Terrorism on the Southeast Asian Front (Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars, 2003) 17. 
166 Amitav Acharya, Terrorism and Security in Asia: Redefining Regional Order? (Asia Research 
Centre, 2004), 1-13. 
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convention ‘borrows’ definitions of terrorism from existing international treaties and 
conventions (thereby seeking to provide a comprehensive response to the crime), it 
simultaneously provides exemptions for a State which is not a party to those other 
instruments. According to Acharya, the convention also asserts the importance of the 
“preservation of sovereignty”, and contains an Article that deals with the “non-
application” of the convention where the location of the crime, the offender and the 
victims all converge within a single State that is party to the convention.167  In this 
context, other ASEAN States are prohibited from interfering with the sovereign 
rights of the contracting party in any manner.  
Another point to consider is that individual ASEAN States prefer to work 
bilaterally with other regional powers, such as the US and Australia, to combat 
terrorism. While such efforts may prove beneficial for the individual States involved, 
these initiatives do not assist the region as a whole. However, counter-terrorism 
efforts in the region would not affect the relationship among the ASEAN States. 
Even though ASEAN States have expectations of each other in terms of responses to 
terrorism and cooperative approaches, it has been argued by Acharya that the main 
objective of the political elites is to maintain political legitimacy and obtain financial 
assistance from other States.168  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
Maritime terrorism has been addressed at both the international and regional levels. 
In Southeast Asia, States have produced numerous frameworks in the form of 
treaties, plans of action as well as declarations. These frameworks include the Treaty 
                                                
167 Acharya, above n 21, 237. 
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on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, the ASEAN Plan of Action to 
Combat Transnational Crime, the Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, 
as well as the ASEAN-US Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International 
Terrorism. Nonetheless, these frameworks have been unable to completely eradicate 
terrorism in Southeast Asia. Several developments need to collectively converge in 
order to address all situations wherein maritime terrorist activities could potentially 
arise, including commitment of ratification and implementation of international 
convention and measures discussed in this chapter. Unilateral State action is very 
unlikely to address the issue in a comprehensive manner, and instead allows terrorist 
cells to continue their operations with little risk of interference by State authorities. 
Indeed, as maritime terrorism is a transnational crime, cooperation among all the 
States in the region is vital. 
. 
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CHAPTER V 
5 People Smuggling in Southeast Asia  
 
5.1 Introduction  
People smuggling constitutes a serious threat to maritime security in Southeast Asia. 
This issue has become one of the main concerns of the international community, as 
people smuggling not only affects countries of origin and destination, but also transit 
States.1 A vast amount of money is received by people smugglers in return for their 
services. The perilous nature of people smuggling operations which take place via the 
sea means that people’s lives are at risk. People are smuggled from and through the 
Southeast Asia region, most of whom are asylum seekers or refugees. The issue is 
clearly worthy of particular attention, and further measures will need to be 
implemented in order to solve the problem.  
 Southeast Asia continues to serve as an important transit area for migrant 
smuggling with routes reaching States as far as Australia and Canada. This is 
significant for the region, as smuggled migrants are more difficult to identify among 
the increasing number of regular migrants that accompany regional integration. The 
smuggling activities cause challenges to States, particularly in combating 
transnational crime as well as upholding border security and immigration laws. 
Furthermore, the movement to reach the destination State sometimes also causes 
deaths. In Southeast Asia, the smuggling of Rohingyas is also a particular concern 
                                                
*Parts of this chapter were published in the following publications: (i) Ahmad Almaududy Amri, 
People Smuggling in Southeast Asia: Trends, Challenges and Way Forward, Australian Journal of 
Maritime & Ocean Affairs, Volume 7, 2015; and (ii) Ahmad Almaududy Amri, International Legal 
Responses on People Smuggling, Ontario International Development Agency, OIDA International 
Journal of Sustainable Development, 7:10, 2014. 
1 C. Brolan, ‘An Analysis of the Human Smuggling Trade and the Protocol Against the Smuggling of 
Migrants by Land, Air and Sea (2000) from a Refugee Protection Pespective’ (2003) 14 International 
Journal of Refugee Law, 562-596. 
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where smuggling usually occurs by boat, especially between the months of November 
and April when seas are calm.2 Rohingyas take a land route from Myanmar through 
Thailand trying to reach Malaysia or Indonesia.  
People smuggling is considered an offence under international law. The 
offence is committed when people attempt to unlawfully enter another State’s 
territory via sea, land or air, and assisted by professional smugglers who know the 
best routes to, and drop-off points in, the destination State. The smuggling process 
also takes into consideration patrols by border control officials. Successful 
smuggling often involves being able to evade detection by these officials.3 In this 
way, eradicating people smuggling activities - whether by land, sea or air - becomes 
a border control issue.4 For the purpose of this thesis, however, people smuggling by 
sea will form the main focus of the discussion.  
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the international and regional legal 
frameworks governing people smuggling. Furthermore, it also examines the gaps in 
the prevailing legal framework at both international and regional levels.  
This chapter is divided into sections which discuss issues related to the 
concept of people smuggling, the regional context of people smuggling, the 
international legal framework on people smuggling, and the regional legal measures 
to combat people smuggling. 
The chapter concludes that the international and regional legal frameworks 
governing people smuggling is inadequate to address the complexity of the people 
smuggling problem. The nature of the problem is transnational and hence addressing 
                                                
2 UNODC, Migrant Smuggling in Asia(UNODC, 2015), 45 
3 Patricia  Mallia, Migrant Smuggling by Sea: Combating a Current Threat to Maritime Security 
through the Creation of a Cooperative Framework (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010), 7. 
4 Ibid, 7. 
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it unilaterally by a single State is inadequate. Therefore, cooperation at the regional 
level is the primary solution to address people smuggling in Southeast Asia. 
5.2 Concept of People Smuggling  
This section will give an overview of the concept of people smuggling. It starts with 
the discussion with the transnational nature of the problem then it explains the 
consequences of people smuggling. The differentiation between people smuggling 
and human trafficking also forms part of the discussion. Furthermore, the section 
also elaborates the policy implications as a result of the differentiation between 
people smuggling and human trafficking. 
5.2.1 The Smuggling of Humans 
People smuggling is now widely considered one of the fastest growing 
transnational crimes. It involves a vast number of countries, as well as numerous 
routes which have continued to increase over time.5 Technological advancements, 
such as the advent of complex navigational equipment, have also helped people 
smugglers refine their activities and escape detection. 
The number of illegal migrants via land, sea and air, according to statistics, 
are around 30-40 million out of approximately 191 million migrants worldwide.6 
This figure accounts for 15-20 per cent of the world’s total immigration.7 
Meanwhile, the Global Commission on International Migration has acknowledged 
that the number of illegal migrants is estimated to be 2.4 to 4 million people 
annually.8 With respect to migration by sea, the UN Secretary General has reported 
                                                
5Ibid, 8.  
6 UN, ‘Trends in Total Migrant Stock: The 2005 Revision’ (UN Publications, New York, 2007). 
7 UN, ‘Trends in Total Migrant Stock: The 2003 Revision’, POP/DB/MIG/REV.2003. 
8 Global Commission on International Migration, ‘Migration in an Interconnected World: New 
Directions for Action’ (October 2005), annex II. See www.gcim.org.  
 
 
156 
 
that in 2006, there were an unprecedented number of migrants who used maritime 
routes to unlawfully enter the territory of other States.9 It has been reported that 
between 2001 and 2007, there were more than 1,200 incidents involving more than 
61,400 migrants.10 However, these statistics do not represent the actual number of 
illegal migrants, as the reported figures only take into account those illegal migrants 
who were apprehended by authorities. Hence, the actual number of illegal migrants 
worldwide is likely to be much higher.11 In light of these statistics, it is hardly 
surprising that people smuggling has caused disruption to the international legal 
framework governing issues of migration, as well as to the national immigration 
policies of States.  
There are several causes of people smuggling. Some people undertake the 
journey to flee volatile political situations in their home country, while others are 
simply seeking a better place to live. However, poverty has always been one of the 
main reasons people choose to ‘migrate’ to another country. Their intention is to find 
a better life for themselves by seeking employment opportunities in their destination 
country.12 Another factor that compels many people to migrate is discrimination. In 
some parts of the world, people face discrimination on the basis of their race or 
gender or membership of other identity groups, and therefore are not afforded the 
same employment opportunities or other rights as the general population.13 
                                                
9 United Nations General Assembly, ‘Oceans and the Law of the Sea: Report of the Secretary-
General’ (2008) 1-88. 
10 MSC.3/Circ.13 Unsafe Practices associated with the Trafficking or Transport of Migrants by Sea 
(31 July 2007). 
11 Mallia, above n 3, 8. 
12 UNHR, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Sales of Children, Child Prostitution and Child 
Pornography: Mission to Morocco, E/CN.4/2001/78/Add.1’ (2001) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/children/pages/childrenindex.aspx> para.21. 
13 Tom Obokata, ‘Smuggling of Human beings from a human rights perspective: Obligations of non-
State and State actors under International Human Rights law’ (2005) 17(2) International Journal of 
Refugee Law 399. 
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Furthermore, there are countries where inequalities exist with regard to the treatment 
of women. In these places, women are marginalised in economic, social and political 
circles and do not receive the same rights enjoyed by men. Humanitarian crises have 
also played a role in the rise of people smuggling.14 In some States, people face abuse 
on the basis of their race, religion and/or political membership, thus causing them to 
voluntarily ‘migrate’ to other countries.  
However, the notion of resettling in another country to enjoy a better quality 
of life does not always eventuate. During the smuggling process, many people are 
treated inhumanely, with some even being subjected to torture. In some 
circumstances, ‘immigrants’ have even died during the course of their voyage. In 
2001 for example, 356 people died when an overcrowded ship commissioned by 
people smugglers sank off the coast of Indonesia.15 Unfortunately, this is not an 
isolated case. In other parts of the world, such as in the UK, the US, Ireland and 
Libya, there have been reports of various accidents during the people smuggling 
voyage, as well as incidents of illegal migrants being treated inhumanely by people 
smugglers.16 Furthermore, terrorist groups harness people smuggling activities, using 
them as a way to clandestinely enter another State’s territory.17  
People smugglers charge exorbitant fees to transfer would-be migrants to 
another State.18 People seeking to be ‘resettled’ often require their relatives to 
shoulder all or part of the financial burden. It is often the case that these relatives do 
not have the required funds, and must thus take out a loan to pay the fee demanded 
                                                
14 Ibid. 399. 
15UNHR, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Migrants’ (2002) <http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G02/108/38/PDF/G0210838.pdf?OpenElement>, para 32. 
16 Obokata, above n 13, 400 
17 Mallia, above n 3, 7. 
18 Obokata, above n 13, 400. 
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by the people smugglers. However, instead of going to established banks, they 
invariably choose questionable lending institutions that ask fewer questions 
regarding the reason for the loan. However, these lenders almost always charge a 
higher rate of interest than the official banks. Thus, in many cases, the borrower ends 
up losing their home or what little land they have in order to pay the debt.   
During their voyage to the destination country, illegal migrants are exposed 
to several risks. Indeed, people smugglers have little regard for the proper treatment 
of the people they are transporting. For example, it is common for illegal migrants to 
be carried in overcrowded containers for extended periods of time. As a result, they 
suffer sickness and are prone to dehydration, malnutrition, as well as exhaustion. 
Furthermore, there have been instances where people have been tortured or treated 
inhumanely during their voyage. Indeed, incidents of sexual assault and other forms 
of violence are relatively common, and serve to earn more money for the people 
smugglers. What is more tragic is that there have been cases where illegal migrants 
have lost their lives before reaching the destination country.  
States have taken measures to combat people smuggling at the multilateral 
and regional level. At the multilateral level, people smuggling is considered an 
offence pursuant to the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea 
and Air19 (Smuggling Protocol) which is attached to the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime20 (CATOC). CATOC defines an “organized 
criminal group” as:  
                                                
19 Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, open for signature 12 December 2000, 
(entered into force 28 January 2004). Hereinafter referred to as Smuggling Protocol. 
20 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, open for signature 
12 December 2000, 2237 UNTS 319 (entered into force 29 September 2003). Hereinafter referred to 
as CATOC. 
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a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting 
in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences 
established in accordance with this convention, in order to obtain, directly or 
indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.21 
 
At the Southeast Asian level, the Bali Process has been one of the most 
important forums in addressing the issue of people smuggling.22 The Bali Process led 
to the creation of an Ad Hoc Group to implement the Bali Process Regional 
Cooperating Framework (RCF). Established on 30 March 2011, the RCF aims to 
establish practical arrangements for members to respond to the irregular movement 
of people through “consistent processing of asylum claims, durable solutions for 
refugees, the sustainable return of those not owed protection and [the] targeting of 
people smuggling enterprises”.23 
5.2.2 Consequences of Smuggling  
The definition of people smuggling in the Smuggling Protocol makes clear that the 
offence is completed when those smuggled reach their destination State.24 However, 
they may still be treated with violence in their new home. As mentioned earlier, 
many illegal migrants must borrow money in order to finance their voyage, and are 
thus willing to accept any job they are offered when they reach their destination 
country, even if the salary and/or working conditions are less than decent.  
Indeed, the vulnerability experienced by many of these illegal migrants has 
the potential to lead to forced labour or even slavery. In these circumstances, people 
smuggling may even be viewed as human trafficking. One illustration of this is 
where smuggled people are made to work in the agricultural sector. On a day-to-day 
                                                
21 Article 2 (a), CATOC. 
22 The Bali Process see http://www.baliprocess.net/ at the 4th of May 2015. 
23 Regional Cooperation Framework, see http://www.baliprocess.net/regional-cooperation-framework 
at the 4th of May 2015. 
24 Obokata, above n 13, 401.  
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basis they may be in direct contact with dangerous chemicals which have the 
potential to affect their health. However, due to their illegal status, and for fear of 
being prosecuted, they hesitate to see a doctor and thus remain in their unhealthy 
state. Another consequence of people smuggling is the inhumane treatment to 
women. Many reports have shown that women who migrate illegally are much more 
likely to be sexually and psychologically abused. Furthermore, some people who are 
smuggled become ‘trapped’ when they arrive in new their homeland. Indeed, people 
smugglers have been known to seize the passports and other documents of the people 
they have transported in order to gain control over them, and as a result the illegal 
migrants are prevented from moving freely in their destination State.25       
Smuggled people also face racism and other forms of discrimination. Indeed, 
people may tend to be racist towards new arrivals as the term “illegal migrants” has a 
negative connotation in many communities.26 Furthermore, they are often 
marginalised due to their poor state of health and lack of knowledge of the local 
customs and language used in the destination State. These inequalities persist 
because smuggled people are less likely to report discriminatory conduct to 
authorities precisely due to their status as ‘illegal migrants’.  
Some of the concerns surrounding the treatment of smuggled people are 
perpetrated by law enforcement authorities themselves. There are instances where 
illegal migrants have been shot by law enforcement officers before entering the 
destination State. Such action has resulted in illegal migrants sustaining severe 
injuries and, at times, even death. In other cases, authorities have acted unlawfully by 
asking for money or sexual favours from illegal migrants in exchange for their 
                                                
25 Tiffany St Claire King, ‘The Modern Slave Trade ‘ (2002) 8 UC Davis Journal of International Law 
and Policy 309. 
26 Obokata, above n 13, 402. 
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freedom. If they fail or refuse to cooperate, they risk spending a longer period of time 
in detention. What makes this situation worse is the poor condition of the detention 
centres. They are often unhygienic and ill-equipped to provide adequate medical 
assistance. Furthermore, while in detention, illegal migrants are often denied basic 
rights such as consular assistance, legal advice and access to interpreters. Although 
not every smuggled person suffers these consequences, they invariably find 
themselves in highly vulnerable situations and are thus prone to exploitation.27  
5.2.3 People Smuggling versus Trafficking in Persons  
Many States which are affected by people smuggling, whether as a State of origin, 
transit or destination, are highly concerned about the issue.28 The money obtained by 
people smugglers is often spent on other illegal activities, such as the trafficking of 
drugs and the illicit arms trade. However, more worrying is the fact that some illegal 
migrants later become involved in criminal activities, such as theft, the drugs trade 
and prostitution, in order to repay their debt to the people smugglers.29 In this regard, 
people smuggling can be seen as a modern form of slavery. However, not all illegal 
migrants find themselves in this situation, with many enjoying a better quality of life 
and a decent living environment in their new homeland.30  
In order to gain a better understanding of people smuggling, scholars have 
sought to differentiate it from human trafficking. Today, there is an international 
legal framework which regulates human trafficking and people smuggling. With 
regard to human trafficking, the Protocol to Prevent and Suppress Trafficking in 
                                                
27 Ibid, 402. 
28 Brolan, above n 1, 578. 
29 Brolan, above n 1, 579. 
30 Ibid, 580. 
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Persons, Especially Women and Children31 (Trafficking Protocol) has been adopted 
by members of the United Nations. In the case of people smuggling, as mentioned 
earlier the United Nations has adopted the Smuggling Protocol. Both of these 
protocols are attached to the CATOC, which is also known as the Palermo 
Convention. These protocols have helped states, scholars, international organisations 
and other parties define and differentiate people smuggling from human trafficking. 
Furthermore, these legally binding instruments assist member States to punish 
perpetrators engaged in the trafficking and smuggling of people. 
The process of entering a State can take place with or without documentation. 
Undocumented entry involves migrants entering a State (other than their country of 
origin) without proper documentation as required by the visited State.32 If the entry 
process is assisted (i.e., from people in the State of origin), then this act could be 
considered people smuggling and/or trafficking in persons. The distinctions between 
the two offences are clearly articulated in the Trafficking and Smuggling Protocols33. 
The Smuggling Protocol defines “smuggling” in Article 3(a) as: 
the procurement in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material 
benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a state party of which the person is not a 
national or a permanent resident. 34 
 
Hence, it is quite clear that people smuggling involves three elements: (i) 
there must be a physical movement of a person; (ii) the activity must be conducted 
across international borders; and (iii) the activity must be conducted in exchange for 
payment or some type of material benefit. Furthermore, the main focus of the crime 
                                                
31 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, open for 
signature 12 December 2000, (entered into force 25 December 2003). Hereinafter referred to as 
Trafficking Protocol.  
32 Mallia, above n 3, 10. 
33 Ibid, 10. 
34 Article 3 (a), Smuggling Protocol. 
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is on the assistance provided by people smugglers to facilitate the unlawful entry of a 
person into the other State. Therefore, the “subsequent treatment of the migrant is not 
a constitutive element of the crime.”35 
On the other hand, trafficking in persons is a more complex crime. It involves 
not only illegal migration, but also other acts such as the use of force, coercion, 
fraudulent conduct and the exploitation of people.36 The Trafficking Protocol has 
defined “trafficking in persons” in Article 3(a) as: 
The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means 
of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of 
deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or 
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control 
over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a 
minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual 
exploitation, forced labour or service, slavery or practices similar to slavery, 
servitude or the removal of organs.37  
 
From the above definition, it is clear that trafficking in persons is different 
from people smuggling in several respects. Firstly, people smuggling is voluntary in 
nature – that is, the act is carried out with the consent of those being smuggled. On 
the other hand, trafficking is not voluntary and involves coercion and deception.38 
Secondly, the act of people smuggling ends when the migrants reach their 
destination, whereas trafficking entails the continuous exploitation of people even 
after they have reached their place of destination.39 Thirdly, people smuggling 
requires international movements, while trafficking can be carried out either within a 
single State or between different States.40 Fourth, in terms of entering a State, people 
smuggling is always illegal, and thus those smuggled are categorised as illegal 
                                                
35 Mallia, above n 3, 10. 
36 Ibid, 10. 
37 Article  3 (a), Trafficking Protocol. 
38 Patrick Twomey, ‘Europe’s Other Market: Trafficking in People’ (2000) 2(1) European Journal of 
Migration and Law 7. 
39 Obokata, above n 13, 397. 
40 Mallia, above n 3, 10. 
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migrants. Conversely, in a trafficking scenario, the trafficked people may enter a 
State legally or illegally.41     
The distinctions that exist between the two offences do not preclude them 
from overlapping. Indeed, there have been cases where both smuggling and 
trafficking has occurred. This arises where people intending to be smuggled into 
another State end up being trafficked. In essence, the migrants are tricked on their 
way to the destination State and are treated inhumanely.42 Moreover, the migrants are 
charged a huge amount of money in order to be transported illegally to the other 
State. As a result, they are exposed to exploitation, thus making them the victims of 
human trafficking. The overlaps between people smuggling and trafficking in 
persons create problems for authorities with respect to law enforcement and 
prosecuting offenders.43   
5.2.4 Policy Implications 
There are different legislative as well as law enforcement approaches to people 
smuggling and human trafficking.44 In the context of trafficking, it has been 
proposed that the apparent and continuous exploitation of people (in the form of 
coercion and deception), requires States to provide assistance and protection to such 
people, even though they may have breached national immigration policies. On the 
other hand, people smuggling involves people who voluntarily depart their home 
State knowing they will violate the immigration laws of the destination State. Many 
States consider such conduct to be reprehensible, and therefore believe that the full 
                                                
41 Obokata, above n 13, 397. 
42 Mallia, above n 3, 11. 
43 Ibid, 11. 
44 Kelly E Hyland, ‘Protecting human victims of trafficking: An American framework’ (2001) 16 
Berkeley Women’s Law Journal 29, 34. 
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force of the law (including arrest, repatriation, detention or deportation) should be 
brought to bear upon them.45   
 Notwithstanding the above argument, the differences between trafficking and 
smuggling have changed the general understanding of exploitation and abuse. It is 
clear from the Smuggling and Trafficking Protocols that preferential treatment is 
given to those who have been trafficked over those who have been smuggled. 
According to the Trafficking Protocol, States are obliged to provide protection to 
victims of trafficking. Such protection extends to “[providing] assistance in criminal 
investigations and proceedings, [the provision] of accommodation, physical and 
psychological assistance, employment and educational opportunities, and [the issue 
of a] temporary or permanent residence permit”.46 In contrast, the Smuggling 
Protocol does not protect those smuggled as extensively as the Trafficking Protocol 
protects trafficked people.   
Even though there are some protective measures embedded in the Smuggling 
Protocol, such as the right to life and the prevention of torture, the protection 
afforded to smuggled people remains limited.47 The protocol supports the right of a 
State to prosecute people involved in people smuggling, especially because the act 
breaches the domestic immigration laws of States. Furthermore, such action is 
affirmed by other international instruments, such as the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights48 1966 (ICCPR), the European Convention on Human 
                                                
45 Anne Gallagher, ‘Human Rights and the New UN Protocols on Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling: 
A Preliminary Analysis’ (2001) 23(4) Human Rights Quarterly 1000. 
46 Articles 4-7, Trafficking Protocol. 
47 Article 16, Smuggling Protocol.  
48International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, open for signature 16 December 1966, 999 
UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1966). Hereinafter referred to as ICCPR. 
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Rights49 1950 (ECHR), the American Convention on Human Rights50 1969 (ACHR), 
as well as the African Charter of Human and People’s Rights51 1981 (African 
Charter). Although these international instruments may also be enforced in relation 
to trafficked people as explained by Obokata, they mainly apply to illegal migrants 
because such people are likely to have breached several provisions under the various 
instruments.52 
5.3 Regional Context of People Smuggling 
This section explains the nature of people smuggling in Southeast Asia. It includes a 
discussion of the trends of people smuggling in the region, the smuggling process 
from Southeast Asia to Australia and Canada, and the networks involved in people 
smuggling. Furthermore, this section also explains the costs involved and the number 
of migrants being transported in Southeast Asia. Several States in Southeast Asia 
serve as the main transit States for those people intending on resettling in Australia 
or Canada, and thus such activities undermine regional maritime. 
5.3.1 People Smuggling in Southeast Asia 
The chief motivation of people smugglers is financial reward. And although they risk 
being kept in detention centres for extended periods of time if their activities are 
uncovered, this punishment seems relatively ‘light’ compared to the profits they 
stand to make from the business. In some cases, people smuggling has been 
                                                
49 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, open for signature 4 
November 1950, (entered into force 3 September 1953). Hereinafter referred to as ECHR. 
50 American Convention on Human Rights, open for signature 20 November 1969, (entered into force 
18 July 1978). Hereinafter referred to as ACHR. 
51 African Charter of Human and People’s Rights, open for signature 27 June 1981, (entered into force 
21 October 1986). Hereinafter referred to as African Charter. 
52 Obokata, above n 13, 398. 
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connected to other criminal syndicates, such as trade in illicit drugs and arms 
trafficking.53 
 Smugglers facilitate the entry of people into the State of destination by 
providing transportation, transit accommodation, as well as fake passports in some 
instances. Indeed, as States become more aware of the increased flow of migrants 
into their territories, tightening their immigration policies to control the influx, 
people smuggling has become more popular.54    
Because of the high fees charged by people smugglers, migrants are not 
always able to pay the whole cost of their journey at once. Thus, they are often 
compelled to work in low skilled jobs and sometimes even the sex industry (where 
formal identity documentation is less likely to be required), in order to satisfy their 
debt to the people smugglers.    
In responding to this threat, several Southeast Asian States have taken 
measures to prevent the flow of undocumented migrants. One such measure has been 
the convening of ministerial conferences to discuss the issue. In 2002, ministers from 
more than thirty nations gathered at the Regional Ministerial Conference on People 
Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime. The 
conference, which was held in Bali, was co-chaired by the Ministers for Foreign 
Affairs from Indonesia and Australia, Hassan Wirajuda and Alexander Downer, 
respectively, and involved several States from which migrants commonly originate, 
such as Iran and Afghanistan.  
                                                
53 Ralf  Emmers, ‘The threat of Transnational Crime in Southeast Asia: Drug Trafficking, Human 
Smuggling and Trafficking, and Sea Piracy: UNISCI Discussion Papers’  (2003)  Institute of defence 
and Strategic Studies, 5.  
54 Ibid, 5. 
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Even though States in the region have tried to enhance cooperation in order to 
deal with the issue, especially after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, people smuggling 
remains one of the major threats to maritime security in the region. This threat also 
forms a barrier to advancing bilateral ties between States in Southeast Asia. Indeed, 
this can be seen in the strained relations between Malaysia and Thailand. Malaysia 
has been critical of undocumented labourers entering its territory from Myanmar, 
Bangladesh and Thailand. As a result, Malaysia has erected a fence along its Thai 
border and instructed its military personnel and border control officials to remove 
any illegal migrant entering the country.55  
Another example of people smuggling militating against regional cooperation 
is the political tension that recently existed between Indonesia and Malaysia.  In 
2002, Malaysia granted amnesty to people (mainly illegal workers) who had entered 
its territory illegally. This policy, which was called the Voluntary Repatriation 
Programme, freed around 300,000 people, most of who originated from Indonesia.56  
5.3.2 Smuggling of Humans through Southeast Asia 
The reason why people decide to ‘resettle’ in another country varies in different parts 
of the world. In Southeast Asia, most of the people being smuggled are asylum 
seekers or refugees.57 Indeed, this has domestic policy implications for prosecuting 
those who have been smuggled. Most of the migrants who transit through Southeast 
Asia intend on resettling in Australia or Canada. Hence, it is important for both these 
countries to strengthen their border control and manage the flow of irregular 
migrants. Even though Australia and Canada have become increasingly concerned 
                                                
55 Ibid, 6. 
56 Ibid, 7. 
57 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), ‘Transnational Organized Crime in East 
Asia and the Pacific: A Threat Assessment’ (2013), 39. 
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over this issue, it is important that their governments recognise the rights of asylum 
seekers and refugees and comply with prevailing international law on the issue.58  
 
 
Figure 7: Asylum Claims Submitted in Industrialised Countries, 2010-201459 
5.3.3 The Trends of People Smuggling in Southeast Asia 
As previously mentioned, there are several reasons why people choose to be 
smuggled. Most of the people who transit through Southeast Asia are from the 
Middle East, South Asia and East Asia, and are fleeing internal conflicts and poor 
economic conditions. On the other hand, destination countries are viewed as offering 
employment opportunities with higher earnings, a better standard of education, as 
well as peace and stability. In 2014, the United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees (UNHCR) noted that the countries with the highest number of citizen 
seeking asylum in Asia included Afghanistan (68,719), Iraq (59,472), Pakistan 
(26,332), Iran (20,241), and Sri Lanka (6,792).60  
                                                
58 David Kyle and Rey Koslowski, ‘The Smuggling of Refugees’ in Global Human Smuggling: 
Comparative Perspectives (John Hopkins University Press, 2011) 256, 256-272. 
59 United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), Asylum Trends 2014, Levels and 
Trends Industrialized Countries, 7. 
60 UNHCR, Asylum Trends 2014, Levels and Trends Industrialized Countries, 23. 
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Over the past few years, there has been a variation in the number of people 
arriving in Australia and claiming asylum or refugee status.61 In order to reach their 
destination, these people use either water transportation (and are thus classified as 
Irregular Maritime Arrivals or IMAs), or aerial transportation (with the result being 
that they are regarded as Non-Irregular Maritime Arrivals or non-IMAs). On average, 
there were 6,551 non-IMA asylum seeker applications per year between 2008 and 
2013.62 On the other hand, within the same period, there were approximately (7,186) 
IMA applications each year.63 There is a greater likelihood of IMAs receiving 
asylum seeker status than non-IMAs.64  
 
 
Figure 8: Asylum claims lodged by Afghan, Iranian, Iraqi and Sri Lankan nationals 
while in Australia after arrival by air65 
 
                                                
61 UNODC, above n 57, 40. 
62 Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Asylum Trends, 2012-2013 Annual Publication, 
4. 
63 Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Asylum Trends, 2012-2013 Annual Publication, 
4. 
64 UNODC above n 57, 40. 
65 Department of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP) or previously known as Department of 
Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC) Systems. 
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Figure 9: Refugee status determination requests by top countries of citizenship (2010-
2011) in Australia by irregular maritime arrivals66 
 
Afghanistan had the highest number of asylum seekers in Australia between 
2010 and 2011 (31 per cent), followed by Iran 30 per cent, Iraq 11 per cent and Sri 
Lanka 7 per cent.67 There was an increase in the number of Iranians seeking asylum 
during this period compared to 2009-2010 (where the figure was only four per cent). 
Most of these asylum seekers are single males under the age of 40.68 
One of the problems facing Australian and Canadian authorities in dealing 
with immigrants coming through Southeast Asia is how to differentiate between bona 
fide refugees and migrants who are using the legal protection afforded to asylum 
seekers and refugees in order to gain entry into their countries. Moreover, there are 
bona fide asylum seekers who nonetheless ask people smugglers to help them enter 
other States.69 
                                                
66 DIBP or previously known as DIAC 2011. 
67 UNODC, above n 57, 40.  
68 Ibid, 40. 
69 UNODC, above n 57, 41. 
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In responding to this problem, States have tried to strengthen their 
immigration and border protection policies in order to prevent the flow of irregular 
arrivals. However, people smugglers are often one step ahead of the authorities, and 
are thus able to find ways to continue their operations. Indeed, this has led the 
Australian Government to assert that people smugglers exploit “softer enforcement 
practices through whatever means and routes [are] available to them.”70 
Another reason why people are willing to undertake the often dangerous 
journey to another State (besides the opportunity of being granted asylum), is that 
diasporic communities exist in both Australia and Canada. There are more than 
300,000 Tamils in Canada, making it the third largest country with a Tamil 
population after Sri Lanka and India. 
Irregular migrants are also aware of the social networks that provide trusted 
information for the journey that would be encountered. Furthermore, social networks 
in the destination State usually inform migrants how to obtain a loan and secure 
accommodation in the initial stages after they reach the destination State. In addition, 
such networks help with advocacy services if those smuggled are intercepted and 
later detained by authorities. Indeed, these types of services were provided by 
Canadian Tamils to migrants on board the MV Sun Sea.71    
Australia and Canada have become the most attractive destinations for 
migrants, as both countries are signatories to 1951 UN Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees72, and hence have an obligation to protect refugees. Moreover, 
neither country was affected by the global financial crisis to a significant extent, and 
                                                
70 Ibid, 41. 
71 Ibid, 41. 
72 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, open for signature 2 July 1950, (entered into force 2 
April 1954). Hereinafter referred to as Refugee Convention. 
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as a result, both countries have relatively high pay rates for workers. In terms of 
immigration regulations, Australia and Canada have relatively open immigration 
policies compared to many other countries. It is for these reasons that people seeking 
to flee their homeland (and especially those from the Middle East, as well as South 
and West Asia) risk the dangerous journey by sea.  In most cases, the person seeking 
to enter the destination State has been directed to do so by their family.73 Indeed, the 
head of the family or the eldest son will often depart before the others. Family 
members will only follow if the first member of their family is given protection in 
the destination State.74 
In 2011, Australian authorities noted an increase in the number of families 
arriving in the country. One of the reasons for this increase was that Australia had 
adopted a new immigration policy whereby children and families would be housed in 
community-based accommodation rather than detention centres. A similar policy 
exists in Canada where children are accompanied by other family members.     
5.3.4 The Smuggling Process from Southeast Asia to Australia and Canada 
The smuggling of people to Australia and Canada is conducted along well-
established routes in Southeast Asia and via different forms of transportation.75    
5.3.4.1 Human Smuggling from Southeast Asia to Australia 
In the 1970s most of the ships arriving in Australia were from Vietnam. However, 
this has changed since the end of 1990s. Since that time people from Afghanistan, 
Iran, Iraq, Sri Lanka and Myanmar have used a new strategy to reach their country of 
                                                
73 M. Neske, Financial Flows in Migrant Smuggling (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 
2011) 
74 UNODC, above n 57, 41. 
75 Ibid, 42. 
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destination.76 Southeast Asia has become an important region for people smugglers, 
as Indonesia is the main transit State for those seeking to resettle in Australia. People 
smugglers use several paths and methods to get their customers into Indonesia. 
People from Afghanistan are transported by bus or on foot to Pakistan or Iran 
through both official and unofficial land borders.77 From these countries, the people 
are then transported to Malaysia by air. To get to Indonesia from Malaysia, smuggled 
Afghans are transported by bus, train or ferry. Once they arrive in Indonesia, they are 
placed on boats in order to continue their journey to Australia.78      
Migrants from Iran and Sri Lanka tend to use a more streamlined approach to 
reach Malaysia or Indonesia: air travel. From these transit States, they board boats in 
order to reach Australia. The Iraqis follow a similar journey. They use an aerial route 
to reach Malaysia or other transit States like Jordan or Iran, before arriving in 
Indonesia.79 As for the Rohingyas, they take a land route from Myanmar through 
Thailand and Malaysia to Indonesia. From Indonesia, they are transported to 
Australia by sea.  
The safest and quickest way to arrive in Southeast Asia is by air travel 
through the Gulf States. Of course, people choosing this method of transportation 
will have to provide genuine documents that will be checked by immigration 
officers. For some States, there are visa conditions that are relatively easy to get from 
Southeast Asian States. For nationals of Iran for instance, a visa on arrival is granted 
by several Southeast Asian States. Migrants from States which do not enjoy the same 
privileges, such as Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and Iraq, require the assistance of people 
                                                
76 J. Phillips and H. Spinks, Boat Arrivals in Australia Since 1976 (Parliament of Australia 2012). 
77 Indonesian National Police, ‘Improving Evidence-Based Knowledge on Migrant Smuggling from, 
through, within to Southeast and East Asia’ (2nd Inter-Regional Workshop, 2011).  
78 Ibid. 
79 UNODC, above n 57, 42. 
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smugglers to get from their homeland to the destination State. The smugglers will 
assist these migrants by giving them false documents such as:  
a genuine passport that is physically altered by photo substitution or insertion of a 
visa page; an entire passport that is fabricated; visa pages that are fabricated; a 
genuine passport or visa fraudulently obtained through stolen or illegally-obtained 
paperwork; or a genuine passport stolen or purchased from the black market.80 
 
There have been cases where people smugglers have themselves 
accompanied migrants to transit countries. For instance, numerous Afghan is have 
been accompanied by air to Indonesia. From there, migrants are transported by land 
to pooling locations. They must then wait in apartment style accommodation for at 
least two weeks until they receive further notice about the time and location of their 
departure. In some cases, the waiting period can be several months long.  
Indonesia is often chosen as the departure point because of its close proximity 
to Australia.81 Furthermore, the authorities are not able to effectively monitor the 
smuggling activities conducted in some parts of Indonesia. There are several points 
within Indonesia from which boats depart to different places in Australia. Two of the 
most popular destinations in Australia are Ashmore Reef, which is located 150km 
from Rote Island, and Christmas Island, which is located 340km from Java Island.82 
The vast majority of boats arrive at either of these two destinations, as opposed to 
travelling straight to mainland Australia.83 
 
 
 
                                                
80 Ibid, 42. 
81 Ibid, 44 
82 E. Karlsen, Refugee Resettlement to Australia: What are the Facts? (Parliament of Australia, 2011). 
83 UNODC, above n 57, 44. 
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Figure 10: Migrant Smuggling to Australia and Canada by Sea84 
 
In response to the rising tide of illegal arrivals, the Australian and Indonesian 
government signed a regional cooperation agreement which sought to prohibit and 
intercept people smugglers and their human cargo on route to Australia.85 Although 
the agreement did not entirely stop people smuggling operations from Indonesia, 
smaller operators were unable to continue after the agreement came into effect.86  
 
 
 
                                                
84 UNODC elaboration based on information from the Indonesian National Police (INP), the DIBP or 
previously known as DIAC and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).  
85 UNODC, above n 57, 44. 
86 M. Crock, B. Saul and A. Dastyari, Future Seekers II: Refugees and Irregular Migration in 
Australia (Federation Press, 2006), 1-232. 
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Figure 11: Indonesian departure points and harbours for boats travelling to Australia87 
 
In order to maximise profits, people smugglers tend to use unseaworthy 
fishing vessels to transport migrants. Therefore, the journey becomes extremely 
perilous, and in many cases passengers have died on the long and treacherous 
journey. For example, in 2001 a fishing boat, Siev X, sank on her journey to 
Christmas Islands as it was overloaded with people. The incident caused the death of 
353 passengers from four countries.88     
In 2012, it was reported that a boat containing almost 200 migrants from 
Afghanistan was attempting to enter Australian territory. However, as the boat was in 
distress, she was not able to complete the journey. Australian authorities thus had to 
rescue the vessel and its passengers on the north-west coast of Australia. 
Unfortunately, only 108 people survived the incident.89  
                                                
87 Presentation by Dr Rebecca Miller, Coordination and Analysis Unit (CAU), UNODC Regional 
Centre for East Asia and the Pacific, Migrant Smuggling by Sea: South-East Asian Facts & Figures, 
Jakarta, Indonesia, 18 March 2013. 
88 UNODC, above n 57, 44.  
89 Ibid, 44. 
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Figure 12: Irregular maritime arrivals to Australia by select nationalities (2011-2012)90 
 
To undertake this journey, people smugglers recruit Indonesian captains who 
steer the ship towards Australia. However, these captains do not usually take control 
of the ship until it reaches Christmas Island or Ashmore Reef. While the ship is 
sailing in international waters, junior crew members are directed to steer the ship on 
the captain’s behalf. In addition to the vessel carrying the human cargo, there is 
invariably a support vessel which is used to carry the crew back to Indonesia. The 
support vessel also ensures that crew members avoid being apprehended by 
Australian or Indonesian authorities. Australian authorities have claimed that 
incidents of people smuggling show similar trends, and that no new strategies have 
been implemented by people smugglers in terms of their operations.91 
                                                
90 DIBP or previously known as DIAC Systems.  
91 UNODC, above n 57, 44. 
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5.3.4.2 Human Smuggling from Southeast Asia to Canada  
The smuggling of people into Canada has been dominated by Sri Lankans since 
1985.92 It should be noted, however, that Canada is not the most popular destination 
for Middle Eastern and Central Asia migrants, such as those from Afghanistan and 
Iran. Following the reconciliation between the Sri Lankan Government and the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in May 2009, many Tamil asylum seekers 
migrated to India, and then to Southeast Asia in order to board boats which would 
take them to their final destination - either Canada or Australia. More than 50 male 
Tamils were carried by the Ocean Lady in 2009, which sailed from Mumbai and then 
through several Southeast Asian countries to pick up other Tamil groups. This 
journey was supported by the Tamil diasporic community in Canada, which 
encouraged Tamils to migrate.93  
Noticing this movement by the Tamils, Canadian authorities successfully 
intercepted another vessel which was carrying almost 500 Tamils in August 2010. 
The vessel in issue, the MV Sun Sea, had sailed from Songkhla, Thailand, and was 
intercepted off the coast of British Columbia. Migrants seeking to resettle in Canada 
usually enter Thailand through legal means – mainly air travel from Jaffna to 
Bangkok. After entering Thailand, they overstay their tourist visas, thus becoming 
illegal migrants. In the case of the MV Sun Sea, it was reported that there were 
approximately 45 people working as people smugglers from different countries (Sri 
Lanka, Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia). These people smugglers provided the 
migrants with tickets and documents to facilitate their arrival in Bangkok. The 
migrants were then asked to stay in apartment-style accommodation until their date 
                                                
92 Ibid, 45. 
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of departure, at which point their Thai documents were confiscated by the people 
smugglers.94       
In 2011, Indonesian authorities intercepted a vessel which was carrying more 
than 80 Sri Lankan asylum seekers to Canada. The vessel was presumably heading to 
New Zealand, however, there was some evidence that the crew on board the ship 
intended to sail to Canada.  
5.3.5 Smuggling Networks 
Smuggling networks originating from the Middle East, as well as those from South 
and West Asia, are involved with numerous criminal syndicates, especially those in 
Asia.95 
Both males and females are involved in people smuggling.96 Indeed, female 
people smugglers have a distinct advantage over their male counterparts, often 
evading detection by immigration officers and other authorities. Female people 
smugglers are also used to accompany migrants who do not wish to travel alone.97    
The smuggling network in this region is characterised by a loose 
organisational structure. Migrants tend to rely on people smugglers who share their 
country of origin. However, people smugglers have also been known to hire local 
people (such as Indonesians), to help them arrange their activities in Indonesia. 
People smugglers also offer different kinds of services, such as providing travel 
                                                
94 Ibid, 45. 
95 Ibid, 45. 
96 Indonesian National Police Presentation at the 2nd Inter-Regional Workshop on Improving 
Evidence-Based Knowledge on Migrant Smuggling from, through, within and to Southeast and East 
Asia, Bangkok, Thailand, October 2011. 
97 UNODC, above n 57, 46. 
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documents and accommodation, to hiring a crew and vessel that will take the 
migrants to their desired destination State.98   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Afghan smuggling network (Amanullah Rezai)99 
 
People smugglers who relocate Tamils operate differently from those 
smuggling syndicates that smuggle people from Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and 
Myanmar to either Australia or Canada. It has been suggested that the smuggling of 
Tamils was closely linked to the LTTE. Indeed, Canadian law still lists the LTTE as 
a terrorist organisation. Moreover, there are other networks which support the 
                                                
98 Ibid, 46. 
99 Indonesian National Police Presentation at the 2nd Inter-Regional Workshop on Improving 
Evidence-Based Knowledge on Migrant Smuggling from, through, within and to Southeast and East 
Asia, Bangkok, Thailand, October 2011. 
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movement of Tamils, such as nationals of Southeast Asian states (through which 
Tamils transit on their way to Canada), as well as Sri Lankan smuggling networks.100  
5.3.6 The Costs of People Smuggling 
The amount of money required by migrants to reach their destination varies 
according to their departure point, the particular route that is being used, as well as 
the length of time they are required to spend in the transit country. For a migrant to 
be smuggled from the Middle East, South or West Asia to Australia, the approximate 
cost is US$10,000. However, if the migrant breaks up their journey into several 
stages and uses different smuggling networks, the cost could be as much as 
US$18,000. In order for a migrant to travel to Australia from a departure point in 
Indonesia, the approximate cost would be US$5,000.101    
In terms of payment, a person seeking to be smuggled will usually pay the fee 
in instalments, either to the smuggler’s syndicate in their country of origin, or 
through a broker or third party (called a ‘hawala broker’). Migrants are required to 
pay a deposit in advance and make periodic payments at different stages of their 
journey. In order to raise the necessary funds, the migrant’s family will often borrow 
money or sell their belongings.102 
On the other hand, the amount of money required by a migrant to reach 
Canada can exceed US$25,000. According to a Canadian Government report, some 
of the Sri Lankans that boarded the MV Sun Sea paid almost US$45,000 for their 
journey.103 Similar to the migrants seeking to enter Australia, those on board the MV  
                                                
100 UNODC, above n 57, 46. 
101 Ibid, 47. 
102 Ibid, 47. 
103 Canadian Government, ‘Improving Evidence-Based Knowledge on Migrant Smuggling from, 
through, within to Southeast and East Asia’ (Inter-Regional Workshop, 2010). 
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Sun Sea had to pay deposits of between US$2,500 and US$8,000 before 
commencing their journey.104 Their families also had to borrow money from banks 
and, in some cases, sell their properties in order to raise the required funds.105 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 21: Potential smuggling service fee from Afghanistan to Australia106 
 
5.3.7 The Number of Migrants Transported 
The flow of migrants to Australia by boat has increased in recent years.  More than 
5,500 people attempted to enter Australia between 2009 and 2010, with almost 120 
boats intercepted. This figure is higher than the previous peak, which occurred 
between 1999 and 2001, and represents the highest number of arrivals in the country 
in the last 20 years. Tumultuous political and social situations in several parts of the 
                                                
104 Ibid. 
105 UNODC, above n 57, 47. 
106 UNDOC 2010. 
Smuggling Service Amount 
Organiser (in source country) $ 4,000 
Fraudulent documents $ 400 
Bribes – law enforcement & border officials $ 2,500 
Logistic air $ 700 
Facilitator (based in Malaysia) $ 1,700 
Facilitator (based in Indonesia) $ 3,000 
Sea voyage $ 5,000 
Total $ 17,300 
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world have contributed to this influx of migrants. It should be noted that in 2002, the 
number of illegal arrivals in Australia declined in the wake of the Pacific Solution, 
which commenced in August 2001.107 However, this trend has been reversed, with 
almost 6000 asylum seekers having attempted to enter Australia between 2009 and 
2012.108  
As mentioned above, each migrant is required pay approximately US$14,000 
for their journey. If this figure is multiplied by the number of asylum seekers that 
sought to enter Australia between 2009 and 2012, the Australian people smuggling 
market is worth approximately US$85 million each year. In the case of Canada, if the 
average payment made by a migrant to a people smuggler is approximately 
US$25,000, and this figure is multiplied by the 492 asylum seekers on board the MV 
Sun Sea, then the annual value of the Canadian people smuggling market is US$12.3 
million.  
 
Figure 14: Boat arrivals since 1989 by calendar year to Australia109 
                                                
107 Stuart Kaye, ‘Tampering with Border Protection: The Legal and Policy Implications of the Voyage 
of The MV Tampa’ in Martin Tsamenyi and Christ Rahman (eds), Protecting Australia’s Maritime 
Borders: The MV Tampa and Beyond (Centre for Maritime Policy University of Wollongong, 2002) 
59, 59. 
108 UNODC, above n 57, 48. 
109 Presentation by Dr Rebecca Miller, Coordination and Analysis Unit (CAU), UNODC Regional 
Centre for East Asia and the Pacific, Migrant Smuggling by Sea: South-East Asian Facts & Figures, 
Jakarta, Indonesia, 18 March 2013. 
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Figure 15: Boat arrivals since 2009 by calendar year to Australia110 
 
5.4 International Legal Framework on People Smuggling 
This section discusses the international legal framework governing people 
smuggling. The Smuggling Protocol, the main global instrument in addressing 
people smuggling, is discussed in this section. The definition of people smuggling as 
stipulated in the protocol is also elaborated. Furthermore, the explanation on the 
categorisation of people smuggling as a crime under the international law is also 
elaborated in this section. 
5.4.1 The Smuggling Protocol 
As people smuggling has become a problem for many countries around the world, 
the act has been criminalised at the international level by virtue of the Protocol 
against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air.111 This protocol is attached 
to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (popularly 
                                                
110 Ibid. 
111 To view the full text of the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, 
supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, see 
http://www.uncjin.org/Documents/Conventions/dcatoc/final_documents_2/convention_smug_eng.pdf  
at the 4th of May 2015.  
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known as the Palermo Convention), and was adopted on the 15 December 2000.112 
The protocol was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly by Resolution 
55/22, and subsequently entered into force on the 28 January 2001. Indeed, the 
instrument has a large following, with more than 120 states parties to the protocol.113 
As stipulated in Article 2 of the Smuggling Protocol, its purpose is to “prevent and 
combat the smuggling of migrants, as well as to promote cooperation among States 
Parties to that end, while protecting the rights of smuggled migrants.”114 In essence, 
the protocol aims to protect smuggled migrants and to foster cooperation between 
States so that smuggling networks can be disrupted. 
The other protocols which supplement this convention include the Protocol to 
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and 
Children, as well as the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking in 
Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition. These instruments not only 
address the issue of human rights, but also create a legal basis for prosecuting 
persons engaged in transnational organised crimes. The Palermo Convention forms a 
general framework, but requires greater specificity in order to be effective. However, 
the convention could be enhanced if provisions were inserted dealing with the need 
for cooperation between States on matters relating to organised crime, such as the 
exchange of information, the building of common entrance policies, and the 
registration of bio-data. Nevertheless, the question that should be asked is whether 
States are willing to accept provisions which have the capacity to infringe State 
                                                
112 To view the full text of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, 
see http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-
e.pdf at the 4th of May 2015.  
113 UNODC, International Framework for Action: To Implement the Smuggling of Migrants Protocol 
(United Nations, 2011), 4 
114 Article 2, Smuggling Protocol. 
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sovereignty. The risk is that, left in its current form, the convention may simply 
amount to what Brolan has referred to as “a list of good intentions.”115       
5.4.1.1 The Smuggling Protocol and the Palermo Convention 
Formal UN discussions on the Smuggling Protocol commenced after Italy urged the 
international community to produce a legal instrument which would criminalise 
people smuggling (and especially those operations conducted by sea).116 This appeal 
was made in response to the unexpected number of people arriving in Italy by boat 
from Turkey.117 By this stage, the problem of people smuggling had certainly caught 
the attention of the international community, with other members of the United 
Nations supporting the course of action proposed by the Italian government. Indeed, 
there was widespread suspicion that highly developed people smuggling syndicates 
were facilitating the illegal transfer of migrants abroad. Hence, other States (and 
especially developed States), were becoming increasingly aware that the same 
problem might present itself in their own jurisdiction, and that an immediate 
international response was required.        
Italy took the initial step of drafting the instrument on people smuggling. 
However, in early 1990s, prior to the drafting, there were approaches adopted to 
address the issues of organised crimes. The formal drafting of the instrument 
occurred in 1992, when the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice 
was established by the United Nations Economic and Social Council.118 
                                                
115 Brolan, above n 1, 581. 
116 Andree Kirchner, Di Pepe and Lorenzo Schiano, ‘International Attempts to Conclude a Convention 
to Combat Illegal Migration’ (1998) 10 International Journal Refugee Law, 662-674. 
117 Brolan, above n 1, 582. 
118 Ibid, 582. 
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The work of the Italian government and the commission reached its peak in 
1998, when the General Assembly of the United Nations passed a resolution which 
“established an Ad Hoc Committee open to all states for the purpose of elaborating a 
new international convention against transnational organized crime and additional 
instruments.”119 These provisions were adopted by Resolution 53/111, which was 
passed on 9 December 1998. The growing importance of the Palermo Convention 
was evidenced by the fact that, by the year 2000, almost one hundred foreign 
ministers had flown to Palermo in order to sign the convention.   
 
State United Nations 
Convention 
against 
Transnational 
Organized 
Crime  
The Protocol to 
Prevent, 
Suppress and 
Punish 
Trafficking in 
Persons, 
especially 
Women and 
Children 
 
The Protocol against 
the Illicit 
Manufacturing and 
Trafficking in 
Firearms, Their Parts 
and Components and 
Ammunition 
Brunei 
Darussalam 
25 Mar 2008 a x x 
Cambodia 12 Dec 2005 2 Jul 2007 12 Dec 2005 a 
Indonesia 20 April 2009 28 sep 2009 x 
Lao PDR 26 Sep 2003 a 26 Sep 2003 a 26 Sep 2003 a 
Malaysia 24 Sep 2004 26 Feb 2009 a x 
Myanmar 30 Mar 2004 a 30 Mar 2004 a x 
Philippines 28 May 2002 28 May 2002 x 
Singapore 28 August 2007 28 Sep 2015 a x 
Thailand 17 Oct 2013 17 Oct 2013 x 
Timor-Leste 9 Nov 2009 a x x 
Vietnam 8 Jun 2012 8 Jun 2012 a x 
 
Legend: Ratification, Accession (a), not ratified (x) 
Table 22: Ratification Status of International Instruments 
                                                
119 Ibid, 583. 
 
 
189 
 
5.4.1.2 People Smuggling according to the Smuggling Protocol 
As stated earlier in this chapter, the Smuggling Protocol defines “people smuggling” 
in Article 3(a), while Article 3(b) of the protocol defines “illegal entry” as “[the] 
crossing of borders without complying with the necessary requirements for legal 
entry into the receiving State.”120 Hence, it could be inferred from this definition that 
any person who enters a State without bringing essential documents (as required by 
the immigration laws of that State), is an illegal migrant. Those people who enter a 
State undocumented or who present false documents would also fall within the scope 
of the article.121 Furthermore, Article 3(c) specifies the different kinds of fraudulent 
documents which may be produced by an illegal migrant, including the unlawful use 
of another person’s immigration documents, as well as documents which have been 
obtained through corruption or duress.122       
The regulation of people smuggling under the Smuggling Protocol should 
also be read in conjunction with United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea123 
(LOSC). Under the protocol, a State party is authorised to board and search a vessel 
allegedly involved in people smuggling where the vessel is without a nationality or is 
assimilated to a vessel without a nationality.124 In addition, a State may take such 
measures deemed necessary in accordance with its national law as well as 
international law if evidence confirming the act of people smuggling is found.  
Likewise, the LOSC authorises States to conduct investigations in respect of 
vessels suspected of engaging in people smuggling. Indeed, in both the territorial sea 
                                                
120 Article 3 (b), Smuggling Protocol. 
121 Brolan, above n 1, 584. 
122 Article 3 (c), Smuggling Protocol. 
123 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 16 November 1994). Hereinafter referred to as LOSC. 
124 Article 8 para 7, Smuggling Protocol. 
 
 
190 
 
and the contiguous zone, LOSC grants States the right to take necessary steps against 
the vessel.125 By virtue of Article 33, LOSC also gives States the right to prevent and 
punish violations of their immigration laws within their territory.126 
Furthermore, as stipulated in Article 111 of LOSC, States are able to engage 
in hot pursuit of foreign vessels in respect of such acts. However, this right can only 
be exercised if the State committing the seizure has adequate grounds to believe that 
the vessel is violating its national laws or regulations.127 
5.4.2 People Smuggling as a Crime under International Law 
People smuggling is considered a crime under international law. A fundamental 
principle of criminal law is that two elements must be present in order for an offence 
to be established.128 The first element, ‘mens rea’, requires the offender to have a 
‘psychological or guilty mind’.  The second element, ‘actus reus’, calls for a 
‘physical or guilty act’ to have been conducted. Therefore, in order for people 
smuggling to be considered a criminal act under the Smuggling Protocol, the offence 
should be composed of both a mental and physical element.  
In Article 6(1) of the Smuggling Protocol, a person commits the offence of 
people smuggling if the act is conducted in order to obtain a direct or indirect 
financial or other material benefit.129 This act, which must be conducted 
intentionally, forms the mental element of the offence.  
                                                
125 UNODC above n 57, 42. 
126 Article 33, LOSC. 
127 Article 111, LOSC. 
128 Brolan, above n 1, 584. 
129 Article 6 (1), Smuggling Protocol. 
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The physical element of the offence is presented in Article 6(1) and Article 4. 
According to Article 6,130 a person conducting migrant smuggling must be involved 
in the actual physical act of smuggling itself, or otherwise be engaged in producing 
false or fraudulent travel or identity documents as elaborated in Article 3(c). 
Furthermore, Article 4 elucidates the nature of the act described in Article 6, stating 
that the act must be transnational in nature and involve an organised criminal 
group.131 The protocol has elaborated the term “organized criminal groups” as 
encompassing:  
a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and 
acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or 
offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, 
directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.132 
 
It is difficult to establish a link between transnational organised crime and 
migrant smuggling activities, as the empirical research on this issue is lacking. 
However, there are several scholars who have argued that people smuggling is not 
committed by structured organisations, but by networks of individuals and groups 
who cooperate with one another in order to reap financial rewards from the activity. 
According to this conception, people smuggling has its own business model, with 
each network performing a particular role within the broader smuggling process. 
Depending upon the particular task, each ‘network’ may involve an individual or a 
group of people. The definition of “organised criminal group” in the Smuggling 
Protocol is wide enough to include such networks.133 
                                                
130 Article 6, Smuggling Protocol. 
131 Article 4, Smuggling Protocol. 
132 UNODC, above n 113, 4. 
133 Ibid, 4. 
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5.5 Regional Legal Framework on People Smuggling 
This section elaborates on several regional legal frameworks which are used to 
address the issue of people smuggling in Southeast Asia. The Bali Process and 
ASEAN are the two prominent forums in the region that deal with the problem.  
5.5.1 The Bali Process 
As previously discussed, in 2002, Indonesia and Australia co-chaired a regional 
ministerial conference in Bali to address the issue of irregular migration.134 This 
meeting formed the foundation of the Bali Process.135 During this first meeting, 
conference participants (which included several States and international 
organisations), stated three major points:136 (i) the problem of irregular migration in 
the Asia Pacific region (and especially where sea transportation is used to enter the 
destination State), creates political, economic, social and security challenges in the 
region;137 (ii) migrant smuggling and trafficking in persons are activities which 
endanger the lives of people. Indeed, such acts are reprehensible as they infringe 
human rights as well as civil liberties;138 and (iii) states are committed to fighting 
people smuggling and trafficking in persons in terms of their international 
obligations and at the domestic level.139 
In addition to these points, the Ministers acknowledged the commitments to 
combat these illegal acts as it has been the region’s common purpose and concern. 
                                                
134 Joseph H Douglas and Andreas Schloenhardt, Combating Migrant Smuggling with Regional 
Diplomacy: An Examination of the Bali Process (Migrant Smuggling Working Group: The University 
of Queensland, 2012), 5. 
135 The Bali Process see http://www.baliprocess.net/ at 4 of May 2015. 
136 Australia and Indonesia, ‘Co-Chairs’ Statement: Bali Ministerial Conference on People Smuggling, 
Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime’ (26-28 February 2002) 
<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/i_crime/people/conf0202.html > at 4 May 2015, 3. 
137Ibid, 3-4. 
138 Ibid, 7. 
139 Ibid, 8-13. 
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However, the Ministers also highlighted that regional cooperation must take into 
account the right of each State to create and implement their own domestic laws to 
address the issue.140 
  The Bali Process also endorsed the formation of an ad hoc expert group to 
follow up the recommendations of the conference.141 Indeed, following the first Bali 
Process two ad hoc expert groups were established. One was led by New Zealand, 
and was responsible for coordinating regional and international cooperation, while 
the other was chaired by Thailand and sought to support States to strengthen policy 
making, legislative arrangements and law enforcement practices.142 
5.5.1.1 The Aim of the Bali Process 
The overarching objective of the Bali Process is to “raise awareness of, encourage 
cooperative action and develop practical regional measures to prevent, intercept and 
disrupt people smuggling, human trafficking and transnational crime.”143 
There were five goals of the Bali Process which were agreed upon in the first 
meeting. They include:  
a. Developing more effective information and intelligence sharing 
arrangements within the region to obtain a more complete picture of 
smuggling and trafficking activities and other forms of illegal 
migration;  
b. Improving the cooperation of law enforcement agencies to enhance 
deterrence and to fight against illegal immigration networks;  
c. Enhancing cooperation on border and visa systems to improve the 
detection and prevention of illegal movement;  
d. Increasing public awareness of the facts of smuggling and trafficking 
operations to discourage those considering illegal movement and to 
warn those susceptible to trafficking, including women and children - 
                                                
140 Douglas and Schloenhardt, above n 134, 6. 
141 Ibid, 7.  
142 Ibid, 7. 
143 About the Bali Process, Bali Process Website http://www.baliprocess.net/about-the-bali-process at 
the 4 of May 2015. 
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enhancing the effectiveness of return as a strategy to deter illegal 
migration through the conclusion of appropriate arrangements; and  
e. Cooperating in verifying the identity and nationality of illegal migrants, 
in a timely manner.144 
 
In order to accommodate developments in migrant smuggling and trafficking 
in persons, these goals were amended in 2009 during the Third Bali Process Regional 
Ministerial Conference.145 The new goals are:  
a. The development of more effective information and intelligence 
sharing;  
b. Improved cooperation among regional law enforcement agencies to 
deter and combat people smuggling and trafficking networks;  
c. Enhanced cooperation on border and visa systems to detect and prevent 
illegal movements;  
d. Increased public awareness in order to discourage these activities and 
warn those susceptible;  
e. Enhanced effectiveness of return as a strategy to deter people 
smuggling and trafficking through conclusion of appropriate 
arrangements;  
f. Cooperation in verifying the identity and nationality of illegal migrants 
and trafficking victims;  
g. The enactment of national legislation to criminalise people smuggling 
and trafficking in persons;  
h. Provision of appropriate protection and assistance to the victims of 
trafficking, particularly women and children;  
i. Enhanced focus on tackling the root causes of illegal migration, 
including by increasing opportunities for legal migration between 
states; and  
j. Assisting countries to adopt best practices in asylum management, in 
accordance with the principles of the Refugee Convention. 146  
 
These goals are used as a benchmark to monitor the development of the conference, 
as well as to measure the fulfilment of the Bali Process mandate.147 
                                                
144 Australia and Indonesia, ‘Co-Chairs’ Statement: Bali Ministerial Conference on People Smuggling, 
Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime’ (26-28 February 2002). 
145 Douglas and Schloenhardt, above n 134, 9. 
146 Australia and Indonesia, ‘Co-Chairs’ Statement: Bali Ministerial Conference on People Smuggling, 
Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime’ (26-28 February 2002). 
147 Douglas and Schloenhardt, above n 134, 9. 
 
 
195 
 
5.5.1.2 Bali Process as a Regional Response 
People smuggling has been the main issue discussed at the Bali Process meetings. 
And although there have been discussions regarding trafficking in persons, people 
smuggling seems to have dominated this particular forum. However, to date, there 
have been no major evaluations of the work conducted by the Bali Process, and 
hence, it is arguable whether the meetings can reasonably be expected to solve the 
problem of people smuggling in the Asia Pacific region. According to Douglas and 
Schloenhardt, the reasoning behind this is that people smuggling is a complex 
problem – one that demands more than a narrow investigation of the issues discussed 
during the meetings. The infrequent nature of the meetings has also caused problems 
in this regard. Furthermore, the Bali Process does not have a secretariat to oversee 
administrative work and to conduct coordination among the committed states. 
Meanwhile, the lack of a fixed schedule to conduct its meetings means that 
evaluating the achievements of the Bali Process mandate is a difficult task.148  
5.5.1.3 The Bali Process as a Forum of Consultation 
The Bali Process serves as one of the largest consultative processes in the world, 
with over 45 members, including States and international organisations such as the 
UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the United Nations 
Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), as well as numerous observers. 
The majority of State members of the Bali Process are from the Asia Pacific 
region. At present, there is no formal qualification process in order for a State to 
become a member of the forum and it is relatively easy for developing States to join 
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the Bali Process. To date, there have been five ministerial meetings organised by the 
Bali Process (2002, 2003, 2009, 2011 and 2013). 
Information sharing among member States of the Bali Process is still lacking. 
Indeed, even though information sharing forms one of the fundamental goals of the 
forum, it remains one of the major hurdles in improving coordination among the 
participating parties. This problem was pointed out during a technical experts 
meeting in Sri Lanka in May 2011.149 The meeting viewed the lack of technical 
information and intelligence sharing as a barrier to fighting people smuggling 
operations.  
5.5.1.4 Results of the Bali Process  
It is difficult to assess whether the Bali Process has been successful in its outcomes 
because the forum is both informal and non-binding,150 with member States 
conducting ‘soft diplomacy’ as a way of approaching other participants in the 
process. Thus, although the Bali Process is neither a forum for international treaty 
negotiation nor a dispute settlement body, it nonetheless serves as a valuable 
platform for dialogue, building and enhancing trust among the parties. And this 
certainly seems to be the case. Since the Bali Process was initiated, States have 
openly discussed concerns surrounding transnational crimes (and particularly 
migrant smuggling) at the international level, whereas previously such matters were 
only discussed domestically, as they involved issues of national sovereignty.151  
                                                
149 Australia and Sri Lanka, ‘Co-Chairs’ Statement’, (Bali Process Ad Hock Group Meeting: Technical 
Experts on Irregular Movements by Air’ (10-11 May 2011) 
http://www.baliporocess.net/index.asp?pageID=2145874806. At 4 May 2015, 3.  
150 Douglas and Schloenhardt, above n 134, 12. 
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197 
 
The Bali Process has also succeeded in getting States to look at the issue of 
people smuggling from different angles, such as from the perspective of source 
States, destination States and transit States.152 Furthermore, it has united States in the 
Asia Pacific which have a diversity of legal systems, social structures, cultural norms 
and economic imperatives. However, these achievements should not supersede the 
fact that the forum produces few practical outcomes.153 
5.5.1.5 Model laws 
The Bali Process has also successfully developed a Model Law to Combat People 
Smuggling, which has been heavily influenced by the Smuggling Protocol 
In its first year, the Ad Hoc Expert Group compiled a list of the national laws 
of member States regulating people smuggling. Subsequently, Australia and China 
drafted a Model Law which was intended to harmonise these laws. The document 
was produced in 2003 and was later promoted in a series of meetings, particularly to 
States lacking legislation on the issue. More than a quarter of Bali Process member 
States have since incorporated the Model Law into their domestic legislation. 
The adoption of the Model Law has harmonised legislation relating to people 
smuggling, especially in the Asia Pacific region. Furthermore, it has the potential to 
enhance cooperation in several areas, including in the legal sector, which may form 
the foundation for greater State cooperation at the bilateral and international levels.  
Moreover, the Model Law is extremely beneficial for countries that have not ratified 
the Smuggling Protocol. Indeed, less than half of Bali Process member States have 
                                                
152 Andrew Hurrell, ‘Regionalism In Theoretical Perspective’ in Louise L’Estrange  Fawcett and 
Andrew Hurrell (eds), Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order 
(Oxford University Press, 1997) 39.  
153 Douglas and Schloenhardt, above n 134, 13. 
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ratified the Smuggling Protocol, and hence the Model Law is particularly significant 
for the Asia Pacific region. 
Because of its voluntary nature, the Bali Process does not have the power to 
compel member States to ratify and implement international instruments, such as 
those related to people smuggling. Thus, the creation of the Model Law facilitates the 
adoption of consistent national legislation across States in the region. Furthermore, as 
the Model Law is based on the Smuggling Protocol, States which do adopt it will 
most likely be acting in a manner which is consistent with international law.154     
In order to improve law enforcement cooperation between relevant authorities 
in the region Bali Process has also developed best practice guidelines on various 
topics. Most of these guidelines mainly focus on capacity building and result from 
numerous workshops conducted between 2002 and 2011155. Model laws serve as 
tools to assist legislative drafters to develop domestic laws, however, greater 
awareness and training should be organized or made available regarding these tools. 
As people smuggling is transnational in nature, regional States require understanding 
and a common legal basis to address the issue. The presence of the Model Law 
would enhance such challenges particularly among States engaged in the Bali 
Process where only less than half of the member States have ratified the Smuggling 
Protocol. 
5.5.1.6 Guidelines for Cooperation 
The Bali Process has formulated a set of guidelines which, in principle, are designed 
to enhance cooperation among government agencies, especially law enforcement 
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agencies.156 The guidelines were the result of several workshops which were held 
since the forum’s inception in 2002 until 2011. Even though the guidelines do not 
have much practical significance, they serve to unite related agencies in the region, 
as their main focus is on capacity building.157 Furthermore, one of the outcomes of 
the guidelines has been to streamline verification and document examination 
procedure in the region. Hence, visas and passports are now examined with greater 
uniformity across member States. Another benefit of the guidelines is that 
information about people smuggling in the region is now readily available, especially 
in countries such as Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.158   
5.5.1.7 Regional Framework Agreement 
The Regional Framework Agreement (RFA) is another important document that has 
been produced by the Bali Process. The rationale for the agreement was first 
canvassed in a paper presented by UNHCR in Manila five months prior to its 
inception, where the UNHCR noted the need to formulate a document which would 
help member States, organisations as well as other stakeholders cooperate with one 
another in order to address the issue of illegal migrants. In early 2011, member States 
attended the Fourth Regional Ministerial Conference of the Bali Process and agreed 
on the RFA. In principle, the aim of the agreement is to enhance State cooperation on 
people smuggling at the regional and bilateral levels.159 Furthermore, during the 
Senior Official Ministers meeting, the Steering Committee formulated a set of 
principles to govern the non-binding agreement. These principles are:  
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a. Irregular movement facilitated by people smuggling syndicates should be 
eliminated and States should promote and support opportunities for 
orderly migration;  
b. Where appropriate and possible, asylum seekers should have access to 
consistent assessment processes, whether through a set of harmonised 
arrangements or through the possible establishment of regional 
assessment arrangements, which might include a centre or centres, taking 
into account any existing sub-regional arrangements;  
c. Persons found to be refugees under those assessment processes should be 
provided with a durable solution, including voluntary repatriation, 
resettlement within and outside the region and, where appropriate, 
possible “in country” solutions;  
d. Persons found not to be in need of protection should be returned, 
preferably on a voluntary basis, to their countries of origin, in safety and 
dignity. Returns should be sustainable and States should look to 
maximize opportunities for greater cooperation; and  
e. People smuggling enterprises should be targeted through border security 
arrangements, law enforcement activities and disincentives for human 
trafficking and smuggling.160 
 
In implementing the agreement, it was agreed that States should take into 
account several considerations such as:  
a. Arrangements should promote human life and dignity;  
b. Arrangements should seek to build capacity in the region to process 
mixed flows and where appropriate utilise available resources, such as 
those provided by international organisations;  
c. Arrangements should reflect the principles of burden-sharing and 
collective responsibility, while respecting sovereignty and the national 
security of concerned States;  
d. Arrangements should seek to address root causes of irregular movement 
and promote population stabilisation wherever possible;  
e. Arrangements should promote orderly, legal migration and provide 
appropriate opportunities for regular migration;  
f. Any arrangements that should avoid creating pull factors to, or within, 
the region;  
g. Arrangements should seek to undermine the people smuggling model and 
create disincentives for irregular movement and may include, in 
appropriate circumstances, transfer and readmission; and  
h. Arrangements should support and promote increased information 
exchange, while respecting confidentiality and upholding the privacy of 
affected persons.161 
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Both the principles and considerations of the RFA are of great significance, 
with both being agreed upon by States during the Fourth Regional Ministerial 
Conference.162 Indeed, the RFA represents a big step forward in combating people 
smuggling. Even though the document is non-binding, it serves to assimilate 
sensitive issues on border security into one document. The fact that many States in 
the Asia Pacific region have not yet ratified the Palermo Convention or the 
Smuggling Protocol undeniably forms a barrier to cooperation on the issue of people 
smuggling. Indeed, this is compounded by the lack of domestic regulation on people 
smuggling. Therefore, the RFA is significant as it provides the impetus for 
cooperative discussions on the issue. In light of the number of culturally and legally 
diverse states that have signed up to the RFA, according to Douglas and 
Schloenhardt, its significance as an instrument cannot be questioned.163     
5.5.2 ASEAN Measures 
People smuggling has also been a concern for members of ASEAN.164 The member 
states of ASEAN have recognised the need for cooperation at both the international 
and regional levels in order to successfully combat people smuggling. Due to the 
transboundary nature of the activity, the ten states of ASEAN have acknowledged 
that the successful prosecution of offenders at the national level is absolutely vital if 
smuggling networks are to be disrupted.165  
However, people smuggling is not a new issue for ASEAN. In 1997, during 
the Second Informal ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur, ASEAN member countries 
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Experience,’ (The 26th Asia-Pacific Roundtable: "ASEAN Security Governancae and Order", 20-30 
May 2012), 12. 
165 Ibid, 12. 
 
 
202 
 
expressed their concern over the issue.166 Since then, people smuggling has received 
greater attention within the organisation. In keeping with this commitment, the 
ASEAN regime has produced several instruments to facilitate cooperation among its 
members on the issue.  
ASEAN has made a formal declaration in combating transnational crime 
which would also include people smuggling, the ASEAN Declaration against 
Transnational Crime, signed in Manila, on 20 December 1997.167 The declaration 
urges member States to strengthen their commitment to combating transnational 
crime through regional measures. Furthermore, it also encouraged member States to 
conduct discussions and meetings in order to discuss issues related to transnational 
crime. The declaration also stated that member States would consider the 
establishment of an ASEAN Centre on Transnational Crime which would be a 
coordinating body to foster regional efforts in combating transnational crime through 
“intelligence sharing, harmonisation of policies and coordination of operations.”168 
Another instrument that facilitates regional ties in combating people 
smuggling is the 2006 Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) in Criminal 
Matters which sets out the basic requirements for cooperation in order to combat 
transnational crimes. The MLA Treaty aims to enhance cooperation and mutual legal 
assistance in prevention, conducting investigations as well as prosecution of criminal 
offences. The treaty urges legal assistance in criminal matters between the 
contracting States as stipulated in Article 1. In order to make the arrangement 
                                                
166 S Pushpanathan, ‘Combating transnational crime in ASEAN’ (Paper presented at the 7th ACPF 
World Conference on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, 1999). 
167 ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime, see http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-
political-security-community/item/asean-declaration-on-transnational-crime-manila-20-december-
1997 at 8 of October 2015. 
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feasible, every State is asked to provide a focal point or central authority which 
would make and receive requests. Furthermore, Article 7 explains the execution 
process which would be conducted in conformity with the national law of the 
requested State.169   
The ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime is the other 
instrument used by ASEAN countries to conduct regional cooperation in addressing 
transnational crime matters, including people smuggling.170 The Plan of Action is 
focussed on several programs of action such as information exchange, legal matters, 
law enforcement matters, training, institutional capacity building and extra regional 
cooperation.171 These programs are conducted in order to achieve both the general 
and specific objectives of the Plan of Action. The general objective of the framework 
is to enhance cooperation in combating transnational crime at different levels such as 
the national, bilateral and regional levels. Furthermore, it also stated that member 
States shall focus on strengthening regional commitments and capacity to combat 
such transnational crimes as terrorism, arms smuggling, trafficking in person and 
piracy. The specific objectives of the Plan of Action are to:  
a. Develop a more cohesive, regional strategy aimed at preventing, 
controlling and neutralizing transnational crime;  
b. Foster regional cooperation at the investigative, prosecutorial, and 
judicial level as well as the rehabilitation of perpetrators;  
c. Enhance coordination among ASEAN bodies dealing with transnational 
crime;  
d. Strengthen regional capacities and capabilities to deal with sophisticated 
nature of transnational crime; and  
                                                
169 Ibid. 
170 ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime, see 
http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-political-security-community/item/asean-plan-of-action-to-
combat-transnational-crime at 8 of October 2015. 
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e. Develop sub-regional and regional treaties on cooperation in criminal 
justice, including mutual legal assistance and extradition172.  
 
The plan of action also included a section on Institutional Framework for 
ASEAN Cooperation on Combating Transnational Crime, where member States 
commit themselves to establish several institutional frameworks in order implement 
the Plan of Action as well as to combat transnational crime. These institutions 
include the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime, the Senior 
Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime, and the ASEAN Secretariat.173 
However, as various States within ASEAN are affected by people smuggling 
in different ways, for example, either as States of origin, transit or destination, 
divergent approaches have been taken by States to address the issue. Such 
complexity has also affected the formulation of a regional legal instrument to tackle 
people smuggling. However, the legal framework provides help in prosecuting the 
offenders as well as establishing uniformity of people smuggling laws among 
ASEAN member States. A convention on transnational crime has been one of 
ASEAN’s main priorities. However, the conflicting perspectives of the member 
States on the issue of people smuggling has affected its progress, and thus more time 
is needed to forge a common understanding before the instrument can be enacted.174  
5.6 Analysis of the Prevailing International and Regional Framework 
Even though many States have ratified the Smuggling Protocol at the international 
level, implementation of the protocol at the national level within the Southeast Asian 
region has not always been forthcoming. There are several reasons for this, including 
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lack of domestic legislation, inadequate policies and planning, as well as limited 
international cooperation.175 
The Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime, which was held in 2008, encouraged States to ratify 
the Palermo Convention as well as its protocols.176 The conference highlighted the 
lack of capacity of numerous States to formulate legislation against people 
smuggling. Nonetheless, the same conference noted that many States had 
successfully criminalised smuggling activities at the national level. Those States that 
had not drafted domestic legislation incorporating the relevant international 
instruments cited limited capability and a lack of expertise as the main factors for the 
legislative gap. Hence, it is important to develop capacity building in the form of 
training sessions and other measures so that this problem can be overcome. Indeed, it 
is critical to have legislation at the national level that accords with international 
instruments in order to suppress people smuggling syndicates, and more importantly, 
to support the political will of States that have ratified the Palermo Convention and 
its protocols.   
Another problem militating against the implementation of the convention and 
its associated protocols is the inadequacy of State policies and planning. Only a few 
States have a specific policy addressing the issue of people smuggling, and as a 
result, it is difficult to establish inter-agency cooperation to respond to smuggling 
activities. Furthermore, law enforcement efforts at the State level are often limited to 
border control, but this is inadequate to deal with the problem. In order to be 
responsive to developments in people smuggling activities, States must engage in 
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advanced planning and have a range of different policies in place. As encouraged by 
the UNODC, this planning should produce “collaborative, multi-agency, long-term 
and coordinated strategies.”177 Such planning, however, must take into account 
several factors, such as the assessment of the smuggling activities and the capability 
of States to respond to the problem. In addition, authorities must develop cooperative 
and collaborative approaches at the regional and international levels in order to 
implement the required strategies. 
In conducting their activities, people smugglers take advantage of States with 
inadequate legal frameworks and weak law enforcement capabilities. Indeed, 
developing States are often used as transit areas, providing people smugglers and 
their customers with a ‘safe haven’ until such time as formal arrangements are in 
place for their departure to the destination State. Moreover, smuggling operations 
conducted by sea threaten the lives of legitimate users of the ocean. In responding to 
this concern, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 64/71, which in principle 
urges States and relevant stakeholders to cooperate and combat people smuggling. 
Furthermore, the resolution encourages States to cooperate at the international level, 
particularly with respect to the Palermo Convention and the Smuggling Protocol.   
The framework for cooperation is outlined in Articles 7 to 9 of the Smuggling 
Protocol.178 In combating people smuggling by sea, States are encouraged to 
cooperate in accordance with international law to the fullest extent possible, as 
stipulated in Article 7.179 In accordance with the first paragraph of Article 8, where a 
State party has reasonable grounds to suspect that a vessel may be engaged in people 
smuggling, it may request assistance from other State parties to prevent the 
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smuggling process. Moreover, the second paragraph of Article 8 allows a State party 
to give permission to other state parties to board, search and take other appropriate 
measures in respect of a vessel flying its flag where the vessel is allegedly being used 
for migrant smuggling purposes.180  
Limited international cooperation is another factor that has hampered the 
implementation of the Smuggling Protocol. It is almost impossible to combat people 
smuggling by unilateral initiatives which ignore the importance of cooperative ties 
with other States. Indeed, in order to track the movement of people smugglers and 
their human cargo, and to create coordinated operational activities between States, 
bilateral as well as international cooperation is needed. People smuggling is a highly 
organised operation, involving numerous criminal networks across multiple regions 
and States. Therefore, a collaborative and transnational approach between States is 
required to comprehensively address the problem. However, such an approach is not 
without its difficulties. Given the disparate social and cultural sensitivities of States 
in the region, it is important to overcome “geographical, political, ideological and 
linguistic” barriers in order to address people smuggling activities.181 
At the regional level, the Bali Process has not been able to produce a binding 
framework for its members to accept and implement.182 Indeed, the forum has only 
produced a few tangible outcomes, and unfortunately has not proved successful in 
eradicating people smuggling activities in Southeast Asia. However, the Bali Process 
does have validity as a forum where States can come together to discuss issues 
related to illegal migrants – something they did not do prior to its inception 
(especially in Southeast Asia). In this regard, it is important to note that the forum is 
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a process, not an organisation, and thus the results which the forum can reasonably 
be expected to achieve must be viewed in perspective. The success of the Bali 
Process lies in creating a common ground amongst States in the region on people 
smuggling issues, but it is unlikely to be able to compel States to ratify and 
implement legal frameworks (if it decides to proceed down that path in the future). 
In 2009, Indonesia and Australia (in their capacity as co-chairs of the forum) 
stated that the Bali Process has reached its “point of maturity”. However, the facts 
indicate that this is not the case.183 The Bali Process has been growing steadily over 
the years and its importance is being recognised by States. One of the prominent 
outcomes of the forum has been the 2011 Regional Framework Agreement.184 
Indeed, it would be counterproductive for States to withdraw from the Bali Process, 
as the forum may have a greater and more enduring impact on transnational crimes 
(such as people smuggling) the longer it operates. 
Undeniably, the Bali Process is one of the most prominent forums for 
addressing people smuggling in the region. Although some stakeholders view the 
work of the forum as moving at a slow rate, the progress made by the Bali Process is 
promising, and with concerted effort by States, it should continue to develop. 
Ultimately, however, it is dependent upon State parties to decide the extent to which 
the Bali Process should address people smuggling. As the problem becomes more 
complex and generates worldwide attention, the action taken by State parties in 
prosecuting offenders and protecting smuggled migrants will become increasingly 
important.185   
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 As for the ASEAN regime, the dialogue on people smuggling has not yet 
crystallised into a formal legal framework. Although the organisation has discussed 
the issue since its Second Informal Summit in 1997, people smuggling still 
dominates its talks. However, the different approaches and perspectives of member 
States toward people smuggling activities (depending upon their involvement as 
States of origin, transit or destination), have always been a barrier to creating a 
transnational crime convention within ASEAN.   
5.7 Conclusion  
People smuggling is a serious maritime security threat in Southeast Asia. The gravity 
of the issue has been recognised by States, and solutions to address the problem have 
been proposed and implemented albeit with limited success. There are existing 
international and regional measures in place which aim to address the problem. At 
the international level, the Smuggling Protocol is the main legal instrument whereas 
at the regional level, the Bali Process and measures within the ASEAN framework 
are most relevant in addressing the issue.  
This chapter explained that the problem of people smuggling is particularly complex 
and challenging for a variety of reasons, as discussed extensively above. Moreover, it 
is undeniable that people smuggling still occurs in Southeast Asia. Hence, it could be 
concluded that the prevailing frameworks are inadequate to comprehensively and 
fully address the problem. The nature of people smuggling as a transnational 
organised crime renders it difficult for a single State to unilaterally address the issue 
as the offenders routinely cross state boundaries to escape prosecution.186 Thus, 
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regional cooperation involving related agencies is regarded as the best way to disrupt 
smuggling networks and to eradicate the practice of people smuggling.  
.
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CHAPTER VI 
6 Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing in Southeast Asia  
 
6.1 Introduction  
The exploitation of fisheries resources has become a significant concern in the 
international community.1 Fish constitutes one of the main sources of animal protein 
in people’s diet.2 The growth of the world’s population has undeniably led to the 
increased exploitation of fisheries resources. Moreover, technological advancements 
have made the harvesting of fish easier, paving the way for the fishing industry to 
better meet the protein requirements of the world’s population.      
Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing is a practice where fishing 
vessels neglect the regulation of fisheries in coastal waters, on the high seas, or in 
those areas which are under the control of Regional Fisheries Management 
Organisations (RFMO).3 Such conduct is almost always premeditated, with offenders 
having reflagged to States which are non-members of RFMOs, changing the vessel 
name and call sign, as well as sharing intelligence information with other 
perpetrators.4 Operators and owners of the IUU fishing vessels have benefited from 
the limitations of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC).5  
                                                
1W Riddle, K., ‘Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing: Is International Cooperation 
Contagious?’ (2007) 37 Ocean Development & International Law , 265 
2 Mary Ann E Palma, Martin Tsamenyi and William R Edeson, Promoting sustainable fisheries: The 
international legal and policy framework to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (Brill, 
2010), 1. 
3 Rachel Baird, ‘Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing: an analysis of the legal, economic and 
historical factors relevant to its development and persistence’ (2004) 5 Melbourne Journal 
International Law 299, 2. 
4 Ibid, 2. 
5 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 16 November 1994). Hereinafter referred to as LOSC.  
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The development of modern marine fisheries has been shaped by historical 
and developmental factors.6 Some of the reasons for this are economic and political 
self-interests. However, it is useful to canvass the factors which have led to this 
change in order to find legal solutions which address the problem of IUU fishing.   
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the concept of IUU fishing, and 
discuss and analyse issues relating to IUU fishing in Southeast Asia. This chapter 
explains the nature and practice of IUU fishing in Southeast Asia, the regional and 
international legal frameworks that are used to combat IUU fishing, as well as their 
legal gaps. The Chapter also focuses on regional cooperation that addresses IUU 
fishing conducted in the EEZ and on the high seas.  
The chapter concludes that States have taken numerous steps at the 
international and regional level to address the problem, but IUU fishing remains a 
significant concern in the region and unilateral action by States is unlikely to solve 
the problem. However, the chapter also affirms that collective measures taken by 
States through regional organisations as well as the implementation of cooperative 
strategies between organisations, may act as a way forward in providing 
recommendations to address IUU fishing based on the experiences of States. 
Moreover, adherence to the international legal framework at the regional level will 
help in uniting existing policies worldwide, thus forging a common understanding of 
the issue and allowing for the more effective enforcement of prevailing laws.7  
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6.2 Concept and Challenges in Combating IUU Fishing    
This section will examine the concept of IUU fishing as a maritime security threat. 
Furthermore, it will analyse the challenges that are being faced by States in 
combating the problem of IUU fishing. 
6.2.1 IUU Fishing as a Maritime Security Threat 
IUU fishing generally refers to any illegitimate fishing act, including 
“noncompliance with fishing seasons, fishing without proper permits, catching 
prohibited species, using illegal fishing gear, catching more than the allowable quota, 
and not reporting or underreporting the amount of fish caught”.8  The UN Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO)9 has stated that IUU fishing is the main factor in the 
collapse of a number of valuable fish stocks around the world.10 The FAO has further 
affirmed that this act is responsible for the decline in fisheries and threatens the 
rebuilding of damaged fish stocks.11     
The International Plan of Action-IUU (IPOA-IUU)12 has defined IUU fishing 
into three parts as follows: 
Illegal fishing refers to activities: a. conducted by national or foreign vessels 
in waters under the jurisdiction of a State, without the permission of that 
State, or in contravention of its laws and regulations; b. conducted by vessels 
flying the flag of States that are parties to a relevant regional fisheries 
management organization but operate in contravention of the conservation 
and management measures adopted by that organization and by which the 
States are bound, or relevant provisions of the applicable international law; or 
c. in violation of national laws or international obligations, including those 
                                                
8 Ibid, 266. 
9 Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, see http://www.fao.org/home/en/ at 29 
October 2015.  
10 FAO, Excess Capacity and Illegal Fishing: Challanges to Sustainable Fisheries 
<www.fao.org/WAICENT/OIS/PRESS_NE/PRED01/pren0111.htm.> at 28 October 2015.  
11 Ibid. 
12 International Plan of Action to prevent, deter, and eliminate illegal, unreported, and unregulated 
fishing, adopted on 2 March 2001. Hereinafter referred to as IPOA-IUU. See 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/y1224e/y1224e00.htm at 16 October 2015. 
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undertaken by cooperating States to a relevant regional fisheries management 
organization.13  
 
Unreported fishing refers to fishing activities: a. which have not been 
reported, or have been misreported, to the relevant national authority, in 
contravention of national laws and regulations; or b. undertaken in the area of 
competence of a relevant regional fisheries management organization which 
have not been reported or have been misreported, in contravention of the 
reporting procedures of that organization.14 
 
Unregulated fishing refers to fishing activities: a.in the area of application of 
a relevant regional fisheries management organization that are conducted by 
vessels without nationality, or by those flying the flag of a State not party to 
that organization, or by a fishing entity, in a manner that is not consistent with 
or contravenes the conservation and management measures of that 
organization; or b. in areas or for fish stocks in relation to which there are no 
applicable conservation or management measures and where such fishing 
activities are conducted in a manner inconsistent with State responsibilities 
for the conservation of living marine resources under international law; and c. 
certain unregulated fishing may take place in a manner which is not in 
violation of applicable international law, and may not require the application 
of measures envisaged under the International Plan of Action.15  
 
 
IUU fishing is a maritime security threat because of its potential to 
compromise and threaten food security worldwide. The exact number of IUU fishing 
incidents worldwide is difficult to obtain, as most of the acts are unreported or 
constitute illegal fishing.16 According to the FAO, IUU fishing has “escalated in the 
past 20 years, especially in high seas fisheries”.17 The FAO estimates that IUU 
fishing constitutes approximately 11–26 million tonnes of fish annually, with a value 
of US$10–23 billion.18 Hence, it is not surprising that IUU fishing threatens the 
                                                
13 Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Committee on Fisheries, International plan of 
action to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (Food and 
Agriculture Organisation, 2001), 2. 
14 Ibid, 2. 
15 Ibid, 2. 
16 Matthew Gianni and Walt Simpson, The Changing Nature of High Seas Fishing: how flags of 
convenience provide cover for illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (Department of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, 2005) 6-8. 
17 FAO, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture (United Nations, 2014) 84. 
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sustainable management of fisheries around the world.19 Furthermore, IUU fishing 
crosses State boundaries, and hence, perpetrators can escape the national jurisdiction 
of States. It is estimated that IUU fishing in the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of 
States is worth $US10-23.5 billion, resulting in the loss of approximately 18 per cent 
of total fisheries.20 The FAO predicts that the incidence of IUU fishing will increase 
in the future, threatening the remaining healthy fish stocks.     
The practice of IUU fishing contravenes several instruments are applicable at 
both the regional and international levels.21 Furthermore, such conduct threatens the 
conservation and management of fish stocks. However, unregulated fishing may in 
some circumstances be legal in the absence of relevant regulations in place. Whilst 
all States have the right to fish on the high seas, they must comply with prevailing 
regulations. An unregulated catch becomes illegal when a State which is not a party 
to an RFMO conducts fishing in an RFMO conservation area and contravenes the 
conservation measures which have been put in place. In terms of unreported fishing, 
it is illegal if a State engages in fishing without reporting to the conservators in areas 
where reporting is an obligation.22  
IUU fishing has become a global security concern, especially after it was 
discovered that illegal fishing activities are often connected to other transnational 
organised crimes such as piracy, people smuggling and illicit weapons smuggling. 
One prominent example of this overlap is the terrorist act that occurred in Mumbai in 
                                                
19 FAO, ‘Illegal Fishing and High-Seas Fisheries: Use of Banned Gear, Operating in Restricted Areas 
Most Common Violations-Information Gaps Widespread’ (2004) 
<http://www.fao.org/newsroom/en/focus/2004/47127/article_47140en.html> at 28 October 2015.  
20 David J Agnew et al, ‘Estimating the worldwide extent of illegal fishing’ (2009) 4(2) Plos One 1, 1-
8. 
21 Global Ocean Commission, ‘Policy Options Paper # 8: Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing’ 
(2013 )  A series of papers on policy options, prepared for the third meeting of the Global Ocean 
Commission 11, 1. 
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2008. The incident involved several transnational crime actors including terrorists, 
people smugglers, pirates, as well as illegal fishers. 
IUU fishing is not a new maritime threat. Indeed, the phenomenon has 
resulted in numerous conservation and management efforts being taken by RFMOs.23 
States have been discussing the issue for some time, with the objective of forging a 
common understanding of the problem and devising concrete measures to combat 
IUU fishing activities. One such output has been the IPOA IUU, which was 
formulated by the FAO. A number of specific measures have been implemented to 
address the problem, including maintaining the number of legitimate fishing 
activities by the FAO, as well as the development of an international treaty which, in 
principle, provides measures that should be adopted by port States to prevent IUU 
fish from entering the seafood market.24  
Likewise, RFMOs have affirmed several policies that need to be followed by 
its members in order to prevent IUU fishing. These measures include registering 
vessels which are going to be used for fishing, as well as the use of monitoring, 
control and surveillance (MSC) systems. Furthermore, legislative and administrative 
steps have been taken to prevent IUU fish from entering the consumer market. Just 
like other commodities, offenders can only benefit from their activities if IUU fish 
are able to be sold commercially.25  
Ideally, all fishing vessels that operate on the high seas should be registered 
and possess an identification number, thus making them recognisable. Indeed, the act 
of registration assists with identifying the beneficial owner of the vessel. It is also 
important that all States become parties to international instruments such as the 
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LOSC and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement26 (UNFSA). According to the Global 
Ocean Commission, not only should States comply with these international 
instruments, but they should also discharge their obligations at the regional level 
(such as within RFMOs). In this regard, States are expected to monitor the fishing 
activities conducted by their citizens and vessels flying their flag. RFMOs should 
also help coordinate action that needs to be taken by its members and other RFMOs 
in relation to IUU fishing and other illegal activities on the high seas. The exact 
location of vessels, as well as their activities on the high seas, should be monitored 
by RFMOs and, if deemed necessary, this information should be shared with other 
stakeholders such as law enforcement officials and fisheries management agencies. 
At the national level, port States should coordinate and cooperate with RFMOs in 
relation to monitoring fishing vessels which enter their ports. This would enable port 
States to deny entry to vessels involved in IUU fishing activities and vessels 
allegedly carrying IUU fish. To eradicate this problem at its financial roots, retailers 
should also play their part by refusing to purchase fish which is suspected of having 
been caught illegally.27  
However, to get to this ideal position championed by the Global Ocean 
Commission, there are several loopholes that have to be addressed. These loopholes 
create opportunities for offenders to conduct their activities and enter new markets. 
IUU fishing on the high seas is an extremely lucrative business. Moreover, due to the 
transnational nature of the crime, multilateral and regional cooperation is needed to 
                                                
26 The United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and 
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, open for signature on 4 
December 1995, (entered into force 11 November 2001). Hereinafter referred to as UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement. 
27 Commission, above n 21, 2. 
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apprehend offenders – many of whom take advantage of weaknesses in law 
enforcement regimes to continue their illegal activities. Therefore, enforcement 
measures on the high seas are unlikely to be effective unless they are supported by 
prevention measures by retailers and the wholesale fish market.  
The bottom line is that IUU fishing can only be combated if States are willing 
to cooperate at the international and regional levels by implementing agreed 
measures and providing the required resources to ensure such implementation.   
6.2.2 Challenges in Combating IUU Fishing 
IUU fishing continues to take place due to shortcomings in the prevailing 
system that is managed by fisheries authorities.28 These shortcomings include 
irresponsible flag States, inadequate port State measures, inadequate regulation by 
RFMOs, individual States and commercial markets, as well as a lack of capacity and 
weak enforcement. 
6.2.2.1 Lack of Responses from Flag States 
According to the LOSC, all States have the right to conduct fishing on the high 
seas.29 Nonetheless, States must exercise responsibility over fishing vessels flying 
their flag. In addition, States need to be aware of the prevailing international and 
regional instruments governing high seas fishing.  States which are members of 
RFMOs have a particular obligation to comply with the conservation and 
management measures which have been agreed upon by the organisation. Indeed, 
even States which are not members of RFMOs need to be aware of such measures, 
and refrain from engaging in conduct which would hamper RFMO conservation and 
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management plans. Therefore, although these States do not have to abide by the 
obligations set out in treaties agreed upon under the RFMO framework, according to 
Global Ocean Commission, they should be reminded of their duty to cooperate, as set 
out in the LOSC and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement.   
If the above responsibilities were to be adhered seriously by all States, then 
the problem of IUU fishing will be minimized.30 However, the facts reveal that 
several flag States are either unable or unwilling to fulfil their obligations in this 
regard. Indeed, some States are unable to control and monitor their vessels due to a 
lack of capacity. Furthermore, there are States which offer cheap and fast registration 
of fishing vessels. Therefore, there are vessels which are registered under different 
flag States within a short span of time.31 More problematic, however, is the lack of 
transparency in the registration process – a shortcoming which allows the beneficial 
owners of vessels to hide behind nominees.32 As a result, IUU fishing is able to 
flourish, thereby threatening the sustainability of fisheries worldwide. 
6.2.2.2 Weak Port State Measures 
Port States play a significant role in the effort to eradicate IUU fishing.33 Indeed, 
both States and RFMOs have recognised the importance of port State measures in 
disrupting IUU fishing activities, especially with regard to the offloading of fish in 
ports. These measures are intended to make it more difficult for IUU fishers to 
conduct their operations, as they must expend considerable time and money on ports 
which are less regulated. Conversely, such measures have proved extremely cost 
                                                
30 Commission, above n 21, 3. 
31 Stefan Flothmann et al, ‘Closing loopholes: getting illegal fishing under control’ (2010) 328(5983) 
Science 1235, 1235-1236. 
32 Commission, above n 21, 3 
33 Ibid, 5. 
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effective for States, as port State control is cheaper to implement than inspections at 
sea.  
In order to be effective, however, port State control has to be practiced at all 
existing ports. If this does not occur, the result may be ‘ports of convenience’, where 
IUU fishers can offload their catch without fear of prosecution. To implement such 
control, port States need to have domestic legislation prohibiting the act, as well as 
legal instruments enabling them to coordinate action with flag States, market States, 
as well as other port States. Indeed, harmonised port State control at both the global 
and regional levels would benefit States with limited enforcement capabilities. Other 
States with similar control programs would be able to assist in cases where IUU fish 
is transported from one port to another within a particular region.34 
Port State control has been successful in resolving issues surrounding 
substandard merchant ships. Currently, there are nine port State control 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) around the world which implement 
international treaties related to shipping. Furthermore, port States participating under 
these MOUs are bound by a set of rules produced by the IMO and the International 
Labour Organization (ILO)35, with such States conducting inspections when vessels 
enter their ports and detaining vessels suspected of violating the terms of the 
prevailing MOU. Similar control measures are being trialled with respect to fishing 
vessels. There are, however, additional enforcement measures that could be 
implemented by port States, such as denying port entry to a vessel that has been 
blacklisted, as well as preventing the offloading of harvested IUU fish. 
                                                
34 Ibid, 5. 
35 International Labour Organization, see http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/lang--en/index.htm 
at 29 October 2015. 
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In 2009, after a series of negotiations, the Agreement on Port State Measures 
to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing 
(PSMA), was approved by the FAO and opened for signature.36 This agreement was 
heavily influenced by the 2004 Port State Model Scheme, which in principle 
recommended the basic port State measures needed to be applied when adopting the 
Regional MOU. The PSMA will enter into force after it is ratified by at least 25 
countries. The agreement has not received wide support and has not yet entered into 
force, which highlights the need for greater effort to convince and encourage States 
to ratify the instrument.37  
6.2.2.3 Black Listing of Vessels  
Each RFMO has devised its own set of measures to address the problem of IUU 
fishing. One such measure is the blacklisting of vessels reasonably suspected of 
having engaged in IUU fishing, as well as those proven to have engaged in such 
activity. The names of these vessels could be released and widely circulated so they 
can easily be identified. The aim of this measure is to prevent detected vessels from 
offloading IUU fish at ports. Currently, there are nine RFMOs including the Western 
and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC)38, the Northwest Atlantic 
Fisheries Organization (NAFO)39 and the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission 
(NEAFC)40, which have officially blacklisted vessels.41  
                                                
36 Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported And 
Unregulated Fishing, opened for signature 22 November 2009, (will enter into force 30 days after 25 
nations have ratified it). Hereinafter referred to as PSMA. 
37 Commission, above n 21, 6. 
38 Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, see https://www.wcpfc.int/ at 29 October 2015. 
39 Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization, see http://www.nafo.int/ at 29 October 2015. 
40 North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission, see http://www.neafc.org/ at 29 October 2015. 
41 M. D Boyle, ‘Without a trace: an updated summary of traceability efforts in the seafood industry’ 
(2012) <http://www.fishwise.org/images/fishwise_traceability_white_paper_august_2012.pdf>. 
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There are more than 70 vessels which have been blacklisted to date.42 
Considering the vast number of RFMOs, this figure may appear small. Indeed, there 
are large numbers of undetected vessels engaging in IUU fishing activities. These 
vessels go undetected for a variety of reasons, including the lack of a mandatory 
numbering scheme, the failure of States to update vessel details, as well as the 
absence of IMO numbers. Furthermore, the problem is compounded by the fact that 
individual blacklists are not shared globally.43        
 
6.2.2.4 Markets 
Retailers are positioned to play an important role in preventing IUU fish from 
reaching the consumer market. If retailers were only allowed to accept seafood 
harvested legitimately (and in circumstances where the origin of the catch has been 
disclosed), then preventing the entry of the IUU fish into the consumer market would 
be facilitated. Furthermore, such a scheme would enable customers, who are unlikely 
to be privy to the dealings between the supplier and retailer, to be confident that the 
seafood they purchase has been procured through legal means.  
The seafood trade is a multi-billion dollar business. Therefore, if seafood 
retailers were to become engaged with the issue of IUU fishing, and their assistance 
sought, they could potentially have a significant impact on reducing the number of 
illegal catch. Indeed, this measure could go some way towards developing and 
maintaining the traceability of fishery products. Traceability is required in order to 
determine the source of all fish destined for the consumer market. It would also be 
beneficial if governments, retailers and consumers were made aware of marine 
                                                
42 Commission, above n 21, 6. 
43 Ibid, 6. 
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fishing practices, with reliable information about the origin of seafood entering the 
local market being made available.44 
 
6.2.2.5 Inadequacy States Compliance with the Agreements 
The PSMA has been acknowledged as one of the most significant measures in 
combating IUU fishing. However, several developing States, and especially those in 
Africa, have asserted that they lack capacity in this area, and are therefore not able to 
meet the requirements of the agreement.45 Indeed, States have differing capacity, 
ranging from human resources to the availability of accessible technology. However, 
Article 21 of the PSMA46 has anticipated this problem, and if implemented 
accordingly, should help the agreement to be effectively discharged following its 
entry into force. For instance, African States have joined the New Partnership for 
Africa's Development (NEPAD)47 through its Stop Illegal Fishing Working Group. 
The main aim of this group is to meet the requirements of the PSMA by listing the 
capacity needs of States and the toolkits required. However, according to the Global 
Ocean Commission, corruption remains the main barrier to its implementation. For 
this reason, accountability and transparency are essential elements to ensure the 
efficacy of the measures taken in combating IUU fishing. 
There has also been growing momentum to categorise IUU fishing as a 
transnational organised crime. It was the Norwegian government who led this 
initiative, seeking the involvement of the International Criminal Police Organization 
                                                
44 Ibid, 7. 
45 Ibid, 7. 
46 Article 21, PSMA. 
47 New Partnership for Africa’s Development, see http://www.nepad.org/ at 29 October 2015. 
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(INTERPOL)48 to combat the problem. IUU fishing has also been categorised as a 
fisheries management problem, and therefore the involvement of INTERPOL 
provides an alternative pathway to address the issue. In response, INTERPOL has 
launched a special initiative to deal with IUU fishing called the Fisheries Crime 
Programme (Project SCALE).  
In September 2013, INTERPOL issued a ‘Purple Notice’ when investigating 
a blacklisted vessel named “Snake”.49 A ‘Purple Notice’ is an international alert used 
to request information and coordinate action. In order to avoid the detection of 
prohibited fishing activities Snake changed its name, national registration (“flag”) 
and other identifying characteristics several times. These actions showed the 
willingness of the owners and operators to avoid “blacklisting” and associated 
sanctions. Thus Snake is suspected of violating numerous laws both at international 
and domestic levels.50 
This was the first time that INTERPOL had used its network for information 
gathering in the context of an IUU fishing case. The Fisheries Crime Programme 
would benefit from information gathering and enforcement measures.  
6.2.2.6 Weak Enforcement Measures 
It is not an easy task to conduct monitoring, surveillance and enforcement activities 
on the high seas, particularly if one considers the vast expanse of ocean and the long 
distances vessels must travel from their coasts in order to carry out the work. A 
survey conducted in the mid-2000s by the FAO reported that over half of the 64 self-
reporting States stated that ‘their ability to control activities of their flagged vessels 
                                                
48 International Criminal Police Organization, see http://www.interpol.int/ at 29 October 2015. 
49 Commission, above n 21, 8. 
50 Interpol, Purple Notice, Requesting Country Norway, 6 September 2013, 1. 
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on the high seas was ineffective or inefficient’51. Indeed, most of the enforcement 
activities carried out by these States focused on areas close to their coastlines (and 
thus within their national jurisdiction). This practice was not only conducted by 
developing countries, but also developed countries, which have the resources to 
conduct patrols on the high seas in addition to areas within their national jurisdiction.    
Monitoring and enforcement measures need to be taken in order to decrease 
or eliminate these linked transnational crimes. Therefore, the tracking of large fishing 
vessels through the use of vessel monitoring systems (VMS) and automatic 
identification systems (AIS) is important. Today, the use of VMS is mandatory in 
several countries. RFMOs are also using VMS in their effort to conserve and manage 
their accredited areas.52 Even though vessel tracking systems do not entirely 
eliminate IUU fishing practice, it still plays a vital role for helping to pinpoint non-
compliant vessels that may be engaged in IUU fishing activities. 
There are also other means to track the activities of vessels. Indeed, satellite 
monitoring systems such as optical imaging satellites, radar satellites, advanced 
ground-based radar and remotely piloted air/sea vehicles have been used to conduct 
surveillance. Even so, there are inherent problems with this approach. Due to the 
high costs involved in procuring satellite monitoring systems, few countries have 
been able to utilise them, and hence the technology is yet to be used as part of a 
coordinated fisheries enforcement program.53    
                                                
51 Commission, above n 21, 8 
52 Ibid, 8. See also Chris Rahman, ‘Use of technology in maritime regulation and enforcement’ in 
Robin Warner and Stuart Kaye (eds), Routledge Handbook of Maritime Regulation and Enforcement 
(Routledge, 2016) 363, 365-369. 
53 Commission, above n 21, 9. 
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6.3 Nature of IUU Fishing in Southeast Asia 
Since 2006, the Asia Pacific region has accounted for more than 50 per cent of the 
world’s fish production54. In Southeast Asia, the top five fish producing countries are 
Indonesia, Myanmar, Philippines, Vietnam and Thailand.55 Together these countries 
account for 31 per cent of the fish production in the Asia Pacific region.56 Indonesia 
is the largest producer in Southeast Asia, producing around 5.4 million tons of fish 
products each year, representing 11 per cent of the total production in the Asia 
Pacific region.57 Fish exports have certainly benefited Southeast Asian nations, with 
States in the region receiving significant foreign currency earnings.58 Therefore, it is 
clear that fisheries make a significant contribution to the livelihood and food security 
of many people in Southeast Asia. However, the increasing demand on fisheries also 
leads to overfishing and the exploitation of aquatic resources.  
Fisheries make a significant contribution to the livelihood and food security 
of many people in Southeast Asia. Indeed, approximately 10 million of people in 
ASEAN countries are employed as fishers. Furthermore around 10 million people are 
engaged in fisheries industries. Families of these workers are indirectly supported by 
the fish stocks in Southeast Asia. Therefore, according to Williams, there are almost 
100 million people who are dependent on fisheries sector in the region.59 
 
 
                                                
54Simon Funge-Smith, Matthew Briggs and Weimin Miao, Regional overview of fisheries and 
aquaculture in Asia and the Pacific (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2012), 
2. 
55 Ibid, 2. 
56 Ibid, 2. 
57 Ibid, 2. 
58 P Pomeroy et al, ‘Regional economic Integration of the Fisheries Sector in ASEAN Countries’ 
(2007)  paper presented at the Interntional Conference on Fisheries and Poverty , 75-102. 
59 Meryl J Williams, Enmeshed: Australia and Southeast Asia’s fisheries, Lowy Institute Paper 20 
(Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2007), 27. 
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Table 23: The amount and relative proportion of capture fishery production 
in Asia Pacific States60 
 
IUU fishing is considered a serious maritime security threat in Southeast 
Asia. Since fish is a primary source of food protein across the region, any act that 
potentially disrupts, undermines, or threatens the supply and sustainability of 
fisheries resources constitutes a threat to the region. Furthermore, trade in fisheries is 
an important component of the economies of many States in Southeast Asia. 
Therefore, States are under pressure to take the necessary measures to protect and 
conserve their respective living resources. 
Illegal fishing in Southeast Asia is reportedly associated with other forms of 
maritime crime, such as piracy.61 As a threat, IUU fishing is difficult for Southeast 
Asian States to address for several reasons. Firstly, government agencies which are 
                                                
60 Funge-Smith, Briggs and Miao, above n 54, 2 
61 Meryl J Williams, ‘Will New Multilateral Arrangements Help Southeast Asian States Solve Illegal 
Fishing?’ (2013) 35(2) Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 
258, 259. 
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tasked to solve the problem often lack adequate resources.62 Secondly, the 
unresolved maritime boundary issues especially in the South China Sea, remain a 
sensitive issue amongst claimant States which often lead to protectionist policies 
over fishing areas as well as acting as a constant source of tension in the region. 
Instead of taking multilateral action to address the problem, States prefer the 
traditional route of bilateral cooperation. However, the growing importance of 
addressing IUU fishing cannot be denied, and hence States have agreed to develop a 
multilateral framework to tackle the problem. Initiatives such as the Regional Plan of 
Action to Promote Responsible Fishing Practices including Combating IUU Fishing 
(RPOA-IUU),63 the ASEAN–Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center 
Strategic Partnership (ASSP),64 as well as the Coral Triangle Initiative (CTI),65 have 
been finalised and implemented to address IUU fishing operations.66      
6.4 International Legal Framework to Combat IUU Fishing   
This section discusses the current international legal framework in place to combat 
IUU fishing. It also elaborates the limitations faced by States in addressing the 
problem.  Furthermore, the section explains the different measures that could be 
taken to reduce IUU fishing.  
6.4.1 Law of the Sea Convention 
The LOSC provides for principles embedded in several provisions which are 
applicable in the economic exclusive zone (EEZ) and high seas, which are of 
relevance to IUU fishing underscoring the equitable, efficient utilisation and the 
                                                
62 Ibid, 259. 
63 Regional Plan of Action to Promote Responsible Fishing Practices including Combating IUU 
Fishing, see http://rpoaiuu.org/index.php/en/ at 23 October 2015. 
64 ASEAN-SEAFDEC Strategic Partnership, see http://www.asspfisheries.net/ at 23 October 2015. 
65 The Coral Triangle Initiative, see http://www.coraltriangleinitiative.org/ at 23 October 2015. 
66 Williams, above n 61, 259. 
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conservation of living resources in these maritime zones.  In the other maritime 
zones where coastal States have exclusive sovereignty, i.e., internal waters, 
archipelagic waters and territorial sea, the LOSC does not provide specific guidelines 
in respect to the management and conservation of fisheries resources.67  
The coastal State exercises jurisdiction over approximately 90 per cent of 
marine resources.68 This change in the management of fisheries resources is due to 
the development of the legal regime of EEZ under the LOSC. Coastal States are 
given the right to manage the living resources within their EEZ along with basic duty 
of ensuring that the living resources are not over-exploited whilst ensuring their 
optimum utilisation. The LOSC urged coastal States to provide conservation 
measures69as provided in Article 62 (4)70, including:  
a) licensing of fishermen, fishing vessels and equipment;  
b) determining the species which may be caught, and fixing quotas of 
catch;  
c) regulating seasons and areas of fishing;  
d) fixing the age and size of fish and other species that may be caught;  
e) specifying information required of fishing vessels; 
f) requiring, under the authorization and control of the coastal State, the 
conduct of specified fisheries research programmes and regulating the 
conduct of such research;  
g) the placing of observers or trainees on board such vessels by the coastal 
State;  
h) the landing of all or any part of the catch by such vessels in the ports of 
the coastal State;  
i) terms and conditions relating to joint ventures or other cooperative 
arrangements;  
j) requirements for the training of personnel and the transfer of fisheries 
technology; and  
k) enforcement procedures.   
 
                                                
67 Palma, Tsamenyi and Edeson, above n 2, 58 
68 Ellen Hey, ‘The Fisheries Provisions of the LOS Convention’ in Ellen Hey (ed), Developments in 
International Fisheries Law (Kluwer Law International, 1999) 20. 
69 Palma, Tsamenyi and Edeson, above n 2, 58. 
70 Article 62 (4), LOSC. 
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While the LOSC has given the right to the coastal state to conduct 
conservation measures on the EEZ, the effectiveness of such laws still depends 
largely upon the willingness and the capacity of the coastal State to implement 
them.71  
 On the high seas, the LOSC requires States to comply with several general 
obligations which include to: ‘a. adopt conservation measures of the living resources 
of the high seas; b. ensure that nationals of states adhere to those measures; and c. 
cooperate with other states to achieve the same objective’.72 The LOSC also contains 
management provisions which apply both to the EEZ and on the high seas, relating to 
cooperation over the management of trans-boundary stocks and the obligation of 
States to cooperate on the conservation and management of living resources on the 
high seas.73 In addition, the LOSC also urged States to cooperate on the management 
of highly migratory special and straddling stocks. These obligations to cooperate 
stipulated in the LOSC served as the underlying driving force in the development of 
other agreements including the UN Fish Stocks Agreement as well the establishment 
of the RFMOs.74 
6.4.2 UN Fish Stocks Agreement 
The UN Fish Stocks Agreement was designed in such a way that is in accordance 
with LOSC but also addresses other issues which arose due to developments in 
international law since the LOSC was negotiated.75 The agreement was opened for 
                                                
71 Palma, Tsamenyi and Edeson, above n 2, 59 
72 Ibid, 59 
73 Article 63, LOSC. 
74 Palma, Tsamenyi and Edeson, above n 2, 59. 
75 Lawrence Juda, ‘The United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement’ in Helge Ole Bergesen and et al (eds), 
Yearbook of International Co-operation on Environment and Development 2001/2002 (Earthscan 
Publications, 2001) , 54. 
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signature in 1995. The UN Fish Stocks Agreement aimed to regulate ecosystem-
based approach to fisheries management, and put forward innovative ocean 
management concepts, which include:  
a. unity of stocks and the need for management of stocks over their entire 
range;  
b. the imperative for compatibility of EEZ and high-seas fisheries 
regimes;  
c. a concern with the catch of non-targeted species and the 
interdependence of stocks; 
d. the need for a precautionary approach to fisheries management; and  
e. transparency in the decision making and activities of regional fisheries 
management organizations and arrangements.76 
The protection of fish stocks which do not fall under the jurisdiction of any 
coastal State is also provided for in this agreement. It urges the relevant regional 
fisheries bodies to conduct fisheries management and protection in their respective 
areas over these fish stocks. The agreement also provides enforcement measures on 
the high seas. It requires the regional fisheries organisation to conduct necessary 
actions against a vessel which does not abide with relevant fisheries conservation and 
management measures in place. Furthermore, States that ratified the agreement are 
also subject to enforcement measures enacted by the regional organisation.   
In circumstances of breach where there is a violation of the agreement, the 
authorities have the obligation to notify the flag State concerned and to collect 
evidence of the offense committed. After such notification, the flag State is given 
                                                
76 Ibid, 54.  
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three days to decide whether it would conduct enforcement measures on its own and 
to inform the inspecting State authorities or otherwise authorise the inspecting State 
to take the necessary enforcement measures. Port States are given the right to inspect 
documents, gear, and catches on entering vessels. Other than these enforcement 
rights, the agreement also allows port States to adopt legislation that prohibits trans-
shipment in situations where the catch conducted on the high seas violates the 
regional management measures. A dispute settlement mechanism is also provided for 
in the agreement, which follows the provisions in the LOSC, and applicable only to 
parties to the agreement.77 Given the importance and the benefit of the UN Fish 
Stocks Agreement, only Indonesia and Philippines have acceded to the agreement in 
Southeast Asia region as shown in Table 24. 
 
 UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement 
Brunei Darussalam x 
Cambodia x 
Indonesia ü 
Laos x 
Malaysia x 
Myanmar x 
Philippines ü 
Singapore x 
Thailand  x 
Vietnam x 
Timor Leste x 
 
Legend: ü = acceded, x = has not acceded 
Table 24: Accession Status of UN Fish Stock Agreement78 
 
                                                
77 Ibid, 55. 
78 Accession Status of UN Fish Stock Agreement, see  
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/status2010.pdf at 4th May 2015. 
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6.4.3 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 
In responding to the decline of global fish stocks, States established a code of 
conduct which would be able to address the problem of the uncontrolled exploitation 
of global fisheries. The issue of the rapid expansion of fishing industries and the 
alarming practice of unregulated fishing on the high seas that threaten global fish 
stocks attracted global attention which led to the adoption of the FAO Code of 
Conduct79 in an effort to address these problems.80   
 The FAO Code of Conduct, adopted on 31 October 1995, establishes 
principles and standards of conservation, management and development of 
fisheries.81 In order to address the issue of IUU fishing, the code is designed to be 
global in scope82 and applicable in maritime zones where coastal States exercise 
jurisdiction as well as on the high seas.83 Furthermore, even though the code is not 
legally binding, it is intended to be applicable and implemented by all stakeholders 
including: members and non-members of FAO, fishing entities, and global and 
regional organisations.84  The Code of Conduct is derived from binding international 
frameworks such as the LOSC, and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement. Thus, it addresses 
the IUU fishing problem and it is in accordance with prevailing international 
arrangements on the matter. 
                                                
79 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, see 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/v9878e/v9878e00.htm at 23 October 2015. 
80 Annick Van Houtte, ‘Legal Aspects of Regional Cooperation in Monitoring, Control and 
Surveillance’ (FAO/Norway Government Cooperative Programme – GCP/INT/648/NOR Regional 
Workshop on Fisheries Monitoring, Control and Surveillance, Kuala Lumpur and Kuala Terengganu, 
Malaysia, 29 June–3 July 1998), 35. 
81 Dikdik Mohamed Sodik, ‘Non-Legally Binding International Fisheries Instruments and Measures to 
Combat Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing’ (2008) 15 Australia International Law Journal 
129,  142. 
82 Article 1 (2), FAO Code of Conduct. 
83 Hasjim Djalal, ‘The emergence of the concept of fishing entities: a note’ (2006) 37(2) Ocean 
Development & International Law 117, 119. 
84 Martin Tsamenyi, ‘The legal substance and status of fishing entities in international law: a note’ 
(2006) 37(2) Ocean Development & International Law 123, 129. 
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 The FAO Code of Conduct imposes the obligation to fish in a responsible 
manner85 in order to support conservation and management measures.86 It also 
requires States to implement management measures to avoid overfishing,87 and to 
control fishing activities in order to create balance with the productive capacity of 
fisheries resources. Furthermore, the Code of Conduct88 elaborated the development 
of environmentally safe fishing gears and practices. These provisions are in line with 
international measures to combat IUU fishing. It further provides that scientific 
evidence should be the basis of any conservation and management decisions.89 
Moreover, traditional knowledge, economic and social factors should also be taken 
into account before carrying out a decision.90 
 
6.4.4 IPOA-IUU 
As mentioned earlier, IUU fishing is not a new issue. Indeed, the problem caught the 
attention of the international community as early as 1990.91 Since then, various 
organisations (including the United Nations), have attempted to address the issue and 
find a suitable solution. A concrete measure to combat IUU fishing at the 
international level was proposed by the Australian delegation at the Twenty-Third 
Session of the Committee on Fisheries (COFI). This measure was the development of 
a governance framework to address IUU fishing in the form of an IPOA.92 This 
                                                
85 Article 6 (1), FAO Code of Conduct. 
86Martin A Hall, Dayton L Alverson and Kaija I Metuzals, ‘By-catch: problems and solutions’ (2000) 
41(1) Marine Pollution Bulletin 204, 206. 
87 Article 6 (3), FAO Code of Conduct. 
88 Article 6 (6), FAO Code of Conduct. 
89 Article 6 (4), FAO Code of Conduct. 
90 Sodik, above n 81, 143 
91 Riddle, above n 1, 269. 
92 D Doulman, J., ‘Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing: Mandate for an International Plan of 
Action’ (FAO, 2000) <http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/y3274e/y3274e06.htm> at 28 October 2015. 
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proposal, which was presented in 1999 by the Australian delegation, marked the 
beginning of a new regime in COFI. Since this time, IUU fishing has become a major 
concern and focus of FAO programs. Two years after the meeting, the IPOA-IUU 
was adopted during the One Hundred and Twentieth Session of the FAO Council.93       
The original purpose of the IPOA-IUU was to address fishing in the EEZ and 
on the high seas. In principle, the goal of the IPOA-IUU is to prevent, deter and 
eliminate IUU fishing.94 This goal is to be achieved by providing States with 
concrete measures which are comprehensive, transparent and effective. Furthermore, 
these same measures are directed at international organisations that deal with 
fisheries management. It is also hoped that the IPOA-IUU will be able to address the 
situation described by Lawrence Juda as a “tragedy of the commons”.95 This 
describes a phenomenon where fishers are motivated to harvest fish stocks quickly. 
The idea behind this is that if fishers opt to conserve the fish stocks rather than 
harvest them, other fishers will simply intervene and exploit the remaining fish 
stocks. As a result of this behaviour, fish stocks decline more rapidly.96   
The IPOA-IUU, which was adopted on 2 March 2001 by COFI, strengthens 
the provisions of the LOSC,97 the FAO Compliance Agreement and the UN Fish 
Stocks Agreement. In fact, the IPOA-IUU contains frameworks which are more 
comprehensive compared to the FAO Code of Conduct.   State parties are able to use 
the provisions stipulated in the framework to conduct enforcement measures against 
                                                
93 Riddle, above n 1, 269. 
94 Ibid, 269. 
95 Lawrence Juda, ‘Rio plus ten: the evolution of international marine fisheries governance’ (2002) 
33(2) Ocean Development &International Law 109, 119. 
96 Riddle, above n 1, 269. 
97 Erik Jaap Molenaar, ‘CCAMLR and southern ocean fisheries’ (2001) 16(3) The International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 465, 482 
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perpetrators conducting IUU fishing.98 The framework also elaborates the 
responsibilities of the stakeholders including coastal States, flag States and market 
States to combat IUU fishing. Furthermore, the IPOA-IUU also contains provisions 
that stipulate the responsibilities of both member and non-member States of regional 
fisheries organisations which should be in accordance with international law.99 Even 
though the development of NPOA or other measures equivalent is significant in 
addressing IUU fishing, none of the Southeast Asian States has the said measure in 
place except for Brunei (Table 25). 
 
Southeast Asian States IPOA-IUU Fishing 
(Development of NPOA or 
other measures equivalent) 
Brunei Darussalam Yes (2011) 
Cambodia - 
Indonesia - 
Laos - 
Malaysia Draft  
Myanmar - 
Philippines Yes (2014) 
Singapore  - 
Thailand Draft 
Timor Leste - 
Vietnam Draft 
Table 25: Southeast Asian states that have started the process of implementing the 
FAO IPOA-IUU Fishing100 
 
                                                
98 DJ Doulman, ‘2001 FAO International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, 
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing: background and progress towards implementation’ (2005)  FAO 
Fisheries Report (FAO) , 40. 
99 Judith Swan, ‘International action and responses by regional fishery bodies or arrangements to 
prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing’ (2004)  FAO Fisheries 
Circular (FAO) 2. 
100 Funge-Smith, Briggs and Miao, above n 54, 139. 
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6.4.5 The Compliance Agreement  
The Compliance Agreement is a binding instrument upon which the most important 
of the IPOA-IUU responses are based. As explained in Article 2 of the Compliance 
Agreement, the application of the Agreement ‘is aimed at all vessels that are used or 
intended for fishing on the high seas except that a party may exempt fishing vessels 
of less than 24 metres in length, unless the exemption would undermine the object 
and purpose of the Agreement’101. 
The Compliance Agreement was able to define several key terms such as 
"vessels" which also includes "mother ships and any other vessels directly engaged 
in such fishing operations". Furthermore it successfully defined ‘record of fishing 
vessels’ instead of ‘register’. The latter only allows control through the register itself, 
whereas in the former, control is primarily conducted through fishing authorization. 
Article 4 states that ‘each party is required to maintain a record of fishing 
vessels entitled to fly its flag and authorized for use on the high seas, and to take 
such measures as are necessary to ensure that all such vessels are entered on that 
record’. Furthermore, Article 5 of the Agreement regulates international cooperation  
‘referring to the exchange of information (such as evidentiary material) relating to 
activities of vessels in order to assist the flag State in identifying those vessels flying 
its flag which have reportedly engaged in activities undermining international 
conservation and management measures’102. 
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6.4.6 Limitations in Combating IUU Fishing 
6.4.6.1 Flag State Control 
Increased competition among legitimate fishers has led to illegal fishing in areas 
within the jurisdiction of littoral States and on the high seas.103 Such competition has 
been prompted by an increase in the number of fishers, as well as dwindling of 
resources. The sustainability of fisheries is further threatened by unreported and 
unregulated fishing. The reflagging of vessels has become a common practice among 
perpetrators of IUU fishing, allowing offenders to avoid the regulatory controls 
established by RFMOs. Reflagging occurs when a vessel flying the flag of an RFMO 
member State intentionally reflags by re-registering the vessel to a non-member 
State, thus avoiding the regulations imposed by the RFMO. In this situation, 
reflagging allows IUU fishing to persist, as the control exerted by the new State over 
the vessel is weak. As argued by Baird, this loophole could be addressed if coastal 
States were to develop a set of requirements allowing them to exercise greater 
control over their vessels.104     
6.4.6.1.1 Reflagging 
In order to conduct fishing, a vessel needs to be registered in the vessel owner’s 
preferred State. This system of registration has become more popular as the fishing 
industry has expanded. Registering a vessel, however, does not appear to be an 
adequate way of controlling the activities of the vessel. This is because vessel owners 
tend to reflag and register their vessels in States which lack high seas fisheries 
regulations.  
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Owners intentionally deregister their vessels (which were once registered in 
an RFMO member states) to other States (which are non-members) in order to avoid 
having to comply with RFMO conservation and management measures.105 These 
States, which are also known as “flags of convenience”, allow vessel owners to fish 
irresponsibly and neglect the regulatory provisions of international instruments such 
as the LOSC and the 1995 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries.106 
Furthermore, on numerous occasions, flag of convenience vessels have been found 
without their name and number printed, and without their flag being flown.107 The 
reflagging of ships has thus been a prime concern to the international community, 
one that has been addressed in international meetings including the third LOSC 
Conference, the 1992 Conference on Responsible Fishing, as well as the 1992 UN 
Conference on Environment and Development.108 The LOSC provides for flag State 
responsibility in Articles 91 and 94.109 Article 91(1) provides that “every State shall 
fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for the registration of ships 
in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag”,110 while Article 94 emphasises that 
each State has the obligation to “effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in 
administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag”.111  
6.4.6.1.2 Determining the Ownership of the Vessel 
Baird has argued that the obligation of flag States to assume responsibility for their 
vessels (as mandated by the international community), seems to have gone unnoticed 
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by some States.112 Indeed, provisions in the LOSC, the FAO Compliance Agreement 
and the FAO Code of Conduct regulate the obligation of flag States in respect of their 
flagged vessels. As mentioned earlier, these obligations find their most lucid 
expression in Articles 91 and 94 of LOSC.113 Article 91 specifically requires a 
genuine link to exist between the flag State and the registered ship.114 However, a 
universally agreed definition of what constitutes a ‘genuine link’ remains elusive. 
Furthermore, as both Articles 91 and 94 are general in nature, it is difficult to 
evaluate whether or not a State has discharged its responsibility with respect to its 
vessels. Likewise, to identify flag State control over a flagged vessel or a ‘genuine 
link’ is challenging. Another instrument which requires a State to have a genuine link 
to its vessels is the FAO Compliance Agreement.115 Article 3(2)116 of the agreement 
requires States to exercise responsibility over their fishing vessels, provided there is a 
genuine link between the State and the vessel. Although it was hoped that this 
agreement would increase the responsibility of flag States towards their vessels, it 
did not enjoy much popularity, and thus not all State parties to the LOSC have 
ratified it. Moreover, the agreement does not elaborate on the definition of ‘genuine 
link’.117  
The difficulty in proving a link between a State and a vessel has been 
exacerbated by the increasing number of flags of convenience. This limitation of 
international law has been used to the advantage of the IUU fishing industry to 
corporatise their illegitimate business. Indeed, the trend towards vessel owners 
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reflagging their vessels is regarded as a ‘tactical commercial decision’.118 In this 
way, the IUU fishing industry has been exploiting ineffective LOSC provisions on 
flag State responsibility for its own self-interest. 
6.4.6.2 Hot Pursuit  
The right of hot pursuit is given to coastal States in cases where rights over their 
maritime zones have been violated or infringed by a foreign vessel. Thus, coastal 
States are permitted to enforce their national laws over the foreign vessel in areas 
outside their jurisdiction - that is, on the high seas. However, the State conducting the 
arrest or seizure must abide by the regulations stipulated in Article 111 of the 
LOSC.119 If the hot pursuit is not conducted in conformity with the LOSC, then the 
state conducting the arrest or seizure may be required to pay compensation for any 
loss or damage caused to the foreign vessel or its crew.120  
6.4.6.3 Complying with Article 111 of LOSC 
The requirements that need to be satisfied by coastal States under Article 111 are 
relatively clear.121 Nonetheless, determining whether a foreign ship is in a coastal 
State’s EEZ can be problematic, as States tend to have different interpretations on 
this issue. For instance, in the Volga Case,122 the Australian Government argued that 
there is no requirement for the State engaging in hot pursuit to prove that the foreign 
vessel (a Russian ship in this instance) was within its (Australia’s) EEZ. 
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Furthermore, it was argued that if the coastal State considers that a foreign vessel is 
within its EEZ, then that is a sufficient basis for conducting an arrest or seizure.123 
Although the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) had the 
opportunity to provide some much needed clarification in this area, its judgment in 
the Volga Case did not consider the debate on the issue. Therefore, in the absence of 
further extrapolation by the LOSC or ITLOS, it is best to take the literal meaning of 
Article 111(4)124 of the LOSC - that is, that a coastal State has to have reasonable 
evidence that the foreign ship was within one of the maritime zones stipulated in the 
Article.125 The Tribunal did, however, find that ‘the Australian government has 
violated the Convention by requiring excessive payments and ruled that the 
government of Australia did not have the right to impose measures beyond the 
paying of a bond’126. 
Another problem arising from the LOSC provisions on hot pursuit is the 
absence of an agreed definition of the term “interrupted”. This term is found in 
Article 111 of LOSC and its precise meaning is significant, particularly for fisheries 
enforcement.127 IUU fishing vessels have developed in speed and hence to justify a 
seizure to be uninterrupted is a concern. Indeed, there have been cases where 
authorities have engaged in lengthy pursuits, some exceeding 3000 nautical miles, 
such as those involving the South Tomi and the Viarsa. In these circumstances, there 
may be debate as to whether or not the pursuit was ‘interrupted’.    
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The need for a visual or auditory signal to be given to a foreign ship before a 
State engages in hot pursuit is another requirement of Article 111(4).128 However, it 
is yet to be decided whether a radio message broadcast, email or even facsimile 
constitutes a visual or auditory signal. In the Volga Case, Australian authorities used 
a radio broadcast, whereas in the South Tomi Case, the crew of the foreign ship was 
contacted via radio and phone by the relevant authorities. However, in the M/V Saiga 
(No.2) Case, Judge Anderson affirmed that if even the Tribunal had been willing to 
consider the fact that authorities had sent messages via radio broadcast over 40 
nautical miles, the evidence to prove that the messages were sent and received was 
absent.     
As demonstrated by the pursuits of the South Tomi and the Viarsa, a radio 
broadcast represents the current practice by which a signal is given to a foreign 
vessel to stop. Indeed, this measure is considered to be a “visual or auditory signal” 
within the context of Article 111(4).129 Furthermore, the International Law 
Commission, in explaining Article 23 of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas, 
has stated that the significant point when engaging in a hot pursuit is to give an order 
to stop and seize the vessel, “not the means by which the right [is] exercised”. 130  
6.4.7 Measures to Decrease IUU Fishing 
As the eradication of IUU fishing requires a robust and comprehensive strategy, it is 
important to examine the measures that have been taken by the international 
community to combat this problem.    
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International law has paved the way for coastal States to implement measures 
to tackle IUU fishing. However, international law also has limitations which may 
affect the measures taken by States.131 Nonetheless, international law still provides 
prominent strategies to address the issue.   
6.4.7.1 Port State Controls 
International treaties such as the LOSC, the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, the IPOA-
IUU, the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
(CCAMLR)132 and Western & Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), as 
examples, have acknowledged the power that a State has over vessels flying its 
flag.133 Indeed, there are jurisdictional rights that exist under international law which 
allow port States to control their vessels on the high seas as well as in ports.134    
One such right is to ask the Master of a vessel to produce documents before 
the vessel enters its port. Regulations concerning vessel safety, pollution and 
working conditions of the crew are also regulated under an IMO MOU. The 
establishment of port State control is also supported by the FAO and the IMO 
through an IUU Fishing and Related Matters Working Group which seeks to, among 
other things, implement a uniform system of port state control so that measures to 
combat IUU fishing can be better coordinated.135 Further support for port State 
control can be found in the CCAMLR Catch Documentation Scheme,136 which 
include regulations in trading toothfish such as the process of landing especially by 
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State parties. Even though toothfish are not caught within the area designated in the 
convention, State parties and non-State parties are encouraged to control such 
activities. Indeed, surveys have shown that both member States and several non-
member States comply with the arrangements of the scheme.  
Even though port State control could be executed by RFMOs on a regional 
basis, non-member States could still bypass RMFO control by entering the port of 
another State in the region not party to the particular RFMO.137 This may lead to the 
control measures implemented by RFMOs being rendered ineffective. Nevertheless, 
CCAMLR can, in certain circumstances, compel non-member States to comply with 
the scheme, and therefore could implement its control measures more effectively. On 
another note, CCAMLR also faced the same problem in ports in Jakarta and 
Mozambique but have been advocated to apply the CCAMLR Catch Documentation 
Scheme.138 
In regards to the WCPFC, it tries to address numerous problems such as 
‘management of high seas fisheries resulting from unregulated fishing, over-
capitalization, excessive fleet capacity, vessel re-flagging to escape controls, 
insufficiently selective gear, unreliable databases and insufficient multilateral 
cooperation in respect to conservation and management of highly migratory fish 
stocks’139. The provisions stipulated in the WCPFC mostly are drawn from the UN 
Fish Stocks Agreement. Furthermore, it also reflects the special political, socio-
economic, geographical and environmental characteristics of the western and central 
Pacific Ocean (WCPO) region. 
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6.4.7.2 Market State Controls 
Market States could also exercise control over fish trade by tracing the origin of all 
fish exported or imported. This would allow a State to prevent incoming IUU fish 
from being sold in their markets. In areas where port State control is well 
implemented, it is likely that any fish caught originated from a legitimate source. 
However, this does not mean that market State control is any less important. Rather, 
it could ensure that measures aimed at preventing, deterring and eliminating IUU 
fishing are conducted in a proper way.140 
6.4.7.3 Database of Vessels Committing IUU  
Establishing an IUU vessel database is another way to minimise IUU fishing.141 
Indeed, IUU Vessel databases consisting of vessels that have been involved in IUU 
fishing activities have been established. In one example, nine RFMOs and 
INTERPOL contributed data to it.142 Furthermore, individual RFMOs such as the 
WCPFC and The International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas 
(ICCAT)143 also publicize such lists.144 The database separates blacklisted vessels 
belonging to member States from those which belong to non-member States. 
However, the database has caused some controversy among States, as listed vessels 
are perceived in a negative light, suffer restrictions on their trading activities, and are 
often denied entry into port States.145  
At the international level, the FAO could work on creating and updating a 
similar database. This list would enable RFMOs to better detect blacklisted vessels, 
and hence take appropriate measures where such vessels attempt to enter the ports of 
member States. Furthermore, the list would enable RFMOs around the world to be 
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informed of new IUU fishing vessels on a consistent basis, as well as those vessels 
which have been rehabilitated.      
Even so, the establishment of a universally agreed list is difficult to achieve. 
The main problem with such a list is that its compilation requires State consent. 
Moreover, if the list was established, but only recognised by a small group of States, 
then its implementation would be hampered. One prominent example of this is the 
protest mounted by Russia and Spain towards the CCAMLR IUU Vessel List in 
2003. Russia argued that the list violated the rights and duties of flag States. 
Therefore, if States could agree on establishing the list of vessels that are involved in 
IUU fishing operating on an international basis, then RFMOs would benefit from it 
and uniformity in terms of information might be achieved.146  
6.4.7.4 Enforcement and Surveillance on IUU Fishing 
Cooperative surveillance could act as a way to decrease the number of IUU fishing 
incidents. Indeed, if one considers that IUU fishing is a global activity, cooperative 
surveillance between States (as well as between RFMOs), could go some way to 
addressing the problem. Several States have adopted this idea, with France and 
Australia having signed a treaty in 2003 for cooperative surveillance in the Southern 
Ocean.147  
The treaty not only allows the two countries to conduct surveillance in each 
other’s EEZ, but also provides assistance in relation to the hot pursuit of foreign 
vessels. Furthermore, it facilitates the exchange of information between the two 
countries in relation to the location and movement of vessels (including fishing 
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vessels). In a similar way, cooperative surveillance and enforcement could assist 
other States and RFMOs to detect fishing vessels engaging in IUU fishing activities, 
as well provide assistance to states in enforcing their national laws.148 
6.5 Regional Framework Addressing IUU Fishing  
This section aims to explain the different regional frameworks that are used as a tool 
in combating IUU fishing in Southeast Asia. The frameworks that are explained in 
this section include the Regional Plan of Action (RPOA), ASEAN-SEAFDEC 
Strategic Partnership (ASSP) and the Coral Triangle Initiative (CTI). 
6.5.1 Regional Plan of Action-IUU   
The idea for an RPOA was born out of a series of measures taken by Australia in the 
late 1980s towards illegal fishing operations conducted by Indonesian fishermen in 
Australian waters. Since then, the measures have intensified, resulting in Australia’s 
decision to establish ‘Operation Clearwater’ in 2005.149 This operation, which took 
place in the northern part of Australia, led to the detention of many Indonesian 
fishermen (as well as their boats), thus souring relations between the two nations. In 
an attempt to rebuild their relationship, Australia and Indonesia subsequently agreed 
to conduct a series of talks on the issue, and eventually agreed to conduct a bilateral 
maritime patrol in the region in 2006. A further development occurred in 2007, when 
both States invited other countries in the region to discuss the problem of IUU 
fishing. The meeting also launched the Regional Plan of Action to Promote 
Responsible Fishing Practices Including to Combat Illegal, Unreported and 
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Unregulated fishing (RPOA-IUU), which was signed by eleven ministers of the 
participating States.150   
 
 
Signed RPOA-IUU 
Brunei Darussalam ü 
Cambodia ü 
Indonesia ü 
Laos x 
Malaysia ü 
Myanmar x 
Philippines ü 
Singapore ü 
Thailand  ü 
Vietnam ü 
Timor Leste ü 
 
Legend: ü = signed, x = not signed 
Table 26: Status of RPOA-IUU in Southeast Asia151 
 
Even though the initial aim of the regional framework was to settle tensions 
between Indonesia and Australia, other States in the region acknowledged the 
importance of the framework, as they too were facing similar issues - internationally 
as well as domestically.152 The Ministers representing the participating countries 
stated that the aim of the RPOA was to combat IUU fishing through a common and 
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collaborative approach, and to promote responsible fishing practices in the region. 
The RPOA also affirmed that the main areas of concerns were the South China Sea, 
the Sulu–Sulawesi Seas, and the Arafura–Timor Seas.153    
Although member States make financial contributions to the RPOA, the main 
contributors are Australian fisheries and development assistance as well the 
Indonesian fisheries.154 The RPOA also receives support from regional organisations 
such as the Fisheries Working Group of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation  
(APEC) forum,155 the World Fish Center, the Asia-Pacific Fisheries Commission 
(APFIC),156 the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC),157 as 
well as Info Fish.  
The RPOA also seeks to help countries use monitoring, control and 
surveillance (MCS) systems in a fisheries context so that financial intelligence units 
can “follow the money trail” of illegal activities. However, the low profile of the 
RPOA renders it difficult to find topics of substance to address fisheries issues at the 
technical level. 
The goal of the multilateral framework is to sustain fisheries resources and 
the marine environment by strengthening fisheries management in the region.158 The 
RPOA Coordinating Committee holds annual meetings to discuss plans for the 
following year, with such plans being reported to member States and the FAO 
Committee on Fisheries.   
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The secretariat of the RPOA is located in Jakarta at the Ministry of Maritime 
Affairs and Fisheries. Member States are also active in hosting meetings and events 
of the RPOA, such as workshops to help States implement the 2009 FAO Port State 
Measures Agreement.  
6.5.2 ASEAN-SEAFDEC Strategic Partnership (ASSP) 
The objective of the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center is to 
promote “sustainable fisheries development in the Southeast Asian region through 
research, training and information services”.159 The center, which was established in 
1967, consists of Southeast Asian States as well as Japan. Initially, SEAFDEC was 
heavily funded by Japan, but since the 1990s Southeast Asian States have provided 
most of the financial support required to sustain the center. In addition, the center 
receives funding from Australia and Sweden, in their capacity as partner agencies.  
SEAFDEC, through its Training Department (TD), conducts the project 
on Promotion of Countermeasures to Reduce IUU Fishing. The project is one of 
the measures taken to combating IUU fishing and aims to develop Regional 
Fishing Vessels Records (RFVR) for fishing vessels 24 metres in length and 
over. Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand, 
and Vietnam Southeast Asian States that have vessels that fall under this 
category.160 In 2013, The SEAFDEC Council at its 45th Meeting and Special 
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SOM-34th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Agriculture and Forestry (AMAF)161 
endorsed the RFVR162.  
ASEAN has worked closely with SEAFDEC, not only in terms of funding, 
but also with regard to facilitating regional control. In return, SEAFDEC has 
supported ASEAN in a fisheries technical capacity. As a result, both organisations 
agreed to launch a fisheries partnership - the ASEAN–SEAFDEC Fisheries 
Consultative Group. The group, which was established in 1998 but rose to status in 
2007, led to the establishment of the more formal ASEAN–SEAFDEC Strategic 
Partnership (ASSP).      
This strategic partnership has helped regional fisheries in several ways. For 
instance, it has supported ASEAN to establish the ASEAN Regional Fisheries 
Management Mechanism (ARFMM). Unsurprisingly, ASEAN has regarded 
SEAFDEC as its fisheries technical advisor. Furthermore, the establishment in 2009 
of the ASEAN Fisheries Consultative Forum received significant support from 
SEAFDEC. This forum has discussed and reached agreement on themes requiring 
fisheries cooperation in the region, such as combating IUU fishing, limiting fishing 
capacity, as well as the need to promote responsible fishing practices. Not only does 
ASSP enhance regional cooperation, it also supports certain sub regional areas which 
are prone to IUU fishing, such as the Gulf of Thailand and the Andaman Sea.163  
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6.5.3 The Coral Triangle Initiative 
This initiative was spearheaded by conservationists in the scientific community, as 
well as international NGOs. One of the aims of CTI is ‘to establish a fully 
functioning and effectively managed region-wide Coral Triangle Marine 
Protected Area System (CTMPAS)’. Furthermore, it seeks common 
understanding about CTMPAS, particularly on how to improve management 
effectiveness and how to design and establish successful MPA networks. This 
was done under the mechanism of Marine Protected Areas (MPA) Working 
Group.164 Since the 1980s, when Australia, Canada and the United States began to 
offer financial support to three ASEAN marine science projects, the conservation 
measures employed in Southeast Asian ecosystems have grown significantly. These 
projects have focused primarily on coastal resource management, living coastal 
resources and environmental quality. Furthermore, the projects have helped forge 
international scientific networks and enhanced the region’s marine resource 
assessment and management programs.165  
The projects in the Coral Triangle were initiated by international conservation 
NGOs in late 1990s.166 However, as Southeast Asian states became aware of the 
significance of regional marine conservation, they too began to make contributions to 
the various projects.167   
Indonesia led the way in this regard, with the Indonesian President 
introducing and publicising the CTI during the Conference of the Parties of the 
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Convention on Biological Diversity in Brazil in 2006.168 Indeed, even before the 
initiative was launched at the Manado World Ocean Conference in 2009, it was 
announced during the APEC Summit in Australia in 2007.169 NGOs played a 
significant role in establishing the initiative, with the World Wildlife Fund, the 
Nature Conservancy, Conservation International and the Wildlife Conservation 
Society all heavily involved. The CTI also has an RPOA which focuses on issues 
such as marine protected areas and fisheries management. The initiative has also 
established secretariats, such as the CTI Secretariat in Jakarta, state CTI coordinating 
committees, the CTI Regional Business Forum, as well as the Secretariat for the US 
CTI Support Partnership.170 Indonesia’s Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries 
hosts the CTI Secretariat in Jakarta.  
6.6 Analysis of the Prevailing Framework on IUU Fishing 
One of the most pressing challenges facing governments in Southeast Asia is 
fisheries governance, including enforcing fisheries regulations. Indeed, in many 
cases, governments in the region have been unable to take effective fisheries 
management measures. Moreover, this problem has been compounded by a lack of 
capacity and funds. 
If present conditions persist for the next two decades, it is almost inevitable 
that significant fisheries problems will arise in Southeast Asia. These problems may 
include demand for fish outstripping supply (resulting in a worrisome picture for 
food security in the region), as well as a substantial increase in the price of fishery 
products (with its concomitant social implications). In order to address these 
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problems, Southeast Asian states have to be committed to cooperate with one another 
and strengthen their regional institutions. Furthermore, States need to implement a 
raft of international instruments in order to sustain regional as well as international 
fisheries. 
Over time, the practice of IUU fishing has intensified and become more 
sophisticated.171 The economic gain obtained by IUU fishers, as well as their ability 
to exploit political situations for their own ends, has shaped IUU fishing into the 
extremely elusive and multi-faceted activity that it is today. In fact, the problem has 
emerged as one of the main threats to the management of high seas fisheries. As 
mentioned earlier, there are limitations in the application of LOSC provisions relating 
to fisheries, particularly with regard to Articles 73 and 111.172 However, as noted by 
Baird proposing amendments to these articles may not be advisable, as coastal States 
may interpret such action as an attempt to curtail their jurisdiction over these waters, 
rather than as a solution to the loopholes in IUU fishing regulations.173   
This chapter has discussed numerous international as well as regional 
frameworks which have been designed to address the problem of IUU fishing. The 
IPOA-IUU is one of the main international frameworks which seeks to prevent, deter 
and eliminate this irresponsible activity.174 Other international frameworks discussed 
are the provisions in LOSC, the FAO Code of Conduct as well as the UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement. At the regional level, the chapter looked at measures employed by States 
and organisations which include the RPOA, ASSP and the CTI. These frameworks 
                                                
171 Baird, above n 3, 36. 
172 Articles 73 and 111, LOSC. 
173 Baird, above n 3, 36. 
174 Riddle, above n 1, 290. 
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have made a positive impact in combating IUU fishing in the region.175 Their 
establishment has helped Southeast Asian States address the problem collectively 
through numerous cooperative and coordinated schemes. This has resulted in States 
being able to address IUU fishing nationally as well as regionally. These 
arrangements have also acted as a starting point for multilateral management action 
in the region, such as the collaborative measures which have taken place between the 
RPOA and the ASSP, as well as between the ASSP and the ASEAN regime. As for 
the CTI, it has been designed to include public and political actors, and therefore it is 
hoped that the initiative will encourage marine management action by both state and 
non-state actors in the future.176   
With its large maritime area, Southeast Asia is undeniably vulnerable to 
maritime security and fisheries issues. However, the establishment of a regional 
fisheries management organisation might not be a feasible solution in the short term. 
Indeed, there are many barriers to the establishment of such an institution, including 
unresolved maritime boundary disputes and complex fisheries problems.177 
Therefore, sub-regional forums focusing on specific hot spots178 (such as the Gulf of 
Tonkin fisheries shared by China and Vietnam), are probably the best way to address 
the aforementioned problems.179 Furthermore, it has been proposed by Williams that 
these forums represent the first step towards long-term cooperation among States in 
the region.180  
                                                
175 Williams, above n 61, 277. 
176 Ibid, 277. 
177 Ibid, 277. 
178 Elinor Ostrom, ‘Beyond markets and states: polycentric governance of complex economic systems’ 
(2010)  The American Economic Review 1, 1-33.  
179 Zou Keyuan, ‘The Sino-Vietnamese Agreement on Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Gulf of 
Tonkin’ (2005) 36(1) Ocean Development & International Law 13, 13-24. 
180 Williams, above n 61, 278. 
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Undeniably, the regional and multilateral arrangements discussed above are 
insufficient to address the broad problem of IUU fishing in Southeast Asia.181 The 
inability or unwillingness of States to exert control over their fisheries resources 
poses a formidable challenge to both the conservation of the marine environment and 
the sustainability of fisheries resources in the region. Also, some Southeast Asian 
States are perpetrators of illegal fishing in the region. Although States in Southeast 
Asia continue to exploit fisheries resources to meet an ever increasing demand, there 
are only several fisheries management areas in the region where fishing is properly 
regulated and enforcement measures are taken against offenders. Furthermore, 
maritime border issues continue to persist, hampering the management of fisheries in 
those areas where states have not clarified the ownership of fisheries resources. In 
such circumstances, IUU fishing is likely to continue, as any unilateral action would 
create tensions between the States involved, particularly given the importance of fish 
as a food source for communities in the region.182     
6.7 Conclusion 
IUU fishing is one of the main maritime security threats in Southeast Asia. The chief 
motive of IUU fishers is the economic windfall they receive from their activities.183 
IUU Fishing occurs in different maritime zones, but particularly in EEZs, and in high 
seas areas controlled by an RFMO. It is clear that, by definition illegitimate fishers 
do not follow the regulations that have been put in place for licensed fishing, and 
thus IUU fishers tend to exploit fisheries resources without any regard for 
conservation or management measures. Several States have tried to implement the 
                                                
181 Ibid, 278. 
182 Ibid, 278. 
183 Marine Resources Assessment Group Ltd (MRAG), ‘Review of Impacts of Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing on Developing Countries’ (2005)  Synthesis Report  5. 
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existing frameworks at both international and regional levels. Nonetheless, in the 
broader picture, proper implementation is still lacking and hence the illegal act is still 
taking place. There are States which are yet to ratify international conventions related 
to IUU fishing. In the case of Southeast Asia, even though there are several legal 
frameworks available, comprehensive regional effort is still not in place. 
Furthermore, there are several States which do not have comprehensive domestic 
frameworks on IUU fishing. Therefore, it could be concluded that the existing legal 
framework, at both international and regional levels, is inadequate to address IUU 
fishing.   
IUU fishing is a transnational issue that needs to be addressed regionally. The 
problem cannot be solved by unilateral measures of a single state. Thus, cooperation 
between the regional States is needed in order to address the problem 
comprehensively.  
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CHAPTER VII 
7 Marine Pollution Caused by Offshore Oil and Gas Activities in Southeast Asia 
 
7.1 Introduction  
The number of offshore oil and gas platforms has increased significantly in the last 
ten years, due mainly to the economic growth of numerous countries around the 
world, particularly those in Asia.1 In the larger context, spending on offshore oil and 
gas development in the Asia Pacific region between 2011 and 2015 has been 
predicted to exceed US$90 billion.2 This represents a 55 per cent increase in capital 
expenditure from the previous five years.3 The number of projects currently 
operating in South Asia, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia and Australia is quite 
significant in comparison to other parts of the world. Combined, these regions have 
441 projected shallow (less than 300 metres) and deep water (greater than 300 
metres) oil and gas fields.4 While offshore oil and gas development may have 
benefited the economy of contracting States, it has also become a potential maritime 
security threat. Indeed, offshore oil and gas activities have the potential to create 
pollution, resulting in long-term damage to the marine environment.  
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the international and regional legal 
frameworks governing maritime pollution caused by offshore oil and gas activities. It 
highlights the fact that offshore oil and gas activities are prone to create marine 
pollution which may affect more than one State. To this end, the chapter focuses on 
                                                
1 Lee Cordner, Offshore Oil and Gas Safety and Security in the Asia Pacific: The Need for Regional 
Approaches to Managing Risks (S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2013) 5. 
2 Ibid, 9. 
3 Gene Kliewer, ‘Asia/Pacific economic growth drives exploration/production offshore’ (5 January 
2012)   <http://www.offshore-mag.com/articles/print/volume-72/issue-5/international-report/asia-
pacific-economic-growth-drives-exploration-production-offshore.html> at 10 May 2015. 
4 Cordner, above n 1, 10. 
 
 
260 
 
two specific marine pollution problems generated by offshore oil and gas activities - 
oil pollution and the dumping of offshore installations at sea.  This threat is chosen 
because petroleum exploration has been rapid through out the region, and the number of 
offshore platforms keeps on increasing. These activities create added  pollution dangers that 
could result in damage to the environment in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, as stated earlier 
in Chapter I, marine pollution caused by offshore oil and gas activity also forms a 
significant challenge to maritime security in the region, as indicated by Brunei 
Darussalam, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand in MSDE 2013. 
To obtain a comprehensive picture of the problem, this chapter will examine: 
(i) the international legal framework governing offshore oil and gas activities; (ii) the 
regional legal framework regulating offshore oil and gas activities; (iii) the nature of 
the problem in Southeast Asia; and (iv) whether the current legal frameworks are 
sufficiently capable of addressing the problem. 
This chapter concludes that the existing legal framework - both at the 
international and regional level - is inadequate to address the problem. This is 
because even though some aspects of the problem may be specific to a single State, 
other aspects are transnational in nature, and thus cannot be addressed by unilateral 
action. What is required to address marine pollution caused by the offshore oil and 
gas activities in Southeast Asia is cooperation at the regional level. 
7.2 Marine Pollution from Offshore Oil and Gas Activities as a Maritime 
Security Threat  
More than seventy percent of the earth’s surface is covered by the ocean.5 For this 
reason, the presence of offshore oil and gas installations carries inherent risks.6 The 
                                                
5 Michael Waldichuk, ‘Control of marine pollution: An essay review’ (1977) 4(3) Ocean Development 
& International Law , 269. 
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end of the 20th century marked the starting point for the development of offshore oil 
and gas activities in the Southeast Asia region, and particularly off the Brunei coast.7 
There are numerous offshore oil and gas platforms across several littoral States in 
Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, Brunei, Thailand and Malaysia.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Location and profile of the Offshore Installations in Southeast Asia8 
 
                                                                                                                                     
6John Warren Kindt, ‘Law of the Sea: Offshore Installations and Marine Pollution ‘ (1984) 12 
Pepperdine Law Review 385. 
7 Youna Lyons, ‘Abandoned Offshore Installations in Southeast Asia and the Opportunity for Rigs-to-
Reefs’ (2013)  Centre for International Law, National University of Singapore, Working Paper, 2. 
8 Offshore oil and gas activities in the SCS (Courtesy of IHS)  
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Figure 17: Shipping traffic in the seas of Southeast Asia9 
 
The presence of international straits in some Southeast Asian States poses a 
different set of challenges. Safety of navigation is affected because vessels frequently 
pass through the Southeast Asia region. The safety of navigation is not only affected 
by the large number of aging oil and gas installations which are not removed but also 
by the increasing number of new installations in the region built to meet the 
economic and petroleum needs of regional States. As a result, sea lanes used for 
navigation are narrowed down requiring the crews to be more cautions in order to 
avoid the risk of hitting the installations. Moreover, since some of these straits are 
located between two or more countries, the need for international cooperation is 
paramount.  The high intensity of shipping traffic as shown in Figure 17 may also at 
some point impact the upon the high number of offshore installation in Southeast 
Asia as illustrated in Figure 16. 
Even so, the total number of offshore oil and gas platforms in the region is 
not comparable with regions which had already established such facilities before the 
                                                
9 Presentation by Youna Lyons, Offshore Decommissioning in Southeast Asia and the opportunity for 
Rig-to-Reef, Centre for International Law, National University of Singapore, Halifax 21-22 June 
2012. (taken from National Centre for Ecological Analysis and Synthesis from UC Santa Barbara) 
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end of the 20th century, such as in the North Sea, the Gulf of Mexico and the Persian 
Gulf. However, Southeast Asia still has a significant number of platforms - 
approximately 1350 - and like all facilities of this nature, these platforms produce 
volatile organic compounds which contribute to global hydrocarbon pollution levels. 
Indeed, more than half of these platforms have been in operation for more than 20 
years and close to 400 are over 30 years old. The life cycle of a platform is around 
20-30 years, and therefore the old and aging platforms in Southeast Asia are certainly 
in need of high-level maintenance.10 Unfortunately, most Southeast Asian States are 
reluctant to invest in these platforms beyond the bare minimum with regard to 
decommissioning, thus creating a maritime security problem for the area. While 
functioning platforms may create oil pollution, disused ones may be a source of 
hydrocarbon pollution occasioned by their (often illegal) dumping. 
 
 
 
 
Table 27: Age of the Offshore Installations in Southeast Asia11 
 
 
 
 
                                                
10 Lyons, above n 7, 2. 
11 Data derived from presentation by Youna Lyons, Offshore Decommissioning in Southeast Asia and 
the opportunity for Rig-to-Reef, Centre for International Law, National University of Singapore, 
Halifax 21-22 June 2012. 
Age (years) Percentage of offshore installations 
0-10 27.9 
10-20 24.1 
20-30 36.1 
30+ 11.9 
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Coastal 
States 
Installations > 30 years Installations 20-30 years Total per 
country 
Maritime 
zone 
Territorial sea/ 
Archipelagic 
Waters 
EEZ Territorial sea/ 
Archipelagic 
Waters 
EEZ  
Indonesia 169 0 170 17 356 
Malaysia 63 (15) 47 45 (8) 54 209 
Brunei 78 (48) 13 55 (19) 4 146 
Thailand 0 16 0 64 80 
Philippines 0 6 0 0 6 
Vietnam  0 0 0 12 12 
China 1 23 24 
Sub-total 306 83 270 174  
Grand Total 389 444 833 
Table 28: Age of the Offshore Installations more than 20 years in Southeast Asia12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 29: Location of the Offshore Installations in Southeast Asia13 
                                                
12 Values must considered as indicative only due to known discrepancies between sources – Data 
derived from presentation by Youna Lyons, Offshore Decommissioning in Southeast Asia and the 
opportunity for Rig-to-Reef, Centre for International Law, National University of Singapore, Halifax 
21-22 June 2012. (Compiled from OPL World Offshore Field Development Guide Database, Vol 2: 
Asia, India Australasia & Far East, 2010). 
Country Total Fixed Mobile 
Indonesia 482 463 13 
Thailand 265 260 5 
Malaysia 249 237  
Brunei 160 160  
Vietnam 46 40 6 
China 120 98 22 
Malaysia- Thailand  
Joint Development Agreement 
15 14 1 
Philippines 8 6 1 
Cambodia 2  2 
Total 1350 1278 27 
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The location of these platforms demonstrates that coastal States prefer to 
conduct offshore oil and gas activities in shallower areas close to their coasts (see 
table 30), most likely because they are more accessible. However, if these areas have 
already been explored and exploited, then coastal States tend to move further out to 
explore other, potentially oil-and-gas-rich sites. Many Southeast Asian States 
including Indonesia, Brunei, Thailand and Malaysia have expressed concern over 
their ageing platforms. Indeed, the domestic incorporation of relevant international 
law provisions is particularly important in these countries, as most of the offshore oil 
and gas operators are controlled by national oil companies. Therefore, it is likely that 
domestic legislation incorporating international obligations on offshore oil and gas 
activities would be adhered to by operators and enforced by the government.14 
Conversely, however, if States in the region oppose the incorporation of relevant 
international law provisions, then operators will also seek to avoid the duties and 
responsibilities that such provisions impose upon them.15 
 
 
 
 
Table 30: Depth of the Offshore Installations in Southeast Asia16 
 
                                                                                                                                     
13 Data derived from presentation by Youna Lyons, Offshore Decommissioning in Southeast Asia and 
the opportunity for Rig-to-Reef, Centre for International Law, National University of Singapore, 
Halifax 21-22 June 2012 
14 Lyons, above n 7, 2. 
15 Ibid, 3. 
16 Data derived from presentation by Youna Lyons, Offshore Decommissioning in Southeast Asia and 
the opportunity for Rig-to-Reef, Centre for International Law, National University of Singapore, 
Halifax 21-22 June 2012. 
Water depth (m) Percentage offshore installations 
0-50 51.5 
50-75 33.3 
75+ 15.2 
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Figure 18: Offshore installations in territorial and archipelagic waters17 
 
Oil spills can have disastrous consequences on the marine environment. In 
addition to the loss of human life, the blowout of an oil rig can damage fragile 
marine ecosystems, affecting both their viability and diversity and their economic 
value. Furthermore, an oil spill can cause significant financial losses and enduring 
reputational damage for the companies involved. A prominent example of such an 
incident is the Montara case, which will be discussed later in this chapter. Marine 
pollution can also be caused by the dumping of abandoned offshore oil and gas 
platforms. The dumping of these structures produces volatile organic compounds 
which contribute to global hydrocarbon pollution levels. as a result, offshore oil and 
gas activities can be considered as creating maritime security risks in Southeast Asia, 
as the activities taking place on these platforms during their operational lifetime (as 
well as their decommissioning, if not correctly managed), creates the potential for 
marine pollution.   
                                                
17 Ibid 
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7.3 Nature of the Problem in Southeast Asia 
This section discusses the nature of the problem caused by offshore oil and gas 
activities in Southeast Asia. The main risks include oil pollution and the dumping of 
disused offshore installations in the region. Furthermore, this section discusses the 
numerous safety and security challenges being faced by States in Southeast Asia. 
7.3.1 Safety and Security Challenges in the Southeast Asia Region 
7.3.1.1 Risks Created by Humans and Inadequate Regulator Regimes  
The large number of offshore oil and gas platforms in Southeast Asia poses 
numerous security challenges to the region. Indeed, human-induced risks and 
regulatory failures are some of the reasons behind offshore oil and gas safety 
incidents.18 The international demand for oil and gas has pushed energy companies to 
greatly increase production. However, some of the activities of these companies take 
place in remote areas, and are conducted by inexperienced crews using outdated 
technology. Furthermore, the political and financial pressures faced by these 
companies, combined with inadequate regulatory regimes, have created additional 
challenges from a risk management perspective.  As a result of these risks, according 
to Cordner one can reasonably expect that security incidents on busy platforms are 
likely to occur. Well blowouts from human errors and regulatory failures are one all-
too-common example. Indeed, it has been predicted that this type of security incident 
is set to increase in the future, and with an ever-increasing number of offshore oil 
                                                
18 Cordner, above n 1, 49. 
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and gas facilities being established in strategic areas, such as the South China Sea, 
the potential for large-scale environmental damage is high.19 
7.3.1.2 Unresolved Tensions between States 
Unresolved territorial and jurisdictional disputes pose yet another challenge to 
offshore oil and gas security and safety.20 As previously stated, worldwide demand 
for oil and gas has increased in recent years, and this has led to States exploring and 
exploiting their own energy resources. However, unresolved maritime boundary 
claims have created tensions among States, with most wanting to explore potential 
energy resources beneath the water surface. One prominent example of this scenario 
are the cases of the South China Sea and East China Seas. Furthermore, as tensions 
mount among States over contested sovereignty and sovereign rights to resources, so 
too does the threat of armed conflict in the region. In the case of the South China 
Sea, claimant States (including China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia) have 
occupied and unilaterally named contested features in order to buttress their claims to 
ownership of the maritime area.21 For example, the Philippines has called the 
disputed water area the ‘West Philippine Sea’, whereas Vietnam has labelled the area 
as the ‘East Sea’.22    
                                                
19 Ibid, 49. Please see, Yann-Huei Song, ‘Potential Marine Pollution Threat from Oil and Gas 
Development Activities in the Disputed South China Sea/Spratly Area: A Role that Taiwan can Play,’ 
(2008) 39 Ocean Development and International Law 150; and Yann-huei Song, ‘A Marine 
Biodiversity Project in the South China Sea: Joint Efforts Made in the SCS Workshop process,’ 
(2011) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 119. 
20 Ibid, 50. 
21 For more information see Nien-Tsu Alfred Hu, ‘South China Sea: Troubled Waters or a Sea of 
Opportunity?’ in Nien-Tsu Alfred Hu and Ted L. McDorman (eds), Maririme Issues in the South 
China Sea: Troubled Waters or A Sea of Opportunity (Taylor & Francis, 2010). 
22 Cordner, above n 1, 50. 
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One major barrier to States entering into multilateral arrangements in the 
region is the lack of clarity on the delimitation of several maritime boundaries.23 
Indeed, this is why the vast majority of oil and gas exploration in the region has 
taken place in areas where States have undisputed national jurisdiction - that is, in 
their territorial waters.24 However, the growing importance of oil and gas exploration 
has encouraged States to expand their exploratory activities into ‘grey areas’ – that 
is, where there are no clear-cut maritime boundaries, often in areas under dispute. 
This is best illustrated by the offshore oil and gas activities that are occurring in the 
South China Sea, where several countries have competing claims.25 
Maritime boundary delimitation is a sensitive public international law issue 
which cannot be resolved in a short span of time.26 Not only are heads of State 
reluctant to discuss the matter during intergovernmental talks (unless of course the 
issue has been flagged ahead of time), but it also raises difficulties for second-track 
diplomacy, with State delegations preferring to avoid discussions relating to 
sovereignty and maritime delimitation. Indeed, as related by Cordner, it is hardly 
surprising that States, when faced with such complex sovereignty issues, eschew 
cooperative engagement with their neighbours regarding oil and gas activities. This 
is because it is important to have a clear picture of the jurisdictional limits of certain 
maritime areas in order to determine the rights and responsibilities of States insofar 
as oil and gas activities are concerned.27  
                                                
23 Ibid, 65. 
24 See figure offshore installations in territorial and archipelagic waters, Chapter VII. 
25 For more information see Bill Hayton, The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia (Yale 
University Press, 2014). 
26 Cordner, above n 1, 65. 
27 Ibid, 65. 
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Several parties in the region remain hopeful that the disputing States will take 
necessary measures (such as arbitration or adjudication), in an effort to resolve the 
problem. These parties have also suggested that a cooperative management regime 
be established – one which directly involves claimant States in the South China Sea 
area.28 The question that arises is whether the increasing importance of oil and gas 
exploration will at some future point act as a trigger for the resolution of maritime 
delimitation disputes in the area or lead to deeper conflict.    
7.3.1.3 Inadequate Law and Order  
A law and order incident or accident such as Montara oil spill has the capacity to 
jeopardise offshore oil and gas security and safety. The consequences of such an 
incident could affect not only the State in which the incident takes place, but also 
neighbouring States in the region.  
7.3.1.4 The Problem of Piracy and Armed Robbery 
Piracy in Southeast Asia, as extensively discussed in Chapter 3 above, has decreased 
gradually since 2011.29 Indeed, this trend has been highlighted in a 2015 Report by 
the Information Sharing Centre (ISC)30 of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on 
Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP)31.  
The number of piracy and armed robbery cases in the Malacca and Singapore 
Straits in particular (as well as in the South China Sea) has declined.32 Piracy and 
armed robbery attacks have usually been directed at vessels anchored in ports. Also 
                                                
28 Sam Bateman, ‘Increasing competition in the South China Sea - Need for a new game plan’ (21 
August 2012) 157/2012 RSIS Commentaries , 1-2. 
29 Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asian Waters, see Chapter III. 
30 About ReCAAP ISA, see http://www.recaap.org/AboutReCAAPISC.aspx at 10 May 2015. 
31 Regional Cooperation Agreement against Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia, adopted 
11th November 2004, (entered into force 4 September 2006). Hereinafter referred to as ReCAAP 
32 ReCAAP ISC, ‘Piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia’ (January to June 2012)  Half Yearly 
Report  3. 
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vulnerable to these types of attacks are small oil tankers that travel at relatively slow 
speeds. Piracy incidents against large oil and gas installations have also been 
reported, but outside Southeast Asia itself. Although attacks against these 
installations are difficult to mount, there have been reports of attacks by local 
militants against oil and gas installations, for example in Nigeria.33 
7.3.1.5 Terrorism 
The incidence of maritime terrorism against offshore oil and gas platforms is 
relatively low in the region.34 Similar to piracy offences, maritime terrorism is 
relatively difficult to perpetrate against large oil and gas installations. However, the 
capability of terrorists to attack such installations should not be underestimated.35  
The terrorist attack in Mumbai, India, for instance, has compelled the government to 
protect its offshore installations. 
Indeed, such preventive action should make regional actors consider the 
possibility of terrorist attacks being directed at their own installations. Furthermore, 
the increase in the exploration of oil and gas, and the accompanying increase in 
offshore platforms, has made the energy and resources sector more vulnerable to 
terrorist attacks.36   
7.3.1.6 Increasing Intensity of Maritime Users   
The increase in intensity of maritime exploration and exploitation has also led to a 
greater number of maritime incidents, such as shipping operation incidents. This, in 
turn, has created risks for offshore oil and gas operations. In the year following the 
                                                
33 Mikhail Kashubsky, ‘Offshore energy force majeure: Nigeria’s local problem with global 
consequences’ (May/June 2008) 160 Maritime Studies 20, 20-26 
34 Cordner, above n 1, 56. 
35 S Bajpai and J. P Gupta, ‘Securing oil and gas infrastructure’ (2007) 55 Journal of Petroleum 
Science and Engineering 174  
36 VK Shashikumar, ‘Gaps in Maritime Security-I’ (2009) 24(1) Indian Defence Review 27, 27. 
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2009 Global Financial Crisis, there was a seven per cent increase in the number of 
shipping operation incidents. The most severe incidents were reported in Asia, 
particularly in the South China Sea area. Furthermore, it has been reported that the 
number of vessels traversing the Malacca Strait each year has reached almost 
70,000.37 Therefore, the likelihood of human-induced incidents as a result of busy 
maritime operations is high. 
Loss of life has been reported in maritime incidents between South China Sea 
claimant States,38 with the majority of such incidents involving fishing vessels and 
maritime security forces.39 Evidently, there is a need to develop risk management 
approaches among States in the region so that maritime incidents can be prevented, 
and also to ensure that any damage resulting from incidents which do occur can be 
minimised. Indeed, as maritime exploration and exploitation continues to grow, one 
can reasonably expect a commensurate increase in the number of maritime incidents 
unless redressive action is taken.40   
7.3.1.7 Safety zones 
Unauthorised activities around the area of oil and gas installations, such as fishing 
and tourism, also pose a safety risk to the facilities. The United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea41 (LOSC) allows for a safety zone of 500 metres to be 
maintained around installations in order to avoid such risks.42 However, this zone is 
                                                
37 Cordner, above n 1, 57.  
38 Jason Miks, ‘China, Philippines in standoff’ (11 April 2012)  The Diplomat , see 
http://thediplomat.com/2012/04/china-philippines-in-standoff/ at 10May 2015. 
39 GMA News Online, ‘Victims from ‘Chinese’ ramming now 1 dead, 1 injured, 4 missing’ ( 24 June 
2012)   <http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/263018/news/regions/victims-from-chinese-
ramming-now-1-dead-1-injured-4-missing> at 10May 2015. 
40 Cordner, above n 1, 58. 
41 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 16 November 1994) . Hereinafter referred to as LOSC. 
42 Article 60, LOSC. 
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not considered wide enough to ensure that the surrounding activities do not affect 
offshore installations. States including Southeast Asian States that claim a safety 
zone of more than 500 metres may be breaching LOSC Article 60 (5). Over time, if 
based on State practice, States might claim larger safety zones  on the basis of ‘new 
generally accepted international standards’, which is permissible in accordance with 
Article 60 (5).43  A follow-up discussion on this issue took place during the 56th 
Session of the International Maritime Organization (IMO)44 Sub-Committee on 
Safety of Navigation in July 2010 where contracting States expressed concern over 
the risks posed by activities taking place around installation areas. The meeting was 
fruitful and produced guidelines to address the matter. In principle “the guidelines 
are intended to increase awareness of the availability and best use of existing 
routeing measures to protect personnel and to prevent serious damage to such 
structures or to the marine environment in the event of a collision”. 45 However, the 
provisions formulated at the meeting did not increase the width of the safety zone, 
but instead seek to increase awareness and routing around the zones, thus leaving the 
problem essentially unchanged.46  
7.3.1.8 Obligation to Comply with the Prevailing International Law 
The tendency of governments to explore and exploit their offshore oil and gas 
resources in response to increased national demand for energy is understandable. 
However, the right to conduct such activities also generates a set of obligations 
which States should abide by. One such obligation is the need for States to comply 
                                                
43 Article 60 (5), LOSC 
44 About the IMO, see http://www.imo.org/en/About/Pages/Default.aspx at 10 May 2015. 
45 IMO Sub-Committee on Safety of Navigation, ‘56th session: 26-30 July 2010’ (30 November 2010) 
<http://www.imo.org> at 5 November 2015. 
46 Cordner, above n 1, 58. 
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with applicable international provisions, such as those governing responsible 
management measures. Yet another is the responsibility of States to ratify and 
implement international treaties that govern the exploration, extraction, production 
and storage of these resources (and well as the safety of those who carry out such 
processes).    
If one considers that offshore oil and gas incidents have the potential to cause 
national, regional as well as international consequences, the need for cooperative 
security arrangements between neighbouring and regional States, and also between 
extra regional actors, cannot be ignored. Indeed, such cooperation is vital for 
preventing, or at the very least minimising, the escalating risks that accompany 
offshore oil and gas operations.     
The number of States that have ratified relevant international treaties on oil 
and gas is relatively low.47 This has the potential to affect the safety of life at sea, as 
international provisions set a benchmark for understanding and resolving problems 
relating to offshore oil and gas activities. Another implication of the low rate of 
ratification in Southeast Asia is the damage that might be caused to the marine 
environment if an offshore oil and gas incident were to occur.  
7.3.2 Oil Pollution Caused by Offshore Oil and Gas Incidents 
Several offshore oil and gas incidents have occurred in Southeast Asia. Moreover, 
those incidents that have taken place outside the region have nonetheless impacted 
Southeast Asian States. Although the likelihood of a major offshore oil and gas 
incident occurring is low, the consequences of such an incident (should it eventuate) 
could be extremely serious for the States concerned. Indeed, these incidents may 
                                                
47 Ibid, 63. 
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result in the loss of human life and create a large-scale environmental disaster. 
Furthermore, they have the capacity to cripple the economy of not only contracting 
States, but also neighbouring States. As the potential ramifications of an oil spill are 
significant and transnational in nature, joint cooperation and coordination between 
relevant stakeholders, including government and industry, is required.  
Oil spills also threaten the safety of international navigation, particularly if the 
incident were to occur in or near one of the significant straits in the region.48 There 
are numerous straits which are used for international navigation in Southeast Asia, 
such as the Malacca and the Singapore Straits. If an oil spill were to occur in any one 
of these straits, not only would it create marine pollution, but the flow of trade in 
certain areas would be disrupted, with concomitant economic consequences. An oil 
spill in the Malacca Strait, for instance, would have a direct financial impact on 
littoral States such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, as well as flow-on effects 
for other countries which depend on seaborne trade traversing the strait.49 Marine 
pollution caused by an oil spill from a platform and which could be operational as 
well as accidental, would also negatively impact marine resources. As Southeast 
Asian states are located in close physical proximity to each other, a large oil spill 
would undoubtedly have a transboundary effect, such that more than one country 
would suffer economic loss and environmental damage from the incident.50 
                                                
48 Geun Lee, ‘Regional Environmental Security Complex Approach to Environmental Security in East 
Asia’ (1998) 52(4) International Organization 855, 15.  
49 Alan Dupont and London Institute for Strategic Studies, The environment and security in Pacific 
Asia (Oxford University Press Oxford, 1998), 7-10. 
50 Lee, above n 49, 15. 
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7.3.2.1 The Impact of Oil Pollution  
Oil spills from offshore installations represent one of the main causes of oil 
pollution, with their effects being many and varied. Indeed, oil is widely regarded as 
one of the most destructive pollutants to the marine environment. A number of 
studies have been conducted to determine the effects of an oil spill incident. One 
such study was conducted by the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, which 
found that a single oil spill would result in the death of plants and animals of 
intertidal marsh and subtidal soft-bottom communities. The study also found that 
these communities would take years to recover. Perhaps the most worrying finding 
from the study, however, was that oil spilled at sea causes persistent damage, 
especially in marsh areas which serve as a source of recontamination by continuously 
oozing oil.51 The clean-up and recovery from an oil spill can be so difficult and 
dangerous that oil residues are often detected in marine resources (such as animals 
and plants) years after the spill took place.52 
Indeed, the sub-lethal effect of oil pollution caused by an oil spill can last for 
more than six years, with marsh grass being particularly vulnerable to the oil’s toxic 
components. Marsh grass, which is beneficial as a land stabilisation mechanism, also 
acts as a nursery area for marine life and as a purification system for runoff water. 
However, once exposed to oil pollution, marsh grass cannot perform these roles 
effectively.53 Oil pollution also causes oil slicks at sea which, at times, can drift onto 
beaches.54 Animals such as water fowl have high mortality rates when exposed to oil 
                                                
51 Office of Research & Development, US. Environmental Protection Agency, Environmental Outlook 
1980, 494. 
52 For example the Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill Incident, see 
http://na.unep.net/geas/getUNEPPageWithArticleIDScript.php?article_id=65 at 22 December 2015. 
53 Ibid, 494. 
54 Eric B Cowell, Oil pollution of the sea (1976)  359.  
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pollution in their environment. Tar residues, which can be found in beaches around 
the world in different forms - such as globs, pellets and balls - are also the result of 
oil pollution.55  
The harmful effects of oil pollution are not limited to the specific flora and 
fauna mentioned above, with “salt marshes, rocky shore ecosystems, sandy and 
muddy shore ecosystems, sediments in general, littoral animals, fisheries, and the 
high seas” all being susceptible to the negative effects of oil exposure.56 
Furthermore, oil pollution poses a hazard to human health. Some studies have noted 
that oil spills cause the spread of carcinogenic hydrocarbons, with these compounds 
having been found in coastal bottom deposits, marine animals and plankton 
following oil spill incidents.57 It is clear that oil pollution affects the marine 
environment, including animals and fragile ecosystems, and therefore States should 
be required to take significant steps to prevent and reduce the occurrence of oil being 
spilled into the ocean. 
7.3.2.2 Offshore Oil and Gas Incidents 
Several offshore oil and gas incidents have occurred in or impacted Southeast 
Asian States, including:  
i. the sinking of the Petormar (a drillship) in the South China Sea. The 
incident occurred on 27 August 1981 following a blowout of shallow gas 
in the area;  
ii. the capsizing and subsequent sinking of a US drillship named Glomar 
Java Sea on the 25 October 1983, resulting in the loss of 81 lives. The 
                                                
55 WRP Bourne, ‘Seabirds and pollution’ (1976) 6 Marine Pollution 403.  
56 John Warren Kindt, ‘Marine Pollution and Hydrocarbons: The Goal of Minimizing Damage to the 
Marine Environment’ (1984) 14 California Western International Law Journal 233, 259. 
57 Cowell, above n 55, 389. 
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incident was due to Typhoon Lex in the South China Sea, approximately 
80 nautical miles east of Vietnam;  
iii. the explosion of an oil rig owned by French company Total Petroleum, 
which killed four people. The incident occurred on the south eastern 
coast of Borneo; and  
iv. the leaking of oil and gas into the Timor Sea from the West Atlas mobile 
drilling rig in the Montara oil field, located off the northwest coast of 
Australia. The incident occurred on 21 August 2009 and caused an oil 
slick covering 50,000 square miles of coastline. Although there were no 
human fatalities, the incident resulted in the death of marine life in the 
area.58 
The following section will focus on the Montara oil spill as the incident is 
relatively recent and has been well documented. This incident has also been selected 
because it attracted international attention and numerous lessons can be drawn from 
it.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
58 Cordner, above n 1, 29. 
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Figure 19: Montara Oil Spill Incident59 
7.3.2.3 Montara Oil Field Incident  
The Montara case involved a blowout from the Montara Wellhead Platform which 
caused oil and gas to escape from the well, contaminating the sea area around the 
platform. The spill occurred in shallow water (less than 300 metres deep), and 135 
nautical miles away from Australia (located half way between main coast of 
Australia and the coast of Pulau Roti)60 and 50 nautical miles from the exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ) boundary with Indonesia, covering an area of 90,000 square 
kilometres.61 This incident is a prominent example illustrating transboundary 
pollution caused by offshore activities. Furthermore, the problem is still unresolved 
and debates on the issue between Australia and Indonesia continue. The incident is 
                                                
59 Montara Map, http://www.au.pttep.com/our-business/montara-incident/ at 20 August 2016. 
60 Youna Lyons, ‘Transboundary Pollution from Offshore Activities: A Study of the Montara Offshore 
Oil Spill’ in S. Jayakumar et al (eds), Transboundary Pollution: Evolving Issues of International Law 
and Policy (Edward Elgar, 2015) 163. 
61 Commissioner David Borthwick, ‘ Report of the Montara Commission of Inquiry’  (17 June 2010) 
301.  
 
 
280 
 
the third largest oil spill in Australia and was caused by PTT Exploration and 
Production Public Company Limited Australasia (PTTEP-AA),62 an Australian 
subsidiary of PTTEP, itself a subsidiary of Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT). 
Fortunately, the incident did not result in the loss of life, with all the crew on the rig 
evacuated to safety. Even so, the incident resulted in the equivalent of 400 to 1,500 
barrels of oil expelled from the well every day, with the spill continuing for more 
than ten weeks.63 This incident polluted the environment and had a direct impact on 
the marine ecosystem in the area. Economic consequences also affected the 
surrounding littoral States. 
The oil field was located in the Indian Ocean on the north western part of 
Australia.64 Following the blowout, another drilling rig called the West Triton was 
brought in to plug the well by drilling under the seabed. These drilling operations, 
which were conducted on 1 November 2009, triggered a fire which broke both the 
platform and another drilling rig located in close proximity - the West Atlas. The fire 
ceased two days later and the well was able to be plugged as planned.  
Some of the findings from the investigation into the oil spill were that “the 
primary operator did not observe sensible oilfield practices”, that “the primary 
regulator was not a sufficiently diligent regulator”, and that “senior company 
personnel had limited experience and did not fully comprehend the implications of 
such operations.”65  
The report produced by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority indicated 
that the operational response to the oil spill took more than 100 days and involved in 
                                                
62 About PTTEP-AA, see  http://www.au.pttep.com/about-us/ at 10 May 2015. 
63 Cordner, above n 1, 19. 
64 Michael White and Alex Molloy, ‘Australian maritime law update: 2010’ (2011) 25(2) Australian 
and New Zealand Maritime Law Journal 212, 217. 
65 David Borthwick, above n 62, 6. 
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excess of 240 people and 120 surveillance flights. The oil spill polluted the marine 
environment within a 35 kilometre range from the platform.66 The report also stated 
that none of the marine parks around the platform were damaged as a result of the 
incident.   
An investigation into the incident was carried out by the Commonwealth 
government, led by David Borthwick, a former senior Commonwealth public 
official. The investigation was completed in mid-2010 and was publicly available in 
late 2010. The report identified more than 100 recommendations for the 
government.67  
The Australian government released its response to the incident in the 
following year.68 The content of the response, which was made available in May 
2011, mirrored the recommendations of the investigative team. Importantly, the 
report revealed that the company did not place enough barriers to stop the spill, and 
that a second barrier, which the company should have installed, was not in place at 
the time of the spill.    
Several recommendations were made to the Northern Territory government in 
the report. Nonetheless, a detailed analysis of the weaknesses and strengths of the 
Commonwealth departments which responded to the incident was lacking in the 
report. The report also recommended that petroleum companies be held liable for all 
the costs incurred as a result of the spill, including operational costs, scientific 
monitoring, as well as clean-up costs. To ensure that this measure is followed 
                                                
66 Australian Maritime Safety Authority, ‘National Plan to Combat Pollution of the Sea by Oil and 
Other Noxious and Hazardous Substances’ ((2003)  Annual Report 2002/2003, 17. 
67 Australian Government, ‘Draft Government Response to the Report on the Montara Commission of 
Inquiry ‘, 28 Oct 2010 <www.ret.gov.au/Department/Documents/MIR/response-to-montara-inquiry-
report.pdf> at 4 May 2015.  
68 Australian Government, ‘Final Government Response to the Report of the Montara Commission of 
Inquiry’, 25 May 2011 <http://www.ret.gov.au/montarainquiryresponse> at 4 May 2015. 
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through, the Commonwealth government would need to establish effective legal 
arrangements for the relevant companies to abide by.   
Furthermore, it should be noted from the Montara incident that in managing the 
risks posed by oil spills, international engagement is an important consideration.69 In 
this case, the oil spill extended beyond the Australian EEZ into Indonesian and 
Timor-Leste waters.  Indeed, the oil present in Indonesia’s EEZ was almost 94 
kilometres off the coast of Palau Roti Island. The oil was also observed around the 
Joint Petroleum Development Area (JPDA), which Timor Leste and Australia 
established in 2002. Therefore, Australia needed to cooperate with other States which 
were affected by the incident, in addition to ensuring that the measures taken 
accorded with international law.70 
The Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 was 
also criticised by the report noting that the provision could be well implemented by 
the Commonwealth government. Furthermore, the report recommended the 
establishment of an independent regulatory body to oversee the safety of the 
platforms.71 
In late 2010, an Australian Minister proclaimed that the Montara incident 
would not have occurred if PTTEP-AA and the relevant authorities in the Northern 
Territory had done their jobs correctly.72 The Minister also added that the 
Commonwealth government should have accepted the recommendations produced 
by the Commissioner, which included the establishment of a National Offshore 
                                                
69 Cordner, above n 1, 22. 
70 Ibid, 22. 
71 Productivity Commission, ‘Annual Review of Regulatory Burdens on Business: Social and 
Economic Infrastructure Services’, Research Report 2007, 257. 
72 Martin Ferguson, ‘Australian Maritime Digest’, No. 197 1 December 2010, 8.  
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Petroleum Safety and Environmental Management Authority (NOPSEMA) 73, as well 
as the granting of additional powers to the National Oil Pollution and Safety 
Authority (NOPSA). Under the Commissioner’s recommendations, NOPSEMA 
would play a role in regulating the health and safety of personnel, oversee operations 
in Commonwealth offshore areas, manage environment plans and attend to 
administrative matters on a daily basis. These measures would help both the State 
and Federal government regulates issues related to offshore installations.     
In Australia the Commonwealth government is responsible for regulating 
offshore installations beyond the three mile limit. This has been agreed between the 
Commonwealth and the States, and is regulated under the 1979 Offshore 
Constitutional Settlement. Thus, in the Montara field, the Northern Territory 
government had the obligation to ensure that the installation complied with the 
prevailing regulations.    
In responding to the incident which caused damaged to the marine 
environment, the Indonesian government has claimed US$2.4 billion in 
compensation.74  Furthermore, one of the provincial legislative speakers of 
Indonesia, Ibrahim Medah, stated that there are three districts (Rote Ndao, Sabu 
Raijua and Kupang) which have been impacted by the oil spill.75 Fishing 
communities, seaweed farms and pearl farms are some of the sectors which suffer the 
direct impacts of the incident. Furthermore, reports were also produced by the West 
Timor Care Foundation which, in principle, stated that Indonesia has conducted 
research and would provide evidence to prove that seaweed farmers are affected and 
                                                
73 About NOPSEMA, see http://www.nopsema.gov.au/about/ at 10 May 2015. 
74 PTTEP, ‘Montara Lessons Learned’ (July 2012), 22.  
75 Eras Poke, ‘East Nusa Tenggara Fishermen Fear for Future After Oil Spill’ (28 June 2010), see 
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waters around the West Timor Sea region are contaminated as a result of the Montara 
oil spill.76 
PTTEP-AA responded to the claim by stating that there is no verifiable, valid, 
scientific evidence that has been presented to them in supporting the claim made by 
Indonesia and West Timor Care Foundation.77   Furthermore, under Australian law, 
in order to receive compensation, the victim (in this case Indonesia) has the 
responsibility to prove and justify losses caused by the incident. Australia’s position 
in responding the Indonesia claim is similar with the view of PTTEP-AA. 
7.3.3 Dumping of Disused Offshore Installations in Southeast Asia  
The abandonment of platforms at sea causes the release of potentially toxic 
hydrocarbons. That being so, it is imperative that appropriate action be taken towards 
such platforms following their operational phase.78 In some circumstances, operators 
partially dispose of the platforms, removing some parts but leaving other parts on the 
surface of the ocean. It is questionable whether the abandonment or partial removal 
of offshore installations constitutes dumping under international law. Prominent 
instruments governing this issue include the LOSC, the 1972 London Convention on 
the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter79 
(London Convention) and its Protocol, as well as the 1989 IMO Guidelines and 
                                                
76 Lyons, above n 61, 185. 
77 PTTEP Australasia, ‘Fact Sheet: Government of Indonesia Compensation Claim’, 1.  
78 Youna Lyons, ‘The New Offshore Oil and Gas Installation Abandonment Wave and the 
International Rules on Removal and Dumping’ (2014) 29(3) The International Journal of Marine and 
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Standards for the Removal of Offshore Installations and Structures on the 
Continental Shelf and in the Exclusive Economic Zone.80  
The LOSC and the London Convention contain identical definitions of 
‘dumping’. The London Convention, which was produced prior to the LOSC, 
includes within its definition the disposal of waste or any structure at sea. This 
expansive definition was settled upon to address all aspects related to ocean 
dumping. The LOSC attempts to be all-encompassing by embracing the participation 
of the international community, and hence its relevant provisions attempt to 
incorporate dumping regulations from the London Convention. The LOSC and the 
London Convention respectively define dumping as “any deliberate disposal of 
wastes or other matter from vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures 
at sea”, and “any deliberate disposal of platforms or other man-made structures at 
sea”.81 
However, there are exceptions to the general prohibition against dumping 
under the London Convention.82 For example, the convention does not regulate 
disposals which are derived from incidental circumstances or the regular operation of 
sea bed activities, man-made structures or vessels. This is because such activities 
should be regulated by other international instruments. The convention clearly states 
that all disposals at sea fall within its ambit unless stated otherwise.      
Moreover, the London Convention makes it clear that the disposal of offshore 
platforms falls within its scope. However, as the convention uses the phrase 
“deliberate disposal”, some stakeholders have argued that the abandonment of 
                                                
80 IMO Assembly Resolution A.672, (adopted 19 October 1989) 16. Hereinafter referred to as IMO 
Guidelines. 
81 Article 1(5), LOSC and Article 3(1), London Convention. 
82 Lyons, above n 77, 486. 
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platforms falls outside the convention. According to these proponents, the 
convention only applies where there has been deliberate action with respect to the 
disposal of a structure, and thus abandoning the object by leaving it in situ is not 
contrary to the convention.83  
These differing views on the scope of the convention were expressed by the 
Informal Group of Legal Experts on Dumping.84 Some of the participants agreed that 
abandonment does not qualify as dumping under the convention, but is instead 
regulated by the IMO Guidelines and Standards. Other participants saw no difficulty 
in construing the abandonment of structures as dumping in accordance with the 
convention. Thus the legal expert group concluded that the act of abandoning or 
leaving in situ an offshore installation with the intent of disposing of the object 
should be classified as dumping.  
Installations are usually placed at sea for industrial purposes.85 However, 
when the object is no longer being used for its initial purpose and is left in the ocean, 
it could be argued that the installation has been disposed of at sea and should thus be 
categorised as dumping. This act of abandonment accords with the LOSC,86 which 
stipulates that the placement of a man-made object at sea with the purpose of 
disposing of the object constitutes dumping. In other words, if the purpose of the 
placement is for a reason other than disposal, then no dumping has occurred.     
                                                
83 Maria Gavouneli, Pollution from Offshore Installations (Martinus Nijhoff, 1995) 26.   
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The LOSC, in Article 60(3), deals with disused or abandoned installations.87 
It stipulates that in order to ensure the safety of navigation, such installations should 
be removed. However, this should be done in accordance with international standards 
produced by the competent international organisation. Furthermore, to help coastal 
States implement Article 60(3), the IMO produced the 1989 IMO Guidelines and 
Standards. This instrument requires parties to remove installations which are not 
being used, but in some cases non-removal is permitted – for example, where the 
removal would cause damage to the marine environment or affect the safety of 
navigation. Furthermore, the definition of dumping in the London Protocol states that 
dumping includes “any abandonment or toppling at site of platforms or other man-
made structures at sea, for the sole purpose of deliberate disposal”.88 
7.3.3.1 Southeast Asia’s Response to Disused Offshore Installations 
As noted above, Southeast Asia is increasingly becoming an important region in 
terms of offshore oil and gas activities. Nonetheless, the establishment and regulation 
of these activities trail behind other parts of the world, such as the Gulf of Mexico, 
the Persian Gulf and the North Sea. Unfortunately, Southeast Asia is yet to establish 
a robust and comprehensive legal framework for the decommissioning of offshore oil 
and gas installations. However, as similar problems have been faced by States in the 
aforementioned areas, unique opportunities exist for Southeast Asian states to learn 
from past struggles and challenges.89 
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A decommissioning incident which took place in the North Sea is instructive 
in this regard.90 Full removal was the measure taken for decommissioning of the 
disused installations. By taking this measure, States in Southeast Asia could comply 
with the provisions of the LOSC, particularly with regard to the protection of the 
marine environment. One of the steps that could be taken in implementing this idea is 
the establishment of a regional framework to formulate guidelines on the 
decommissioning of disused installations. 
As there is no clear agreement on decommissioning, the State practice in the 
region varies according to the operator’s internal standards and any applicable 
domestic laws. Decommissioning itself involves a set of operations, the precise 
details of which depend upon the decommissioning plan being undertaken. These 
operations may include well capping and the abandonment of pipelines, as well as 
the removal of cuttings, the topside, and the jacket of the platform (among other 
processes). There are sets of rules governing the decommissioning of disused 
installations at the international level. These rules include the 1989 IMO Guidelines 
and Standards for the Removal of Offshore Installations and Structures, as well as 
the London Convention.  
A large number of offshore installations have been constructed in Southeast 
Asia’s maritime areas. Almost 1400 offshore facilities are located across the water of 
Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand alone.91 However, these platforms have 
reached a state of maturity and need to be decommissioned. Indeed, more than half 
of the platforms in the region are over 20 years old and need to be withdrawn. Even 
so, the majority of Southeast Asian States appear unwilling to follow through with 
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this course of action. Disused offshore oil and gas installations have the potential to 
create safety of navigation problems. This is because in addition to aging 
installations being left in situ, States are continuously building new installations in 
their respective maritime areas, the effect of which is a narrowing of navigational 
lanes. Considering the number of ships that traverse Southeast Asian waterways, this 
situation is increasingly hazardous.  
Following the termination of an oil operator’s contract, offshore installations 
tend to remain under the control of coastal States. Therefore, as argued by Lyons, it 
is incumbent upon coastal States to take responsibility for these aged installations. 
The most appropriate use for the platforms has been the subject of much debate. 
Indeed, the plethora of views that have been expressed appear to stem from a 
misinterpretation of the applicable international law, as well as loopholes in 
prevailing international instruments.92   
7.3.3.2 Different Treatments of Disused Installations 
There are different opinions on the treatment of disused offshore installations. One 
popular view is that disused installations should be removed completely and brought 
ashore. Proponents of this view have been influenced by the European interpretation 
of relevant LOSC provisions. Another instrument which lends credence to this 
conclusion is the 1989 Guidelines and Standards for the Removal of Offshore 
Installations adopted by the IMO. The case study that best illustrates this view is the 
1995 Brent Spar incident.93  
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This incident was sparked by Greenpeace activists occupying the Brent Spar 
platform in an effort to compel Shell (the oil operator) to remove its oil platform. 
Shell, on the other hand, had planned for the deep-water disposal of the installation. 
However, Greenpeace opposed this course of action on environmental grounds, and 
was urging Shell to completely remove the platform from the sea bed. Following 
intense international pressure, Shell dispensed with its original plan and brought the 
platform ashore.  
Another alternative to the full removal of disused platforms is to turn them 
into artificial reefs.94 However, this suggestion has come under opposition by the 
intergovernmental organisation charged with the protection of the marine 
environment in the Northeast Atlantic95 (OSPAR), due to the requirement that 
artificial reefs be composed of virgin materials. Furthermore, OSPAR has adopted 
regulations on the prevention and elimination of pollution from offshore sources96 – 
regulations which sit uneasily with such facilities being abandoned at sea. 
7.3.3.3 International Regime on Disused Offshore Installations in the Region 
The LOSC has been ratified by all States in Southeast Asia which engage in 
significant offshore oil and gas activities. The convention clearly states that in order 
to ensure safety of navigation, contracting parties must remove disused installations 
from their exclusive economic zone. Furthermore, following the removal of the 
installation, the LOSC requires coastal States to publicise the new location of the 
installation. In this context, the LOSC makes reference to generally accepted 
                                                
94 Ibid, 2. 
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international standards governing disused facilities97, namely, IMO Guidelines. In 
principle, these guidelines recommend that States conduct an evaluation on the 
treatment of disused offshore oil platforms. Indeed, it is for this reason that the 
approach favours a case-by-case evaluation; one which considers a number of factors 
including freedom of navigation, risks to the marine environment, the costs involved 
in removing the facility, as well as the technical feasibility of the removal.98 
The situation in Southeast Asia is quite different from other parts of the 
world. From a regional perspective, Southeast Asia does not have uniform 
regulations governing the treatment of disused offshore oil platforms.  As mentioned 
earlier, most of the installations in the region are quite old and will cease to operate 
in the near future. However, the fact that these platforms weigh in the vicinity of 
4,000 tons in air, and are located in water less than 75 meters deep, has influenced 
recommendations regarding their treatment post-decommissioning.99 As complete 
removal of the platforms would be costly and technically infeasible, it has been 
suggested that they remain in situ. Furthermore, as most of the platforms in Southeast 
Asia are located within the territorial sea of littoral States, the relevant LOSC 
provisions cannot be invoked to regulate their removal. This is because States 
possess a maximum level of jurisdiction over their territorial sea and archipelagic 
waters. Leaving the aged installations in their current positions to serve as artificial 
reefs is permitted under IMO Guidelines, provided such action “do[es] not cause 
unjustifiable interference with other uses of the sea”.100  
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However, disused platforms which are left in the sea without any provision 
being made for the subsequent treatment may be considered ocean dumping. Indeed, 
the 1989 IMO Guidelines contain a provision to this effect - one which is applicable 
both in the territorial sea the exclusive economic zone.  Both the LOSC and the 
London Convention, support this view.101 According to the LOSC, approval from the 
competent authorities of the coastal State is required prior to any such disposal. 
Moreover, if there are national laws in place, they should also be taken into 
consideration and abided by.102  
Although all States in Southeast Asia have ratified the LOSC, most of them 
have not yet ratified the London Convention. However, this convention should also 
be taken into consideration, as it is widely accepted as an international regulation or 
‘global rule and standard’ on dumping, as well as having been established before the 
LOSC.  
In light of the above discussion, states need to exercise caution when granting 
permission for the disposal of offshore facilities. Indeed, they should evaluate and 
consider several important factors including other uses of the sea, the location of the 
dumping, as well as the potential impact of pollution from the facility. It is ill-
advised for foreign operators to seek dumping approval from littoral states which 
have minimal law enforcement measures in place.103 Conversely, an operator’s 
corporate image would likely be enhanced if it were to create new uses for disused 
platforms. As neither LOSC nor the London Convention on Dumping prohibits new 
uses for disused platforms, operators have a unique opportunity to act in a way that is 
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economically, environmentally and socially responsible. There are several novel uses 
for disused offshore oil and gas platforms, including artificial reefs, fisheries 
management infrastructure, aquaculture and marine tourism. The process by which a 
disused platform serves as an artificial reef for fisheries is known as ‘rigs-to-reefs’104. 
Even so, the rigs-to-reefs idea has not received a positive response from non-
governmental organisations such as Greenpeace105. These organisations have insisted 
that once a platform is not in use, it is the responsibility of the operator or the coastal 
state to remove it from the sea. The socio-economic advantages of the rigs-to-reefs 
concept has also been denied by these organisations, with the complete removal of 
the installation being touted as the most sensible approach. In contrast, the United 
States government has responded positively to the program, and has established a 
rigs-to-reefs regime in the Gulf of Mexico and in California106. 
7.3.3.4 Rigs-to-Reefs 
There are two main theories on the rigs-to-reefs regime. The first has been 
called the ‘aggregation’ theory and propounds that artificial reefs attract fish, 
allowing them to converge on a common site. This view argues that aggregation 
facilitates the protection of fish species and allows for improved fisheries 
management. The downside to this theory, however, is that fish are displaced from 
other sea areas to the location of the artificial reef.107     
The second theory is known as the ‘production’ theory which “refers to the 
creation of new life on [the] artificial reef”.108 This view argues that the existence of 
                                                
104 Ibid, 4. 
105 Ibid, 4. 
106 Ibid, 4. 
107 Ibid, 4. 
108 Ibid, 4. 
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the reef inhibits the existence of marine life at the location of the reef. If the reef is 
removed, then there is a chance for new marine life to inhabit the area. Both theories 
have been scientifically validated, with researches asserting that, depending upon the 
location of the reef, ‘aggregation’ as well as the prevention of ‘production’ may 
occur. 
International law does not object to rigs-to-reefs, as long as the goal is to 
enhance fisheries management109 Furthermore, it is a settled principle of international 
law that coastal States have the right to reuse oil and gas installations in their 
respective territorial waters and exclusive economic zone. In circumstances where an 
artificial reef does not have a direct link to fisheries, but nonetheless aims to protect 
an endangered marine habitat, a coastal State will still be acting in accordance with 
the LOSC. Moreover, this view is supported by the Convention on Biological 
Diversity and the Ramsar Convention on the Protection of Wetlands of International 
Importance, both of which have been ratified by most oil-producing countries in 
Southeast Asia.110 
It is important to note, however, that a rigs-to-reefs regime must have a 
genuine purpose - that is, a coastal State has to be able to create a new use for the 
disposed installation. In order to prove this intention, and thus demonstrate that the 
measures taken in respect of the facility are genuine, a coastal state has to have 
supporting scientific documents. A monitoring and evaluation process should also be 
put in place to safeguard against environmental risks. If the above requirements are 
not satisfied, the status of ‘artificial reef’ may not be granted to the facility, and as 
such the disposal may be considered illegal dumping.   
                                                
109 Ibid, 4. 
110 Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature 5 June 1992, 1760 UNTS 79 (entered into 
force 12 October 2014).  
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Efforts have been made to formulate a set of rules governing oil and gas 
activities at the international level. However, the initiative is yet to come up with a 
framework that has global appeal. The reason for this is that every region has its own 
approach to offshore oil and gas activities, and thus there are legal gaps in the 
existing provisions which regulate such activities.111  
For instance, with respect to well-plugging and the abandonment of offshore 
oil installations, any action taken by a well operator would be informed by best 
industry practice, which in turn has to accord with the domestic law of the state 
concerned.112 External States would certainly play a role if the well-plugging or 
abandonment were to cause pollution which spreads to neighbouring States (and thus 
any action taken would fall within the affected States’ respective jurisdiction). 
Furthermore, the State which owns the well would be responsible to pay or otherwise 
provide suitable compensation to states affected by the pollution. Indeed, as pollution 
from disused installations has the capacity to harm the marine environment, 
compensation would need to be provided to repair any damage caused. 
Another issue which has not been addressed under the existing framework is 
the decommissioning of pipelines.113 The 1996 Protocol to the London Convention 
does not contain any provisions on the abandonment of pipelines, and therefore 
regulation of this issue falls to the domestic law of coastal States. Although the 
LOSC contains a provision dealing with the jurisdiction of pipelines (the substance of 
which is mirrored in the 1996 Protocol to the London Convention), the provision 
does not regulate the issue of abandonment of such pipelines.  
                                                
111 Lyons, above n 92, 5. 
112 Ibid, 5. 
113 Ibid, 5. 
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Interestingly, the IMO Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
(MARPOL),114  has regulated drill cuttings and other solid waste from offshore oil 
and gas activities since its entry into force. The downside to this instrument is that it 
does not regulate the decommissioning of disused platforms. However, once offshore 
oil and gas activities cause trans-boundary pollution, then irrespective of whether the 
facility is in its production stage or is disused, the state conducting the activity is 
responsible to pay compensation for any damage caused.115  
7.4 International Legal framework on Offshore Oil and Gas 
 
For the establishment of a unified standard on offshore oil and gas activities, States 
in Southeast Asia would need to adopt or accede to relevant international 
instruments. A unified standard would benefit industries in the region in that a clear, 
common and consistent approach would facilitate cooperation and lead to an 
enhanced understanding of the issues involved. Therefore, the adoption of key 
conventions should be a priority for States in the region.116  
This section will discuss the various international legal instruments governing 
marine pollution caused by offshore oil and gas activities including the LOSC, 
MARPOL, the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response 
and Cooperation117 (OPRC Convention), the 1989 IMO Guidelines and Standards, 
the SUA Convention and Protocols, ISPS Code, as well as the London Convention 
                                                
114 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973 and the 1978 Protocol, 
opened for signature 17 February 1978 (entered into force 2 October 1983) 17 ILM 246. Hereinafter 
referred to as MARPOL. 
115 Lyons, above n 92, 5. 
116 Cordner, above n 1,72. 
117 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation, opened for 
signature 30 November 1990, (entered into force 13 May 1995). Hereinafter referred to as OPRC 
Convention. 
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and its Protocol. Furthermore, this section evaluates the risk management approach 
to offshore oil and gas security and safety.  
7.4.1 Law of the Sea Convention 
The location and nationality of an offshore platform determines the legal framework 
which applies to it.118 Jurisdictional control over the platform also depends upon the 
maritime zone in which the platform resides. According to the LOSC, coastal States 
have jurisdiction over different zones of the ocean. For example, coastal States have 
exclusive and absolute rights within their internal waters. These rights persist in the 
territorial sea, except for the right of innocent passage which is given to foreign 
vessels.119  
Therefore, the domestic laws of a State apply to those offshore platforms 
located in the internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea of the state. This 
regulatory power also extends to offshore platforms in the EEZ and continental 
shelf.120 Indeed, the jurisdictional control of a State over artificial islands and other 
installations is similar in both of these maritime zones. Under the LOSC, States are 
given the authority to conduct several activities within the EEZ, including “(a) the 
establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures; (b) marine 
scientific research; [and] (c). the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment.”121 Furthermore, Article 60 of the LOSC allows States to construct and 
to authorise and regulate the construction, operation and use of “(a) artificial islands; 
(b) installations and structures for the purposes provided for in article 56 and other 
                                                
118 Kindt, above n 6, 410. 
119 Article 2(1), LOSC. 
120 Articles 80 and 79(4), LOSC. 
121 Article 56(1)(b), LOSC. 
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economic purposes; [and] (c) installations and structures which may interfere with 
the exercise of the rights of the coastal State in the zone.”122  
The practical effect of Article 60 of the LOSC is that States are given control 
over artificial islands and installations in the EEZ.123 Thus, States are able to exercise 
their economic rights in this particular maritime zone. Nonetheless, before 
establishing an offshore platform, coastal States are required to provide notice of 
their construction plans in order to avoid navigational problems.124 In addition, those 
platforms which are disused or abandoned should be decommissioned.125   
The establishment of offshore platforms is prohibited in sea lanes which are 
used for international navigation.126 Moreover, the establishment of the platform 
needs to accord with international provisions on the marine environment. In 
particular, the construction of such platforms should preserve and protect the marine 
environment from being polluted. States are obliged to comply with the provisions in 
Part XII Section I of the LOSC, which makes it incumbent upon States to: (a) protect 
and preserve the marine environment.127 Furthermore, Article 194 LOSC stated that 
States shall:  
(a) take, individually or jointly as appropriate, all measures consistent with 
this Convention that are necessary to prevent, reduce and control pollution of 
the marine environment from any source, using for this purpose the best 
practical means at their disposal and in accordance with their capabilities; 
[and] (b) take all measures necessary to ensure that activities under their 
jurisdiction or control are so conducted as not to cause damage by pollution 
to other States and their environment.128 
 
                                                
122 Article 60(1), LOSC. 
123 Bateman, above n 29, 412. 
124 Article 60(3), LOSC. 
125 Article 60(3), LOSC. 
126 Article 60(7), LOSC. 
127 Article 192, LOSC.  
128 Article 194, LOSC. 
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Furthermore, when implementing anti-pollution measures, States need to 
ensure that their activities do not transfer pollution from one place to another or from 
one form to another. Article 194(3)(c)129 and (d)130 regulates the obligation of States 
to prevent pollution that may arise from offshore platforms, particularly with regard 
to the exploitation of resources.  
 
The marine environment can also be affected by intentional pollution caused 
by activities related to offshore platforms.131 Such activities are regulated in LOSC 
provisions on dumping in Article 210(1) and (2).132 These provisions require States 
to conduct measures and adopt rules relating to the reduction, control and prevention 
of pollution by dumping. Furthermore, States are obliged to monitor their industries 
to ensure they comply with prevailing legal frameworks and fulfil the obligations 
stipulated in the Article. Enforcement measures in relation to dumping activities are 
covered in Article 216 of the LOSC.133 Under this provision, both the LOSC and 
international standards produced by competent international organisations should be 
ratified by States so that laws and regulations on the prevention, reduction and 
control of pollution of the marine environment can be enforced:  
(a) by the coastal State with regard to dumping within its territorial sea or its 
exclusive economic zone or onto its continental shelf; (b) by the flag State with 
regard to vessels flying its flag or vessels or aircraft of its registry; [and] (c) by any 
State with regard to acts of loading of wastes or other matter occurring within its 
territory or at its off-shore terminal.134  
 
                                                
129 Article 194(3)(c), LOSC. 
130 Article 194(3)(d), LOSC. 
131 Kindt, above n 6, 414. 
132 Article 210(1) and (2), LOSC. 
133 Article 216, LOSC. 
134 Article 216(1)(a)-(c), LOSC. 
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Provisions governing offshore installations at the regional level are also 
important.135 Thus, legally binding frameworks in the forms of agreements or treaties 
are necessary in order to comprehensively address the issue of marine pollution, 
particularly when it originates from offshore oil or gas exploration. What makes 
regional institutions significant is that they have an international character (in the 
sense that they consist of more than one State), while retaining a strong national 
outlook in terms of enforcement action.  While regional provisions would be 
applicable for States when governing offshore installations in their EEZ, the national 
legislation of the particular State would still apply in maritime zones such as internal 
waters and the territorial sea. 
The Intergovernmental Conference on the Convention on Civil Liability for 
Oil Pollution Damage from Offshore Operations is one example of a regional 
arrangement on offshore activities. This conference, which was held in London 
between 1975 and 1976, produced the Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage Resulting from Exploration for and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral 
Resources, which deals with issues related to oil pollution damage from offshore 
activities.136 Although the content of the convention is limited, it could be used as a 
positive example for states in Southeast Asia to establish a regional framework 
governing offshore activities.137 
7.4.2 MARPOL 
The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution by Ships (MARPOL) 
identifies floating crafts and fixed or floating platforms as ships. Thus, this 
                                                
135 Kindt, above n 6, 416. 
136 Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from Exploration for and 
Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources, adopted in London on 1 May 1977. 
137 Kindt, above n 6, 417.  
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framework is relevant in addressing pollution arising from offshore platforms.138  
There are other potentially relevant IMO instruments such as the International 
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC Convention)139, and 
the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (FUND Convention)140, but are not 
discussed in this thesis. There are limitations to the implementation of MARPOL. For 
example, the definition of ‘discharge’ in Article 2(3)(b) of the convention excludes 
dumping (within the meaning of the Convention on the Prevention of Marine 
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter), as well as the spread or release 
of poisonous substances from the exploration and exploitation of offshore platforms, 
particularly in connection with the processing of seabed mineral resources.141   
However, MARPOL also contains provisions on the prevention of oil 
pollution which would apply to ‘ships’ (including offshore platforms). One such 
provision can be found in Annex I and states that “the discharge into the sea of oil or 
oily mixture [is] prohibited except when the oil content of the discharge without 
dilution does not exceed 15 ppm”.142 However, in Southeast Asia not every State has 
adopted MARPOL, and thus the practical application of the provision is limited Table  
31 shows that only Laos, Malaysia and Timor Leste have not yet acceded to 
MARPOL. 
 
                                                
138 Cheser Brown, ‘International Environmental Law in the Regulation of Offshore Installations and 
Seabed Activities: The Case for a South Pacific Regional Protocol’ (1998) 17 Australian Mining & 
Petroleum Law Journal 109, 121.  
139 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, opened for signature 31 
December 1970, 973 UNTS 3 (entered into force 19 June 1975). 
140 International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil 
Pollution Damage opened for signature until 31 December 1972, 1110 UNTS 57 (entered into force 
16 October 1978). 
141 Article 2(3)(b), MARPOL.   
142 Annex 1 reg. 21(c), MARPOL. 
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 MARPOL 73/78 
(Annex I/II) 
Brunei 
Darussalam 
ü 
Cambodia ü 
Indonesia ü 
Laos x 
Malaysia x 
Myanmar ü 
Philippines ü 
Singapore ü 
Thailand  ü 
Vietnam ü 
Timor Leste x 
 
Legend: ü = acceded, x = has not acceded 
Table 31: Accession Status of MARPOL in Southeast Asia143 
 
7.4.3 OPRC Convention 
Those states which are highly dependent on resources found in the marine 
environment should be able to mount an adequate response if an oil spill were to take 
place. To this end, the international community (within the framework of the IMO) 
drafted the OPRC Convention between 1989 and 1990. Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand are the only Southeast Asian countries that have 
acceded to OPRC 1990, as illustrated in Table 32. 
The 1989 Exxon Valdez disaster was the impetus for the OPRC Convention. 
In the Exxon incident, ten million gallons of oil spilled into Prince William Sound, 
Alaska, damaging the area’s marine environment.144 Thus, the preamble to the 
convention expressly recognises the threat posed to the marine environment by oil 
                                                
143 Accession Status of MARPOL in Southeast Asia, see  
 http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx, at 4th May 2015. 
144 Maria Gavouneli, Pollution from Offshore Installations (Martinus Nijhoff, 1995) 121.  
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pollution incidents (such as those involving offshore platforms, oil handling 
facilities, ships, sea ports etc.). Composed of numerous provisions from the LOSC, as 
well as those from the IMO framework, the convention was adopted in late 1990 and 
entered into force in 1995. 
Under the convention, member States are obliged to take necessary steps to 
prepare for, and respond to, oil pollution incidents that damage the marine 
environment.145 Furthermore, the convention requires States to ensure that operators 
of offshore units within their jurisdiction have emergency plans in place for oil 
pollution, and that these plans have been approved by the relevant State authority.146  
Facilitating international cooperation and mutual legal assistance to prevent 
major oil pollution incidents forms the main objective of the convention. To promote 
both the ratification and implementation of the convention among developing States, 
the OPRC Working Group was created in 1991 by the IMO’s Marine Environment 
Protection Committee (MEPC). The working group is composed of experts from the 
IMO, intergovernmental organisations and non-governmental organisations. The 
working group seeks to enhance cooperation between relevant institutions, encourage 
states to combat marine pollution, as well as promote regional action in order to 
prevent and control oil pollution incidents.       
The OPRC Convention in Article 6 recognises the importance for States to 
cooperate at the regional level so that a national system capable of responding to oil 
pollution incidents is established.147 Regional arrangements that deal with marine 
pollution incidents have been supported by several international institutions, such as 
                                                
145 Article 1(1), OPRC. 
146 Brown, above n 139, 122. 
147 Article 6, OPRC. 
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the IMO and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).148 Capacity 
building, emergency responses and collective planning are among the issues being 
discussed and actioned by participating regional and international institutions.149 
Article 6 of the OPRC Convention further requires member States to nominate a 
focal point and establish a national contingency plan for responding promptly and 
effectively to oil pollution incidents. Through regional arrangements, the convention 
is confident that States will be able to comply with its requirements, which include 
the “a minimum level of pre-positioned oil spill combating equipment; a programme 
of exercises for oil pollution response organizations; training programmes for 
relevant personnel; a mechanism or arrangement to co-ordinate the response to an oil 
pollution incident, and capabilities to mobilise the necessary resources.” 150  
For developing States, financial and technical resources from other States (as 
well as institutional support) are needed to facilitate their ability to implement the 
convention. Indeed, the capabilities of a State will certainly affect its level of 
involvement in the convention. Certain regions are not able to implement the 
convention effectively because they do not have adequate support from external 
actors. Nonetheless, there are other regions where regional and bilateral 
arrangements govern marine pollution, particularly with regard to preparing and 
responding to oil pollution incidents. A prominent example of this is the Barcelona 
Convention, which operates in the Mediterranean and has in excess of 15 members. 
Regional activities involving developed and developing states (as well as the 
European Commission), are being funded under this arrangement. Furthermore, as a 
                                                
148 About UNEP, see http://www.unep.org/about/ at 10 May 2015. 
149 Oleg Khalimonov, ‘Framework for co-operation and recent IMO activities in preventing and 
managing marine pollution’ (1999) 3 Singapore Journal of International and Comparative Law 370, 
378. 
150 Article 6(2), OPRC. 
 
 
305 
 
result of the Mediterranean Action Plan, both the financial and institutional 
framework of the institution is being supported.151 Indeed, the trust fund of the 
institution is funded by States including Italy, France and Spain, as well as the 
European Commission.  
A legal framework for the implementation of the Regional Marine Pollution 
Emergency Response Centre152 (REMPEC) is present in the Mediterranean. This 
framework consists of the Barcelona Convention and the Protocol Concerning Co-
operation in Combating Pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by Oil and Other 
Harmful Substances in Cases of Emergency. The institution is active in 
implementing the convention and protocol in numerous ways, such as providing 
focal points, informing regional simulation models, providing expert lists and data 
banks, as well as assisting States prepare and improve their contingency plans 
(among other things).153 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
151 Khalimonov, above n 150, 378 
152 About REMPEC, see http://www.rempec.org/rempec.asp?pgeVisit=New&theID=6 at 10 May 
2015. 
153 Khalimonov, above n 150, 380. 
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 OPRC 1990 
Brunei 
Darussalam 
x 
Cambodia x 
Indonesia ü 
Laos x 
Malaysia ü 
Myanmar x 
Philippines ü 
Singapore ü 
Thailand  ü 
Vietnam x 
Timor Leste x 
 
Legend: ü = acceded, x = has not acceded 
Table 32: Accession Status of OPRC 1990 in Southeast Asia154 
7.4.4 The 1989 IMO Guidelines and Standards Regulating treatments of light 
platforms in shallow waters 
The LOSC in Article 60(3) provides that a “competent international organization” 
may create “generally accepted international standards” regarding artificial islands, 
installations and structures.155 The competent organisation in this case is the IMO, 
and the relevant international standards comprise the 1989 IMO Guidelines and 
Standards for the Removal of Offshore Installations and Structures on the 
Continental Shelf and in the Exclusive Economic Zone. These guidelines and 
standards show a keen awareness by the IMO that the growing number of aging oil 
platforms has the capacity to create serious environmental problems if not hastily 
addressed.156 With regard to Southeast Asia, these guidelines and standards are 
applicable to those platforms which are found in shallow water close to the shore. 
                                                
154 Accession Status of OPRC 1990 in Southeast Asia, see  
 http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx, at 4th May 2015. 
155 Article 60(3), LOSC.  
156 G.C. Kasoulides, ‘Removal of offshore platforms and the development of international standards’ 
(1990) 14 Marine Policy 84. 
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The provisions contained in the 1989 IMO Guidelines and Standards differ 
somewhat from other international law provisions, such as those in the 1958 Geneva 
Convention on the Continental Shelf, as well as Article 60 of the LOSC.157 The latter 
provisions clearly state that the full removal of offshore oil and gas installations is 
the best treatment for disused facilities. On the other hand, the IMO provisions allow 
coastal States (as well as oil and gas operators), to decide the most appropriate 
treatment for aging offshore oil and gas installations on a case-by-case basis. These 
guidelines and standards thus provide for the partial removal of the installations, 
enabling some parts of the facility to be left in situ on the sea surface. It is important 
to note, however, that in certain circumstances full removal is an option supported by 
this set of provisions. In accordance with section 3.1 of the IMO Guidelines,158 small 
installations weighing 4,000 tons or less and located in shallow water 75 meters deep 
or less should be fully removed. There are, however, several qualifications to this 
general rule. Small offshore installations located in shallow water may only be 
partially removed if they meet one of the following criteria: (i) the entire removal of 
the installation is not technically possible; (ii) the removal would involve extreme 
cost, or (iii) the removal would involve unacceptable risks to personnel or to the 
marine environment.159     
These exceptions are derived from decommissioning cases of offshore 
installations in the North Sea.160 Indeed, there have been debates on the matter 
which, in principle, can be divided into two main arguments. The first argument is 
that partial removal should be allowed due to the fact that some installations are too 
                                                
157 Article 60, LOSC. 
158 Section 3.1, IMO Guidelines. 
159 Article 3.5, IMO Guidelines.  
160 Lyons, above n 7,5. 
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large and heavy, making full removal very costly. This particular view enjoys the 
support of some coastal States, particularly those eager to bolster the development of 
industries, and in particular offshore oil and gas industries. The second argument, 
which calls for the full removal of oil and gas facilities, has the support of 
environmentalists and coastal States with a stake in commercial fisheries. 
However, the arguments canvassed above are not particularly relevant in 
Southeast Asia, where the vast majority of platforms are located in shallow waters 
and are relatively small and light.161 Thus, the full removal of these platforms is 
feasible and should be encouraged. Nonetheless, the high costs associated with such 
removal means that, in some circumstances, the financial outlay overshadows the 
benefits. It should be noted, however, that where an aging installation is unstable and 
may impact the safety of navigation, full removal is the only option.  
 According to the 1989 IMO Guidelines and Standards, the risk to personnel 
also needs to be borne in mind when considering whether to fully remove a platform. 
If the risk is too high, then full removal of the installation is not permitted. Therefore, 
looking at the conditions in Southeast Asia, one could argue that the 1989 IMO 
Guidelines and Standards do not fully suit the unique characteristics of disused 
installations in the region.162     
7.4.4.1 Application of the 1989 IMO Guidelines and Standards in the Region  
Application of the IMO Guidelines and Standards on offshore oil and gas activities 
in Southeast Asia can be assessed from different perspectives. Furthermore, its 
                                                
161 OPL ‘World Offshore Field Development Guide Database’ (2010) 2 Asia, India, Australasia & Far 
East 1, 1-10. 
162 Lyons, above n 7, 6. 
 
 
309 
 
relationship with other international binding instruments needs to be considered 
when assessing the effectiveness of its implementation in the region.  
7.4.4.1.1 LOSC and the 1989 IMO Guidelines and Standards 
The 1989 IMO Guidelines and Standards have generally been viewed as an 
extension of LOSC Article 60(3).163 Indeed, LOSC provisions regulating pollution 
derived from seabed activities are considered to be the basis for these guidelines and 
standards. The relevant provisions in the LOSC provide that a coastal State has an 
obligation to implement any international framework regulating pollution from oil 
and gas activities, particularly around the seabed area. Moreover, the LOSC 
encourages States to establish common platforms for the treatment of such pollution 
through diplomatic ties and engagement in relevant international networks and 
organisations.164   
Articles 210 and 214 of the LOSC are enlivened when dumping activities 
occur. For coastal States to implement these provisions, they first have to adopt the 
international framework on dumping, as well as establish national laws specifying 
measures to prevent and reduce marine pollution.165 Therefore, both regional and 
national frameworks governing pollution from seabed activities are important in 
keeping the marine environment healthy and thriving.    
7.4.4.1.2 Limitations of the 1989 IMO Guidelines and Standards  
As previously mentioned, LOSC Article 60(3), which seeks to regulate the treatment 
of disused offshore oil and gas platforms, provided the impetus for the 1989 IMO 
                                                
163 Article 60 (3), LOSC. 
164 Article 208(5), LOSC.    
165 Articles 210 and 214, LOSC. 
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Guidelines and Standards.166 According to Article 60(3), such platforms should be 
removed in accordance with international standards established by relevant 
international organisations to ensure safety of navigation.167 The IMO Guidelines and 
Standards expand on this point, stating that before a platform is removed, coastal 
States should consider other factors such as the protection of the marine 
environment, fisheries, as well as the sustainability of other marine life.  
As these guidelines and standards are derived from Article 60(3) of the 
LOSC, they should be construed in light of the main aim of the Article. In this regard, 
the phrase “safety of navigation” takes on special significance, as it represents the 
main goal of removing platforms and installations. Therefore, when debates arise on 
the correct interpretation of the guidelines and standards, it is important to refer to 
the overarching objective of Article 60(3) of LOSC in order to properly construe the 
provision(s) in issue.168   
 
 
7.4.4.1.3 Accepted International Standards  
The 1989 IMO Guidelines and Standards are considered as generally accepted 
international standards.169 Another point to consider is that LOSC Article 60 enables 
coastal States to take into account prevailing international standards.170 Thus, the 
article allows for flexibility in its implementation, allowing States to adopt relevant 
provisions produced by competent international organisations. Indeed, the 
                                                
166 Lyons, above n 7, 7. 
167 Article 60(3), LOSC. 
168 P. Peters, A.H.A. Soons and L.A. Zima, ‘Removal of installations in the exclusive economic zone’ 
(1984) 15 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 167, 188. 
169 Bernard H Oxman, ‘The duty to respect generally accepted international standards’ (1991) 24 New 
York University  Journal of International Law and Politics 109, 121-139. 
170 Article 60, LOSC. 
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application of Article 60 can be seen in the guidelines and standards produced by the 
IMO. In the third part of these guidelines and standards, the IMO has included more 
stringent provisions for the removal of disused installations located in shallow water 
which are lightweight.171 Furthermore, the guidelines and standards contain strict 
provisions on pollution caused by dumping and seabed activities.   
7.4.5 London Convention and its Protocol  
The London Convention and its Protocol aim to control pollution of the marine 
environment by dumping. Furthermore, the provisions of the convention require 
States to take necessary measures to prevent marine pollution caused by the dumping 
of water and other materials.172 Even so, the convention has its limitations, such as 
the exclusion of dumping “derived from the normal operation of vessels, aircraft, 
platforms or other man-made structures at sea and their equipment”.173 The 
convention also excludes the disposal of materials as a result of the exploitation of 
sea-bed mineral resources (and the associated offshore processing of such resources). 
Thus, only the disposal of disused offshore oil platforms and unwanted materials 
arising from operations on these offshore platforms are covered by the convention.174 
Even though the London Convention and its Protocol are significant in preventing 
marine pollution caused by dumping, nonetheless, among the Southeast Asian States 
only the Philippines has acceded to them as shown in Table 33. 
 
 
                                                
171 IMO Guidelines and Standards 1989, section 3(1).   
172 International Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other 
Matter, opened for signature 13 November 1972 (entered into force 30 August 1975), Article 1. 
173 Article 4(b)(i), London Convention. 
174 Brown, above n 139, 122. 
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 London 
Convention 1972 
London  
Protocol 1996 
Brunei 
Darussalam 
x x 
Cambodia x x 
Indonesia x x 
Laos x x 
Malaysia x x 
Myanmar x x 
Philippines ü ü 
Singapore x x 
Thailand  x x 
Vietnam x x 
Timor Leste x x 
 
Legend: ü = Contracting States, x = Non- Contracting States. 
Table 33: Status of London Convention and Protocol in Southeast Asia175 
 
7.4.5.1 London Convention  
The London Convention regulates dumping, including the disposal of disused oil and 
gas platforms. According to the convention, the act of disposing of offshore oil and 
gas installations at sea constitutes dumping.176 Specifically, Annex II (which is also 
known as the ‘grey list’), deals with the disposal of platforms and other man-made 
structures. Importantly, disposal at sea is not always prohibited, with the convention 
allowing for disposals which have been permitted by authorised bodies. For a State 
to receive a dumping permit from the relevant authority, it must progress through 
several stages, including a pre-screening assessment of the disused waste, an impact 
study of the waste on the environment, as well as an evaluation of the unique features 
of the dumping site.177     
                                                
175 Status of Conventions, see 
  http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx at 22 October 
2015. 
176 Article 3(1)(a)(ii), London Convention.   
177 Article 4(1)(b), Annex 2(b) and Article 6(1)(a), London Convention.   
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There have been debates over the term “deliberate disposal at sea”, which 
forms the main focus of this convention.178 One view is that the convention does not 
cover the on-site abandonment of disused offshore platforms by States. The 
argument raised is that since there has been no movement of the platform from its 
original location to the disposal site, the convention’s requirement of a “deliberate 
disposal” has not been satisfied, and therefore the convention cannot be enforced.179  
However, another approach, which has drawn wide support, is that the act of leaving 
the disused installation in situ is a conscious decision to dump. Indeed, this view was 
agreed upon at the thirteenth consultative meeting of the Contracting Parties to the 
London Convention, and informs the application of the convention, especially with 
respect to abandoned or disused offshore oil and gas platforms.180 
7.4.5.2 1996 Protocol to the London Convention and Guidelines  
The 1996 Protocol to the London Convention and Guidelines was adopted as a result 
of a series of discussion and debates, particularly after the introduction of the 1989 
IMO Guidelines and Standards. The protocol and guidelines specifically regulate the 
following: 
a. The deliberate abandonment or toppling of platforms and other man-made 
structures at their original location for the purpose of deliberate disposal. This 
provision is contained in the 1996 Protocol. Furthermore, other provisions 
such as the ‘polluter pays principle’ and the precautionary approach have 
been adopted in this protocol;181  
                                                
178 Lyons, above n 7, 8. 
179 Gavouneli, above n 145. 26. 
180 IMO, The First Decade and Beyond, The London Convention (1991), 282. 
181 Articles 3(1) and 3(2), 1996 London Protocol.   
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b. Before a disposal is approved, the document provides guidelines for waste 
assessment. These guidelines cover dumping site selection, an approach for 
carrying out waste prevention audits, as well as waste management 
options;182 and  
c. Man-made structures at sea, including offshore oil and gas platforms, are 
assessed under a specific guideline.183 
Even though the introduction of 1996 Protocol has heralded a different 
approach towards dumping, the main principle of the London Convention still 
prevails – that is, that dumping is only permitted if a State has received prior 
authorisation from a body appointed under the convention. Importantly, the 1996 
Protocol has brought a substantial change in the way waste assessments are carried 
out – a change which is being implemented at the national level.  
Other than the precautionary approach and the polluter pays principle, the 
guidelines regulate other practices such as waste management options, the 
description and characterisation of waste, as well as waste prevention audits.  There 
is also a guideline related to the placement of artificial reefs, which was produced by 
United Nations Environment Programme and the IMO in 2009.184 This guideline 
seeks to legitimise certain acts of dumping which are prohibited under the London 
Convention and Protocol. However, the guideline has not been adopted by members 
of the United Nations Environment Programme or Contracting Parties to the London 
Convention due to a lack of support.     
                                                
182 Adopted at the 19th Consultative Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the London Convention in 
1997.   
183 Adopted at the 23rd Consultative Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the London Convention in 
2000 (LC 22/14 5.3(i)).   
184 The text of the guidelines is available on the IMO website at 
http://www.imo.org/blast/blastDataHelper.asp?data_id=25688&filename=London_convention_UNEP
_Low-res-ArtificialReefs.pdf at 4 May 2015.   
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7.4.5.3 Enforcement of the London Convention, Protocol and Guidelines  
The provisions of the London Convention are broader than the 1989 IMO Guidelines 
and Standards. While the application of the latter is limited to dumping that takes 
place in the EEZ of States, the scope of the former instrument extends to other 
maritime zones, such as the territorial sea and archipelagic waters. Even so, the 
London Convention does not apply to the internal waters of a State. In Southeast 
Asia, name of the major countries involved in offshore oil and gas activities, such as 
Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia and Thailand, have adopted the convention as 
demonstrated in Table 33, the Philippines is the only Southeast Asian State party to 
the London Convention and Protocol . As these States play a significant role in the 
oil and gas sector, the adoption of the convention should be a priority.185    
7.4.5.3.1 Obligation to Adopt International Rules produced by Competent 
Organisations  
States are obliged to prevent, control and reduce pollution derived from their seabed 
activities. This obligation is made clear in the LOSC by virtue of Articles 208, 210, 
214 and 216.186 The LOSC also acknowledges the applicability of global rules and 
standards which regulate the aforementioned obligation. However, the debate that 
arises is whether these global rules and standards are applicable to States which have 
not yet ratified the LOSC. The provisions of the LOSC referred to above indicate that 
international rules and standards produced by competent organisations shall be 
adopted by states conducting offshore oil and gas activities. Even so, it should first 
be made clear whether the London Convention and its Protocol are to be categorised 
as global rules and standards. Moreover, another view that has been expressed is that 
                                                
185 See the argument in Lyons, above n 7, 9. 
186 Articles 208, 210, 214 and 216, LOSC. 
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even if a state has not yet ratified the convention and its protocol, it should at least 
have relevant domestic legislation in place to address the problem.187   
7.4.5.3.2 London Convention as a Global Rule   
Whether a rule or standard has gained global acceptance is a matter of varying 
viewpoints. Oxman has stated that there are three criteria that should be satisfied in 
order for a rule to have gained ‘global acceptance’.188 First, it should be adopted by 
several States. Secondly, it should be implemented by States, and lastly, it should 
respect the parties which are conducting the activities as mentioned in the said rule. 
If these criteria are applied to the London Convention, it would appear that the first 
two requirements have been met. Even though the London Convention has not gained 
popularity in Southeast Asia, it has been ratified by more than 85 countries around 
the world. Moreover, the convention came into existence in 1972, during the 
negotiation period of the LOSC but before it was formally agreed. However, the third 
requirement postulated by Oxman cannot reasonably be said to apply to the London 
Convention. Although the willingness of State parties to implement the London 
Convention is high, some reports have shown that the level of compliance with the 
convention is low.189 Furthermore, in the case of the 1996 Protocol, the number of 
States ratifying the instrument is relatively low. Indeed, only 40 States have ratified 
the instrument, thus indicating it is still some way off from being globally 
accepted.190  
                                                
187 Lyons, above n 7, 10. 
188 Oxman, above n 170, 141. 
189 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 1972 
and its 1996 Protocol, Final Report on Permits Issued in 2007, LC-LP.1/Circ.43, 2 February 2011.   
190 David L. VanderZwaag and Anne Daniel, ‘International Law and Ocean Dumping: Steering A 
Precautionary Course Aboard the 1996 London Protocol, But Still an Unfinished Voyage’ in T.L. 
McDorman and S.J. Rolston, A. Chircop (eds), Future of Ocean Regime-Building, Essays in Tribute 
to Douglas M. Johnson (Martinus Nijhoff, 2009) 159.  
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7.4.5.3.3 Domestic Rules  
The application of domestic rules by States is a separate consideration to the 
implementation of global rules and standards.191 In these circumstances, States have 
the authority to set their own rules related to the activities that they are involved in. 
Indeed, when states are given the flexibility to formulate their own rules, the question 
that arises is whether they are required to follow certain international provisions as a 
benchmark. In the context of offshore oil and gas activities, the London Convention 
is clearly one of the relevant frameworks regulating disposal of disused platforms. It 
adopts a case-by-case approach when deciding whether to permit a State to conduct a 
dumping operation. The convention takes into account several factors when making 
this inquiry, such as the location of the dumping site, the type of waste involved, the 
cost to remove the installation, as well as the risks posed to the environment. It has 
been proposed by Lyons that if States are unable to implement the London 
Convention into their national legal framework, they should at least ensure that their 
domestic legislation has an equivalent standard in place.192  
7.5 Regional Framework on Offshore Oil and Gas in Southeast Asia 
Therefore, in order to mitigate risks, Southeast Asian States should consider entering 
into regional cooperative arrangements for preventing marine pollution caused by oil 
and gas incidents.193 Such incidents have the capacity to affect not only the 
immediate area surrounding the facility, but also neighbouring countries. If one 
considers that States in Southeast Asia are located in close proximity to each another, 
the likelihood of a security incident in one State affecting neighbouring States is 
                                                
191 Lyons, above n 7, 11. 
192 Ibid, 11. 
193 Ibid1, 73. 
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high. In the event of a multi-state incident, the immediate country affected would 
need to seek assistance from other littoral states, and this is where regional 
cooperative arrangements would play an important role.194 Although there are few 
regional frameworks currently in place, this section will discuss those which have 
been established and which are relevant to offshore oil and gas security and safety in 
Southeast Asia. 
7.5.1 The Cooperative Mechanism between the Littoral States and User States on 
Safety of Navigation and Environmental Protection in the Straits of Malacca 
and Singapore 
The Cooperative Mechanism195 was established in order to implement Article 43 of 
the LOSC which states that user States and coastal States bordering a strait should 
cooperate in establishing and maintaining necessary navigational and safety aids for 
international navigation.196 Furthermore, the article also stated that the contracting 
States should cooperate in order to prevent, reduce and also control pollution from 
ships.197  
The main aim of the cooperative mechanism as stipulated in point 7 is 
facilitating cooperation among the littoral states and forms as a platform for 
dialogues.198 The establishment of the mechanism are based on several primary 
principles such as    
1. Re-affirming the sovereignty, sovereign rights, jurisdiction and territorial integrity 
of the littoral States over the Straits; 2. It is consistent with international law and in 
                                                
194 This could be seen in the discussions between participants from different States in Southeast Asia 
on maritime security scenarios in the 3rd and 4th Maritime Security Desktop Exercise Which was held 
in Jakarta (2012) and Bali (2013). 
195 The Co-Operative Mechanism Between the Littoral States and User States on Safety of Navigation 
and Environmental Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, IMO/SGP 2.1/1, 16 August 
2007. Hereinafter referred to as Co-Operative Mechanism. 
196 Point 5, Cooperative Mechanism and Article 43, LOSC. 
197 Article 43, LOSC. 
198 Point 7, Cooperative Mechanism. 
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particular article 43 of UNCLOS; 3. It is established within the framework of the 
Tripartite Technical Experts Group on the Safety of Navigation in the Straits of 
Malacca and Singapore (TTEG) and that the primary responsibility over the safety of 
navigation and environmental protection in the Straits lies with the littoral States; 
and 4. Recognising the interests of user States and other stakeholders and the role 
they could play in respect of the Straits, and that such co-operation should be on a 
voluntary basis.199 
 
The safety of navigation and environmental protection in the straits are the 
main focus of the cooperative mechanism. This focus is implemented by conducting 
co-operation forums, establishing a project co-ordination committee to implement 
numerous projects particularly with sponsoring users and to receive financial 
contribution for maintenance of aids to navigation.200 
The cooperation forum serves as a platform of dialogue which would involve 
stakeholders such as user States, the shipping industry and the coastal States.201 The 
project co-ordination committee is established for implementing Article 43 of the 
LOSC by promoting safety of navigation and environmental protection through the 
implementation of projects.202 These projects will be conducted and funded by 
stakeholders including littoral States (Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore) and user 
States, and the shipping industry. Other than significant contribution by the coastal 
States for the maintenance of navigation, Japan as a user State continues to provide 
financial aid on a voluntary basis.203   
Knowing that a number of platforms are present around the Straits of Malacca 
and Singapore, the presence of the cooperative mechanism could be beneficial in 
addressing issues related to marine pollution as well as safety of navigation. The co-
operation mechanism, as a platform for dialogue, thus offers options to cooperate and 
                                                
199 Point 7, Cooperative Mechanism. 
200 Point 8, Cooperative Mechanism. 
201 Point 10, Cooperative Mechanism. 
202 Point 13, Cooperative Mechanism. 
203 Point 18, Cooperative Mechanism. 
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contribute on voluntary basis to protect the environment and ensure the safety of 
navigation of the straits.204 
7.5.2 CSCAP Memorandum on Safety and Security of Offshore Oil and Gas 
Installations205 
The CSCAP Memorandum revealed several safety and security issues as a result of 
offshore oil and gas activities in the Asia-Pacific. It is one of the few regional 
attempts at a recommendatory framework to address the safety and security of 
offshore oil and gas installations. The memorandum recommended that risk 
mitigation and treatment options to the platforms need to be developed. Furthermore, 
cooperative measures to ensure the safety and security of offshore oil and gas 
installations is needed, involving stakeholders including regional governments and 
relevant industries. In addition, it urges that close attention should be directed to 
regional disaster and emergency prevention, response and recovery measures.206      
In order to address the offshore oil and gas safety and security issues in the 
Asia-Pacific region the memorandum identified and recommended several risk 
mitigation and treatment options. The memorandum stated that comprehensive 
assessment of the issue in the region should be in place.207 Stakeholders need to 
adopt a common risk management approach that would enable a common risk 
treatment, prevention, response and recovery arrangements and capabilities if an 
incident occurs. One guide used by industries is the ISO 31000:2009 Risk 
Management - Principles and Guidelines. Point 2 of the memorandum states that 
                                                
204 Point 25, Cooperative Mechanism. 
205 CSCAP Memorandum No. 16 on Safety and Security of Offshore Oil and Gas Installations, A 
Memorandum from the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP), January 2011. 
Hereinafter referred to as CSCAP Memorandum. 
206 CSCAP Memorandum. 
207 Point 1, Emerging Issues and Potential Consequences, CSCAP Memorandum. 
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regional States and consultative entities are urged to cooperate in numerous fields 
including:  
a. Maritime safety and security cooperative activities, including dialogue and 
consultation; b. Disaster response and emergency management;  c. Regional search 
and rescue, including training and exercises;  d. Establish regional standards on 
marine pollution including dumping and environment/seabed management (this 
could take the form of a treaty as is already the practice in many other maritime 
regions);  e. Establish a regional approach to decommissioned platforms;  f. Regional 
environmental disaster response measures; and  g. Reference global best practices to 
improve regional arrangements.208  
 
Furthermore, the memorandum encouraged States to ratify and implement 
international conventions and regional instruments including the LOSC, SUA 
Convention and Protocol, London Convention, OPRC Convention, IMO Resolution 
A.672 (16) Guidelines for the removal of offshore installations, and 2002 ASEAN-
China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.209 
The memorandum also encouraged stakeholders to address offshore oil and 
gas safety and security issues by sharing responsibilities for prevention, response and 
recovery.210 This could be done by considering that responsibilities of the 
stakeholders are clearly divided and, thus, regional States and industries are aware of 
their respective obligations. Furthermore, treatment of the decommissioned platforms 
should be effectively addressed by stakeholders. In addition, it argues that there 
should be a common arrangement in disaster and emergency response.211     
                                                
208 Point 2, Emerging Issues and Potential Consequences, CSCAP Memorandum. 
209 Point 3, Emerging Issues and Potential Consequences, CSCAP Memorandum. 
210 Point 4, Emerging Issues and Potential Consequences, CSCAP Memorandum. 
211 Point 4, Risk Mitigation and Treatment Options, CSCAP Memorandum. 
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7.5.3 The Decommissioning Guidelines for Offshore Oil and Gas Facilities by the 
ASEAN Council on Petroleum  
A legally binding instrument on the decommissioning of offshore oil and gas 
facilities is yet to be agreed upon in Southeast Asia.212 However, in 2013, a non-
legally binding document was produced by the ASEAN Council on Petroleum 
(ASCOPE) 213, titled ‘ASCOPE Decommissioning Guidelines for Offshore Oil and 
Gas Facilities’. Although the guidelines cannot be enforced, it is hoped that they will 
be used as a common platform for addressing the issue in Southeast Asia and, in the 
future, lead to a binding framework on the decommissioning of offshore oil and gas 
facilities.  
 ASCOPE was established on 15 October 1975 in Jakarta, Indonesia, with the 
ASEAN member countries represented by their respective national oil companies. 
The main aim of the association is to support member States with various aspects of 
the petroleum industry, including mutual assistance. Furthermore, the council serves 
as a platform for regional cooperation, particularly on petroleum and energy matters. 
The ASCOPE Declaration states that petroleum has a strategic importance to 
member States, and should therefore be protected to enhance economic development 
in Southeast Asia. 
The guidelines agreed upon by ASCOPE member countries consist of 
regional decommissioning provisions which accord with both international law and 
the domestic legislation of member states. The goal of these guidelines is to “provide 
a common technical reference for ASEAN countries for decommissioning”.214 In 
addition, the guidelines aim to enhance environmental protection and the safety of 
                                                
212 Lyons, above n 92, 5. 
213 ASCOPE, see http://www.ascope.org/ at 10 May 2015. 
214 ASCOPE Projects and Initiatives, see http://www.ascope.org/projects.html at 4 May 2015.  
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navigation. However, as the guidelines do not cover natural disasters or the collapse 
of platforms, they only apply in the context of the normal operations of oil and gas 
facilities.215  
However, in the absence of international instruments and established industry 
practices regulating decommissioning in the region, the domestic law of individual 
States must be relied upon as the prevailing legal norm.216 Also, while it is true that 
the full removal of oil and gas installations is to be preferred over their disposal at 
sea, the notion of reusing disused platforms for legitimate purposes presents a 
feasible solution that accommodates the interests of various stakeholders. As the 
development of offshore oil and gas facilities in the region continues to intensify, 
regional organisations such as ASCOPE (as well as other forums), are needed to 
address the gaps in the current framework and to create a common platform for 
understanding the complex interplay of issues related to offshore oil and gas 
activities.217 
7.5.4 The 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and 
Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking in the Agreement Area in the South China 
Sea 
The 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC) was 
initiated to obtain peaceful and durable solution to the dispute between China and 
ASEAN – one which accords with international law principles.218 Furthermore, the 
declaration provides that the parties will take measures for the planning and 
                                                
215 ASCOPE Projects and Initiatives, see http://www.ascope.org/projects.html at 4 May 2015. 
216 Lyons, above n 92, 5. 
217 Ibid, 5. 
218 ASEAN, ‘ Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea’ (4 November 2002)  , see 
http://www.asean.org/asean/external-relations/china/item/declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-
the-south-china-sea at 4 May 2015. 
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realisation of cooperative initiatives. Nonetheless, the declaration does not initiate 
intensive cooperation between States, and it has been alleged that both China and 
some ASEAN States have violated the declaration. The efforts of ASEAN member 
States to implement the DoC by establishing a Regional Code of Conduct in the 
South China Sea (CoC) in 2012 have not been successful this far.219 China is yet to 
agree on the draft CoC and has indicated that it may take time for States to comply 
with the agreement, as the terms of the document evince what is essentially the long-
term goal for the South China Sea issue, rather than the means by which the goal can 
be achieved.220   
The main objective of the DoC is to mitigate the South China Sea dispute 
through a regional framework – that is, the ASEAN regime and prevailing principles 
of international law. As the principle of non-intervention is still well respected 
among ASEAN nations, and China prefers to have bilateral rather than multilateral 
talks, it is unlikely that the issue will be resolved through independent international 
mediation.  
Setting aside maritime delimitation issues, cooperative oil and gas 
exploration activities are not regarded as a positive step forward by States in the 
region.221 However, in 2005, an agreement was reached among the national oil 
companies of China, Vietnam, and the Philippines for a Joint Marine Seismic 
Undertaking in the Agreement Area in the South China Sea. Although the agreement 
was considered an important step in the resolution of the dispute, it did not achieve 
the desired cooperative outcomes. Indeed, it was reported that only a few of the 
                                                
219 ASEAN, ‘ Statement of ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ (20/07/2012)   
220 Ian Storey, ‘Little hope of effective South China Sea conduct code’ South China Morning Post, (27 
July 2012). 
221 Cordner, above n 1, 73. 
 
 
325 
 
cooperative measures contemplated by the agreement were actually carried out.222 
The existing territorial disputes thus remain, and serve as the main barrier to the 
development of an agreed framework on oil and gas safety and security in the region. 
7.5.5 Partnerships in Environmental Management for the Seas of East Asia 
The goal of the establishment of Partnerships in Environmental Management for the 
Seas of East Asia (PEMSEA) was ‘to foster and sustain healthy and resilient coasts 
and oceans, communities and economies across the Seas of East Asia through 
integrated management solutions and partnerships’.223 In order to conduct effective 
management of coasts and oceans in maritime areas around East Asia, PEMSEA has 
provided several suggestions as well as solutions. PEMSEA also serves as the 
regional coordinating mechanism for the Sustainable Development Strategy for the 
Seas of East Asia (SDS-SEA). Furthermore, the organisation also works with 
national and local governments, companies, research and science institutions, 
communities, international agencies, regional programs, investors and donors 
towards implementation of the SDS-SEA. 
PEMSEA plays a vital role as the pioneer of integrated coastal management 
(ICM), ecosystem rehabilitation and protection and adaptive and resilient 
communities in East Asia. 224  Also, ICM creates positive impacts on communities 
through food security and livelihood opportunities, pollution and waste 
management, water use and supply management as well as civil society 
empowerment youth. In 2003, participating countries in PEMSEA adopted the SDS-
                                                
222 Ian Storey and Carl Thayer, ‘The South China Sea dispute: A review of developments and their 
implications since the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties’ in K. V.  Kesavan and Daljit  
Singh (eds), South and Southeast Asia: Responding to Changing Geo-Political and Security 
Challenges (ISEAS and KW Publisher, 2010) 57, 57-72.  
223 On PEMSEA, see  http://www.pemsea.org/about-PEMSEA at 20 August 2016 
224  See http://www.pemsea.org/our-work  at 20 August 2016 
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SEA as a management framework for integrated implementation of various IMO 
marine pollution conventions and other multilateral instruments addressing the 
coastal and marine environments. SDS-SEA has more than 50 action programs, 
many of which focus on prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution.225 
 
7.5.6 Regional Cooperative Approach 
Pollution produced from the activities of offshore installations is best dealt with 
under regional arrangements.226 Indeed, according to the UN Charter, regional 
organisations play an important role in addressing such issues among states in a 
given region.227 There are several reasons why regional organisations are significant 
in addressing pollution from offshore installations: (i)  international efforts may not 
be able to take into account the specific and unique geographic conditions of a 
particular region, which may be relevant in addressing the prevailing problems in the 
area;228 (ii) regional efforts represent a solid platform for complying with larger, 
global agreements, as a smaller group of states with mutual interests can work 
together potentially, making it easier to achieve consensus on pertinent issues;229 and 
(iii) compared to large organisations such as the UN, regional organisations are 
perceived to be directly accountable by the international legal and political order.230       
Thus, for the protection of the marine environment, there are several regional 
responses in place covering a variety of issues including environmental control, 
                                                
225 Sustainable Development Strategy for the Seas of East Asia (SDS-SEA) Implementation Plan 
2012-2016, see http://www.pemsea.org/sites/default/files/sdssea-implementation-plan_0.pdf, at 20 
November 2016 
226 Brown, above n 139, 126.  
227 Charter of the United Nations, signed on 26 June 1945, 1 UNTS XVI. Hereinafter referred to as 
UN Charter. Article 52. 
228 Gavouneli, above n 145, 43. 
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arrangements on regional development, as well as scientific research.231 As for 
pollution from offshore platform activities, the UNEP Oceans and Coastal Areas 
Programme is one initiative that supports regionalism. The program has noted that 
there are ten regional seas which are governed by twenty five international 
frameworks.232  
International anti-pollution measures would be effective if States were 
prepared to implement such measures through regional mechanisms.233 That said, 
Southeast Asian States have made an effort to address marine environmental 
problems through their relevant domestic agencies. However, what is lacking is 
coordination between these agencies, and thus, at present, the individual efforts of 
States are not producing the desired results. In what is considered a positive step, 
institutions at both the international and regional levels are conducting capacity-
building measures to address the issue of marine pollution. These institutions include 
the IMO, UNEP, the Global Environment Facility, the South East Asian Programme 
on Ocean Law Policy and Management (SEAPOL), Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC),234 as well as ASEAN.  
Despite the beneficial work of these institutions, the measures and activities 
undertaken are usually repetitive and overlapping.235 Furthermore, the relevant 
officers in charge of attending and participating in the numerous capacity building 
and training programmes hosted by these institutions are often confused as to which 
                                                
231 Lewis M Alexander, ‘Regionalism at Sea: Concept and Reality’ (1978)  Regionalization of the Law 
of the Sea 5, 9-12.  
232 Cowell, above n 55, 127. 
233 Zafrul Alam, ‘Enhancing Regional Institutional Capacity and Technical Capability to Implement 
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of the (often competing) measures need to be implemented. Therefore, to effect 
meaningful change, these institutions must communicate with each other and 
formulate a coordinated response to capacity building activities. One of the ways to 
achieve this goal is through the creation of a regional mechanism which would act as 
a platform for mapping and prioritising regional activities, thereby achieving 
mutually beneficial outcomes for the States involved.   
Indeed, there are numerous instances where institutions have acted 
unilaterally to address the same problem. These same institutions are conducting 
capacity building activities in Southeast Asia to implement marine pollution 
provisions. Joint training programs have been conducted by the IMO and several 
regional States in order to implement the IMO Convention on Marine Pollution. 
Likewise, ASEAN countries have agreed on the ASEAN Cooperation Plan on 
Transboundary Pollution, which aims to enhance enforcement activities and 
implement capacity building activities among relevant officers, thereby preventing 
and responding to marine pollution. Similar efforts have been made by UNEP, 
SEAPOL and APEC. 
Undeniably, these capacity building efforts are positive and will benefit 
States in implementing pertinent provisions on marine pollution. However, there 
should be a focus on coordinating these efforts so that activities do not overlap and 
confusion does not ensue. Indeed, such coordination could be realised by means of a 
regional mechanism which would provide a forum for discussion and act as a 
platform for deciding which activities should be undertaken by States in the 
region.236 
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7.5.7 Recommendations to Enhance Regional Collaboration 
The implementation of prevailing minimum standards and frameworks of offshore 
oil and gas activities at the regional level remains a significant concern for States in 
the region237 Moreover, the absence of a common platform for implementing risk 
management measures during security incidents has been highlighted as an issue 
worthy of detailed consideration. It is submitted that regional organisations and 
consultative groups such as ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional forum (ARF)238  and 
APEC should intervene in order to devise and implement cooperative arrangements 
concerning the issue.  
Several key areas that could be considered in furtherance of the cooperative 
arrangements have been suggested by Cordner, and include:  
a. a unified risk management approach to offshore oil and gas safety and 
security. This would ensure that states respond to security incidents 
involving offshore platforms with a degree of consistency and 
coherency;  
b. cooperative activities as well dialogue on issues such as environmental 
protection and maritime safety and security;  
c. cooperative arrangements on regional maritime search and rescue 
operations;  
d. a marine pollution arrangement to tackle dumping at the regional level; 
e. a unified standard for regional environmental disaster response, 
including procedures, equipment reserves and training; and  
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f. the adoption of international best practices on offshore oil and gas 
safety and security in order to improve and develop the current regional 
arrangements. 239 
7.6 Analysis of the Current Framework 
 
There are numerous globally-applicable international provisions that seek to regulate 
marine pollution caused by offshore oil and gas activities. LOSC is still the main 
reference point for the development of other relevant international frameworks. 
However, the main problem is the lack of regional frameworks regulating such 
issues.    
Oil spill incidents cause marine pollution which, in turn, has the potential to 
damage the marine environment. There have been several offshore oil and gas 
incidents in the Southeast Asia region. The consequences of such incidents can be 
serious, with significant harm to human life in addition to devastating environmental 
damage. Furthermore, if such an incident were to occur in an important area, such as 
the Malacca or Singapore Strait, it would cause serious disruption to international 
trade. As the previous section has demonstrated, there are limitations to the existing 
international framework governing marine pollution from offshore activities. These 
limitations are mainly due to a lack of quantitative standards, the general nature of 
the duties imposed on States, the dependency of States on the prevailing international 
framework for the adoption and/or development of regional regulations, as well as 
the unwillingness of States (especially in Southeast Asia) to ratify and implement the 
relevant international instruments.    
                                                
239 Cordner, above n 1, 78. 
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The dumping of disused offshore oil and gas platforms is a major cause of 
marine pollution. The responsibility of States to remove disused offshore platforms is 
governed by the LOSC.240 Indeed, LOSC is the primary international instrument 
regulating the further treatment of offshore oil platforms, and in particular whether 
they should be removed or left in situ. Even so, there are differing interpretations of 
the prevailing LOSC provisions, while those in other international instruments (such 
as the London Convention and Protocol, as well as 1989 IMO Guidelines and 
Standards) have not been universally adopted. This uncertainty creates difficulties 
for States when it comes to implementing the relevant provisions into their domestic 
legal regime. In Southeast Asia for instance, both regional and domestic provisions 
are lacking, particularly with regard to the adoption of the London Convention and 
Protocol, as well as the IMO Guidelines and Standards. 
The disposal of offshore platforms is permitted by both Article 210241 of 
LOSC as well as the London Convention and Protocol. However, such action can 
only be taken if States adopt the ‘permit system’ for dumping at sea. States which are 
active in oil and gas production are reluctant to adopt the London Protocol, despite 
the instrument being useful in instances where States have abandoned their disused 
offshore platforms. 
Neither the London Convention nor the IMO Guidelines oppose the reuse of 
disused offshore installations.242 Indeed, such action is not considered dumping 
under either instrument. Furthermore, the IMO Guidelines cannot be implemented on 
their own. LOSC provisions on dumping are also necessary in order to decide the 
proper treatment of disused offshore installations. In removing or disposing of 
                                                
240 Lyons, above n 79, 519. 
241 Article 210, LOSC. 
242 Lyons, above n 79, 520. 
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offshore platforms, LOSC requires States to consider the protection of the marine 
environment as well as the safety of navigation of vessels.  
In order to effectively apply the provisions on the removal of offshore 
installations, and to avoid the legal uncertainties previously mentioned, regional 
provisions on the treatment of disused installations should be adopted. In Southeast 
Asia, these regional provisions would help in filling the legal gaps which currently 
exist with regard to the decommissioning regime. If these rules were in place, the 
marine environment would be better managed and protected, and the safety of 
navigation would be assured. It is important to note, however, that such provisions 
need to be applied on a case-by-case basis. Indeed, some platforms may pose less of 
a risk if left in their current position, as removal may endanger the safety of 
personnel.243    
Given the vast number of disused platforms in the region, the lack of 
regulations governing their partial or full removal has the capacity to cause problems 
for the protection of the marine environment. Conversely, if these regulations were 
put in place, a case-by-case evaluation of the platforms would occur, and ultimately a 
decision would be made regarding their full or partial removal. Alternatively, a new 
use for the installation may be ordered, such as the creation of an artificial reef. 
Moreover, LOSC expressly provides in Article 210 that States are obliged to 
implement globally accepted rules and standards which regulate offshore oil and gas 
activities.244 
                                                
243 Ibid, 520. 
244 Article 210, LOSC. 
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In light of the sheer number of ageing platforms in the region, it is imperative 
that States in Southeast Asia develop regional agreements to address the situation.245 
These agreements would be useful as they establish a common platform for offshore 
oil and gas activities in the area. In this regard, it is important to note that ASCOPE 
has conducted a substantial number of meetings on the decommissioning of oil and 
gas facilities in the region. It is now incumbent upon Southeast Asian States to 
support these meetings and work towards the establishment of a comprehensive 
framework which takes into account the protection of the marine environment, the 
safety of navigation, as well as the commercial and security interests of States. 
7.7 Conclusion  
Marine pollution caused by an oil spill from offshore platforms, as well as the 
dumping of such platforms following their operational phase, has the capacity to 
pollute the marine environment. At the international level, offshore oil and gas safety 
and security has been addressed by international conventions such as LOSC, 
MARPOL, the OPRC Convention, the 1989 IMO Guidelines and Standards, the 
London Convention and Protocol. Despite the absence of a comprehensive regional 
framework, there are several instruments which seek to address the safety and 
security of offshore oil and gas activities in the Southeast Asia region, such as the 
ASEAN Decommissioning Guidelines for Offshore Oil and Gas Facilities. However, 
as discussed in this chapter, the current framework - at both the international and 
regional levels - is inadequate to address the problem of marine pollution resulting 
from oil and gas operations. Although some aspects of the problem may arise within 
a single State, others are transnational in nature, such that they cannot be solved 
                                                
245 Lyons, above n 7, 20. 
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through unilateral State action. For this reason, regional cooperation among all States 
in Southeast Asia represents the only practicable for ensuring offshore oil and gas 
safety and security, and thus reducing or preventing damage to the marine 
environment from oil pollution.  
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CHAPTER VIII 
8 Prospects for Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: A Proposal for Change  
 
8.1 Introduction 
It is no easy task for defence and law enforcement officers to maintain 
security and safety in their maritime areas.1 Such officers have been authorised by 
States to ensure that maritime zones falling under national jurisdiction are safe from 
criminal acts. These maritime areas range from the territorial sea and archipelagic 
waters to the exclusive economic zone. The major concern for States lies not only 
with the security of living and non-living resources above the subsoil, but also 
natural resources which are found on the continental shelves.  The presence of 
international straits in some Southeast Asian states poses a different set of 
challenges. As many ships transit through these straits, it is vital that relevant 
security measures are taken by authorities to ensure that no unlawful activities take 
place. Moreover, because some of these straits are located between two or more 
countries, the need for international cooperation is paramount.   
To address maritime security issues, cooperation through bilateral and 
multilateral frameworks is needed.2 These arrangements constitute the goal of 
Maritime Security Partnerships, and are also encouraged by international law and 
various conventions. In implementing such agreements, contracting States may use 
their respective statutory authorities and military capabilities, provided their actions 
do not contradict generally accepted principles of international law.  
 
                                                
1 Naval Studies Board, Maritime Security Partnerships (National Academies Press, 2008) 18. 
2 Ibid, 19. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to identify common themes related to the five 
maritime security threats in Southeast Asia which are covered in this thesis: piracy, 
maritime terrorism, people smuggling, illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) 
fishing, and marine pollution caused by offshore oil and gas activities. This chapter 
concludes that the existing international and regional frameworks are inadequate to 
address the entire maritime security threats in Southeast Asia and therefore States in 
the region could consider implementing regional measures as proposed in this 
chapter. All five maritime security threats discussed in this thesis are transnational in 
nature and thus unilateral action by a single State will not be adequate to address the 
problem comprehensively. Regional cooperation is required in combating maritime 
security threats in Southeast Asia.   
The chapter will propose Maritime Security Partnership as a solution to deal 
with the existing maritime security threats. Furthermore, it also proposes other 
solutions at the regional level to address the maritime security problems. A way 
forward in maintaining the safety of the region and to prevent the occurrence of 
maritime security threats will also form a part of the discussion.  
8.2 Maritime Security Threats in Southeast Asia: Common Themes 
8.2.1 Piracy 
As a maritime security threat, the problem of piracy in Southeast Asia has received 
worldwide attention. As discussed in Chapter Three, the act of piracy affects human 
safety as well as international commerce. Piracy is governed by both international 
and regional legal frameworks. The prominent legal frameworks at the international 
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level are the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC)3 and the 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Safety of Maritime 
Navigation (SUA Convention).4 However, these instruments are inadequate as the 
LOSC definition of piracy does not encompass most of the piratical acts occurring in 
the region. The SUA Convention, on the other hand, is essentially inapplicable 
because several States, including Indonesia and Malaysia, are not party to the 
convention and its protocol. One of the reasons for not ratifying the Convention is 
sovereignty concerns: they argue that it would undermine their sovereignty. 
At the regional level, there are frameworks which address piracy such as the 
Regional Cooperation Agreement against Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships 
in Asia (ReCAAP)5 and the Malacca Straits Patrols.6 The handicap with the 
effectiveness of ReCAAP is that neither Indonesia nor Malaysia are parties to the 
agreement. The Malacca Straits Patrols are the one of the measures that seem to be 
effective in monitoring and mitigating risks of piratical attacks in the Straits of 
Malacca. There are other forums which are relevant to piracy eradication such as the 
ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF), the ASEAN Regional Forum Inter-Sessional 
Meeting (ARF-ISM) on Maritime Security, and the Maritime Security Expert 
Working Group (MSEWG).7 Nonetheless, these forums are regarded as mere ‘talk 
                                                
3 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 16 November 1994). Hereinafter referred to as LOSC. 
4 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against Safety of Maritime Navigation, opened for 
signature 10 March 1988 (entered into force1 March 1992). Hereinafter referred to as SUA 
Convention. 
5 Regional Cooperation Agreement against Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia, adopted 
11th November 2004, (entered into force 4 September 2006). Hereinafter referred to as ReCAAP 
6Malacca Straits Patrols, see http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/matrix/malacca-strait-patrolsat at 23 
October 2015.  
7 Sam Bateman, ‘Solving the “Wicked Problems” of Maritime Security: Are Regional Forums up to 
the Task?’ (2011) 33(1) Contemporary Southeast Asia 1, 18. 
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shops’ which are largely perceived as not producing legally binding frameworks but 
only viewed as platform for dialogues. 
In conclusion, international and regional legal frameworks are in place in 
order to combat piracy in Southeast Asia. However, existing frameworks still need 
further development in order to be effective and therefore in its current state they are 
inadequate to address the problem of piracy in the region.     
8.2.2 Maritime Terrorism 
Maritime terrorism is regarded as a maritime security threat by the international 
community and Southeast Asian States. Numerous developments and the adoption of 
several international legal frameworks regulating transnational organised crime 
including terrorism, have taken place.8 The SUA 2005 Convention Protocol and the 
ISPS Code are amongst the international instruments which address the issue of 
maritime terrorism. Nonetheless, these instruments still have their limitations and 
shortcomings, and therefore the further development of these frameworks is required. 
For example, the SUA Convention fails to address all aspects of maritime terrorism .  
In the Southeast Asia region, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) has initiated numerous efforts in combating maritime terrorism. However, 
ASEAN States seem to be proceeding with caution in developing their response.9 As 
a result of this tentative approach, operational measures to combat terrorism are 
totally lacking in ASEAN. Instead of adopting and implementing operational and 
                                                
8 Nong Hong and Adolf KY Ng, ‘The international legal instruments in addressing piracy and 
maritime terrorism: A Critical Review’ (2010) 27(1) Research in Transportation Economics 513, 59. 
9 Sheldon W.  Simon, ‘U.S. Policy and Terrorism in Southeast Asia’ in Asia Program Special Report 
No. 112, Fighting Terrorism on the Southeast Asian Front (Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars, 2003) 17.  
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practical measures in counter terrorism, ASEAN initiatives are more geared towards 
the declaration of common principles.10  
In conclusion, there are several international legal frameworks which address 
the issue of maritime terrorism. However, these legally binding frameworks still need 
to be developed in order to be effective. In the Southeast Asian region there are 
numerous non-binding frameworks in the form of declarations initiated within the 
framework of ASEAN. Nonetheless, non-binding frameworks are not enough in 
eradicate the complex issue of maritime terrorism in the region. It could be 
concluded that the current measures both at international and regional level are 
inadequate to address the threat of maritime terrorism in Southeast Asia. 
8.2.3 People Smuggling 
People smuggling is regarded as another maritime security threat in Southeast Asia. 
It causes human loss as well as breaches to immigration policies of several States. At 
the international level, the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea 
and Air11 (Smuggling Protocol) which is attached to the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organised Crime (CATOC)12 serves as the prominent legal 
framework in addressing the matter. Even though the protocol has been ratified by 
most States, its implementation still leaves much to be desired. The lack of 
implementing legislation, inadequate policies and planning, as well as limited 
international cooperation, account for the ineffectiveness of the Protocol. It is 
                                                
10 Amitav Acharya, Terrorism and security in Asia: redefining regional order? (Asia Research Centre, 
2004), 1-13. 
11 Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, open for signature 12 December 2000, 
(entered into force 28 January 2004). Hereinafter referred to as Smuggling Protocol. 
12 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, open for signature 
12 December 2000, (entered into force 29 September 2003). Hereinafter referred to as CATOC. 
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difficult to establish interagency cooperation to respond to the problem of people 
smuggling activities as there are only a few States that have a specific policy 
addressing the matter. 
 At the regional level, the Bali Process13 has been the prominent platform in 
addressing the issue. The Bali process aims to raised regional awareness of the 
consequences of people smuggling, trafficking in persons and related transnational 
crime. It has produced several outcomes which are not legally binding and thus not 
widely regarded as successful in combating people smuggling activities in Southeast 
Asia. Moreover, the Bali Process is a forum, not an organisation and therefore its 
outcomes are mostly intangible. In ASEAN, people smuggling has received the 
attention of the member states since 1997, however the organisation is not able to 
produce a legally binding framework as member States have different approaches 
and perspectives towards people smuggling activities depending upon their 
involvement as States of origin, transit or destination. 
In conclusion, whilst an international legal framework is in place to address 
people smuggling, at the regional level there are only non-binding frameworks 
produced by the Bali Process and within ASEAN. Since the implementation of the 
international binding framework is insufficient and in the absence of a legally 
binding framework at the regional level, it could be concluded that the current 
measures at the international as well as the regional levels in addressing people 
smuggling in Southeast Asia are inadequate. 
                                                
13 The Bali Process see http://www.baliprocess.net/ at the 4th of May 2015. 
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8.2.4 Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing 
IUU fishing poses a threat to maritime security in Southeast Asia. As fish are 
considered a main source of protein for all States and also a source of national 
income, therefore, IUU fishing is considered a threat to the sustainable management 
of fisheries resources and food security. Similar to piracy, the problem of IUU 
fishing is addressed by legally binding frameworks both at international and regional 
levels. However, the implementation of such frameworks is still insufficient. One of 
the challenges in combating IUU fishing in the region is the enforcement of fisheries 
regulations. In several circumstances, governments are not able to conduct effective 
fisheries management measures due to the lack of capacity as well as fiscal 
resources. 
At the international level, IUU fishing is addressed in the LOSC, International 
the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported 
and Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU),14 the FAO Code of Conduct15 as well as the 
UN Fish Stocks Agreement.16 At the regional level, measures in place include the are 
Regional Plan of Action (RPOA), the ASEAN-SEAFDEC Strategic Partnership17 
(ASSP) and the Coral Triangle Initiative.18 Positive impacts in eradicating IUU 
fishing in Southeast Asia have been made by these frameworks. The presence of 
these frameworks particularly at the regional level has pushed the Southeast Asian 
                                                
14 International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated 
Fishing, see http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/y1224e/y1224e00.htm at 23 October 2015.  
15 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, see 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/v9878e/v9878e00.htm at 23 October 2015. 
16 The United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and 
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, open for signature on 4 
December 1995, (entered into force 11 November 2001). Hereinafter referred to as UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement. 
17 ASEAN-SEAFDEC Strategic Partnership, see http://www.asspfisheries.net/ at 23 October 2015. 
18 The Coral Triangle Initiative, see http://www.coraltriangleinitiative.org/ at 23 October 2015. 
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States to work together through several coordinated schemes. Nonetheless, with a 
large maritime area, the Southeast Asia region is prone to maritime security problems 
including IUU fishing. Regional fisheries management organisations need time in 
order to be able to comprehensively address the issue. Furthermore, unresolved 
maritime boundary disputes and complex fisheries problems also constitute barriers 
to address IUU fishing. Also, some Southeast Asian States fishers are perpetrators of 
illegal fishing in the region.   
 In conclusion, even though IUU fishing is governed by international and 
regional frameworks, the problem still prevails and thus the legally binding 
frameworks are inadequate to address it. There are numerous non-binding regional 
instruments in place to address the issue of IUU fishing. These instruments, however, 
are not obligatory; they are voluntary in nature, thus only applicable to those States 
that are willing to apply them. The inability and unwillingness of States to implement 
such frameworks and to exert control over their fisheries resources serve as the main 
reasons why existing frameworks remain inadequate. 
8.2.5 Marine Pollution caused by Offshore Oil and Gas Activities 
Offshore oil and gas activities also pose potential maritime security threats to 
Southeast Asian States. These activities potentially cause pollution to the marine 
environment in Southeast Asian waters. Two specific marine pollution problems 
generated by offshore oil and gas activities in the region are oil pollution and the 
dumping of offshore installations at sea.  Similar to people smuggling, this problem 
is only addressed by a legally binding framework at the international level. There is 
no legally binding instrument at the regional level which addresses the issues.  
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 The global instruments governing marine pollution caused by offshore oil and 
gas activities include the LOSC, the 1989 IMO Guidelines and Standards19, and the 
International Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of 
Wastes and Other Matter (London Convention).20 However, these legal frameworks 
are not popular in the region and therefore not many of the Southeast Asian States 
have ratified them. 
At the regional level, several non-legally binding frameworks are found in the 
context of addressing marine pollution caused offshore oil and gas activities, such as 
the Decommissioning Guidelines for Offshore Oil and Gas Facilities produced by 
ASEAN Council on Petroleum (ASCOPE).21 This guideline is projected to form a 
common platform for Southeast Asian States to address decommissioning of offshore 
oil and gas facilities. Furthermore, member States of ASCOPE also hope that the 
guidelines could lead to the establishment of a binding framework in addressing the 
matter. 
In conclusion, a legally binding framework at the regional level governing 
marine pollution caused by offshore oil and gas activities is yet to be produced. 
However, there are several binding frameworks which prevail at the international 
level. Nonetheless, these frameworks are yet to be ratified by most of the Southeast 
Asian States. Therefore, as a result the current regional frameworks alone governing 
marine pollution caused by offshore oil and gas activities are inadequate in 
addressing the problem in Southeast Asia.  
                                                
19 IMO Assembly Resolution A.672, (adopted 19 October 1989) 16  
20 International Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other 
Matter, opened for signature 13 November 1972, (entered into force 30 August 1975). Hereinafter 
referred to as London Convention. 
21 ASEAN Committee on Petroleum, see http://www.ascope.org/ at 23 October 2015 
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8.2.6 Overall conclusion 
Southeast Asia is considered as an area which is prone to maritime security threats. 
The maritime area in this region is particularly vast and the number of vessels 
traverse within the region is high. Therefore, the five maritime security threats 
examined in this thesis exist in this area. From the discussions above and in the 
previous chapters, it can be concluded that the international and regional frameworks 
are inadequate in addressing the problems. The five maritime security problems still 
prevail in Southeast Asia.  
Maritime security threats such as piracy and IUU fishing are addressed at both 
international and regional level with binding legal frameworks. Nonetheless, the 
implementation of such frameworks is insufficient.  Maritime terrorism, people 
smuggling and marine pollution caused by offshore oil and gas activities face a 
different challenge where legally binding frameworks are only found at the 
international level whilst at the regional level, only non-binding frameworks are in 
place. 
Piracy, maritime terrorism, people smuggling, IUU fishing, and marine 
pollution caused by offshore oil and gas activities are transnational in nature. 
Therefore these problems cannot be addressed by a single State. Better multilateral 
and regional cooperation is needed in order to comprehensively address these 
problems.   
From the above-mentioned maritime security threats in Southeast Asia there 
are two common themes that can be identified in every threat: ratification of legal 
instruments, both international and regional; and implementation of the legal 
frameworks at the domestic level. In addition, a complex geopolitical situation in 
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Southeast Asia, and constraints on maritime security information sharing, also create 
barriers to addressing the five threats.   
8.2.6.1 Ratification of Legal Instruments 
The ratification level of international legal instruments regulating maritime security 
is considered lacking in the region. As shown in Tables 34 and 35, not a single 
international instrument has been ratified by all States in Southeast Asia. Nonetheless 
the SUA Convention 1988 and its Protocol, SOLAS Convention 1974 and MARPOL 
73/78 (Annex I/II), have been ratified by most of the States in Southeast Asia. 
 
 SUA 
Convention 
1988 
SUA 
Protocol 
1988 
SUA 
Convention 
2005 
SUA 
Protocol 
2005 
SOLAS 
Convention 
1974 
Brunei 
Darussalam 
ü ü x x ü 
Cambodia ü ü x x ü 
Indonesia x x x x ü 
Laos ü ü x x x 
Malaysia x x x x ü 
Myanmar ü ü x x ü 
Philippines ü ü x x ü 
Singapore ü x x x ü 
Thailand  x x x x ü 
Vietnam ü ü x x ü 
Timor Leste x x x x x 
 
Legend: ü = Contracting States, x = Non- Contracting States. 
Table 34: Status of International Legal Instruments in Southeast Asia22 
 
 
 
                                                
22 Status of International Legal Instruments in Southeast Asia, see 
  http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx at 22 October 
2015.  
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 UN Fish 
Stocks 
Agreement 
MARPOL 73/78 
(Annex I/II) 
OPRC 1990 London 
Convention 1972 
London  
Protocol 1996 
Brunei 
Darussalam 
X ü x x x 
Cambodia X ü x x x 
Indonesia ü ü ü x x 
Laos X x x x x 
Malaysia X x ü x x 
Myanmar X ü x x x 
Philippines √ ü ü ü ü 
Singapore X ü ü x x 
Thailand  X ü ü x x 
Vietnam X ü x x x 
Timor 
Leste 
X x x x x 
 
Legend: ü = acceded, x = has not acceded 
Table 35: Accession Status of International Legal Instruments in Southeast Asia23 
 
On the other hand, regional legal or policy frameworks regulating maritime 
security threats are limited. However, two regional frameworks, namely ReCAAP 
and APEC’s Counter Terrorism Action Plans, have been adopted by the majority of 
the States in the region (Table 36). The low level of ratification of the international 
legal frameworks and the presence of only minimal regional instruments creates 
issues in resolving common problems. One of the benefits of ratifying existing 
frameworks is that it creates common understanding as well as mechanisms to 
mitigate threats, and control and punish perpetrators. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
23 Accession Status of International Legal Instrument in Southeast Asia, see  
 http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Pages/Default.aspx, at 4th May 2015. 
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Southeast Asian States ReCAPP APEC's Counter 
Terrorism Action Plans 
Brunei Darussalam ü ü 
Cambodia ü x 
Indonesia x ü 
Laos ü x 
Malaysia x ü 
Myanmar ü x 
Philippines ü ü 
Singapore ü ü 
Thailand  ü ü 
Vietnam ü ü 
Timor Leste x x 
 
Legend: ü = Contracting States and x = Non-Contracting States 
Table 36: Status of Regional Instruments in Southeast Asia 24 
 
8.2.6.2 Implementation and Criminalisation  
While not ratifying the existing maritime security legal frameworks could be 
problematic, not implementing those frameworks that have been ratified is another 
problem. For some States, implementation of international and domestic instruments 
at the domestic level is required to make the application of the international or 
regional framework effective. It would be insufficient to only ratify an international 
instrument without having national legislation that could implement it.  As maritime 
security threats continue to occur in Southeast Asia and necessary actions under 
international law are required to be taken in order to eradicate the problems, States 
are urged to establish implementing regulations at the domestic level. This requires 
                                                
24 Status of Regional Instruments in Southeast Asia. About ReCAAP, see 
http://www.recaap.org/AboutReCAAPISC.aspx at 14th October 2015. Also see status of APEC 
Counter Terrorism Action Plans in Southeast Asia, see http://www.apec.org/Groups/SOM-Steering-
Committee-on-Economic-and-Technical-Cooperation/Working-Groups/Counter-Terrorism/Counter-
Terrorism-Action-Plans.aspx 22 October 2015. 
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criminalization of certain offences such as piracy, consistent with the LOSC, in 
domestic law. 
8.2.6.3 Geopolitics  
The geopolitical situation also forms a barrier to combating maritime security threats 
in Southeast Asia. The complexity of the Southeast Asian regional maritime 
geography creates a challenge in addressing reginal maritime security problems. 
Several States in the region still have maritime disputes in regard to territory, 
jurisdiction or maritime boundary delimitation. This problem creates mistrust among 
States and can be an obstacle in conducting bilateral and multilateral cooperation. 
Furthermore, perpetrators of several maritime security threats such as IUU fishing 
and maritime terrorism originate within the region itself. Moreover, sub-regions in 
Southeast Asia are not equally balanced in terms of maritime security partnerships. 
The Malacca Strait Patrol for instance only operates in the Straits of Malacca and is 
conducted by the littoral States, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and 
Thailand. Other sub-regions which are equally important, such as the Sulu-Sulawesi 
Seas tri-border area also require similar measures to mitigate threats and exert good 
order at sea. Thus, in certain sub-regions, States need to step up, create and push 
forward sub-regional partnerships in order to maintain safety and security of the sub-
region. 
8.2.6.4 Information Sharing 
The last common theme of the maritime security threats in Southeast Asia is the 
reluctance of some States in the region to provide and share information about their 
maritime security status, threats and perception. One of the reasons behind this 
argument is that sharing of information may undermine the sovereignty of certain 
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States. The non-intervention principle, which has been greatly respected in Southeast 
Asia, makes it clear that States do not have the rights to interfere in other States’ 
affairs. This, however, is difficult in shared maritime geography lacking the clarity of 
well delimited boundaries. Nonetheless, meetings such as the Maritime Security 
Desktop Exercises (MSDE), which have been hosted by both Australia and 
Indonesia, and used as a guide for the framework of this thesis, have become an 
important platform for discussing prevailing maritime security threats in the region. 
Furthermore, the exercises addressed several maritime security scenarios, with 
participating States agreeing that cooperation is vital in addressing maritime security 
threats, especially those which are transnational in nature. A particular outcome 
common to all MSDEs has been agreement on the singular importance of maritime 
security information gathering and sharing, both nationally and regionally between 
partner States in the inherently transnational maritime environment. MSDE aims at 
strengthening coordination among the participating countries in combating crimes at 
sea at the region. As stated in Chapter I the Southeast Asian States which participated 
in the Maritime Security Desktop Exercise (MSDE) 2, 3 and 4 held in 2011, 2012 
and 2013, revealed that piracy, maritime terrorism, people smuggling, IUU fishing 
were the primary maritime security threats in Southeast Asia. 
8.3 Maritime Security Partnerships as a Proposed Solution to address 
Maritime Security Threats  
This section will discuss the proposed solution for Southeast Asian states to address 
the maritime security threats by conducting maritime security partnerships. The 
discussion will include modes and models of Maritime Security Partnerships, 
international legal frameworks, Maritime Security Partnerships (MSP) models, 
requirements for MSP establishment, levels of MSP, and schemes for the 
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implementation of MSP. This concept was produced by the US Navy, which aimed 
to bring all nations together in order to build a global maritime network. 
Furthermore, another goal of establishing such a network is to create the basis for 
regional or sub-regional cooperation (such as ReCAAP). The first and most 
important step of the initiative is to encourage construction of local networks of 
cooperation and information sharing in a maritime region or sub-region.25  MSP 
could be used as a model to eradicate maritime security problems in Southeast Asia. 
As noted in previous chapters, many of the frameworks governing maritime security 
in Southeast Asia are inadequate. Therefore, in the absence of comprehensive and 
effective legal frameworks, MSP offers potential operational-level cooperative 
solutions to some of the problems.  
 In regards to the Southeast Asia region, the obstacles in the application of 
MSP include sovereignty sensitivities and acceptance of involvement of extra-
regional powers. Furthermore, the effective application of MSP in the region also 
depends upon the willingness of States to share relevant maritime security 
information to support the establishment of maritime security networks. Nonetheless, 
if Southeast Asian states could put aside these barriers in order to achieve a bigger 
goal, that is, to comprehensively address and possibly eliminate maritime security 
threats in the region, MSP might have a better chance of being accepted.  
8.3.1 Modes and Models of Maritime Security Partnership 
The aim of creating maritime security partnerships is to encourage 
cooperation among States (particularly with regard to sharing information), so that 
each party has a clear picture of the security situation in their respective maritime 
                                                
25 For more information see Chris Rahman, The Global Maritime Partnership Initiative: Implications 
for the Royal Australian Navy (Commonwealth of Australia, 2008)  1.  
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areas.26 The next step is to analyse the data and identify security trends in the region, 
thereby enabling effective solutions to be formulated. Indeed, as a result of MSP, 
states obtain a greater awareness of the prevailing security situations in their 
respective maritime areas, and are therefore able take steps to improve security 
protection measures. Moreover, to enhance regional security, States are obliged to 
share relevant data with other countries, thus enabling them to implement broader 
security measures at the regional level.  
Different models of security partnerships have been adopted by States. 
During the Cold War era, security cooperation was conducted under the umbrella of 
an international institution, and with a legal treaty forming the foundation for the 
partnerships. Such security cooperation still occurs today, and can be found in the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).27 This organisation has its own laws 
which bind member States. However, in practice, NATO members are willing to 
cooperate more than what the treaty requires them to. Indeed, States are willing to 
share information and work together to successfully carry out the mission of the 
organisation. The long history of the organisation means that member States are 
bound by mutual trust, and therefore NATO negotiations tend to be open and 
engaging. Even though there have been disagreements among members in the past, 
NATO maritime forces have remained steadfast in their commitment and continued 
to train with one another in order to successfully complete maritime missions in the 
Arabian Sea, the Persian Gulf, as well as along the East African coast. Therefore, the 
                                                
26 Naval Studies Board, above n 1, 30. 
27 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, see http://www.nato.int/ at 23 October 2015. 
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sharing of intelligence is not a problem among NATO member States, and this 
practice continues today.28    
Bilateral security partnerships also exist between States. One such partnership 
is between the United States and Russia. Under this partnership, the two States have 
agreed to share and develop certain strategic information, although the areas of 
cooperation are limited and narrowly defined. Such cooperation includes protocols 
and mechanisms for risk avoidance, as well as common signals (formal and 
informal), which have been produced and implemented between the two nations’ 
navies.29   
8.3.2 International Legal Framework 
The existence of maritime governance gaps has allowed illegal activities to flourish 
at sea. Indeed, if this problem is not comprehensively addressed, maritime security 
threats such as piracy, maritime terrorism, IUU fishing, people smuggling, and 
marine pollution caused by offshore oil and gas activities will continue to occur. 
Moreover, as these crimes or impacts are transboundary in nature, they have the 
capacity to impact more than one country. For this reason, international cooperation 
represents the best way to address the problem.  
It is proposed that information sharing serves as a principal platform for 
achieving this cooperation. By conducting this activity, States would have better 
surveillance over their maritime areas, and thus be more likely to apprehend 
perpetrators of criminal activities in the region. Once a perpetrator is apprehended, 
the relevant State could prosecute the crime according to prevailing international law 
and the domestic law of the country concerned. Furthermore, surveillance activities 
                                                
28 Naval Studies Board, above n 1, 32. 
29 Ibid, 32. 
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would enable States to take preventive measures to ensure the safety of their 
maritime areas. These measures include boarding vessels suspected of being 
involved in criminal activities and checking their registration. Such measures not 
only avoid the negative effects of criminal acts on the State immediately concerned, 
but also reduce the harm that may be occasioned to neighbouring states.30 
One of the strategies behind MSP is to first receive international recognition 
and support, thus demonstrating that such partnerships are worthy of implementation. 
However, this strategy is only feasible if: (i) the unifying concepts behind MSP are 
being shared internationally; and (ii) those States initiating the MSP in their region 
are lobbying or otherwise engaged in discussions with other states to achieve a 
common understanding on the subject. The greater the willingness of States to get 
involved, the easier it will be for groups of States to conduct such activities. 
Conversely, if the idea of MSP does not receive a positive response from States, then 
it will be more difficult for such partnerships to operate in practice. A global 
maritime security network is the ultimate goal of MSP. If such an objective is not 
welcomed by a majority of States, then the prospect of MSP being implemented is 
slight.  
In order to gain popularity and acceptance from States, MSPs must be able to 
demonstrate their significance and prove that they are compatible with prevailing 
international frameworks. Furthermore, such partnerships have the capacity to serve 
as a set of guidelines for the implementation of new international frameworks. If the 
objectives, regulations and responsibilities of MSP could later be embodied in a more 
formal document, this would broaden the applicability of such initiatives, 
                                                
30 Ibid, 31. 
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encouraging States to adopt them one as one of the necessary sets of instruments for 
maintaining maritime security. However, MSP can only be effective if States are 
willing to implement the agreed strategies and share relevant information so that a 
global maritime security network can be established.31  
8.3.3 Requirements for MSP Establishment 
The establishment of MSP require several elements to ensure that the cooperation 
has the desired effect of maintaining security in the region. These elements include: 
(i) personnel who have the requisite linguistic and cultural competencies. These staff 
members should ideally be drawn from both civilian and military backgrounds and 
have a sound understanding of the region; (ii) adequate funding to ensure that the 
forged partnerships can endure well into the future; and (iii) the involvement of high 
level officials. This is significant from a policy-making perspective, as well as for 
coordination between authorities and agencies at the State level.32    
The establishment and strength of MSP can be influenced by several 
factors,33 including: 
a. the level of the organisation that is representing the state that would act 
as the focal point of the partnership;  
b. the commitment of the parties to exchange information and consult with 
one another;  
c. the agreement period;  
                                                
31 Ibid, 31. 
32 Ibid, 33. 
33 Ibid, 34. 
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d. the type of agreement or partnership – i.e., is it bilateral, regional or 
multilateral? Indeed, the type of partnership has the potential to influence 
the strength of the MSP;  
e. the officials involved. In this regard, an important question to consider is 
whether the state’s representatives are from a military or civilian 
background (or both)? A combination of the two is always preferable, 
and would make a significant contribution to the partnership; and  
f. the scope of the agreement – i.e., whether it will be limited to 
information sharing, or will it also encompass other activities such as 
military and law enforcement operations.    
8.3.4 Levels of MSP 
MSP can be conducted in different forms at both the bilateral and multilateral level. 
The basis for the cooperation is the sharing of information between contracting 
parties. The cooperation can also extend to the signing of an agreement whereby 
States engage in a more sophisticated relationship, such as a military operation or 
joint law enforcement measures. 
8.3.4.1 Bilateral Cooperation 
In terms of bilateral relations, States can offer different kinds of cooperation, ranging 
from basic information sharing to more intense cooperation, such as joint tactical 
operations. Furthermore, such cooperation can be undertaken in a number of 
different areas, such as surveillance and reconnaissance.34  
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8.3.4.2 Multilateral Cooperation 
Another way of establishing MSP is through multilateral relationships. This form of 
cooperation is marked by the signing of an agreement by more than two States. The 
agreement typically contains different forms of commitments and partnership 
arrangements, as agreed by the contracting States. Like bilateral relationships, 
multilateral agreements may range from basic information sharing to a specific joint 
operation. Therefore, in certain circumstances, MSP may contain more ambitious 
agendas.35      
Many of these agreements have been produced by international organisations, 
and therefore the stated obligations apply to all members of the organisation. The 
agreement may take the form of a protocol, treaty or convention, with the provisions 
generally being in accordance with prevailing international law. Various multilateral 
frameworks have been produced by Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), Interpol 
and the International Maritime Organization (IMO). States have also agreed to 
multilateral arrangements which, in principle, focus on issues related to maritime 
safety and security. One such agreement is the International Convention for the 
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS).36 This arrangement provides standards for the 
identification of ships with 300 GT or more as stipulated in the Automatic 
Identification System (AIS) and Long-range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) 
regulations.37 On the other hand, multilateral organisations may create non-binding 
or informal agreements. Although these types of arrangements are not prescriptive, 
                                                
35 Ibid, 37. 
36 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, opened for signature 1 November 1974, 
(entered into force 25 May 1985). Hereinafter referred to as SOLAS Convention. 
37 Regulation V/19 and Regulation V/19-1(amendment to Chapter V), SOLAS Convention. For more 
information see Chris Rahman, ‘Maritime Domain Awareness in Australia and New Zealand’ in 
Natalie Klein, Joanna Mossop and Donald R Rothwell (eds), Maritime Security: International Law 
and Policy Perspectives from Australia and New Zealand (Routledge, 2010) 203, 210. 
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they are usually welcomed by states because they contain norms which are widely 
accepted.38    
Compared to bilateral agreements, multilateral agreements are far more 
challenging to set up, requiring the acceptance of all parties in order to be effective.39 
However, once established, they tend to attract greater legitimacy, as they are more 
inclusive. This accords with the main aim of MSP – to foster cooperation and trust 
between States. From a broad perspective, States which are linked to one another 
through MSP benefit the global security network. This is because the network 
enables States to share their information in accordance with agreed multilateral 
agreements. In addition, the network encourages States to engage closely with one 
another and to form comprehensive partnerships, thus benefitting all contracting 
parties.  
8.3.5 Maritime Security Partnership in Practice 
MSP could be implemented at different levels, such as through local, regional or 
global schemes, depending upon the issues involved and the depth of the agreement.  
Local agreements usually involve two to three States which are 
geographically close to each other. An example of one such arrangement is an illegal 
fishing agreement. These agreements typically consist of provisions regarding 
mutual rights to arrest citizens of other contracting States, as well as rights relating to 
the prosecution of offenders. Importantly, contracting States are able to determine the 
applicability of the agreement in light of their own unique circumstances. Regional 
agreements represent a wider arrangement, with states in a specific area seeking to 
address common dilemmas. This mutual concern for matters affecting their security 
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serves as the basis for the cooperative strategy, and is usually harnessed to prevent 
and solve security issues in the region. The best time to implement these types of 
schemes is when all relevant parties have a high degree of interest in addressing the 
prevailing issues. Indeed, at this point there would likely be overwhelming support to 
implement the provisions of the contemplated agreement. This type of arrangement 
is popular in Southeast Asia, with ASEAN playing a pivotal role in addressing the 
common concerns of its ten member States.  
Global agreements are the most expansive cooperative schemes, bringing 
together not only groups of States but also third party actors, such as non-
governmental organisations and commercial stakeholders, to address a variety of 
security issues.40  
There are several different approaches towards regional maritime 
cooperation. They include the top-down approach (which has been suggested by 
stakeholders outside the region), and the bottom-up approach (which has been 
proposed by States within the region and has become the preferred model among 
members).41 Both these approaches seek to shape the regional maritime security 
landscape based on their respective agendas, as well as create a regional maritime 
security regime which prioritises the interests of States.  
Although a variety of definitions have been proffered for the term 
“international regimes”, the author has selected one which focuses on “regulated 
patterns of practice on which expectations converge [to] govern State behaviour in 
                                                
40 Ibid, 40. 
41 Victor Huang, ‘Building maritime security in Southeast Asia: outsiders not welcome?’ (2008)  
Naval War College Review 87, 92. 
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specific areas of international relations”.42 Currently, there are several maritime 
regimes regulating fishing, the protection of marine resources, as well as shipping. 
However, the most comprehensive and globally accepted maritime regime is the 
LOSC. In Southeast Asia, this convention is highly significant as it forms the basis of 
cooperation for a range of maritime activities. Not only does the convention govern 
the rights of States, it also sets out the obligations of foreign States conducting 
activities in other States’ jurisdictions.  
As maritime security is a common concern in the region, the prospect of 
maritime regime suites the needs of most Southeast Asian States.43 However, despite 
a plethora of meetings and conferences designed to build trust and foster 
understanding of the importance of regime building, regional states have remained 
silent on the issue, preferring to maintain the status quo.44 However, the idea of 
regime building will remain significant, especially to extra-regional players such as 
the United States and Japan.  
8.3.5.1.1 The Top-Down Approach 
The political situation in Southeast Asia is not only influenced by regional players, 
but also extra-regional actors who have an interest in the region and therefore 
contribute to the Southeast Asian political landscape.45 While some regional States 
welcome input from extra-regional actors, other States remain critical of such 
‘external’ involvement, openly rejecting any proposals put forward by these 
                                                
42 Sam   Bateman, ‘Maritime Regime Building’ in Joshua Ho and Catherine Zara  Raymond (eds), The 
Best of Times, the Worst  of Times: Maritime  Security in the Asia-Pacific (World Scientific, 2005) , 
263.  
43 Arthur  Stein, ‘Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World’ in David A.  
Baldwin (ed), Neorealism  and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (Columbia University 
Press, 1993) 29, 29-59.  
44 Mark Valencia, ‘Regional Maritime  Regime Building’ (2000) (31) Ocean Development & 
International Law 223, 241.  
45 Huang, above n 41, 92. 
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stakeholders.46 One prominent example of this scenario is Japan’s Ocean 
Peacekeeping Force.47 This government supported initiative sought to increase 
cooperation between Japan and littoral States in Southeast Asia. The idea was 
proposed in 1999 during the ASEAN Plus Three Summit and involved Japan, South 
Korea and China. The main aim of the initiative was to form a regional coast guard 
with a view to eradicating piratical attacks in the region. However, China did not 
agree with a key aspect of the proposal – namely, multilateral patrols composed of 
forces from Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia and China. Indeed, the proposal 
was viewed by the Chinese government as a way for Japan to expand its security 
influence in the East Asia region. 
Acknowledging the sensitivity of some States to joint patrols, but not wanting 
to cease their engagement in the region, Japan proposed a more flexible initiative that 
would garner the support of all relevant States - ReCAAP.48 Under ReCAAP, as 
noted by Rahman members are encouraged to voluntarily share information with 
contracting parties.49 Furthermore, the funding of the institution is conducted on a 
voluntary basis. However, what the above discussion makes clear is that when extra-
regional players attempt to lead cooperative strategies, they inevitably face 
challenges from the other extra-regional players who are seeking to exert their own 
leadership prowess in the area.   
Sovereignty issues pose another barrier to the involvement of extra-regional 
players. A prime example of this is the 2004 Regional Maritime Security Initiative 
                                                
46 Ibid, 93. 
47 Donald E Weatherbee, International relations in Southeast Asia: the struggle for autonomy 
(Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), 175. 
48 Huang, above n 41, 93. 
49 Chris Rahman, ‘The international politics of combating piracy in Southeast Asia’ in Peter Lehr (ed), 
Violence at Sea (Routledge, 2007) 183, 191. 
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(RMSI) which was proposed by the US. The aim of this initiative was to serve as a 
platform for information sharing between regional States, as well as to give early 
warnings of transitional threats.50 Importantly, the initiative was designed to be 
neutral and function as a platform for multilateral maritime security cooperation. 
However, despite its grand agenda, the RMSI was rejected by a majority of regional 
States due to a series of misunderstandings and mixed messages as to its aims. 
Indeed, there were conflicting media reports over the suggestion of the US Pacific 
Command (USPACOM), under the leadership of Admiral Thomas Fargo, that US 
forces conduct patrols in the Malacca Strait.51 Furthermore, testimony presented to 
the US Congress indicated that such patrols would be conducted by American 
Special Forces and Marines using high speed vessels. Although the US did not 
confirm the media reports, Indonesia and Malaysia perceived the contemplated 
patrols as a breach of their sovereignty and immediately rejected the idea.52 As a 
result, the RMSI was not able to be implemented in the region and the US had to 
withdraw the proposed initiative.     
It is unlikely that a different result would have been achieved had the 
misunderstanding not occurred.53 This is because the implementation of the RMSI 
would have undoubtedly given the US a leadership position in the region – one 
which it could easily have used to develop even greater cooperative strategies. In 
light of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the prospect of giving the US an integral 
role in guiding and developing local plans and strategies was difficult for regional 
                                                
50 U.S.Pacific Command, ‘Regional Maritime Security Initiative’ (21 June 2004)   
51 John F Bradford, ‘The Growing Prospects for Maritime Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia’ 
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States to accept. Furthermore, other extra-regional players such as China were 
opposed to the US taking the lead in one of the most important regions in the world. 
However, China remained silent on this particular issue, realising that regional States 
would reject the US-led initiative on the basis that it would breach their 
sovereignty.54  
Its goal is to build regional capacity to address a range of maritime challenges 
– including China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea – through various 
means such as improving regional maritime domain awareness, expanding exercises, 
and leveraging senior-level engagements.  
More recently the United States has introduced the Southeast Asia Maritime 
Security Initiative (MSI)55, which actually appears as the “South China Sea 
Initiative” in U.S. legislation. It authorizes funds for assistance and training for the 
purpose of increasing maritime security and maritime domain awareness of the South 
China Sea littoral States – Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and 
Vietnam. Specifically authorized elements of assistance for these countries include 
equipment, supplies, training and small-scale military construction. The authorization 
also includes additional “covered countries” – Brunei, Taiwan and Singapore – 
which may participate in training and other activities. 
Another US-based proposal which has not been very popular in the region is 
the Proliferation Security Initiative. This initiative seeks to prevent the proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) -- an issue of concern for the US in the wake 
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of the September 11 terrorist attacks. In order to implement the PSI statement of the 
Interdiction Principle as discussed in Chapter 4,  the initiative requires partnership by 
as many States as possible in the region, as only flag States have the right to stop and 
inspect vessels on the high seas, or coastal or port states in their territory under 
limited circumstances.56 The PSI remains open to any State willing to join, and 
therefore the PSI has participants rather than members. The PSI is not considered an 
organisation per se, but rather an activity which seeks to engage as many States as 
possible to enter into non-binding arrangements. Furthermore, States are not required 
to conduct activities which conflict with their national interests. The activities of the 
PSI may include inspecting vessels which are suspected of carrying WMD, as well as 
providing consent for suspect vessels that are registered with a participating State to 
be searched and inspected. Furthermore, the PSI is in keeping with the 2004 UN 
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 154057 which, in principle, urges States to 
take measures to oppose and prevent proliferation of WMD.58   
In order to develop and update the initiative, PSI partners have made several 
efforts to strengthen the initiative, including to review progress made since the 2013 
High-Level Political Meeting (HLPM) and future measure that need to be taken 
before the 15th anniversary of the PSI in 2018; conduct workshops and exercises in 
order to promote PSI activities; highlight the growing importance of preventing 
proliferation financing; and conduct capacity building activities. 59.  
                                                
56 Mark R Shulman, ‘The proliferation security initiative as a new paradigm for peace and security’ 
(2006)  US Army War College , 8. 
57 UN Security Council Resolution 1540, see http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/ at 23 October 2015. 
58 Hemy Low, The Proliferation Security Initiative Dilemma: To join or Not to join?, U.S. Naval War 
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59 Proliferation Security Initiative 2016 Mid-Level Political Meeting, 
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Despite the impressive goals of the PSI, the initiative was not well received in 
Southeast Asia. Indeed, only Singapore and Malaysia responded favourably to the 
idea. Within Asian generally, Japan was the only country to show support for the 
initiative. With regard to Malaysia, it is important to note that although the State’s 
commitment to non-proliferation was expressed before the UN General Assembly, 
Malaysia also stressed the need for multilateral arrangements which are universal, 
comprehensive and non-discriminatory.60 The Malaysian perspective suggests a 
desire to avoid American hegemony in the region,61 as well as a need to prevent the 
rise of unilateralism instead of negotiation and multilateral consultations.62 
Concerns have also been raised over the legal ramifications of 
implementing the PSI. Several States have expressed concern that the PSI would 
enable the US to implement its security strategy abroad – a strategy that allow pre-
emptive action to be taken against WMD threats in certain circumstances. Indeed, 
such action could be viewed as a breach of international law. China clearly stated 
in 2005 that it would not join the PSI due to legal concerns. A similar stance was 
taken by the Indonesian government when it received a request from the US 
Secretary of State to join the initiative. One of the reasons the Indonesian 
government declined the proposal was that the implementation of the PSI might 
violate the LOSC.63    
From the various regimes discussed above (ReCAAP, RMSI and PSI), 
there are several conclusions that can be drawn. First, extra-regional powers that 
attempt to exert their leadership prowess in Southeast Asia are unlikely to gain a 
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foothold, if only because other, extra-regional powers will likely prevent them 
from doing so. Indeed, China’s reaction towards the posturing of the US and Japan 
clearly demonstrates that some States will not tolerate external interference in the 
region. Furthermore, the strong economic relations which China has with several 
Southeast Asian countries mean that the leadership aspirations of other third-party 
States are unlikely to be realised. Thus, this situation favours several States in the 
region which do not wish to be aligned with a particular extra-regional actor.    
Evidently, the notion of regime building by extra-regional States is viewed 
as a breach of national sovereignty by regional States. Similarly, alleged plans by 
some external actors to conduct maritime operations within Southeast Asian 
territorial waters have caused sovereignty concerns in the area. Indeed, this 
explains why several States have been reluctant to join patrol operations at the 
behest of extra-regional powers. States in the region remain confident that 
controlling their own maritime areas is the best way to avoid interference with 
their sovereignty. Furthermore, Indonesia, by virtue of being the largest 
archipelagic State in the world and the fourth most populous country, is the 
leading ASEAN power. Therefore, its influence in keeping the area free from 
external leadership has been well acknowledged by external powers.    
Another factor militating against ‘regime building’ by external powers is 
that regional States are quite content to maintain the status quo based on prevailing 
international law principles. Indeed, these States would probably only consider 
changing from their current regime if there were substantial changes to 
international law. One of the consequences for States engaging in maritime 
security cooperation with extra-regional players is the concomitant sacrifice of 
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their political freedom. Regional States might be prepared to shoulder this burden 
if the upshot of such cooperation was the maintenance of State security or the 
provision of an enhanced sense of security. However, it could be argued that the 
prevailing security issues in the region are not compelling enough for a majority of 
Southeast Asian States to cooperate with external powers at the risk of 
relinquishing their autonomy and political freedom.64  
8.3.5.1.2 The Bottom-Up Approach 
Considering that ‘regime building’ by extra-regional powers is unlikely to occur, 
another option is for the necessary cooperation to be forged through a range of 
mechanisms which are formulated by regional States themselves.  
Indeed, cooperative strategies such as information sharing and coordinated 
patrols have existed in the region for some time, with States assisting each other to 
maintain maritime security without any third-party intervention. Therefore, there 
are both multilateral and bilateral ties among regional States with regard to various 
operations, including coordinated antipiracy patrols and personnel exchanges. 
These ties derive from the region itself, and unlike initiatives proposed by external 
actors, represent the preferred means of maintaining maritime security in 
Southeast Asia. However, there are initiatives in place which have been introduced 
by extra-regional powers, such as the Japan initiated ReCAAP agreement. Even 
so, Indonesia and Malaysia have declined to join.  
Multilateral cooperation in the region was first implemented by means of 
the Malacca Strait Patrols. This initiative involved Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Singapore, and was initially established to conduct coordinated patrols around the 
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Malacca Strait. However, the scope of the Malacca Strait Patrols was later 
restricted, with the patrols being implemented by only three littoral States. These 
restrictions were imposed to avoid any sovereignty issues that might arise. The 
Coordinated Patrols were established in mid-2004.65 What makes these patrols 
unique is that each participating State is only allowed to conduct patrols within 
their own territorial sea. Also, the scheme does not allow the littoral States from 
engaging in hot pursuit in other States’ territorial waters, and therefore 
coordination between States is necessary into order to make this initiative 
effective.  
The following year, contracting States initiated an aerial patrol operation 
named Eyes in the Sky (EiS).66 This adjunct to the Malacca Strait Patrol allows 
member States to conduct air patrols over each other’s territorial sea. This is 
permitted due to the fact that the strait is quite narrow and can only be effectively 
controlled if enhanced surveillance is carried out. However, to ensure that the 
operation does not infringe on the sovereignty of States, officers are prevented 
from carrying weapons on board, and a foreign liaison is also present to ensure 
that the operation is undertaken in the due and proper way.67 
Fortunately, neither the Malacca Strait Patrols nor the EiS initiative has 
created tension among contracting parties, with both programs being generally 
well received. Moreover, the programs do not violate international law, as member 
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states voluntarily agree to conduct such operations. Importantly, the restrictions 
which have been placed upon the maritime patrols and aerial surveillance 
operations ensure that the sovereignty concerns of states are assuaged.68     
Under ReCAAP, several forms of cooperation are conducted among 
member States, such as information sharing, extradition, legal assistance and 
capacity building. ReCAAP also has an Information Sharing Centre69 (ISC) which 
is located in Singapore. ReCAAP is considered a breakthrough in multilateral 
arrangements in Southeast Asia.70 As mentioned earlier, ReCAAP is able to 
strategically engage extra-regional powers to conduct multilateral exercises. 
However, the main reason for the program’s success has been its emphasis on 
neutrality and sense of inclusiveness, particularly among Asian States. However, 
Malaysia and Indonesia are yet to ratify the initiative. Malaysia objected the 
location of ReCAAP ISC in Singapore,71 while Indonesia has sovereignty 
concerns regarding the presence of ReCAAP.72 
8.4 Proposed Solutions to Address Maritime Security Threats in Southeast 
Asia 
This section will discuss proposed solutions for the Southeast Asian States to address 
maritime security threats at the regional level. The discussion will include regional 
cooperation enhancement, maritime cooperation in Southeast Asia, maximising 
maritime security cooperation, equitable maritime security partnership, regime 
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formation in Southeast Asia’s maritime sphere, and securing Southeast Asia’s 
maritime environment. 
8.4.1 Regional Cooperation Enhancement 
Maritime security cooperation is influenced by structural, normative and economic 
changes to the regional system in Southeast Asia.73 There are a variety of factors that 
could lead to a greater cooperative engagement in the region. According to Bradford, 
these factors can include reduction of sovereignty sensitivities, potential involvement 
of extra-regional players; cooperation norms enhancement, development of necessary 
state resources, recognition of the importance of maritime security, and protecting 
Southeast Asia’s maritime area.74 
8.4.1.1 Reduction of Sovereignty Sensitivities 
Sovereignty has been a sensitive issue among many Southeast Asian countries – one 
which continues to prevail even today. Indeed, as most States in the region were once 
colonised, and fear a return to their colonial past, they are eager to safeguard against 
threats to their sovereignty. To this end, States in the region abide by the non-
intervention principle – that is, States respect the domestic affairs of their neighbours 
and eschew any interference.75 Therefore, maritime security cooperation is unlikely 
to be successful if States perceive any interference with their domestic affairs.76      
Even though this sensitivity is still prevalent in contemporary society, there 
are several areas where States tend to be more relaxed in their cooperative 
                                                
73 John F Bradford, ‘The Growing Prospects for Maritime Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia’ 
(2005)  58(3) Naval War College Review 63, 73. 
74 Ibid, 73. 
75 Sam Bateman, ‘Regional Efforts for Maritime Cooperation: State and Prospect,’ in Dalchoong Kim 
(ed), Maritime Security and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Toward the 21st Century (Institute of 
East and West Studies, 2000) 215, 235. 
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exchanges, with one of these areas being maritime issues. A prominent example of 
maritime cooperation amidst sovereignty incursions can be seen in Singapore and 
Malaysia’s compliance with post 9/11 IMO and US security standards. Both States 
allowed the stationing of US authorities in their respective ports, even though 
according to Bradford such action would have been viewed as highly suspicious in 
different circumstances.77  
8.4.1.2 Potential Involvement of Extra-Regional Players 
Historically, certain Southeast Asian States have been reluctant to cooperate with 
extra-regional powers. However, States including Japan, the US, Australia, India and 
China have repeatedly approached Southeast Asian nations with a view to 
developing mutually beneficial security agendas. As previously mentioned, several 
proposals from extra-regional States have proved unpopular in the region, and 
therefore could not be effectively implemented. These programs include the RMSI, 
as well as Japan’s joint patrol initiative. However, despite these programs failing to 
launch, extra-regional powers are still keen to cooperate with Southeast Asian States 
to achieve greater security in what is undoubtedly a strategically important region of 
the world.78  
8.4.1.3 Cooperation Norms Enhancement 
Cooperation between Southeast Asian States began to grow after the Cold War 
period. Before this time, States were very reluctant to engage in cooperative 
arrangements due to nationalistic tendencies and earlier conflicts that had occurred. 
Fortunately, Southeast Asian States now acknowledge that cooperative strategies 
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(and particularly maritime security partnerships), are vitally important to keep their 
respective maritime areas (and the region as a whole) safe and secure. There are 
various maritime dialogues which have been established and are still operating today, 
including the ARF Maritime Focus Group, the South China Sea Workshop, Maritime 
Cooperation Working Group (CSCAP-MCWG), ReCAAP and the APEC Working 
Group on Maritime Security. 
Although the non-intervention principle is still regarded as important among 
ASEAN States, the above-mentioned maritime dialogues and negotiations elicit one 
clear response: in certain areas States are willing to communicate and share 
information to achieve a greater sense of security and safety in the region.79 
Furthermore, these dialogues are important in fostering trust and confidence among 
regional States - qualities which are essential for a firm and robust cooperative 
platform. If this engagement is maintained, Southeast Asia may well be on its way to 
establishing the same type of maritime security cooperation enjoyed by other 
developed nations around the world.       
8.4.1.4 Development in Fulfilling Necessary State Resources 
Limited resources are another factor that forms a barrier to maritime security 
cooperation in Southeast Asia. Indeed, several States in the region are still facing 
economic challenges, and thus their main focus is on stimulating economic growth. 
Also significant is the disproportionate number of sea patrols compared to land 
patrols. Most States prefer to safeguard their land territory, with their maritime areas 
being a secondary consideration. At the same time, they are unlikely to engage in 
international cooperation for fear that other States may exert undue influence over 
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them.80 However, it is important to note that States such as Singapore and Brunei are 
economically equipped to unilaterally implement maritime patrols.  
The 1997 Asian financial crisis prompted States to prioritise economic 
growth rather than develop their maritime capabilities.81 However, as economic 
conditions in the region improved, States were able to enhance and extend their 
maritime capabilities. In particular, new maritime opportunities arose for States 
including Singapore, the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand, such as the purchase of 
state-of-the-art naval ships and, in the case of Malaysia, the establishment of a coast 
guard force. If this trend continues, Southeast Asia States may be able to keep their 
territories safe and cooperate with extra-regional maritime powers (such as the US 
and China), to create an enhanced maritime security platform. However, these 
positive developments do not obviate the economic challenges facing the region. 
Indeed, States with large maritime areas (such as Indonesia), must have sufficient 
resources to compensate for smaller nations which have less expansive sea territories 
and limited economic capabilities. Nonetheless, States in the region are showing 
increased optimism - something which will hopefully result in improved maritime 
security cooperation in the near future.82   
8.4.1.5 Recognition of the Importance of Maritime Security  
Historically, traditional military threats have been prioritised over and above the 
types of maritime security threats analysed in this thesis. This view has been 
acknowledged by Southeast Asian States with large maritime areas such as Indonesia 
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and the Philippines whose primary security concern for most of their post-colonial 
existence has been domestic stability. However, after the Cold War period, regional 
States became cognisant of the growing importance of maritime security, making it a 
State priority. One of the reasons for this shift has undoubtedly been the increased 
frequency of maritime crime - both on a regional scale and a global scale. Most 
Southeast Asia States thus have paid closer attention to maritime security threats than 
in times gone by.  
8.4.1.6 Protecting Southeast Asia’s Maritime Area 
As criminal syndicates operate in more than one country, multilateral cooperation is 
needed to eradicate transnational crimes such as piracy, maritime terrorism, people 
smuggling, IUU fishing and marine pollution.83 
During the Cold War period, cooperation was lacking between States in 
Southeast Asia due to the separation between pro-communist and non-communist 
States. However, after the Cold War ended, talks began between pro-communist 
States such as Laos and Vietnam, and other states in the region, and eventually new 
possibilities for security cooperation opened up. In 1992, maritime security 
arrangements at both the bilateral and multilateral level were formally discussed. 
Perhaps the most important regional organisation insofar as maritime security 
cooperation is concerned is ASEAN. Indeed, in 2003, ASEAN played a significant 
role in bringing together like-minded states to create a security community which, 
through open dialogue and cooperative action, would later give attention to 
combating transnational crimes such as piracy and maritime terrorism.84   
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Despite its visionary security goals, ASEAN’s policies are limited by the 
principle of non-intervention, whereby States eschew interference with other States 
domestic affairs.  
8.4.2 Maximising Maritime Security Cooperation  
Maritime security cooperation in Southeast Asia began to develop in the post-Cold 
War era.85 However, since this time different threats to maritime security have arisen 
– threats which have capacity to severely impact the lives of people, many of whom 
are already vulnerable due to their socio-economic conditions and geographic 
location. States in the region are also facing economic, legal and structural 
challenges which are proving advantageous in fostering maritime security 
cooperation in Southeast Asia. Regardless of these developments, there are barriers 
to enhancing maritime security cooperation. Distrust between some States is still 
high, and concerns over sovereignty and territoriality still abound. 
Even so, greater maritime security cooperation in the region is seen as a 
priority, and could serve to diffuse some of the intense distrust between States. 
Indeed, Southeast Asian States have made maritime security cooperation one of their 
goals to ensure the safety of their territory and the region as a whole. Even though 
bilateral ties represent a more feasible way of achieving this cooperation as opposed 
to forming new multilateral frameworks, existing regional organisations could be 
used as a platform to foster regional maritime security cooperation.86  
                                                
85 Bradford, above n 73, 82. 
86 Ibid, 84. 
 
 
375 
 
8.4.3 Equitable Maritime Security Partnership 
It is a misconception that extra-regional States are not welcome to join maritime 
security cooperative strategies in Southeast Asia. ReCAAP is clear evidence that 
proposals from non-Southeast Asian States are accepted by most States in the 
region. However, when compared to other multilateral arrangements devised and 
implemented by regional States, third party initiatives are bound by certain 
restrictions that have the capacity to affect their chances of success.87   
Despite the open-mindedness of Southeast Asian States to maritime 
security initiatives proposed by extra-regional powers, the sovereign concerns of 
regional States must be taken into consideration. For this reason, the most 
successful initiatives tend to be those which are not politicised or narrowly framed.  
The ‘bottom-up’ approach is certainly preferred to the ‘top-down’ approach, as it 
allows operational cooperation to build incrementally and does not breach the 
sovereignty of States. 
ReCAAP has been successful because it is viewed as a neutral initiative 
which welcomes other extra-regional powers. Also, due to its limited scope, it 
serves mainly as an information sharing platform, with provision having been 
made for non-military assistance where required. Therefore, in order to strengthen 
the regional maritime security regime, extra-regional States could take several 
measures, including: 
1. Brainstorming ideas related to regime-building through international 
multilateral forums. Viable forums which could be used to develop these ideas 
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include the Shangri-La Dialogue88 (which is held annually in Singapore and is 
attended by defence ministers).89  
2. Offering support to prevailing initiatives such as ReCAAP. Other States which 
are interested in becoming involved in regime-building could seek inclusion in 
existing maritime security initiatives. After becoming a member, these States 
could suggest ideas to strengthen regional security measures. 
3. Engaging regional States by proposing capacity building activities. This would 
promote confidence and increase understanding between States. Extra-regional 
powers could send their experts to regional States to offer training programs 
and lead various security initiatives. Indeed, technical assistance is required by 
several States in the region, as often budgetary constraints do not allow these 
states to promote maritime security arrangements. A measure fitting this 
description was implemented by Japan in 2006, when it donated a training ship 
to Malaysia through the Nippon Foundation.90 
Another way of building trust is through the provision of humanitarian 
assistance. An example of this occurred in the wake of the 2004 Indian Ocean 
tsunami which decimated several coastal areas, including the city of Aceh in 
Indonesia. Both the US and Japan (among other countries) provided significant 
financial and non-financial aid to Indonesia, resulting in tremendous goodwill 
being established between the countries concerned.91  
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4. Extra-regional States could also assist with regional capacity building by 
contributing ideas to international organisations. Indeed, both the UN and the 
IMO could produce legal instruments, the provisions of which could be 
effectively implemented not only by regional States in Southeast Asia, but by 
contracting parties all around the world. Therefore, if a State would like to 
propose an ambitious agenda to be implemented in the region, creating new 
frameworks through highly-regarded international organisations might be a 
supportive suggestion.92   
5. Several sub-regions are in particular need of maritime security partnerships, 
such as the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas tri-border area, Gulf of Thailand, Andaman Sea 
and Bay of Bengal. These areas are prone to maritime security threats 
discussed in this thesis and thus require coordinated measures among the sub-
regional States in order to mitigate threats and exert good order at sea. The 
Andaman Sea and Bay of Bengal, however, need the involvement of extra-
regional States such as India and Bangladesh because of their location. 
Regional and sub-regional measures such as ReCAAP and Malacca Strait 
Patrols, respectively, are prominent examples of the types of maritime security 
partnerships that could be adopted by the States where such measures are 
currently absent.     
8.5 Challenges Ahead 
Cooperation among Southeast Asian states has shown signs of positive progress. 
With various regional initiatives in place, it would appear that the stage is set for 
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even more regional agreements to be struck in the future.93 Moreover cooperative 
efforts combined with capacity building support have also been the main reasons for 
the improved maritime security situation in Southeast Asia.94 Nonetheless, more 
work is needed to ensure the development is progressing and that cooperation is 
increasing. As maritime security incidents continue to occur with increasing 
frequency in the region, States are encouraged to maintain existing ties and develop 
more robust and comprehensive cooperative platforms.   
Both international as well as regional frameworks are in place to address the 
maritime security threats in Southeast Asia. However, these frameworks are 
inadequate to eradicate the problem comprehensively. Maritime security incidents 
still prevail and thus regional States are encouraged to maintain prevailing 
frameworks and explore prospects for new initiatives that enable greater security in 
the region, especially in the maritime space.95 
 It is clear that in order to adequately address and eliminate maritime security 
threats in the region both regional and international cooperation is required. Maritime 
security threats in Southeast Asia are transnational in nature and therefore it is almost 
impossible for States to unilaterally address such threats. Thus, cooperation among 
regional States is essential. However, it should be noted that sovereignty concerns 
are still prevalent in the region, and therefore extra-regional powers should approach 
the needs and preferences of littoral States with a degree of understanding and 
sensitivity. Only by acknowledging this will regional and extra-regional States be 
able to work together to strengthen the maritime security regime in the region.  
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8.6 Conclusion  
There are different ways of combating maritime security threats in Southeast Asia. 
This thesis proposes Maritime Security Partnership as one of the solutions to address 
the problem. MSP encourages States to cooperate in order to be informed about 
each-others’ security situations. It focuses on information sharing and capacity 
building. Improved acquisition, sharing and analysis of information are thus 
necessary in formulating an effective solution in addressing the maritime security 
problems. As stated earlier, in order to gain popularity and acceptance by regional 
States, MSP must be able to demonstrate  benefits and s operational level cooperative 
solutions, particularly in those circumstances where legal instruments are not in place 
or poorly endorsed. Furthermore, in order MSP to be accepted in Southeast Asia, 
States could seal their commitments in a binding document which portrays the intent 
of States to resolve problems using MSP.   
This thesis also proposes a solution which could be taken at the regional level 
that would enable greater cooperative engagement among the Southeast Asian States. 
The factors that enable greater cooperation, as extensively discussed in this chapter, 
include the reduction of sovereignty sensitivities, the potential involvement of extra-
regional players, enhancement of cooperation norms, the development in fulfilling 
necessary State resources, the recognition of the importance of maritime security, 
and protecting Southeast Asia’s maritime area. Improved maritime security 
cooperation may potentially reduce sovereignty sensitivities, because the issues of 
maritime security cannot be addressed by the solo attempts of a single State. 
Therefore, establishing multilateral treaties, determined cross-border cooperation, 
and less formal forms of cooperation can be pursued by Southeast Asian countries as 
ways to reduce sovereignty issues. 
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 Southeast Asian States can accept involvement of extra-regional players by 
establishing a neutral multinational framework with them. Sharing ideas and building 
understanding through multilateral forums can also create an acceptance of 
involvement of extra-regional powers,. If states in the region take into account these 
factors, then differences between States would not be a barrier to establish 
meaningful cooperative arrangements and partnership would be enhanced. As a 
result, the potential for new or enhanced regional initiatives to address prevailing 
maritime security threats will become more likely, making a tangible improvement in 
Southeast Asia’s regional security. 
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